When the European coalition invaded revolutionary France, the 
French were in a similar position to that of the Americans a short 
time before, except that they had not the same advantages of 
ground. In order to fight the numerous armies, invading or 

threatening to invade the country, upon the old line principle, 
they would have required well drilled men, and these were scarce, 
while undrilled volunteers were plentiful. As far as time allowed, 
they were exercised in the elementary evolutions of linear tactics; 
but as soon as they got under fire, the battalions deployed in line 
dissolved themselves, unconsciously, into thick swarms of skir- 
mishers, seeking protection against fire from all accidents of 
ground, while the second line formed a kind of reserve which 
often enough was involved in the fight from the very beginning of 
the engagement. The French armies, moreover, were very 
differently organized from those opposed to them. They were 
formed, not into an unbending monotonous line of battalions, but 
into army divisions, each of which was composed of artillery, 
cavalry, and infantry. The great fact was all at once rediscovered 
that it matters not whether a battalion fights in its “correct” place 
in the order of battle, so that it advances into line when ordered, 
and fights well. The French government being poor, tents and the 
immense baggage of the 18th century were done away with; 
bivouacking was invented, and the comforts of the officers, which 
in other armies formed a large portion of the impediments, were 
reduced to what they could carry on their backs. The army, 
instead of being fed from magazines, had to depend upon 
requisitions on the -country passed through. Thus the French 
attained a mobility and a facility of forming order of battle quite 
unknown to their enemies. If beaten, they were out of the reach 
of pursuit in a few hours; if advancing, they could appear on 
unexpected points, on the flanks of the enemy, before he got 
notice. This mobility, and the jealousy among themselves of the 
chiefs of the coalition, gave them breathing time to drill their 
volunteers, and to elaborate the new tactical system which was 
rising among them. 

From the year 1795 we find this new system taking the definite 
form of a combination of skirmishers and close columns. The 
formation in line was subsequently added, though not for a whole 
army as hitherto, but for single battalions only, which deployed in 
line whenever an opportunity appeared to require it. It is evident 
that this latter manoeuvre, requiring more steadiness of drill, was 
the last to be resumed by the irregular bands of the French 
revolution. Three battalions formed a demi-brigade, 6 a brigade; 2 
or 3 brigades of infantry a division, to which were added 2 
batteries of artillery and some cavalry; several such divisions 
formed an army. Whenever a division met the enemy, the 
skirmishers of its advanced guard established themselves in a 

Infantry 361 

defensive position, the advanced guard forming their reserve until 
the division came up. The brigades then formed upon two lines 
and a reserve, but every battalion in column, and with no stated 
intervals; for the protection of rents in the order of battle there 
was the cavalry and the reserve. The line of battle was no longer 
necessarily a straight and uninterrupted one; it might be bent in 
all directions, as the ground required, for now there was no longer 
a selection of naked level plains for battle fields; on the contrary, 
the French preferred broken ground, and their skirmishers, 
forming a chain in front of the whole line of battle, threw 
themselves into every village, farm yard, or copse that they could 
get hold of. If the battalions of the first line deployed, they 
generally all turned now soon skirmishers; those of the second line 
always remained in column, and_ generally charged in_ this 
formation against the thin lines of the enemy with great success. 
Thus, the tactical formation of a French army for battle gradually 
came to consist of two lines, each formed of battalions in close 
column, placed en échiquier,* with skirmishers before the front, and 
a compact reserve in the rear. 

It was at this stage of development that Napoleon found the 
tactics of the French revolution. As soon as his accession to 
political power allowed him to do so, he began to develop the 
system still further. He concentrated his army in the camp of 
Boulogne,*”’ and there gave them a regular course of drill. He 
especially practised them in the formation of compact reserve 
masses on a small space of ground, and in the quick deployment 
of these masses for entering into line. He formed 2 or 3 divisions 
into one army corps so as to simplify the command. He invented 
and brought to its highest perfection the new marching order, 
which consists in spreading the troops over so great an extent of 
ground that they can subsist on the stores it contains, still keeping 
so well together that they can be united on any given point before 
the part which is attacked can be crushed by the enemy. From the 
campaign of 1809, Napoleon began to invent new tactical 
formations, such as deep columns of entire brigades and divisions, 
which however signally failed and were never again revived. After 
1813 this new French system became the common property of all 
nations on the continent of Europe. The old line system, and the 
system of recruiting mercenaries, had both been abandoned. 
Everywhere the liability of every citizen to military service was 
acknowledged, and everywhere the new tactics were introduced. 

a Chequer-wise.— Ed. 

In Prussia and Switzerland every one had actually to serve; in the 
other states a conscription was introduced, the young men 
drawing lots to determine who should serve; everywhere reserve 
systems were introduced, by dismissing a portion of the men, 
when drilled, to their homes, so as to have a large number of 
drilled men at disposal in case of war, with little expense in peace. 

Since that time several changes have occurred in the armament 
and organization of infantry, produced partly by the progress of 
the manufacture of small arms, partly by the collision of French 
infantry with the Arabs of Algeria. The Germans, always fond of 
the rifle, had increased their battalions of light riflemen; the 
French, driven by the necessity of having in Algeria an arm of 
greater range, at last in 1840 formed a battalion of riflemen 
armed with an improved rifle of great precision and range. These 
men, drilled to perform all their evolutions and even long marches 
in a kind of trot (pas gymnastique), soon proved themselves of such 
efficiency that new battalions were formed. In this manner a new 
light infantry was created, not from sporting shots and game- 
keepers, but from the strongest and most agile men; precision of 
fire and long range were combined with agility and endurance, 
and a force was formed which, as far as it went, was certainly 
superior to any other infantry in existence. At the same time, the 
pas gymnastique was introduced into the infantry of the line, and 
what even Napoleon would have considered the height of folly, 
running, is now practised in every army as an essential part of 
infantry drill. 

The success of the new rifle of the French riflemen (Delvigne- 
Poncharra) soon produced new improvements.* The conical bullet 
was introduced for rifled arms. New means were invented by 
Minié, Lorenz, and Wilkinson, to make the bullet glide down easily 
into the bore, and still to expand it, when once down, so as to fill 
up the grooves with its lead, and thus to give it the lateral rotation 
and force on which the effect of the rifle depends; on the other 
hand, Dreyse invented the needle gun, to be loaded at the breech, 
and not requiring a separate priming. All these rifles were capable 
of hitting at 1,000 yards, and quite as easily loaded as a common 
smooth-bore musket. Then the idea arose of arming the whole of 
the infantry with such rifles. England was the first to carry out this 
idea; Prussia, which had prepared for this step long before, 
followed; then Austria and the smaller German states; at last 

a For details on the rifles mentioned here and below see Engels’ The History of the 
Rifle, this volume, pp. 436-39.— Ed. 

Infantry 363 

France. Russia, and the Italian and Scandinavian states, are still 
behind. This new armament has completely changed the aspect of 
warfare, but not in the way expected by tactical theorists, and for a 
very simple mathematical reason. It can be easily proved, by 
constructing the flight of these bullets, that an error of 20 or 30 
yards in the estimation of the distance of the object will destroy all 
chance of hitting beyond 300 or 350 yards. Now, while on the 
practice ground the distances are known, on the battle field they 
are not, and they change every moment. Infantry posted in a 
defensive position, and having had time to pace off the distances 
of the most conspicuous objects before the front, will thus have an 
immense advantage, at from 1,000 to 300 yards, over an attacking 
force. This can only be obviated by advancing rapidly and without 
firing, at full trot, to some 300 yards, when the fire of the two 
parties will be equally effective. At this distance firing will become 
so murderous between two well posted lines of skirmishers, and so 
many bullets will hit the pickets and reserves, that a plucky 
infantry can do no better than seize the first opportunity to make 
a rush at the enemy, giving a volley at 40 or 50 yards. These rules, 
first proved theoretically by the Prussian Major Trotha,* have been 
practically tried by the French in their late war against the 
Austrians,’ and with success. They will, therefore, form part and 
parcel of modern infantry tactics, especially if they prove to be of 
equally good effect when tried against such a rapidly loading arm 
as the Prussian needle gun. The arming of all infantry with one 
and the same rifle gun will tend to do away with the distinctions, 
still existing, of light and line infantry, by forming an infantry 
capable of any service. In this will evidently consist the next 
improvement of this arm. 

Written between the end of August and Reproduced from The New Ameri- 
October 10, 1859 can Cyclopaedia 

Cyclopaedia, Vol. TX, 1860 

a Trotha, Beitrag zur Erérterung der Frage: Welchen nothwendigen Einfluss haben die 
jetzt gebraduchlichen weittragenden Handfeuerwaffen auf das Gefecht der Infanterie?— Ed. 

364 

Frederick Engels 

NAVY°*” 

Navy, a collective term for the vessels of war belonging to a 
sovereign or nation. The war fleets of the ancients, though often 
numerous, were insignificant when compared with those of the 
present day, in regard to the size of the ships, their powers of 
locomotion, and their aptitude for offence. The sea-going vessels 
of Phoenicia and Carthage, of Greece and Rome, were flat- 
bottomed barges, unable to live in a gale of wind; sea room, in a 
squall, was destruction to them; they crept along the coasts, casting 
anchor at night in some cove or creek. To cross over from Greece 
to Italy, or from Africa to Sicily, was a dangerous operation. The 
ships, unfit to carry the press of sail to which our modern 
men-of-war are accustomed, were provided with but little canvas; 
the oars were relied upon to propel them sluggishly through the 
waves. The compass had not yet been discovered; latitudes and 
longitudes were unknown; and landmarks and the pole star were 
the only guides in navigation. The implements for offensive 
warfare were equally inefficient. Bows and arrows, javelins, clumsy 
ballistas and catapults, were the only arms that could be used at a 
distance. No serious harm could be done to an enemy at sea until 
the two fighting ships came into actual contact. Thus, there were 
but two modes of naval fighting possible: to manoeuvre so that the 
sharp, strong, iron-pointed prow of your own ship should be 
driven with full force against the enemy’s broadside in order to 
run him down; or else to run on broadside to broadside, fasten 
the two ships together, and board the enemy at once. After the 
first Punic war, which destroyed the naval superiority of the 
Carthaginians,*” there is not a single naval engagement in ancient 
history offering the slightest professional interest, and Roman 

Navy 365 

dominion soon put an end to the possibility of further naval 
contests in the Mediterranean. 

The real birthplace of our modern navies is the German ocean.’ 
About the time when the great mass of the Teutonic tribes of 
central Europe rose to trample down the decaying Roman empire 
and to regenerate western Europe, their brethren on the northern 
shores, the Frisians, Saxons, Angles, Danes, and Northmen, began 
to take to the sea. Their vessels were firm, stout sea boats, with a 
prominent keel and sharp lines, relying mostly on sails alone, and 
not afraid to face a gale in the middle of that rough northern sea. 
It was with this class of vessels that the Anglo-Saxons passed from 
the mouths of the Elbe and Eider to the shores of Britain, and 
that the Northmen undertook their roving expeditions, extending 
to Constantinople on the one side and America on the other. With 
the construction of ships that dared cross the Atlantic, navigation 
underwent a complete revolution; and before the middle ages had 
passed away, the new sharp-bottomed sea boats had been adopted 
on all the coasts of Europe. The vessels in which the Northmen 
made their excursions were probably of no very large size, 
perhaps not exceeding 100 tons burden in any case, and carrying 
one or at the outside two masts, fore-and-aft rigged. 

For a long time both ship building and navigation appear to 
have remained stationary; during the whole of the middle ages 
vessels were small; and the bold spirit of the Northmen and the 
Frisians had passed away; whatever improvements were made 
were owing to Italians and Portuguese, who now became the 
boldest sailors. The Portuguese discovered the route by sea to 
India; two Italians in foreign service, Columbus and Cabot, were 
the first since the times of Leif the Northman to cross the Atlantic. 
Long sea voyages now became a necessity, and they required large 
ships; at the same time the necessity of arming vessels of war and 
even merchantmen with heavy artillery, equally tended to increase 
size and tonnage. The same causes which had produced standing 
armies on land, now produced standing navies afloat; and it is 
from this time only that we can properly speak of navies. The era 
of colonial enterprise which now opened for all seafaring nations, 
also witnessed the formation of large fleets of war to protect the 
newly formed colonies and their trade; and a period followed 
richer in naval struggles and more fruitful to the development of 
naval armaments than any that preceded it. 

2 North Sea.— Ed. 

The foundation of the British navy was laid by Henry VII, who 
built the first ship called The Great Harry. His successor* formed a 
regular standing fleet, the property of the state, the largest ship of 
which was called the Henry Grace de Dieu. This vessel, the largest 
ever built up to that time, carried 80 guns, partly on two regular 
flush gun decks, partly on additional platforms both forward and 
astern. She was provided with 4 masts; her tonnage is variously 
stated at from 1,000 to 1,500. The whole of the British fleet, at 
the death of Henry VIII, consisted of about 50 sail, with an 
aggregate tonnage of 12,000, and manned by 8,000 sailors and 
marines. The large ships of the period were clumsy contrivances, 
deep-waisted, that is to say, provided with towering forecastles and 
poops, which rendered them exceedingly top-heavy. The next 
large ship we hear of is the Sovereign of the Seas, afterward called 
the Royal Sovereign, built in 1637. She is the first vessel of whose 
armament we get something like an accurate account. She had 3 
flush decks, a forecastle, a half deck, a quarter deck, and a round 
house; on her lower deck she carried 30 guns, 42 and 
32-pounders; 30 on her middle deck, 18 and 9-pounders; on her 
upper deck 26 lighter guns, probably 6 and 3-pounders. Beside 
these, she carried 20 chase guns and 26 guns on her forecastle 
and half deck. But on her regular home establishment this 
armament was reduced to 100 guns, the full complement being 
evidently too much for her. As to the smaller vessels, our 
information is very scanty. 

In 1651 the navy was classed in 6 rates; but beside them there 
continued to exist numerous classes of unrated ships, such as 
shallops, hulks, and later bombs, sloops, fire ships, and yachts. In 
1677 we find a list of the whole English navy; according to which, 
the largest first rate three-decker carried 26 42-pdrs., 28 24-pdrs., 
28 9-pdrs., 14 6-pdrs., and 4 3-pdrs.; and the smallest two-decker 
(fifth rate) carried 18 18-pdrs., 8 6-pdrs., and 4 4-pdrs., or 30 
guns in all. The whole fleet consisted of 129 vessels. In 1714, we 
find 198 vessels; in 1727, 178; and in 1744, 128. Afterward, as the 
number of vessels increases, their size also gets larger, and the 
heaviness of the armament is augmented with the tonnage. 

The first English ship answering to our modern frigate was built 
by Sir Robert Dudley, as early as the end of the 16th century; but 
it was not till fully 80 years later that this class of ships, first used 
by the southern European nations, was generally adopted in the 

a Henry VIIL.— Ed. 

Navy 367 

British navy. The particular fast-sailing qualities of frigates were 
little understood, for some time, in- England. British ships were 
generally overgunned, so that their lower ports were but 3 feet 
from the water’s edge, and could not be opened in a rough sea, 
and the sailing capacities of the vessels were also greatly impaired. 
Both the Spaniards and the French allowed more tonnage in 
proportion to the number of guns; the consequence was that their 
ships could carry heavier caliber and more stores, had more 
buoyancy, and were better sailers. The English frigates of the first 
half of the 18th century carried as many as 44 guns, of 9, 12, and 
a few of 18 Ibs. caliber, with a tonnage of about 710. By 1780 
frigates of 38 guns (mostly 18-pdrs.) and of 946 tons were built: 
the improvement here is obvious. The French frigates of the same 
epoch, with a similar armament, averaged 100 tons more. About 
the same time (the middle of the 18th century) the smaller 
men-of-war were more accurately classed in the modern way as 
corvettes, brigs, brigantines, and schooners. 

In 1779 a piece of ordnance was invented (probably by the 
British Gen. Melville) which changed to a great extent the 
armaments of most navies. It was a very short gun, with a large 
caliber, approaching in its shape a howitzer, but intended to throw 
solid shot, with small charges, at short ranges. From these guns 
being first manufactured by the Carron iron company, in 
Scotland, they were called carronades. The shot from this gun, 
useless at long ranges, had fearful effects upon timber at close 
quarters; from its reduced velocity (by the reduced charge), it 
made a larger hole, shattered the timber far more, and made 
numerous and more dangerous splinters. The comparative light- 
ness of the guns, too, made it easy to find room for a few of them 
on the quarter deck and forecastle of vessels; and as early as 1781 
there were 429 ships in the British navy provided with from 6 to 
10 carronades over and above their regular complement of guns. 
In reading the accounts of naval engagements during the French 
and American wars, it should be borne in mind that the British 
never include the carronades in the number of guns given as a 
ship’s complement: so that, for instance, a British frigate, stated to 
be a 36-gun frigate, may in reality have carried 42 or more guns, 
including the carronades. The superior weight of metal which the 
carronades gave to the British broadsides, helped to decide many 
an action fought at close quarters during the war of the French 
revolution. But after all, carronades were merely a makeshift to 
increase the strength of the comparatively small-sized men-of-war 
of 80 years ago. As soon as the size of the ships was increased for 

each rating, they were again cast aside, and are now comparatively 
superseded. 

In this particular, the construction of men-of-war, the French 
and Spaniards were decidedly ahead of the English. Their ships 
were larger and designed with far better lines than the British; 
their frigates especially were superior both in size and sailing 
qualities; and for many years the English frigates were copied 
from the French frigate Hebe, captured in 1782. In the same 
proportion as the vessels were lengthened, the high towering 
erections at the bow and stern, the forecastles, quarter decks, and 
poops, were reduced in height, the sailing qualities of the ships 
being increased thereby; so that gradually the comparatively 
elegant and swift-sailing lines of the present men-of-war came to 
be adopted. Instead of increasing the number of guns to these 
larger ships, the caliber was increased, and so were the weight and 
length of each gun, in order to admit of the use of full charges, 
and to receive the greatest point-blank range, so as to allow of the 
fire being opened at long distances. The small calibers below 24 
Ibs. disappeared from the larger vessels, and the remaining 
calibers were simplified, so as to have no more than two calibers, 
or at the outside three, on board of any one vessel. In ships of the 
line, the lower deck, being the strongest, was armed with guns of 
the same caliber as the upper decks, but of greater length and 
weight, in order to have at least one tier of guns available for the 
greatest possible range. 

About 1820 the French Gen. Paixhans made an invention which 
has been of great importance in naval armaments. He constructed 
a gun of large caliber provided with a narrow chamber at the 
breech for the insertion of the powder, and began to fire hollow 
shot, at low elevations, from these “shell guns” (canons obusiers). 
Hitherto hollow shot had been fired against ships from howitzers 
in shore batteries only; though in Germany the practice of firing 
shell horizontally from short 24-lb. and even 12-lb. guns had been 
long in use against fortifications. The destructive effects of shells 
against the wooden sides of vessels were well known to Napoleon, 
who at Boulogne*’’ armed most of his gun boats for the 
expedition to England with howitzers, and laid it down as a rule 
that ships must be attacked with projectiles which will burst after 
hitting. Now, Paixhans’ shell guns gave the means of arming ships 
with cannon which, by throwing their shells as nearly as possible 
horizontally, could be used at sea, ship against ship, with nearly 
the same probability of hitting as the old round-shot guns. The 
new gun was soon introduced into all navies, and, after 

Navy 369 

undergoing various improvements, now constitutes an essential 
portion of the armament of all large men-of-war. 

Shortly afterward the first attempts were made to apply steam to 
the propulsion of ships of war, as it had already been applied by 
Fulton to that of commercial vessels. The progress from the river 
steamer to the coasting steamer, and gradually to the ocean 
steamer, was slow; in the same ratio was the progress of war 
steamers retarded. As long as paddle boats were the only steamers 
in existence, this was justifiable. The paddles and part of the 
engine were exposed to the enemy’s shot, and could be disabled by 
a single lucky hit; they took up the best portion of the broadside 
room of the vessel; and the weight of engine, paddles, and coal so 
much reduced the capacity of the ship, that a heavy armament of 
numerous long guns was entirely out of the question. A paddle 
steamer, therefore, could never be a ship of the line; but its 
superior speed might permit it to compete with frigates, which are 
expected to hover on the flanks of an enemy, to collect the fruits 
of a victory, or to cover a retreat. Now a frigate has just the size 
and armament which enable it to go fearlessly on any independent 
roving errand, while its superior sailing qualities enable it to 
withdraw in time from an unequal contest. The sailing qualities of 
any frigate were far outstripped by the steamer; but without a 
good armament the steamer could not fulfil its mission. Regular 
broadside fighting was out of the question; the number of guns 
must, for want of space, be always inferior to that of a sailing 
frigate. Here, if anywhere, the shell gun was in its place. The 
diminished number of guns on board a steam frigate was 
counterbalanced by their weight of metal and caliber. Originally 
these guns were intended to throw shells only, but recently they 
have been made so heavy, especially the chase guns (at the bow 
and stern of the vessel), that they can, with full charges, throw 
solid shot also to considerable distances. Moreover, the reduced 
number of guns admits of traversing platforms and railways being 
laid down on the deck, by means of which all or most of the guns 
can be brought to bear in almost any direction; a provision by 
which the strength of a steam frigate for an attack 1s nearly 
doubled, and a 20-gun steam frigate can bring at least as many 
guns into action as a 40-gun sailing frigate with but 18 working 
guns for each single broadside. Thus the large modern paddle- 
steamer frigate is a most formidable ship; the superior caliber and 
range of her guns, added to her velocity, enable her to cripple an 
opponent at a distance where scarcely any effective return of fire 
is possible to the sailing vessel; while the weight of her metal 

comes in with crushing power when it is to her advantage finally 
to force the fighting. Still the disadvantage remains that her whole 
motive force is exposed to direct fire, and offers a large object to 
aim at. 

For smaller vessels, corvettes, advice boats and other light craft, 
not counting in a naval battle, but very useful throughout a 
campaign, steam was at once found of great advantage, and there 
were many such paddle boats constructed in most navies. It was 
the same with transport ships. Where landings were intended, 
steamers not only reduced the length of passage to a minimum, 
but permitted one to calculate to a moral certainty the time of 
arrival at any given place. The transport of bodies of troops was 
now made a matter of great simplicity, especially as every naval 
country had a large fleet of commercial steamers to fall back upon 
for transport vessels in case of necessity. It was on these 
considerations that Prince de Joinville, in his well known 
pamphlet, ventured to maintain that steam had altered the 
condition of naval warfare to such an extent as to render an 
invasion of England by France no longer an impossibility.” Still, 
so long as the ships used for decisive action, the ships of the line, 
remained exclusively sailing vessels, the introduction of steam 
could work but little change in the conditions under which great 
naval battles were fought. 

The invention of the screw propeller was destined to supply the 
means of revolutionizing naval warfare entirely, and to transform 
all war fleets into steam fleets. It was fully 13 years after the 
invention of the screw before the first step in this direction was 
made. The French, always superior to the English in naval design 
and construction, were the first to do it. Finally in 1849 the 
French engineer Dupuy-Del6me constructed the first screw 
line-of-battle ship, the Napoléon, of 100 guns and 600 horse power. 
This ship was not intended to depend upon steam only; unlike the 
paddles, the screw allowed a ship to retain all the lines and rigging 
of a sailing vessel, and to be moved, at will, by steam alone, by sails 
alone, or by both combined. She could, therefore, always save her 
coal for emergencies by having recourse to her sails, and was thus 
far less dependent upon the proximity of coaling stations than the 
old paddle-wheel steamer. On this account, and because her steam 
power was too weak to give her the full speed of a paddle steamer, 
the Napoléon and other vessels of this class were called auxiliary 
steam vessels; since then, however, ships of the line have been 
constructed which have steam power enough to give them all the 
speed of which the screw propeller is capable. The success of the 

Navy 371 

Napoléon soon caused screw ships of the line to be built both in 
France and England. The Russian war* gave a new impulse to this 
radical change in naval construction; and when it was found that 
most strong-built ships of the line could, without too much 
difficulty, be fitted with a screw and engines, the transformation 
of all navies into steam fleets became only a matter of time. No 
large naval power now thinks of constructing any more large 
sailing vessels; almost all ships newly laid down are screw steamers, 
excepting the few paddle steamers which for certain purposes are 
still required; and before 1870 sailing ships of war will be almost 
as completely antiquated as the spinning wheel and the smooth- 
bore musket are now. 

The Crimean war called into existence two new naval construc- 
tions. The first of these is the steam gun boat or mortar boat, 
originally constructed by the English for the contemplated attack 
on Cronstadt; it is a small vessel drawing from 4 to 7 feet of water, 
and armed with one or two heavy long-range guns or a heavy 
mortar; the former to be used in shallow and intricate waters 
generally, the latter in the bombardment, from a long distance, of 
fortified naval arsenals. They answered exceedingly well, and will 
no doubt play an important part in future naval campaigns. The 
mortar boat, as proved at Sveaborg,*” totally alters the relations of 
attack and defence between fortresses and ships, by giving the 
ships that power of bombarding the former with impunity which 
they never before possessed; at 3,000 yards, from which the shells 
of the mortar boats can hit an object as large as a town, they are 
themselves quite secure from their smallness of surface. The gun 
boats, on the contrary, when acting in concert with coast batteries, 
will strengthen the defence, and will also provide naval warfare 
with those light skirmishers which were hitherto wanting to it. 

The second innovation is the iron-sided, shot-proof floating 
batteries, first constructed by the French, for the attack of coast 
defences. They were tried at Kinburn only, and their success, even 
against the rickety parapets and rusty cannon of that little place, 
was not so very signal.*™ Still, the French appeared to be so well 
satisfied with them, that they have gone on ever since experiment- 
ing upon steel-plated vessels. They have constructed gun boats 
with a kind of shot-proof steel parapet on the forecastle, which 
shelters the gun and its crew; but if the floating batteries were 
unwieldy and had to be towed, these gun boats always had their 

a The Crimean war of 1853-56.— Ed. 

heads in the water and were not at all seaworthy. They have 
however produced a steel-plated steam frigate called La Gloire, 
which is said to be shot-proof, of very good speed, and quite 
capable of living in a gale. The most exaggerated statements are 
made with regard to the probable revolution these shot-proof 
frigates will create in naval warfare. We are told that ships of the 
line are antiquated, and that the power to decide great naval 
actions has passed over to these frigates with a single battery of 
guns, covered in shot-proof on all sides, against which no wooden 
three-decker can stand. This is not the place to argue these 
questions; but we may observe that it is far easier to invent and 
put on board ship rifled artillery heavy enough to smash iron or 
steel plates, than it is to construct vessels cased with metal thick 
enough to withstand the shot or shell from these guns. As to the 
Gloire, it is not certain after all that she is fit to live in a gale, and 
from her incapacity for holding coal it is said that she cannot keep 
the sea under steam for more than 3 days. What her British 
competitor, the Warrior, will do, remains to be seen. No doubt, by 
reducing the armament and coal, and by altering the mode of 
construction, it may be possible to render a ship entirely 
shot-proof at long and medium ranges, and a fair steamer; but in 
an age when the science of artillery makes such rapid strides, it is 
very doubtful whether such ships will be worth constructing in the 
long run.*” 

The revolution in artillery which the rifled gun is now effecting 
appears to be a far more important matter for naval warfare than 
any thing that can be effected by steel-plated ships. Every rifled 
gun that deserves the name gives such a precision at long ranges 
that the ancient inefficiency of naval firing at such ranges appears 
to be fast becoming a matter of the past. Moreover, the rifled 
cannon, by admitting elongated shot and reduced charges, allows a 
considerable reduction in the bore and weight of broadside guns; 
or otherwise, the bore remaining the same, gives results far 
greater. The elongated shot from a 56 cwt. rifled 32-pounder will 
surpass the round shot from a 113 cwt. smooth-bore 10-inch gun, 
not only in weight, but also in penetration, range, and precision. 
The power of attack of every vessel is at least tripled if it be armed 
with rifled ordnance. Moreover, the great desideratum has always 
been to invent a useful percussion shell which should explode the 
very moment it penetrates a ship’s side. The rotation of round 
shot has rendered this impracticable; the percussion fuze was not 
always in the proper position when the shell struck, and then it 
did not go off. But an elongated shot from a rifled cannon, 

Navy 373 

rotating round its longitudinal axis, must always strike head 
foremost; and a simple percussion cap on the fuze head bursts the 
shell the moment it enters the ship’s side. It is not probable that 
any steel-clad ship yet invented can brave two such broadsides 
from a two-decker with impunity; not to speak of the shells which 
enter the ports and must explode between decks. Rifled ordnance 
must to a great degree put a stop to such close-fought actions as 
were those in which carronades could be useful; manoeuvring will 
once more regain the ascendant; and as steam now makes the 
contending vessels independent of wind and tide, naval warfare 
will in future much more approach the method and be subject to 
the tactics of land battles. 

The vessels of war of which modern navies are composed are 
classed in various ratings, from first to sixth rates; but as these 
ratings are both variable and arbitrary, it will be better to class 
them in the common way as ships of the line, frigates, sloops, 
brigs, schooners, &c. Ships of the line are the largest men-of-war 
afloat, destined to form the line of battle in a general action, and 
to decide the struggle by the weight of metal thrown into the 
enemy’s ships. They are either 3-deckers or 2-deckers; that is to 
say, they have either 3 or 2 covered decks armed with guns. These 
decks are called the lower, middle, and main or upper deck. The 
upper deck, which was formerly covered in at the quarter deck 
and forecastle only, is now covered in by a continuous open deck 
from stem to stern. This open deck, which is still called the 
quarter deck and forecastle (the position amidships being called 
the gangway), also carries artillery, mostly carronades; so that in 
reality a 2-decker carries 3, and a 3-decker 4 tiers of guns. The 
heaviest guns are, of course, placed on the lower deck; and the 
guns become lighter in proportion as the batteries are more 
elevated above the water. The caliber being mostly the same, this 
is obtained by reducing the weight of the guns themselves, in 
consequence of which those on the upper decks can only stand 
reduced charges, which implies that they can be used only at 
shorter ranges. The only exception to this rule is in the case of 
chase guns, which are placed at the bow and stern of a ship, and 
which, even if placed on the forecastle or quarter deck, are still as 
long and heavy as possible, as they are required to act at the 
longest ranges practicable. Thus, the bow and stern guns of 
English ships of the line are composed either of 8 or 10-inch shell 
guns, or of 56-pdr. (bore 7.7 inches) or 68-pdr. (bore 8.13 inches) 
solid shot guns, one of which is placed on the forecastle on a 
traversing platform. There are in the English navy generally 6 

stern and 5 bow guns to a first rate; the remaining armament of 
such a ship is as follows: 

eer ereeree ress 

eee ve eneccene 

Upper deck ............. 

Forecastle and 6 
quarter deck t 14 
AOlAl wena ssml j§ ~Seite ~ ‘A ‘Aue fe Gan 120° 

The armament of the smaller ratings of vessels of the line is 
arranged upon the same principle. For the sake of comparison, we 
also give that of a French first rate, viz.: lower deck, 32 long 30-lb. 
guns; middle deck, 4 80-Ib. shell guns, and 30 short 30-lb. guns; 
upper deck, 34 30-lb. shell guns; forecastle and quarter deck, 4 
30-lb. shell guns, and 16 30-lb. carronades; in all, 120 guns. The 
French 80-lb. shell gun has a larger bore than the 8-inch English 
gun by 0.8 inch; the 30-Ib. shell gun and the 30-lb. gun have a 
slightly larger bore than the English 32-pdr., so that the advantage 
of weight of metal would lie with the French. The smallest ship of 
the line now carries 72 guns; the largest frigate carries 61. 

A frigate is a ship with only one covered deck carrying guns, 
and another open deck above it (forecastle and quarter deck) 
which is equally provided with guns. The armament, in the 
English service, is generally of 30 guns (either all shell guns or 
part shell guns and part long 32-pdrs.) on the gun deck, and 30 
short 32-pdrs. on the forecastle and quarter deck, with a heavy 
pivot gun on a traversing platform at the bow. Frigates being 
mostly sent on detached service, where they are always likely to 
become engaged single-handed against hostile frigates sent on the 
same errand, it has been a great point with most naval nations to 
make them as large and powerful as possible. In no class of vessels 
is the increase in size so remarkable as in this. The United States, 
requiring a cheap navy strong enough to enforce respect, were the 
first to see the great advantage to be drawn from a fleet of large 
frigates, each of them superior to any frigate which other nations 
could bring against it. The superiority of the American ship 
builders in producing swift vessels was also taken advantage of, 
and the last war against England (1812-'14)*° showed in many 

Navy 375 

well contested engagements what formidable antagonists these 
American frigates were. Up to the present day the U.S. frigates 
are considered models of this class of vessels, although the 
difference in size when compared with other navies is not by far 
so marked as it was 30 or 40 years ago. 

The next class of men-of-war are called corvettes. They have but 
one tier of guns, placed on an open deck; but the larger class are 
provided with a forecastle and quarter deck (not connected, 
however, by a continuous deck amidships), where they carry a few 
guns more. Such corvettes, therefore, almost correspond to what a 
frigate was 80 years ago, before the two elevated extremities of the 
vessel were connected by a flush deck. These corvettes are still 
strong enough to carry the same caliber of guns as the larger 
vessels. They also carry 3 masts, all square-rigged. Of smaller 
vessels, brigs and schooners carry from 20 guns to 6. They have 
but two masts, square-rigged in brigs, fore-and-aft rigged in 
schooners. The caliber of their guns is necessarily smaller than 
that of the larger ships, and does not generally exceed 18 or 
24-pdrs. going down as low as 12 and 9-pdrs. Vessels of this small 
power of offence cannot be sent where serious resistance is 
anticipated. In European waters they are becoming generally 
superseded by small steamers, and they can be of actual service 
only on such coasts as those of South America, China, &c.,where 
they have to meet powerless antagonists, and where they merely 
serve to represent the flag of a powerful naval nation. 

The armaments given above are merely those adopted at 
present, but they will undoubtedly be changed in every respect 
during the next 10 years by the general adoption of rifled ship 

guns.”