We believe we have published every important account of the 
battle of Magenta which has been given to the world by the 
Governments involved and by the leading European journals. 
That battle happened nearly a month ago; and even in the view of 
our rather rigid friends of The Evening Post, it may now be 
discussed in a newspaper without doing violence to either 
propriety, earnestness or honesty; and accordingly we proceed 
- with all deference to set forth the truth in the form of a historical 
and, if we may be allowed the expression, a strategical study of 
that battle.’ 

On the morning of June 4, the Austrians had completed their 
retreat across the Ticino, and were marching up toward Magenta 
and Abbiategrasso, in order to take in flank the French army 
advancing toward Milan; while Gen. Clam-Gallas, who had just 
arrived with a division of the lst corps from Milan, was to oppose 
them in front with his division and the 2d corps (Liechtenstein’s), 
which had joined him at Magenta. As a reserve, he had the 
Reischach division of the 7th corps (Zobel’s) at Corbetta, a couple 
of miles behind Magenta. The line of the Ticino itself having been 
abandoned as indefensible, these seven or eight Austrian brigades 
were to hold the line of the Naviglio Grande, a large canal 

Emperor, June 7, 1859”, The Times, No. 23331, June 13, 1859.)— Ed. 

running nearly parallel to the Ticino, and passable by bridges 
only. The two bridges to be defended were those of Boffalora and 
Magenta, on two roads leading both from Magenta to the bridge 
of San Martino over the Ticino. The division of the Ist corps 
(commanded by Gen. Cordon) advanced on the road to Turbigo; 
two brigades of the 2d corps were on the bridges; a third at 
Magenta; and Reischach’s division, as we have said, at Corbetta. 

The French advanced in two columns. The first, under the 
nominal command of Louis Napoleon, consisted of the division of 
grenadiers of the guard, of Canrobert’s, Niel’s and Baraguay 
d’Hilliers’s corps, in all 9 divisions, or 18 brigades (117 battalions). 
It advanced on the direct road from Novara to Milan, by the 
bridge of San Martino, and was to take the bridges of Boffalora 
and Magenta. The second, under McMahon, consisted of the 
division of voltigeurs* of the guard, of McMahon’s corps, and of 
the whole Piedmontese army—in all 8 divisions, or 16 brigades, 
and including 109 battalions, as the Piedmontese divisions count 
one battalion more than the French. The head of this body had 
passed the Ticino and Naviglio without serious resistance at 
Turbigo, and was now to support the front attack of the first 
column by a movement upon the flank of the Austrians, by 
marching straight upon Magenta from the north. This column was 
to attack first, and, after it had well engaged the Austrians, the 
first column was to assault the bridges. 

About noon the attack was commenced by McMahon. With 
superior forces he drove the division of Cordon before him 
toward Magenta, and about 2 o'clock the grenadiers of the guard, 
who had driven in the Austrian outposts as far as the canal, 
attacked the bridges of Boffalora and Magenta. There were at the 
time 3° French brigades on the battle-field, against what Louis 
Napoleon calls 125,000 Austrians, but what in reality was confined 
to 5 brigades (2 of the Ist and 3 of the 2d corps), or less than 
30,000 men; for even Reischach’s 2 brigades stood, as yet, at 
Corbetta.‘ The French, by a violent effort, carried the bridges over 
the canal. Gyulay, who was at Magenta, ordered Reischach to 
advance and retake the bridge of Magenta, which he did; but 

Boffalora seems to have remained in the hands of the French. 
The battle came to a stand; McMahon’s corps, as well as the 
grenadiers, had been successfully repulsed; but also, every 
available man of the Austrians was engaged. Where were the other 
corps? They were everywhere. except where they were wanted. 
The 2d division of the Ist corps was still on the road from 
Germany, and could not reasonably be expected to arrive. The 
remaining brigade of the 2d corps, for Gyulay distinctly says in his 
report, there were only 3 brigades of the 2d engaged, is not 
accounted for. The 2d division of the 7th corps, that of Gen. Lilia, 
was at Castelletto, 6 or 7 miles from Magenta. The 3d corps was at 
Abbiategrasso, 5 miles from Magenta. The 5th corps was on the 
march to Abbiategrasso, having come, probably, from Bereguardo, 
and when the battle began was at least 9 miles from Magenta. The 
8th corps was on the march from Binasco to Bestazzo, 10 or 12 
miles distant, and the 9th was actually on the Po,* below Pavia, 20 
or 25 miles from the scene of action. By this precious scattering of 
his troops, Gyulay brought himself into the awkward predicament 
that with 7 brigades he had to resist the shock of the two French 
heads of columns from noon to somewhere about 4 or 5 o’clock in 
the afternoon, and these seven brigades would not have been able 
to do so if it had not been for the fact that the French marching on 
two roads only, with enormous masses of troops, could move but 
slowly. 

While Reischach held the bridge of Magenta and took one of 
the new French rifled guns, Gyulay hurried to Robecco, a village 
on the canal about three miles below Boffalora, to hurry on the 
march of the 3d and 5th corps and to point out to them their 
directions of attack. Four brigades of the 3d corps were now 
thrown forward, the front line under Hartung and Ramming, and 
with Durfeld in reserve, all three along the canal, and Wetzlar 
along the Ticino. They were to attack the right flank of the 
French. But in the mean time the latter had also obtained 
reenforcements. Picard’s brigade (of Renault’s division, and 
Canrobert’s corps) arrived to support the grenadiers, and drove 
Reischach back over the bridge. They were followed by Vinoy’s 
division (Niel’s corps), Jannin’s brigade (Renault’s division) and 
Trochu’s division (Canrobert’s corps). Thus the French concen- 
trated on this point six brigades in addition to the two brigades of 
grenadiers, while of the four Austrian brigades of the 3d corps, 

only two or three were actually engaged. In spite of these odds, 
the Austrians again took and retook the bridge of Magenta over 
and over again; but at last it remained in the hands of the 
French.* 

While this was going on at the bridges, McMahon had prepared 
a second attack upon the troops opposed to him, consisting of 
four or five brigades of the Ist and 2d corps. His two divisions 
again advanced in two columns upon Magenta, followed, in second 
line, by Camou’s division of voltigeurs of the guard. The divisions 
of Espinasse and La Motterouge (McMahon’s corps) having been 
effectually stopped by the Austrians, the voltigeurs advanced to 
support them. The struggle now reached its crisis. The first of the 
French columns had passed the bridge of Magenta, and also 
advanced against the village, which was already hard pressed by 
McMahon’s column. The 5th Austrian corps having at last made 
its appearance on the battle-field, the Prince of Hesse’s brigade,” 
almost at nightfall, made a fresh attempt to drive the French back 
over the bridge, but in vain. It was, indeed, too much to expect 
that a weak brigade (it had already fought at Montebello‘) should 
have arrested and hurled back that torrent of troops which came 
pouring over the bridge of Magenta. The Austrians in Magenta, 
assailed in front, flank, and rear, and having been under fire, 
without rest, since the beginning of the action, at last gave way, 
and after a violent struggle, Magenta was occupied by the French 
about nightfall. 

Gyulay withdrew his troops through Corbetta, which had been 
occupied in the meantime by Lilia’s division from Castelletto, and 
through Robecco, which was also strongly held by the 3d corps, 
the 5th corps bivouacking between the two places. He intended to 
continue the struggle on the 5th of June, but there appears to 
have been some blundering with regard to orders given, for in the 
middle of the night he learned that the Ist and 2d corps had, 
according to orders, as they understood it, retired several miles 
from the field of battle, and were to continue their retreat at 3 
o'clock in the morning. This intelligence decided Gyulay to desist 
from another battle. A brigade of the 3rd corps again assaulted 

Magenta to cover the retreat of the Austrian army, which took 
place in the most perfect order. 

According to the Austrian report,* there were engaged on their 
side: 

Of the Ist Corps, Cordon’s Division ............::::::sceeeeeeeees 2 Brigades. 
OF the 2d COrps so sisas sctnti acess taeie tes qieeeant tin win aetna 3 Brigades. 
Of the 7th Corps, Reischach’s Division ............::ccscccesseeeeees 2 Brigades. 
OR CES GCOr p> sesisss wvavesravescecdasvestnyssdyauretinnseysnveiskateaderauearouias 3 Brigades. 
Of the 5th Corps, late at nightfall ..0......... ccc cecceeteeeeeeeeteees 1 Brigade. 

In all, 11 brigades, equal to 55 battalions, with auxiliary arms, 
about 65,000 men. 
According to the French account,° the Allies had engaged: 

The Corps of Guards, 2 divisions ..............:ccccessccceesetseeeeeeees 4 Brigades. 
McMahon’s Corps (2 divisions) .........ccssccessscecessceeesteeetssseeeens 4 Brigades. 
Of Canrobert’s Corps, 2 divisions (Renault’s & Trochu’s) ... 4 Brigades. 

Of Niel’s Corps, | division (Vinoy’s) ..........:::ccscceeeseeeeeteeee 2 Brigades. 

In all 14 brigades, or 91 battalions, equal to at least 80,000 men. 
But the French report, when speaking of the advance of Vinoy’s 
division, says, 

“the 85th of the line suffered most ... Gen. Martimprey received a wound while 
leading on his brigade.” 

Now, neither the 85th nor Gen. Martimprey’s brigade belong to 
“Vinoy’s division of Gen. Niel’s corps.” The ‘85th belongs to the 2d 
brigade, commanded by Gen. Ladreitt de la Charriére of 
Ladmirault’s division, and Gen. Martimprey commands the Ist 
brigade of that same division, which does not belong to Niel’s 
corps, but to that of Marshal Baraguay d’Hilliers. We thus find a 
decisive proof that more French troops were engaged than are 
enumerated in the report; and if Ladmirault’s division, which swells 
the number of brigades to 16, and that of battalions to 104, and 
that of combatants to 90,000, is thus glibly passed over, we cannot 
but expect that still other troops contributed to the result of the 
day. The Austrians, too, say that they made prisoners belonging to 
almost every regiment forming part of the army of Italy, and it is, 

the Emperor, June 7, 1859”, The Times, No. 23331, June 13, 1859.— Ed. 

le 5 juin 1859”, Le Moniteur universel, No. 161, June 10, 1859.— Ed. 

therefore, probable that at least 16 brigades were engaged. This 
gives the French a numerical superiority, which reflects the 
highest honor upon the bravery of the Austrian troops. They were 
beaten by just the width of the battle-field; they took one gun and 
lost four, and they must have left the battle-field with the cer- 
tainty that if numbers had been even, victory would have been 
theirs. 

But what shall we say of their General? He expects the attack on 
the 4th; within 8 miles of the battle-field he has 13 brigades (the 7 
first engaged, 2 of Lilia’s, 4 of the 3d corps); at 9 miles 4 more of 
the 5th; at 10 or 12 miles 4 more of the 8th corps. This was at 
8:30 in the morning. Now, is it expecting too much, on a day of 
battle, that all these corps should have been united by 4, or at 
latest 5, in the afternoon close enough to Magenta to take part in 
the conflict? Is it expecting too much, that at 2 o’clock, when the 
battle became serious, 13 instead of 7 brigades should have been 
engaged? In that case, the position—held, as it was, til nightfall 
by 4—might have been easily maintained with 12 brigades, and 
the great losses which Cordon’s division and the 2d corps must 
undoubtedly have suffered would have been avoided. On the 
arrival of the 5th corps, the offensive might have been taken, and 
the French driven back across the Ticino. But the old slowness of 
movement appears again to have got hold of the Austrians. As the 
greater Napoleon said of them, they lose the most precious 
moments in useless pomposity and idle formalities. Gyulay has 
done the same, and given Louis Napoleon a victory which would 
have been an easy and a decisive one but for the bravery of the 
Austrian troops, and which Gyulay might himself have had.* 

On the morning of the 5th, Gyulay had under his orders, of 
intact troops, that had not been engaged at Magenta: 

One Division of the 3d Corps ...........cccceeccceesessseeeceeessteeeeeeeees 2 Brigades. 
Three Brigades of the 5th Corps .............:::ccccessessceeeeeteeeeeeens 3 Brigades. 
One Division (Lilia’s) of the 7th Corps ..........ccccccceeeesceeeeees 2 Brigades. 
Whe Sth Corps asccdccchoebasinitimernsnassiminaiionigencken 4) Brigades: 

Eleven brigades, or a force equal to that with which he had fought 
the day before. Of the troops engaged the day before, only 3 

divisions (1st and 2d corps) were so disorganized as to be unable 
to fight—this appears to be the real meaning of the mysterious 
retreat of these troops. There remained 8 brigades, in all 19 
brigades, or above 100,000 men. There were opposed to him the 
16 brigades of French engaged on the 4th; 4 more divisions of the 
French army, which must have been ready to fight on the 5th, and 
1 or 2 divisions of Piedmontese, as most of the latter were still 
very far to the rear. Thus, on the 5th, Gyulay would have had 19 
brigades, and perhaps later in the day, 25 (counting the Ist and 
2d corps, if brought up again), against about 28 Franco- 
Piedmontese brigades, which, perhaps, toward evening, might 
have been reenforced by 2 or 3 more Piedmontese brigades. Now 
we see what an egregious blunder Gyulay committed in sending 
the 9th corps so far away. With the 9th corps present, his 29 
brigades would have been a match for the whole allied army, and 
it is not at all impossible that the battle of the 5th might have had 
a different result to that of the day before. 

Gyulay’s mistakes may be summed up as follows: 

1. When Louis Napoleon made a flank march within reach of 
the Austrians, from Vercelli to Turbigo, Gyulay did not profit by 
the unfavorable position of his enemy, by pouncing at once, with 
all his forces, on their exposed line of march, by which he might 
have cut them in two and driven part of them toward the 
Alps—repeating Radetzky’s maneuver of 1849. 

2. Instead of this, he retired behind the Ticino, and thus 
marched round-about to cover Milan, to which the straight road 
was abandoned to the enemy. 

3. He scattered his troops during this retreat, which he 
conducted with an ease and laziness scarcely pardonable in peace 
maneuvers. 

4. His 9th corps was so far away that it was out of reach of 
concentration. 

5. The concentration even during the battle was carried on with 
unpardonable slowness, in consequence of which the troops first 
engaged had to suffer unnecessarily, and moreover the battle was 
lost instead of won. 

If, with such blunders, he did not suffer a total defeat, having 
the élite of the French army to fight, it is merely to be attributed 
to the conspicuous bravery of his troops, and not at all to any 
qualities in their commander. 

It will also appear from this review of the battle that the 
desertions of Italian and Hungarian troops, on which some of our 

friends have laid so much stress, were really very small, and had 
no calculable influence on the result of the day.’