THE BRITISH AND CHINESE TREATY 


London, Sept. 28, 1858 


The official summary of the Anglo-Chinese treaty,* which the 
British Ministry has at last laid before the public, adds, on the 
whole, but little to the information that had already been conveyed 
through different other channels. The first and the last articles 
comprise, in fact, the points in the treaty of exclusively English 
interest. By the first article, “the supplementary treaty and general 
regulations of trade,” stipulated after the conclusion of the treaty 
of Nankin,*' are “abrogated.” That supplementary treaty provided 
that the English Consuls residing at Hong Kong, and the five 
Chinese ports opened to British commerce, were to cooperate with 
the Chinese authorities in case any English vessels should arrive 
within the range of their consular jurisdiction with opium on 
board. A formal prohibition was thus laid upon English merchants 
to import the contraband drug, and the English Government, to 
some degree, constituted itself one of the Custom-House officers 
of the Celestial Empire. That the second opium war should end in 
removing the fetters by which the first opium war still affected to 
check the opium traffic, appears a result quite logical, and a 
consummation devoutly called for by that part of the British 
mercantile public which chanted most lusty applause to Palmer- 
ston’s Canton fireworks.*? We are, however, much mistaken, if this 
official abandonment on the part of England of her hypocritic 
opposition to the opium trade is not to lead to consequences quite 
the reverse of those expected. By engaging the British Govern- 
ment to cooperate in the suppression of the opium traffic, the 
Chinese Government had recognized its inability to do so on its 


a The Times, No. 23109, September 27, 1858.— Ed. 


The British and Chinese Treaty 47 


own account. The supplementary treaty of Nankin was a supreme 
and rather desperate effort at getting rid of the opium trade by 
foreign aid. This effort having failed, and being now proclaimed a 
failure, the opium traffic being now, so far as England is 
concerned, legalized, little doubt can remain that the Chinese 
Government will try a method alike recommended by political and 
financial considerations—viz.: legalize the cultivation of the poppy 
in China, and lay duties on the foreign opium imported. Whatever 
may be the intentions of the present Chinese Government, the 
very circumstances in which it finds itself placed by the treaty of 
Tien-tsin, show all that way. 

That change once effected, the opium monopoly of India, and 
with it the Indian Exchequer, must receive a deadly blow, while 
the British opium traffic will shrink to the dimensions of an 
ordinary trade, and very soon prove a losing one. Till now, it has 
been a game played by John Bull with loaded dice. To have 
baffled its own object, seems, therefore, the most obvious result of 
the opium war No. II. 

Having declared “a just war” on Russia, generous England 
desisted, at the conclusion of peace, from demanding any 
indemnity for her war expenses. Having, on the other hand, all 
along professed to be at peace with China itself, she, accordingly, 
cannot but make it pay for expenses incurred, in the opinion of 
her own present Ministers, by piracy on her own part. However, 
the first tidings of the fifteen or twenty millions of pounds sterling 
to be paid by the Celestials proved a quieter to the most 
scrupulous British conscience, and very pleasant calculations as to 
the beneficial effects of the Sycee silver* upon the balance of 
trade, and the metal reserve of the Bank of England, were entered 
into by The Economist and the writers of money articles generally. 
But alas! the first impressions which the Palmerstonian press had 
given itself so much trouble to produce and work upon, were too 
tender to bear the shock of real information. 

A “separate article provides that a sum of two millions of taels”? shall be paid 
“on account of the losses sustained by British subjects through the misconduct of 


the Chinese authorities at Canton; and a further sum of two millions of taels on 
account of the expenses of the war.” 


Now, these sums together amount to £1,334,000 only, while, in 
1842, the Emperor of China had to pay £4,200,000, of which 
£1,200,000 was indemnity for the contraband opium confiscated, 


a Tael—a Chinese monetary unit; three taels are equal to one pound 
sterling.— Ed. 


48 Karl Marx 


and £3,000,000 for the expenses of the war. To come down from 
£4,200,000, with Hong Kong into the bargain, to simple 
£1,334,000, seems no thriving trade after all; but the worst 
remains still to be said. Since, says the Chinese Emperor, yours 
was no war with China, but a “provincial war” with Canton only, 
try yourselves how to squeeze out of the province of Kwang-tung 
the damages which your amiable war steamers have compelled me 
to adjudge to you. Meanwhile, your illustrious Gen. Straubenzee 
may keep Canton as a material guaranty, and continue to make 
the British arms the laughing-stock even of Chinese braves. The 
doleful feelings of sanguine John Bull at these clauses, which the 
small booty of £1,334,000 is encumbered with, have already 
vented themselves in audible groans. 


“Instead,” says one London paper, “of being able to withdraw our 53 
ships-of-war, and see them return triumphant with millions of Sycee silver, we may 
look forward to the pleasing necessity of sending an army of 5,000 men to 
recapture and hold Canton, and to assist the fleet in carrying on that provincial 
war which the Consul’s deputy has declared. But will this provincial war have no 
consequences beyond driving our Canton trade to other Chinese ports?... Will not 
the continuation of it [the provincial war] give Russia a large portion of the tea 
trade? May not the Continent, and England herself, become dependent on Russia 
and the United States for their tea?” 


John Bull’s anxiety as to the effects of the “provincial war” 
upon the tea trade is not quite gratuitous. From McGregor’s 
Commercial Tariffs” it may be seen that in the last year of the 
former Chinese war, Russia received 120,000 chests of tea at 
Kiakhta. The year after the conclusion of peace with China the 
Russian demand fell off 75 per cent, amounting to 30,000 only. At 
all events, the costs still to be incurred by the British in distraining 
Kwang-tung are sure so to swell the wrong side of the balance that 
this second China war will hardly be self-paying, the greatest fault 
which, as Mr. Emerson justly remarks, anything can be guilty of in 
British estimation. 

Another great success of the English invasion is contained in 
Art. 51, according to which 


“the term barbarian is not to be applied to the British Government nor to 
British subjects in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese 
authorities.” 


a “Treaties with China”, The Free Press, No. 21, September 22, 1858.— Ed. 

5 J. Mac-Gregor, Commercial Tariffs and Regulations, Resources, and Trade of the 
Several States of Europe and America, London, 1841-50. Quoted from The Free Press, 
No. 21, September 22, 1858.— Ed. 


The Bnitish and Chinese Treaty 49 


The Chinese authorities styling themselves Celestial, how hum- 
ble to their understanding must not appear John Bull, who, 
instead of insisting on being called divine or Olympian, contents 
himself with weeding the character representing the word 
barbarian out of the official documents. 

The commercial articles of the treaty give England no advantage 
not to be enjoyed by her rivals, and, for the present, dissolve into 
shadowy promises, for the greater part not worth the parchment 
they are written on. Art. 10 stipulates: 


“British merchant ships are to be allowed to trade up the great river (Yang-tse), 
but in the present disturbed state of the Upper and Lower Valley, no port is to be 
opened for trade with the exception of Chin-kiang, which is to be opened in a year 
from the signature of the treaty. When peace is restored, British vessels are to be 
admitted to trade at such ports, as far as Hankow, not exceeding three in number, 
as the British Minister, after consulting with the Chinese Secretary of State, shall 
determine.” 


By this article, the British are in fact excluded from the great 
commercial artery of the whole empire, from “the only line,” as 
The Morning Star justly remarks, “by which they can push their 
manufactures into the interior.” If they will be good boys, and 
help the Imperial Government in dislodging the rebels from the 
regions now occupied by them, then they may eventually navigate 
the great river, but only to particular harbors. As to the new 
seaports opened, from “all” the ports, as at first advertised, they 
have dwindled down to five ports, added to the five ports of the 
treaty of Nankin, and, as a London paper remarks, “they are 
generally remote or insular.” Besides, at this time of the day, the 
delusive notion of the growth of trade being proportionate to the 
number of ports opened, should have been exploded. Consider 
the harbors on the coasts of Great Britain, or France, or the 
United States, how few of them have developed themselves into 
real emporiums of commerce? Before the first Chinese war, the 
English traded exclusively to Canton. The concession of five new 
ports, instead of creating five new emporiums of commerce, has 
gradually transferred trade from Canton to Shanghai, as may be 
seen from the following figures, extracted from the Parliamentary 
Blue-Book on the trade of various places for 1856-57. At the same 
time, it should be recollected that the Canton imports include the 
imports to Amoy and Fu-chow, which are transhipped at Canton. 
[See Table on p. 50.] 

“The commercial clauses of the treaty are dinsadetacton.” "isa 
conclusion arrived at by The Daily Telegraph,; Palmerston’s most 
abject sycophant; but it chuckles at “the brightest point in the 


50 Karl Marx 


British import trade to British export trade from 
Canton. Shanghai. Canton. Shanghai. 
1844............ $15,500,000 $2,500,000 $17,900,000 $2,300,000 
P45 icvssrsveass 10,700,000 5,100,000 27,700,000 6,000,000 
1846............ 9,900,000 3,800,000 15,300,000 6,400,000 
ROS cxstssetned 9,600,000 4,300,000 15,700,000 6,700,000 
1848............ 6,500,000 2,500,000 8,600,000 5,000,000 
1849.00.00. 7,900,000 4,400,000 11,400,000 6,500,000 
TSB0 eettesaces 6,800,000 3,900,000 9,900,000 8,000,000 
LOB iccntinets 10,000,000 4,500,000 13,200,000 11,500,000 
| Es be bP Eee eee 9,900,000 4,600,000 6,500,000 11,400,000 
Gs ele Poanee Renee 4,000,000 3,900,000 6,500,000 13,300,000 
|e 5s ear 3,300,000 1,100,100 6,000,000 11,700,000— 
LOSS etieseustacs 3,600,000 3,400,000 2,900,000 19,900,000 
LOS Gwin, ee 9,100,000 6,100,000 8,200,000 25,800,000 * 


programme,” viz.: “that the British Minister may establish himself 
at Pekin, while a Mandarin will install himself in London, and 
possibly invite the Queen to a ball at Albert Gate.” However John 
Bull may indulge this fun, there can be no doubt that whatever 
political influence may be exercised at Pekin will fall to the part of 
Russia, which, by dint of the Jast treaty, holds a new territory, 
being as large as France, and, in great part, on its frontier, 800 
miles only distant from Pekin. It is by no means a comfortable 
reflection for John Bull that he himself, by his first optum-war, 
procured Russia a treaty yielding her the navigation of the Amoor 
and free trade on the land frontier, while by his second opitum-war 
he has helped her to the invaluable tract lying between the Gulf of 
Tartary and Lake Baikal, a region so much coveted by Russia that 
from Czar Alexei Michaelowitch down to Nicholas, she has always 
attempted to get it.44 So deeply did the London Times” feel that 
sting that, in its publication of the St. Petersburg news, which 
greatly exaggerated the advantages won by Great Britain, good 
care was taken to suppress that part of the telegram which 
mentioned Russia’s acquisition by treaty of the valley of the 
Amoor. 


Written on September 28, 1858 Reproduced from the New-York 


First. published in the New-York Daily Dasy: Levine 
Tribune, “No. 5455, October 15, 1858; 

reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly 

Tribune, No. 1398, October 19, 1858 


a “What Commercial Treaties May Really Effect”, The Economist, No. 785, 
September 11, 1858.— Ed. 

b“The Russian Despatch from China”, The Times, No. 23085, August 30, 
1858.— Ed.