We will not join in the noisy chorus which, in Great Britain, is 
now extolling to the skies the bravery of the troops that took Delhi 
by storm. No people, not even the French, can equal the English 
in self-laudation, especially when bravery is the point in question. 
The analysis of the facts, however, very soon. reduces, in 
ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the grandeur of this heroism 
to very commonplace proportions; and every man of common 
sense must be disgusted at this overtrading in other people’s 
courage, by which the English paterfamilias who lives quietly at 
home, and is uncommonly averse to anything that threatens him 
with the remotest chance of obtaining military glory, attempts to 
pass himself off as a participator in the undoubted, but certainly 
not so very extraordinary, bravery shown in the assault on Delhi. 

If we compare Delhi with Sevastopol, we of course agree that 
the Sepoys were no Russians; that none of their sallies against the 
British cantonment was anything like Inkermann**; that there was 
no Todtleben in Delhi, and that the Sepoys, bravely as every 
individual man and company fought in most instances, were 
utterly without leadership, not only for brigades and divisions, but 
almost for battalions; that their cohesion did not therefore extend 
beyond the companies; that they entirely lacked the scientific 
element without which an army is now-a-days helpless, and the 
defense of a town utterly hopeless. Still, the disproportion of 
numbers and means of action, the superiority of the Sepoys over 
the Europeans in withstanding the climate, the extreme weakness 
to which the ‘force before Delhi was at times reduced, make up for 
many of these differences, and render a fair parallel between the 
two sieges (to call these operations sieges) possible. Again we do 

not consider the storming of Delhi as an act of uncommon or 
extra-heroic bravery, although as in every battle individual acts of 
high spirit no doubt occurred on either side, but we maintain that 
the Anglo-Indian army before Delhi has shown more persever- 
ance, force of character, judgment and skill, than the English 
army when on its trial between Sevastopol and Balaklava.*” The 
latter, after Inkermann, was ready and willing to re-embark, and 
no doubt would have done so if it had not been for the French. 
The former, when the season of the year, the deadly maladies 
consequent upon it, the interruption of the communications, the 
absence of all chance of speedy re-enforcements, the condition of 
all Upper India, invited a withdrawal, did indeed consider the 
advisability of this step, but for all that, held out at its post. 

When the insurrection was at its highest point, a movable 
column in Upper India was the first thing required. There were 
only two forces that could be thus employed—the small force of 
Havelock, which soon proved inadequate, and the force before 
Delhi. That it was, under these circumstances, a military mistake to 
stay before Delhi, consuming the available strength in useless 
fights with an unassailable enemy; that the army in motion would 
have been worth four times its value when at rest; that the 
clearing of Upper India, with the exception of Delhi, the 
re-establishing of the communications, the crushing of every 
attempt of the insurgents to concentrate a force, would have been 
obtained, and with it the fall of Delhi as a natural and easy 
consequence, are indisputable facts. But political reasons com- 
manded that the camp before Delhi should not be raised. It is the 
wiseacres at headquarters who sent the army to Delhi that should 
be blamed—not the perseverance of the army in holding out 
when once there. At the same time we must not omit to state that 
the effect of the rainy season on this army was far milder than was 
to be anticipated, and that with anything like an average amount 
of the sickness consequent upon active operations at such a period, 
the withdrawal or the dissolution of the army would have been 
unavoidable. The dangerous position of the army lasted till the 
end of August. The re-enforcements began to come in, while 
dissensions continued to weaken the rebel camp. In the beginning 
of September the siege train arrived, and the defensive position 
was changed into an offensive one. On the 7th of September the 
first battery opened its fire, and on the evening of the 13th two 
practicable breaches were opened. Let us now examine what took 
place during this interval. 

If we were to rely, for this purpose, on the official dispatch of 

Gen. Wilson,* we should be very badly off indeed. ’‘This report is 
quite as confused as the documents issued from the English 
headquarters in the Crimea ever were. No man living could make 
out from that report the position of the two breaches, or the 
relative position and order in which the storming columns were 
arranged. As to the private reports, they are, of course, still more 
hopelessly confused. Fortunately one of those skillful scientific 
officers who deserve nearly the whole credit of the success, a 
member of the Bengal Engineers and Artillery, has given a report 
of what occurred, in The Bombay Gazette, as clear and business-like 
as it is simple and unpretending. During the whole of the 
Crimean war not one English officer was found able to write a 
report as sensible as this. Unfortunately he got wounded on the 
first day of the assault, and then his letter stops. As to later 
transactions, we are, therefore, still quite in the dark. 

The English had strengthened the defenses of Delhi so far that 
they could resist a siege by an Asiatic army. According to our 
modern notions, Delhi was scarcely to be called a fortress, but 
merely a place secured against the forcible assault of a field force. 
Its masonry wall, 16 feet high and 12 feet thick, crowned by a 
parapet of 3 feet thickness and 8 feet hight, offered 6 feet of 
masonry beside the parapet, uncovered by the glacis and exposed 
to the direct fire of the attack. The narrowness of this masonry 
rampart put it out of the question to place cannon anywhere, 
except in the bastions and martello towers.*”° These latter flanked 
the curtain but very imperfectly, and a masonry parapet of three. 
feet thickness being easily battered down by siege guns (field 
pieces could do it), to silence the fire of the defense, and 
particularly the guns flanking the ditch, was very easy. Between 
wall and ditch there was a wide berm or level road, facilitating the 
formation of a practicable breach, and the ditch, under these 
circumstances, instead of being a coupe-gorge’ for any force that 
got entangled in it, became a resting place to re-form those 
columns that had got into disorder while advancing on the glacis. 

To advance against such a place, with regular trenches, 
according to the rules of sieges, would have been insane, even if 
the first condition had not been wanting, viz, a force sufficient to 
invest the place on all sides. The state of the defenses, the 

November 16, 1857.— Ed. 

disorganization and sinking spirit of the defenders, would have 
rendered every other mode of attack than the one pursued an 
absolute fault. This mode is very well known to military men 
under the name of the forcible attack (attaque de vive force). The 
defenses, being such only as to render an open attack impossible 
without heavy guns, are dealt with summarily by the artillery; the 
interior of the place is all the while shelled, and as soon as the 
breaches are practicable the troops advance to the assault. 

The front under attack was the northern one, directly opposite 
to the English camp. This front is composed of two curtains and 
three bastions, forming a slightly re-entering angle at the central 
(the Cashmere) bastion. The eastern position, from the Cashmere 
to the Water bastion, is the shorter one, and projects a little in 
front of the western position, between the Cashmere and the 
Moree bastions. The ground in front of the Cashmere and Water 
bastions was covered with low jungle, gardens, houses, &c, which 
had not been leveled down by the Sepoys, and afforded shelter to 
the attack. (This circumstance explains how it was possible that the 
English could so often follow the Sepoys under the very guns of 
the place, which was at that time considered extremely heroic, but 
was in fact a matter of little danger so long as they had this cover.) 
Besides, at about 400 or 500 yards from this front, a deep ravine 
ran in the same direction as the wall, so as to form a natural 
parallel for the attack. The river, besides, giving a capital basis to 
the English left, the slight salient formed by the Cashmere and 
Water bastions was selected very properly as the main point of 
attack. The western curtain and bastions were simultaneously 
subjected to a simulated attack, and this maneuver succeeded so 
well that the main force of the Sepoys was directed against it. 
They assembled a strong body in the suburbs outside the Cabool 
gate, so as to menace the English right. This maneuver would 
have been perfectly correct and very effective, if the western 
curtain between the Moree and Cashmere bastions had been the 
most in danger. The flanking position of the Sepoys would have 
been capital as a means of active defense, every column of assault 
being at once taken in flank by a movement of this force in 
advance. But the effect of this position could not reach as far 
eastward as the curtain between the Cashmere and Water bastions; 
and thus its occupation drew away the best part of the defending 
force from the decisive point. 

The selection of the places for the batteries, their construction 
and arming, and the way in which they were served, deserve the 
greatest praise. The English had about 50 guns and mortars, 

concentrated in powerful batteries, behind good solid parapets. 
The Sepoys had, according to official statements, 55 guns on the 
attacked front, but scattered over small bastions and martello 
towers, incapable of concentrated action, and scarcely sheltered by 
the miserable three-feet parapet. No doubt a couple of hours must 
have sufficed to silence the fire of the defense, and then there 
remained little to be done. 

On the 8th, No. 1 battery, 10 guns, opened fire at 700 yards 
from the wall. During the following night the ravine aforesaid was 
worked out into a sort of trench. On the 9th, the broken ground 
and ‘houses in front of this ravine were seized without resistance; 
and on the 10th, No. 2 battery, 8 guns, was unmasked. This latter 
was 500 or 600 yards from the wall. On the 11th, No. 3 battery, 
built very boldly and cleverly at 200 yards from the Water bastion 
in some broken ground, opened fire with six guns, while ten 
heavy mortars shelled the town. On the evening of the 13th the 
breaches—one in the curtain adjoining the right flank of the 
Cashmere bastion, and the other in the left face and flank of the 
Water bastion—were reported practicable for escalade, and the 
assault was ordered. The Sepoys on the llth had made a 
counter-approach on the glacis between the two menaced bastions, 
and threw out a trench for skirmishers about three hundred and 
fifty yards in front of the English batteries. They also advanced 
from this position outside the Cabool gate to flank attacks. But 
these attempts at active defense were carried out without unity, 
connection or spirit, and led to no result. 

At daylight on the 14th five British columns advanced to the 
attack. One, on the right, to occupy the force outside the Cabool 
gate and attack, in case of success, the Lahore gate. One against 
each breach, one against the Cashmere gate, which was to be 
blown up, and one to act as a reserve. With the exception of the 
first, all these columns were successful. The breaches were but 
slightly defended, but the resistance in the houses near the wall 
was very obstinate. The heroism of an officer and three sergeants 
of the Engineers (for here there was heroism) succeeded in 
blowing open the Cashmere gate, and thus this column entered 
also. By evening the whole northern front was in the possession of 
the English. Here Gen. Wilson, however, stopped. The indiscrimi- 
nate assault was arrested, guns brought up and directed against 
every strong position in the town. With the exception of the 
storming of the magazine, there seems to have been very little 
actual fighting. The insurgents were dispirited and left the town in 
masses. Wilson advanced cautiously into the town, found scarcely 

any resistance after the 17th, and occupied it completely on the 
20th. 

Our opinion on the conduct of the attack has been stated. As to 
the defense—the attempt at offensive counter movements, the 
flanking position at the Cabool gate, the counter-approaches, the 
rifle-pits, all show that some notions of scientific warfare had 
penetrated among the Sepoys; but either they were not clear 
enough, or not powerful enough, to be carried out with any effect. 
Whether they originated with Indians, or with some of the 
Europeans that are with them, is of course difficult to decide; but 
one thing is certain: that those attempts, though imperfect in 
execution, bear a close resemblance in their ground-work to the 
active defense of Sevastopol and that their execution looks as if a 
correct plan had been made for the Sepoys by some European 
officer, but that they had not been able to understand the idea 
fully, or that disorganization and want of command _ turned 
practical projects into weak and powerless attempts.