The famous article on Italian affairs, in the Moniteur of the 9th 
of September, supposed to come directly from Louis Napoleon 
himself,? and which has been the occasion of so much comment, 
may be considered as including three principal topics. The first of 
these topics is an apology for the treaty of Villafranca,*” and 
especially for that part of it which provided for the restoration of 
the expelled Archdukes. The second topic is a confession that the 
treaty, and the expensive war which preceded it, have wholly 
failed to bring about any settlement of Italian affairs, and an 
attempt to shift the blame of that failure from the treaty itself to 
the shoulders of those who have stood in the way of the stipulated 
restoration of the expelled sovereigns. The third topic is a warning 
to the Italians, that since they are unwilling to conform to the 
arrangements which the French Emperor saw fit to make for 
them, they have nothing more to expect from him, and that they 
must prepare themselves to see Austria resume her old position, 
without any further interference on the part of France, of the 
oppressor of the Italians under her immediate rule, and the 
jealous, bitter, and ever watchful enemy of Italian nationality, 
impending over Italy with a great army and keeping it in a 
constant state of unquiet and distrust. 

The excuse given for treating at all, and for leaving Austria by 
that treaty in the possession of an important part of Italy, contrary 
to the programme with which the war commenced, is—first, the 

@ Le Moniteur universel, No. 252, September 9, 1859.— Ed. 

The Future of Italy 505 

strength of Austria herself, notwithstanding her defeats with 
forces still numerically superior, and now backed by formidable 
fortresses; and, secondly and principally, the impending danger of 
an interference on the part of Germany, which would have 
compelled the Emperor Napoleon to transfer his military efforts 
to the banks of the Rhine, thus seriously risking the loss of the 
advantages already gained in Italy. In excuse for the agreement 
that the banished Archdukes should be restored, Napoleon pleads 
that it was only by this concession that he could induce the 
Emperor of Austria* to come into the proposed Italian Confedera- 
tion, and in so doing to recognize Italian nationality, and 
voluntarily to abandon the supremacy and control which she had 
acquired over the Italian peninsula, and which had been the 
occasion of the late war. He also sets forth as another reason for 
his consent to the restoration of the Archdukes, a counter- 
stipulation on the part of Austria, now heard of for the first time, 
to give Venetia a government of its own, distinct from the general 
administration of the Austrian Empire—in fact, to convert it from 
an Austrian Province, held by the hand of a conqueror with 
military force, into an Italian Principality, with a distinct local 
administration, and, as a member of the Italian Confederation, 
participating in the advantages of Italian nationality. He sets up 
also this further excuse for a stipulation which seemed like 
betraying and abandoning those whom he had stimulated to act, 
and by which his Italian popularity has so severely suffered, that it 
was by no means intended to bring back the Archdukes by the 
assistance of foreign troops, but to effect their return with the 
consent of the people, and with guaranties as to the future. 
The article proceeds to draw a glowing picture of what might 
have been expected had the arrangements agreed upon for Italy 
by the two Emperors been frankly adopted by the people of Italy 
and carried into effect. Austria, from the dread and terror of 
Italy, would have been at once converted into a friendly or at least 
a harmless power. The Italian Confederation, in giving to Italian 
nationality a practical existence, would have, as its most influential 
member, Sardinia, the representative of the cause of Italy. But 
greatly to the chagrin of the Imperial penman of the Moniteur all 
these hopes have been dashed, by the narrow-mindedness and 
selfishness, as he alleges, of those who have stood and still stand in 
the way of the restoration of the banished Archdukes; and by 
reason of their conduct he pronounces the war and the treaty to 

a Francis Joseph.— Ed. 

be a complete failure. Since this part of the treaty has failed of its 
effect, he declares Austria to be released from her stipulations on 
behalf of Venetia, and as to the Italian Confederation. She is now 
at liberty, as to both those points, to pursue her old policy—to 
make the armaments kept up on the south bank of the Po a 
reason for maintaining her own forces on the opposite bank upon 
a war footing, and, in fact, to assume, as to all the rest of Italy, the 
very same position which was made the occasion of the late war, 
and which cannot fail in the end to lead to fresh troubles and 
disasters. 

The statement that it was not intended at Villafranca that an 
armed force should be employed for the restoration of the 
expelled Archdukes, seems to be understood in Italy as amounting 
to a declaration on the part of Napoleon that he will not allow a 
foreign armed force to be employed for that purpose, and in that 
point of view this Moniteur article has been received there with 
satisfaction. But it does not admit of any such construction. The 
most that it amounts to is, that Napoleon did not pledge himself to 
interfere by force for the carrying out of that provision of the 
treaty, and that he does not intend to do so. But there is not the 
least intimation that should Austria see fit to cross the Po, for 
which she might easily find pretenses, he considers himself bound 
to interfere. On the other hand he can only be understood as 
giving notice that he has played out his game of Italian 
intervention, and as washing his hands of any responsibility for 
what may hereafter take place in Italy. In referring to the 
proposed European Congress on Italian affairs, he even suggests 
that nothing can be got from Austria without compensation. At 
least the only other alternative is war. In that respect France has 
done all she intends, and the Italians will look in vain for anybody 
else willing to go to war for them. 

In truth, this article appears to hold out this alternative to the 
Italians, either to submit to the restoration of the Archdukes, or to 
abandon all hopes of further French interference, and to prepare 
themselves to deal with Austria as they may. In truth, from the 
complimentary tone in which the article alludes to the Emperor of 
Austria, and his readiness, for the sake of a good understanding 
with France, to make the sacrifices he did at the peace of 
Villafranca, there certainly would seem just now not the least 
disposition to engage in a new quarrel with him. On the other 
hand, the main object of this manifesto would seem to be to give 
notice to Austria that so far as France is concerned she is at liberty 
to deal with Italy as she may deem fit. Having spent a hundred 

The Future of Italy 507 

millions of dollars and used up 50,000 men to establish an Italian 
Confederation, which proves a chimera, the French Emperor 
proposes to withdraw from all further special concern in Italian 
affairs.