Infantry, the foot soldiers of an army. Except among nomadic 
tribes, the great mass, if not the entire strength of all armies, has 
always consisted of foot soldiers. Thus even with the first Asiatic 
armies, with the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Persians, infantry 
made up, numerically at least, the main body. With the Greeks at 
first the whole army was composed of infantry. What little we 
know of the composition, organization, and tactics of ancient 
Asiatic infantry, has already been stated in the article Army,* to 
which we refer for many details which it would be useless to 
repeat here. In this article, we shall restrict ourselves to the most 
important tactical features only in the history of the arm; we 
therefore at once begin with the Greeks. 


I. GRECIAN INFANTRY 


The creators of Grecian tactics were the Dorians*”; among 
them, the Spartans brought to perfection the ancient Doric order 
of battle. Originally, the whole of the classes which composed a 
Dorian community were subjected to military service; not only the 
full citizens who formed the aristocracy, but also the subject 
periaeci,’” and even the slaves. They were all formed into the same 
phalanx, but each in a different position. The full citizens had to 
appear heavily armed, with defensive armor, with helmet, cuirass, 
and cuissarts of brass, with a large wooden shield covered with 
leather, high enough to protect the whole person, and with a lance 
and sword. They formed, according to their numbers, the first or 


4 See this volume, pp. 85-89.— Ed. 


first and second ranks of the phalanx. Behind them stood the 
subjects and slaves, so that every Spartan squire had his retainers 
in his rear; these were without the costly defensive armor, relying 
on the protection afforded to them by the front ranks and their 
shields; their offensive weapons were slings, javelins, knives, 
daggers, and clubs. Thus the Doric phalanx formed a deep line, 
the hoplites or heavy infantry in front, the gymnetae or light 
infantry in the rear ranks. The hoplites had to bear down the 
enemy by the charge of their spears; once in the midst of the 
hostile body, they drew their short swords, and worked their way 
forward at close quarters, while the gymnetae, who first prepared 
the charge by throwing stones and javelins over the heads of the 
front ranks, now assisted the onward pressure of the hoplites by 
disposing of the wounded and straggling enemies. The tactics of 
such a body were thus very simple; tactical manoeuvring there was 
scarcely any; the courage, tenacity, bodily strength, and individual 
agility and skill of the men, especially the hoplites, decided every 
thing. 

This patriarchal union of all classes of the nation in the same 
phalanx disappeared soon after the Persian wars,” principally 
from political causes; the consequence was that the phalanx was 
now formed exclusively of hoplites, and that the lhght infantry, 
where it continued to exist, or where a new light infantry was 
formed, fought separately as skirmishers. In Sparta, the Spartan 
citizens along with the periaect formed the heavy armed phalanx; 
the helots**° now followed with the baggage, or as shield-bearers 
(hypaspistae). For a while this phalanx was made to suffice for all 
the exigencies of battle; but soon the skirmishers of the Athenians, 
in the Peloponnesian war,**' compelled the Spartans to provide 
themselves with troops of a similar kind. They did not, however, 
form gymnetae of their own, but sent out the younger portion of 
their men on skirmishing duty. When, toward the end of that war, 
the number of citizens and even of periaeci had become greatly 
reduced, they were compelled to form phalanxes of heavily armed 
slaves, commanded by citizens. The Athenians, after banishing 
from the phalanx the gymnetae, formed of the poorer citizens, of 
retainers and slaves, created special corps of light infantry, 
consisting of gymnetae or psiles, destined for skirmishing, and 
armed exclusively for distant fighting, slingers (sphendonetae), 
archers (toxotae), and javelin-throwers (akontistae), the latter also 
called peltastae from the small shield (pelta) which they alone 
carried. This new class of light infantry, originally recruited from 
the poorer citizens of Athens, very soon came to be formed almost 


342 Frederick Engels 


exclusively of mercenaries and the contingents of the allies of 
Athens.2* From the moment these skirmishers were introduced, 
the clumsy Doric phalanx was no longer fit to act alone in battle. 
Its materials, too, had been constantly deteriorating; in Sparta, by 
the gradual extinction of the warlike aristocracy; in the other 
towns, by the influence of commerce and wealth, which gradually 
undermined the ancient contempt of death. Thus, the phalanx, 
formed of a not very heroic militia, lost most of its old importance. 
It formed the background, the reserve of the line of battle, in 
front of which the skirmishers fought, or behind which they 
retired when pressed, but which scarcely ever was expected to 
come itself to close quarters with the enemy. Where the phalanx 
was formed of mercenaries, its character was not much better. Its 
clumsiness made it unfit for manoeuvring, especially in ground 
but lightly broken, and its whole use was passive resistance. This 
led to two attempts at reform made by Iphicrates, a general of 
mercenaries. This Grecian condottiere exchanged the old, short 
spears of the hoplites (from 8 to 10 feet long) for considerably 
longer ones, so that, with closed ranks, the lances of 3 or 4 ranks 
projected in front and could act against the enemy; thus, the 
defensive element of the phalanx was considerably strengthened. 
On the other hand, to create a force fit for deciding battles by 
close yet rapid attack, he armed his peltastae with light defensive 
armor and a good sword, and drilled them in the evolutions of the 
phalanx. When ordered to charge, they advanced at a pace 
unattainable by the phalanx of hoplites, gave a volley of javelins at 
10 or 20 yards, and broke into the enemy with the sword. The 
simplicity of the ancient Doric phalanx had thus made way for a 
far more complicated order of battle; the action of the general 
had become an important element of victory; tactical manoeuvres 
had become possible. Epaminondas was the first to discover the 
great tactical principle which up to the present day decides almost 
all pitched battles: the unequal distribution of the troops on the 
line of front, in order to concentrate the main attack on one 
decisive point. Hitherto the battles of the Greeks had been 
delivered in parallel order; the strength of the front line was the 
same on all points; if one army was superior in numbers to the 
one opposed to it, either it formed a deeper order of battle, or it 
overlapped the other army on both wings. Epaminondas, on the 
contrary, destined one of his wings for attack and the other for 
defence; the attacking wing was composed of his best troops, and 
of the mass of his hoplites, formed in a deep column and followed 
by light infantry and by the cavalry. The other wing was of course 


considerably weaker, and was kept back, while the attacking one 
broke through the enemy, and the column, either deploying or 
wheeling into line, rolled them up with the assistance of the light 
troops and horsemen. 

The progress established by Iphicrates and Epaminondas was 
still further developed when Macedonia had taken the lead of the 
Hellenic race and led them against Persia. The long lances of the 
hoplites appear still further lengthened in the Macedonian sarissa. 
The peltastae of Iphicrates appear again in an improved form in 
Alexander’s hypaspistae. Finally, the economy of forces, as applied 
to the order of battle by Epaminondas, was extended by 
Alexander to a combination of the various arms such as Greece 
with her insignificant cavalry could never have produced. Alexan- 
der’s infantry was composed of the phalanx of hoplites, which 
formed the defensive strength of the order of battle; of the light 
skirmishing infantry, which engaged the enemy all along the front, 
and also contributed to the following up of the victory; and of the 
hypaspistae, to which belonged his own body guard, which, 
though lightly equipped, were still capable of regular phalangitic 
manoeuvring, and formed that kind of average infantry which is 
more or less adapted to both close and extended order. Still, 
neither Greece nor Macedonia had produced a movable infantry 
which could be relied upon when opposed to a solid phalanx. 
Here, Alexander brought in his cavalry. The attacking wing was 
formed by the mass of his heavy cavalry, chosen from the 
Macedonian nobility, and with them acted the hypaspistae; they 
followed the charge of the horsemen, and rushed into the gap 
they had made, securing the success obtained by them, and 
establishing themselves in the midst of the enemy’s position. After 
the conquest of the centre of the Persian empire, Alexander used 
his hoplites chiefly for garrisoning the conquered towns. They 
soon disappeared from the army which subdued by its bold and 
rapid marches the tribes of Asia to the Indus and Jaxartes. That 
army was formed chiefly of cavalry, hypaspistae, and light 
infantry; the phalanx, which could not have followed on such 
marches, became at the same time superfluous from the nature of 
the enemy to be conquered. Under the successors of Alexander, 
his infantry, as well as his cavalry and tactics, were completely and 
rapidly deteriorated. The two wings of the order of battle were 
formed exclusively of cavalry, and the centre of infantry; but the 
latter was so little relied on, that it was covered by elephants. In 
Asia, the prevailing Asiatic element soon got the upper hand, and 
rendered the armies of the Seleucidae all but worthless; in 


344 Frederick Engels 


Europe, the Macedonian and Greek infantry regained some 
solidity, but with it came a return to the former exclusive 
phalangitic tactics. Light troops and cavalry never recovered, while 
much trouble and ingenuity were wasted in vain attempts to give 
to the phalanx that mobility which from its very nature it could 
never attain; until finally the Roman legion put an end to the 
whole system. 

The tactical organization and manoeuvres of the phalanx were 
simple enough. Being generally 16 deep (under Alexander), a line 
of 16 files formed a complete square, and this, the syntagma, 
formed the unit of evolutions; 16 syntagmas, or 256 files, formed 
a phalangarchy of 4,096 men, 4 of which again were to form the 
complete phalanx. The phalangarchy, in order of battle, formed 
in line 16 deep; it passed into the order of march by facing right 
or left, or by wheeling into syntagmas, in each case forming a close 
column 16 in front. When in line, the depth could be increased 
and front decreased by double files, the even files placing 
themselves behind the odd ones; and the opposite movement was 
performed by double ranks, reducing the depth from 16 to 8 men 
per file. Countermarching by files was employed when the enemy 
suddenly appeared in the rear of the phalanx; the inversion 
caused by this (every file being in a wrong place in its own section 
or syntagma) was sometimes set right by a countermarch by ranks 
in each section. Add to this the handling of the lance, and we have 
enumerated the various items of the drill of the ancient hoplites. 
It is a matter of course that the lighter troops, though not exactly 
destined to fight in close order, still were exercised in the 
phalangitic movements. 


II. ROMAN INFANTRY 


The Latin word legio was originally used to express the totality 
of the men selected for field service, and thus was synonymous 
with army. Subsequently, when the extent of the Roman territory 
and the power of the enemies of the republic required larger 
armies, they were divided into several legions, each of which had a 
strength similar to that of the original Roman army. Up to the 
time of Marius, every legion was composed of both infantry and 
cavalry, the latter about '/;9 of the former in strength. Originally 
the infantry of the Roman legion appears to have been organized 
similarly to the ancient Doric phalanx, fighting in a deep line, the 
patricians and richer citizens in heavy armor forming the front 
ranks, the poorer and lighter armed plebeians behind them. But 


about the time of the Samnite wars the legion began to undergo a 
change of organization, which soon placed it in perfect contrast to 
the Grecian phalanx, and of which, after it had attained its full 
development in the Punic wars,*™* Polybius gives us a full account.’ 
The legion, of which 4 were generally levied for each campaign, 
was now composed of 4 classes of infantry, velites, hastati, principes, 
and triarii; the first, formed from recruits, were light infantry; the 
triarii, from veterans, were the reserve of the army; the other two 
classes, forming the main fighting body or infantry of the line, 
composed the remainder of the army, and differed in this, that 
the principes were selected from those men who, after the triarii, 
had seen most service. The velites wore leather caps, light round 
shields for defensive armor, and carried swords and a number of 
light javelins; the remaining 3 classes had brass helmets, leather 
body armor covered with brass plates, and brass cuissarts. The 
hastati and principes, beside a short sword, carried two pila or 
javelins, a light one and a very heavy one; this latter formed the 
specific arm of attack of the Roman infantry. It was of thick, 
heavy wood, with a long iron point, weighing in all at least 10 
pounds, and with the point nearly 7 feet long. It could be thrown 
at very short distances only, say 8 or 12 yards, but from its weight 
its effect was formidable to the light defensive armor of those 
times. The triarii, beside the sword, carried lances instead of pila. 
Every legion contained 1,200 hastati, divided into 10 manipuli or 
companies of 120 men each; the same number of principes, 
similarly divided; 600 triarii, in 10 manipuli of 60 each; and 1,200 
velites, 40 of whom were attached to each of the 30 manipuli, and 
formed the rear ranks unless otherwise employed. The hastati 
formed the first line, each manipulus being deployed in line, 
probably 6 deep, with an interval from the next manipulus equal 
to its front, which, as the room allotted for every man in a rank 
was 6 feet, extended about 120 feet, the whole line extending 
2,400 feet. Behind them, in second line, were placed the 10 
manipuli of the principes, covering the intervals of the manipuli of 
the first line, and behind the principes the triarii, each line at an 
appropriate distance from the one in front of it. The velites 
skirmished before the front and flanks. By doubling files, the 
order of battle could be reduced to one half its original extent of 
front, or 1,200 feet. The whole of this order of battle was 
calculated for attack. 

Capable, by the smallness of the tactical units and by the great 


a Polybius, Histories, Book 6.— Ed. 


346 Frederick Engels 


liberty thereby secured to all its movements, of fighting in almost 
any kind of ground, it was immensely superior to the Grecian 
phalanx, which required a level plain, and had been very soon 
reduced by its own clumsiness to a mere formation for defense. 
The legion advanced; at 8 or 12 yards the hastati, probably 
doubling their ranks for the occasion, threw their heavy pila into 
the phalanx, whose lances could not yet reach the Romans, and, 
having thereby broken the closed order of the phalangites, rushed 
upon them sword in hand. If a single manipulus got into disorder, 
the effect was not transmitted to the neighboring companies; if the 
combat continued without immediate decision, the principes 
marched up into the intervals, threw their pila, and broke in upon 
the enemy with the sword, thus giving the hastati an opportunity 
of disentangling themselves and reforming behind the triarii. In 
an extreme case, these latter advanced, either to finally decide the 
victory or to secure an orderly retreat. The velites, in company 
with the cavalry, did outpost duty, engaged the enemy in the 
beginning of the battle by skirmishing, and followed up the 
pursuit. The light pilum of the hastati and principes appears to 
have been principally used in defensive positions, to create 
disorder in the ranks of an advancing enemy before he was close 
enough for the heavy pilum. Marches to the front were begun 
from either wing, the first manipulus of hastati in front, followed 
by the first respectively of principes and triarii, then the 3 second 
manipuli in the same order, and so forth; marches to a flank were 
made in 3 columns, each of the 3 classes of infantry forming a 
column; the baggage was on the side furthest from the enemy. If 
the latter appeared from the side where the triarii marched, the 
army halted, and faced toward the enemy, the principes and 
hastati passing through the intervals of the manipuli of the triari 
and taking up their proper positions. 

When, after the second Punic war, the continued wars and 
extended conquests of the Romans, combined with important 
social changes in Rome and Italy generally, rendered the universal 
liability to military service almost impracticable, the Roman armies 
began gradually to be composed of voluntary recruits from the 
poorer classes, thus forming soldiers by profession instead of the 
old militia in which all the citizens were included. The army 
hereby entirely changed its character; and, the elements from 
which it was composed becoming deteriorated, a new organization 
became more and more a necessity. Marius carried out this new 
organization. The Roman horse ceased to exist. What little cavalry 
remained was composed of barbarian mercenaries or allied 


contingents.*” The distinction of the 4 classes of infantry was done 
away with. The velites were replaced by allied contingents or 
barbarians, and the remainder of the legion formed of one and 
the same class of infantry of the line, armed like the hastati or 
principes, but without the light pilum. The manipulus was 
replaced, as a tactical unit, by the cohort, a body averaging 360 
men, and formed originally by the fusion of 3 manipuli into one; 
so that the legion was now divided into 10 cohorts, which were 
generally disposed in 3 lines (4, 3, and 3 cohorts respectively). The 
cohort was formed 10 deep, with 3 to 4 feet front for each file, so 
that the total extent of front of the legion was very much reduced 
(about 1,000 feet). Thus, not only were the tactical movements 
much simplified, but the influence of the commander of the 
legion was made much more immediate and powerful. The 
armament and equipment of every soldier was lightened, but on 
the other hand he was made to carry the greater part of his 
baggage on wooden forks invented for the purpose by Marius 
(mult Mariani); the impedimenta of the army were thus considera- 
bly reduced. On the other hand, the concentration of 3 manipuli 
into one cohort could not but reduce the facility of manoeuvring 
in broken ground; the absence of the light pilum reduced the 
capability for defence; and the abolition of the velites, not always 
fully replaced by foreign auxiliaries or mercenaries, or by the 
antesignani (men selected from the legion for light infantry service 
by Caesar, but left without arms for distant fighting), diminished 
the chances of maintaining an engagement and still evading a 
decision. Rapid, resolute attack became the only form of combat 
fitted for these legions. Still the Roman infantry continued to 
consist of Romans, or at least Italians; and in spite of the decline 
of the empire under the Caesars, it maintained its ancient renown 
so long as the national character was left intact. But when Roman 
citizenship was no longer a necessary condition for admission into 
a legion, the army soon lost its standing. As early as the times of 
Trajan, barbarians, partly from the Roman provinces, partly from 
unconquered countries, formed the main force of the legions, and 
from that moment the character of the Roman infantry was lost. 
The heavy armor was thrown away; the pilum was replaced by the 
lance; the legion, organized into cohorts, was again fused into an 
unwieldy phalanx; and as a general unwillingness to come to close 
quarters was a characteristic of the infantry of this period, the bow 
and javelin were now used, not for skirmishing only, but also for 
the closed order of infantry of the line. 


348 Frederick Engels 


III. THE INFANTRY OF THE MIDDLE AGES_ 


The decline of the Roman infantry found a continuation in that 
of the Byzantine foot soldiers. A kind of forced levy was still 
maintained, but with no other result than to form the very dregs 
of the army. Barbarian auxiliaries and mercenaries composed its 
better portions, but even these were of no great value. The 
hierarchic and administrative organization of the troops was 
perfected to an almost ideal state of bureaucracy, but with the 
same result that we now see in Russia: a perfect organization of 
embezzlement and fraud at the expense of the state, with armies 
costing enormous sums and existing in part only on paper. The 
contact with the irregular horse of the East reduced both the 
importance and quality of the infantry more and more. Mounted 
archers became the favorite arm; the greater part if not all of the 
infantry were also equipped with the bow beside the lance and 
sword. Thus, fighting at a distance became the fashion, hand-to- 
hand encounters being regarded as out of date. The infantry was 
considered such rubbish that it was intentionally kept away from 
the field of battle, and used for garrison duty principally; most of 
the battles of Belisarius were fought by the cavalry exclusively, and 
when the infantry partook in them, it was sure to run away. His 
tactics were entirely based upon the principle of avoiding a combat 
at close quarters, and of tiring out the enemy. If he succeeded in 
this against the Goths, who had no distance arms at all, by 
choosing broken ground in which their phalanx could not act, he 
was beaten by the Franks, whose infantry had something of the 
old Roman mode of fighting about them, and by the Persians, 
whose cavalry was certainly superior to his. 

The German invaders of the Roman empire originally consisted 
for the greater part of infantry, and fought in a kind of Doric 
phalanx, the chiefs and wealthier men in the front ranks, the 
others behind them. Their arms were the sword and lance. The 
Franks, however, carried short, double-edged battle axes, which 
they threw, like the Roman pilum, into the hostile mass the 
moment before they charged sword in hand. They and the Saxons 
retained for some time a good and respected infantry; but 
gradually the Teutonic conquerors everywhere took to cavalry 
service, and left the duty of the foot soldiers to the conquered 
Roman provincials; thus the infantry service became despised as 
an attribute of slaves and serfs, and the character of the foot 
soldier necessarily sunk in proportion. By the end of the 10th 
century cavalry was the only arm which really decided battles all 


over Europe; infantry, though far more numerous in every army 
than cavalry, was nothing better than an ill-armed rabble with 
hardly any attempt at organization. A foot soldier was not even 
considered a soldier; the word miles became synonymous with 
horseman. The only chance for maintaining a respectable infantry 
lay with the towns, especially in Italy and Flanders. They had a 
militia of their own which was necessarily formed of infantry; and 
as its service for the protection of the towns, in the midst of the 
never-ending feuds among the surrounding nobles, was a perma- 
nent one, it was soon found convenient to have a force of paid 
mercenaries instead of a militia composed of the citizens, this 
latter force being reserved for extraordinary occasions. Still, we do 
not find that the contingents of the towns showed any marked 
superiority over the rabble of footmen collected by the nobles, and 
in battle always left to protect the baggage. This holds good, at 
least, for the classic period of chivalry. In the cavalry of these 
times, every knight appeared armed cap-a-pied,* covered all over 
with armor, and mounting a similarly armed horse. He was 
accompanied by an esquire rather more lightly armed, and by 
sundry other mounted men without any armor and armed with 
bows. In order of battle, these forces were ranged upon a 
principle similar to that of the ancient Doric phalanx—the heavily 
armed knights in the first, the esquires in the second rank, the 
mounted archers behind them. These last, from the nature of 
their arm, were soon employed in dismounted fighting, which 
became more and more the rule with them, so that their horses 
were mainly used for locomotion, not for a charge. The English 
archers, armed with the long-bow, while those of southern Europe 
carried the cross-bow, especially excelled in this mode of fighting 
on foot, and it was very likely this circumstance which soon led to 
an extension, in this service, of dismounted fighting. No doubt, in 
their long campaigns in France, the horses of the heavily armed 
knights got soon knocked up and unfit to serve for more than 
means of transport. In this plight it was natural that the worst 
mounted gendarmes should dismount and form a phalanx of 
lances, to be filled up by the better portion of the footmen 
(especially the Welsh); while those whose horses were still fit for a 
charge, now formed the actual fighting cavalry. Such an arrange- 
ment appeared very well adapted for defensive battles, and upon 
it were based all the battles of the Black Prince,” and, as is well 


a From head to foot.— Ed. 
b Edward, Prince of Wales.—FEd. 


350 Frederick Engels 


known, with perfect success. The new mode of fighting was soon 
adopted by the French and other nations, and may be considered 
as almost the normal system of the 14th and 15th centuries. Thus, 
after 1,700 years, we are brought back almost to the tactics of 
Alexander; with this difference only, that with Alexander cavalry 
was a newly introduced arm which had to strengthen the declining 
capabilities of the heavy infantry, while here the heavy infantry, 
formed by dismounted horsemen, was a living proof that cavalry 
was on the decline, and that a new day had dawned for infantry. 


IV. THE REVIVAL OF INFANTRY 


From the Flemish towns, then, the first manufacturing district 
of the world, and from the Swiss mountains, arose the first troops 
which, after centuries of decline, again deserved the name of 
infantry. The French chivalry succumbed as much to the weavers 
and fullers, the goldsmiths and tanners of the Belgian cities, as the 
Burgundian and Austrian nobility to the peasants and cowherds of 
Switzerland. Good defensive positions and a light armament did 
the most, supported as they were in the case of the Flemish by 
numerous fire-arms, and in that of the Swiss by a country almost 
impracticable to the heavily armed knights of the time. The Swiss 
carried principally short halberts, which might be used as well for 
thrusting as for striking, and were not too long for hand-to-hand 
fight; subsequently they also had pikes, and cross-bows and 
fire-arms; but in one of their most celebrated battles, at Laupen 
(1339),**° they had no arms for distant fighting but stones. From 
defensive encounters in their inaccessible mountains, they soon 
came to offensive battles in the plain, and with these to more 
regular tactics. They fought in a deep phalanx; defensive armor 
was light, and in general confined to the front ranks and the flank 
files, the centre being filled up by men without armor; the Swiss 
phalanx, however, was always formed in 3 distinct bodies, an 
advanced guard, a main body, and a rear guard, so that greater 
mobility and the chance of varied tactical arrangements were 
secured. They soon became expert in taking advantage of the 
accidents of ground, which, coupled with the improvement in 
fire-arms, protected them against the onslaught of cavalry, while 
against infantry armed with long lances they devised various 
means to work an entrance somewhere through the forest of 
lances, after which their short heavy halberts gave them an 
immense advantage, even against men cased in armor. They very 
soon learned, especially when assisted by artillery and small 


fire-arms, to hold out in squares or cross-shaped bodies against the 
charges of cavalry; and as soon as an infantry was again capable of 
doing that, the days of chivalry were numbered. 

About the middle of the 15th century the struggle of the cities 
against the feudal nobility had been everywhere taken up by the 
princes of the larger monarchies now consolidating, and conse- 
quently the latter had begun to form armies of mercenaries both 
for putting down the nobles and for carrying out independent 
objects of foreign policy. Beside the Swiss, the Germans, and soon 
after them most other European nations, began to furnish large 
contingents of mercenaries, raised by voluntary enlistment, and 
selling their services to the highest bidder without any regard to 
nationality. These bands formed themselves tactically upon the 
same principle as the Swiss; they were armed chiefly with pikes, 
and fought in large square battalions, as many men deep as there 
were in the front rank. They had to fight, however, under 
different circumstances from the Swiss who defended their 
mountains; they had to attack as well as to hold out in defensive 
positions; they had to encounter the enemy in the plains of Italy 
and France as well as in the hills; and they very soon found 
themselves face to face with the now rapidly improving small- 
arms. These circumstances caused some deviations from the old 
Swiss tactics, which were different according to the different 
nationalities; but the chief characteristics, the formation in 3 deep 
columns, figuring in name, if not always in reality, as advanced 
guard, main body, and rear guard or reserve, remained common 
to all. The Swiss retained their superiority until the battle of 
Pavia,**’ after which the German Landsknechte, who had already for 
some time been nearly if not fully equal to them, were considered 
the first infantry of Europe. The French, whose infantry had as 
yet never been good for any thing, tried very hard during this 
period to form a serviceable national body of foot soldiers; but 
they succeeded with the natives of two provinces only, the Picards 
and the Gascons. The Italian infantry of this period never counted 
for any thing. The Spaniards, however, among whom Gonsalvo de 
Cérdova during the wars with the Moors of Granada** first 
introduced the Swiss tactics and armament, very soon rose to 
considerable reputation, and after the middle of the 16th century 
began to pass for the best infantry of Europe. While the Italians, 
and after them the French and Germans, extended the length of 
the pike from 10 to 18 feet, they retained shorter and more handy 
lances, and their agility made them very formidable with sword 
and dagger in close encounter. This reputation they upheld in 


352 Frederick Engels 


western Europe—France, Italy, and the Netherlands at least—to 
the close of the 17th century. 

The contempt of the Swiss for defensive armor, based upon 
traditions of a different time, was not shared by the pikemen of 
the 16th century. As soon as a European infantry was formed in 
which the different armies were becoming more and more equal 
to each other in military qualities, the system of lining the phalanx 
with a few men covered with breastplates and helmets proved to 
be insufficient. If the Swiss had found such a phalanx impenetra- 
ble, this was no longer the case when it was met by another 
phalanx quite its equal. Here a certain amount of defensive armor 
became of some importance; so long as it did not too much 
impede the mobility of the troops, it was a decided advantage. The 
Spaniards, moreover, had never participated in this contempt for 
breastplates, and they began to be respected. Accordingly, 
breastplates, helmets, cuissarts, brassarts, and gauntlets began 
again to form a part of the regular equipment of every pikeman. 
To it was added a sword, shorter with the Germans, longer with 
the Swiss, and now and then a dagger. 


V. THE INFANTRY OF THE 16TH AND 17TH CENTURIES 


The long-bow had for some time disappeared from the 
continent of Europe, excepting Turkey; the cross-bow made its 
last appearance among the French Gascons in the first quarter of 
the 16th century. It was everywhere replaced by the matchlock 
musket, which, in different degrees of perfection, or rather 
imperfection, now became the second arm of the infantry. The 
matchlocks of the 17th century, unwieldy and defectively con- 
structed machines, were of very heavy caliber, to secure, beside 
range, at least some precision, and the force to penetrate the 
breastplate of a pikeman. The form generally adopted about 1530 
was the heavy musket fired off from a fork, as a man could not 
have taken aim without such a support. The musketeers carried a 
sword, but no defensive armor, and were used either for 
skirmishing or in a kind of open order, to hold defensive positions 
or to prepare the charge of the pikemen for the attack of such 
positions. They soon became very numerous in proportion to the 
pikemen; in the battles of Francis I in Italy they were far inferior 
to the pikemen in numbers, but were at least in equal numbers 
with them 30 years later. This increase in the number of 
musketeers compelled the invention of some tactical method of 
regularly encasing them in the order of battle. This was done in 


the system of tactics called the Hungarian ordinance, invented by 
the imperial troops in their wars with the Turks in Hungary. The 
musketeers, being unable to defend themselves at close quarters, 
were always placed so as to be able to retire behind the pikemen. 
Thus they were sometimes placed on either wing, sometimes on 
the 4 corners of the wings; very often the whole square or column 
of pikemen was surrounded by a rank of musketeers, who found 
protection under the pikes of their rear men. Finally, the plan of 
having the musketeers on the flanks of the pikemen got the upper 
hand in the new tactical system introduced by the Dutch in their 
war of independence.” This system is distinguished especially by 
the subdivision of the 3 great phalanges in which every army was 
formed according to both the Swiss and Hungarian tactics. Each of 
them was formed upon 3 lines, the middle one of which was again 
subdivided into a right and a left wing, separated from each other 
by a distance equal at least to the extent of front of the first line. 
The whole army being organized in half regiments, which we will 
call battalions, each battalion had its pikemen in the centre and its 
musketeers on the flanks. The advanced guard of an army, 
consisting of 3 regiments, would thus be formed as follows: two 
half regiments in contiguous line in the first line; behind each of 
their wings another half regiment; further to the rear, and 
covering the first line, the remaining two half regiments also in 
contiguous line. The main body and rear guard might be placed 
either on the flank or behind the advanced guard, but would be 
formed on the same plan. Here we have a return in a certain 
degree to the old Roman formation in 3 lines and distinct small 
bodies. 

The imperialists, and with them the Spaniards, had found the 
necessity of dividing their large armies into more than the 3 
masses already mentioned; but their battalions or tactical units 
were much larger than the Dutch, fought in column or square 
instead of in line, and had not had a regular formation for order 
of battle until during the Dutch war of independence the 
Spaniards began to form them in what is known as a Spanish 
brigade. Four of these large battalions, each consisting often of 
several regiments, formed in square, surrounded with a rank or 
two of musketeers, and having wings of musketeers at the corners, 
were disposed at proper intervals on the 4 corners of a square, 
one corner being turned toward the enemy. If the army was too 
large to be comprised in one brigade, two could be formed; and 
thus arose 3 lines, having 2 battalions in the first, 4 (sometimes 
only 3) in the second, and 2 in the third. As in the Dutch system, 


354 Frederick Engels 


we find here the attempt to return to the old Roman system of 3 
lines. 

Another great change took place during the 16th century; the 
heavy cavalry of the knights was broken up and replaced by a 
mercenary cavalry, armed similarly to our modern cuirassiers, with 
cuirass, helmet, sword, and pistols. This cavalry, greatly superior 
in mobility to their predecessors, became thereby more formidable 
to infantry also; still the pikemen of the time were never afraid of 
it. By this change cavalry became a uniform arm, and entered in a 
far larger proportion into the composition of armies, especially 
during the period we now have to consider, viz., the 30 years’ 
war.’ At this time the system of mercenary service was universal 
in Europe; a class of men had been formed who lived upon war 
and by war; and though tactics might have gained thereby, the 
character of the men, the material composing armies as well as 
their morale, had certainly suffered. Central Europe was overrun 
by condottiert of all kinds, who took religious and political quarrels 
for their pretext to plunder and devastate the whole country. The 
character of the individual soldier had entered upon that 
degradation which went on increasing until the French revolution 
finally swept away this system of mercenary service. The imperial- 
ists formed their battles upon the Spanish brigade system, having 
4 or more brigades in line, thus forming 3 lines. The Swedes 
under Gustavus Adolphus formed in Swedish brigades, each 
consisting of 3 battalions, one in front and two a little to the rear, 
each deployed in line, and having the pikes in the centre and the 
musketeers on the wings. They were so disposed (both arms being 
represented in equal numbers) that by forming a contiguous line 
either could cover the other. Supposing the order given to form a 
contiguous line of musketeers, the two wings of that arm of the 
centre or front battalion would cover their own pikes by stepping 
before them, while those of the two other battalions would, each 
on its flank, advance into alignment with the first. If an attack of 
cavalry was apprehended, all the musketeers retired behind the 
pikemen, while the two wings of these latter advanced into 
alignment with the centre, and thus formed a contiguous line of 
pikes. The order of battle was formed of two lines of such 
brigades, composing the centre of the army, while the numerous 
cavalry was stationed on the two wings, and intermixed with small 
bodies of musketeers. The characteristic of this Swedish system is 
that the pikemen, who in the 16th century had been the great 
offensive arm, had now lost all capacity of attack. They had 
become a mere means of defence, and their office was to screen 


the musketeers from a charge of cavalry; it was this latter arm 
again which had to do all the attacking work. Thus, infantry had 
lost, cavalry had regained ground. But then Gustavus Adolphus 
put an end to the firing which had become a favorite mode of 
fighting for cavalry, and ordered his horse always to charge at full 
speed and sword in hand; and from that time to the resumption 
of fighting in broken ground every cavalry which adhered to these 
tactics was able to boast of great successes over infantry. There can 
be no greater condemnation of the mercenary infantry of the 17th 
and 18th centuries than that; and yet it was, for all purposes of 
battle, the most disciplined infantry of all times. 

The general result of the 30 years’ war upon European tactics 
was that both the Swedish and the Spanish brigades disappeared, 
and armies were now disposed in two lines, the cavalry forming 
the wings and the infantry the centre. The artillery was placed 
before the front or in the intervals of the other arms. Sometimes a 
reserve of cavalry, or of cavalry and infantry, was retained. The 
infantry was deployed in line, 6 deep; the muskets were so much 
lightened that the fork could be dispensed with, and cartridges 
and cartridge boxes had been everywhere adopted. The mixing up 
of musketeers and pikemen in the same infantry battalions now 
gave rise to the most complicated tactical movements, all founded 
upon the necessity of forming what was called defensive battalions, 
or what we should call squares against cavalry. Even in a simple 
Square, it was no trifle to get the 6 ranks of pikemen from the 
centre so drawn asunder that they completely surrounded on all 
sides the musketeers, who, of course, were defenceless against 
cavalry; but what must it have been to form in a similar way the 
battalion into a cross, an octagon, or other fanciful shapes! Thus it 
happened that the drilling system of this period was the most 
complicated ever seen, and nobody but a soldier for life ever had 
any chance of attaining even the commonest proficiency in it. At 
the same time, it is obvious that, before the enemy, all these 
attempts at forming a body capable of resisting cavalry were 
perfectly useless; any decent cavalry would have been in the midst 
of such a battalion before one fourth of the movements could 
have been gone through. 

During the latter half of the 17th century, the number of 
pikemen was very much reduced in proportion to that of 
musketeers; for from the moment that they had lost all power of 
attack, the musketeers were the really active part of the infantry. 
Moreover, it was found that the Turkish cavalry, the most 
formidable of the time, very often broke into the squares of 


356 Frederick Engels 


pikemen, while they were quite as often repulsed by the well 
aimed fire of a line of musketeers. In consequence, the 
imperialists did away with all pikes in their Hungarian army, and 
replaced them sometimes by chevaux de frise, which were put 
together on the field, the musketeers carrying the blades as part of 
their regular equipment. In other countries, too, cases occurred of 
armies being sent into the field without a single pikeman, the 
musketeers trusting to their fire and the assistance of their own 
cavalry when threatened with a charge of horse. Still, two 
inventions were required to do away entirely with the pike: the 
bayonet, invented in France about 1640, and improved in 1699 so 
far as to be the handy weapon now in use; and the flint lock, 
invented about 1650.* The former, though certainly an imperfect 
substitute for the pike, enabled the musketeer to give himself, to a 
certain degree, that protection which he had hitherto been 
supposed to find in the pikemen; the second, by simplifying the 
process of loading, enabled him to do much more than make up 
by rapid firing for the imperfections of the bayonet. : 


VI. THE INFANTRY OF THE 18TH CENTURY 


With the superseding of the pike, all defensive armor disap- 
peared from infantry equipment, and this arm was now composed 
of one class of soldiers only, armed with the flint-lock musket and 
bayonet. This change was accomplished in the first years of the 
Spanish war of succession,’ coinciding with the first years of the 
18th century. At the same time, we now find everywhere standing 
armies of considerable magnitude, recruited as much as possible 
by voluntary. enlistment coupled with kidnapping, but in case of 
need also by forced conscription. These armies were now regularly 
organized in battalions of from 500 to 700 men, as tactical units, 
subdivided for special purposes into companies; several battalions 
forming a regiment. Thus the organization of infantry now began 
to take a more stable and settled form. The handling of the flint 
lock requiring far less space than that of the old matchlock, the 
old open order was done away with, and the files were closed well 
up to each other, in order to have as many firing men as possible 
in the same space. For the same reason, the intervals between the 
various battalions in line of battle were reduced to a minimum, so 
that the whole front formed one stiff and uninterrupted line, the 
infantry, in two lines, in the centre, the cavalry on the wings. 


a The New American. Cyclopaedia has 1670 here.— Ed. 


Firing, formerly done by ranks, every rank after having fired 
retiring to the rear to reload, was now done by platoons or 
companies, the 3 front ranks of each platoon firing simultaneously 
as the word of command was given. Thus an uninterrupted fire 
could be maintained by every battalion against the enemy in front 
of it. Every battalion had its distinct place in this long line, and the 
order giving to each its place was called the order of battle. The 
great difficulty now was to organize the marching order of the 
army so that it could always with facility pass from the marching 
to the fighting order, every portion of the line getting at once and 
quickly into its proper place. Encampments within reach of the 
enemy were arranged with a view to the same object. Thus the art 
of marching and encamping armies made great progress during 
this epoch; still the stiffness and unwieldiness of the order of 
battle formed a heavy clog upon all the movements of an army. At 
the same time, its formality, and the impossibility of handling such 
a line in any but the most level plains, still more restricted the 
choice of ground for battle fields; but as long as both parties were 
bound by the same fetters, this was no disadvantage for either. 
From Malplaquet*” to the outbreak of the French revolution, a 
road, a village, or a farm yard was tabooed to infantry; even a 
ditch or a hedge was considered almost a drawback by those who 
had to defend them. 

The Prussian infantry is the classic infantry of the 18th century. 
It was principally formed by Prince Leopold of Dessau. During the 
war of the Spanish succession, the line of infantry had been 
reduced from 6 deep to 4 deep. Leopold did away with the 4th 
rank, and formed the Prussians 3 deep. He also introduced the 
iron ramrod, which enabled his troops to load and fire 5 times in 
a minute, while other troops scarcely fired 3 times. At the same 
time they were drilled to fire while advancing, but as they had to 
stop for firing, and as the alignment of the whole long line had to 
be maintained, the step was but slow—what is called the goose 
step. Firing began at 200 yards from the enemy; the line advanced 
at the goose step, stepping shorter and redoubling fire the nearer 
it got to the enemy, until the latter either gave way, or was so far 
shaken that a cavalry charge from the wings, and an advance with 
the bayonet of the infantry, drove him from his position. The 
army was always ranged on two lines, but, there being scarcely any 
intervals in the first line, it became very difficult for the second to 
come to the aid of the first when wanted. Such was the army and 
such were the tactics which Frederick II of Prussia found at his 
disposal on his accession. There appeared to be very little chance 


358 Frederick Engels 


for a man of genius to improve upon this system, unless he broke 
through it, and that Frederick, in his position and with the 
material he had for soldiers, could not do. Still he contrived to 
organize his mode of attack and his army so that he could, with 
the resources of a kingdom less than Sardinia now is, and with 
scanty pecuniary support from England, carry on a war against 
almost all Europe. The mystery may be easily explained. Hitherto 
the battles of the 18th century had been parallel battles, both 
armies being deployed on lines parallel to each other, struggling in 
a plain, fair, stand-up fight, without any stratagems or devices of 
art; the only advantage accruing to the stronger party being that 
his wings overlapped those of his opponent. Frederick applied to 
the line order of battle the system of oblique attack invented by 
Epaminondas. He chose one wing of the enemy for the first 
attack, and brought against this one of his wings, overlapping that 
of the enemy, and part of his centre, at the same time keeping 
back the rest of his army. Thus not only had he the advantage of 
outflanking the enemy, but also of crushing by superior forces the 
troops exposed to his attack. The other troops of the enemy could 
not come to the assistance of those attacked; for not only were 
they tied to their places in the line, but as the attack on the one 
wing proved successful, the remainder of the army entered into 
line and engaged the hostile centre in front, while the original 
attacking wing fell upon its flank after disposing of the wing. This 
was indeed the only imaginable method by which it was possible, 
while maintaining the system of lines, to bring a superior force 
upon any one part of the enemy’s line of battle. Every thing, then, 
depended upon the formation of the attacking wing; and as far as 
the rigidity of the order of battle admitted of it, Frederick always 
strengthened it. He very often placed in front of the first line of 
infantry of the attacking wing an advanced line formed of his 
grenadiers or élite troops, so as to insure success as much as 
possible at the first onset. 

The second means which Frederick took to improve his army 
was the reorganization of his cavalry. The teachings of Gustavus 
Adolphus had been forgotten; cavalry, instead of relying on the 
sword and the impetuosity of the charge, with rare exceptions had 
returned to fighting with the pistol and the carbine. The wars in 
the beginning of the 18th century had thus not been rich in 
successful charges of horsemen; the Prussian cavalry was especially 
neglected. But Frederick returned to the old plan of charging 
sword in hand and at full gallop, and formed a cavalry unequalled 
in history; and to this cavalry he owed a very great part of his 


successes. When his army became the model of Europe, Frederick, 
in order to blind the military men of other nations, began to 
complicate to an astonishing degree the system of tactical 
evolutions, all of them unfit for actual war, and intended only to 
hide the simplicity of the means which had procured him victory. 
He succeeded so well in this that nobody was more blinded than 
his own subordinates, who actually believed that these complex 
methods of forming line were the real essence of his tactics; and 
thus Frederick, beside laying the foundation for that pedantry and 
martinetism which have since distinguished the Prussians, actually 
prepared them for the unparalleled disgrace of Jena and 
Auerstadt.*”” 

Beside the infantry of the line, which we have so far described, 
and which always fought in closed ranks, there was a certain class 
of light infantry, but this did not appear in great battles. Its task 
was the war of partisans; for this the Austrian Croats were 
admirably adapted, while for every other purpose they were 
useless. Upon the model of these half savages from the military 
frontier against Turkey,’ the other European states formed their 
light infantry. But skirmishing in great battles, such as was 
practised by the light infantry of antiquity and of the middle ages, 
even up to the 17th century, had completely disappeared. The 
Prussians alone, and after them the Austrians, formed a battalion 
or two of riflemen, composed of gamekeepers and forest guards, 
all dead shots, who in battle were distributed over the whole front 
and fired at officers; but they were so few that they scarcely 
counted. The resuscitation of skirmishing is the product of the 
Amcrican war of independence.” While the soldiers of European 
armies, held together by compulsion and severe treatment, could 
not be trusted to fight in extended order, in America they had to 
contend with a population which, untrained to the regular drill of 
line soldiers, were good shots and well acquainted with the rifle. 
The nature of the ground favored them; instead of attempting 
manoeuvres of which at first they were incapable, they uncon- 
sciously fell into skirmishing. Thus, the engagement of Lexington 
and Concord marks an epoch in the history of infantry.