Our indiscreet friend, Mr. William Russell of The London Times, 
has recently been induced, by his love of the picturesque, to 
illustrate, for the second time, the sack of Lucknow, to a degree 
which other people will not think very flattering to the British 
character.* It now appears that Delhi, too, was “looted” to a very 
considerable extent, and that besides the Kaiserbagh, the city of 
Lucknow generally contributed to reward the British soldier for 
his previous privations and heroic efforts. We quote from Mr. 
Russell: 

“There are companies which can boast of privates with thousands of pounds 
worth in their ranks. One man I heard of who complacently offered to lend an 
officer ‘whatever sum he wanted if he wished to buy over the Captain.’ Others have 
remitted large sums to their friends. [...} Ere this letter reaches England, many a 
diamond, emerald and delicate pearl will have told its tale in a very quiet, pleasant 
way, of the storm and sack of the Kaiserbagh. It is as well that the fair wearers ... saw 
not how the glittering baubles were won, or the scenes in which the treasure was trove.... 
Some of these officers have made, literally, their fortunes... There are certain small 
caskets in battered uniform cases which cowtain estates in Scotland and Ireland, and 
snug fishing and shooting boxes in every game-haunted or salmon-frequented 

This, then, accounts for the inactivity of the British army after 
the conquest of Lucknow. The fortnight devoted to plunder was 
well spent. Officers and soldiers went into the town poor and 
debt-ridden, and came out suddenly enriched. They were no 
longer the same men; yet they were expected to return to their 

4 Here and below see W. H. Russell, “Lucknow, April 5”, The Times, 
No. 23007, May 31, 1858.— Ed. 
> Italics by Engels.— Fad. 

The British Army in India 557 

former military duty, to submission, silent obedience, fatigue, 
privation and battle. But this is out of the question. The army, 
disbanded for the purpose of plunder, is changed for ever; no 
word of command, no prestige of the General, can make it again 
what it once was. Listen again to Mr. Russell: 

“It is curious to observe how riches develop disease; how one’s liver is affected 
by loot, and what tremendous ravages in one’s family, among the nearest and 
dearest, can be caused by a few crystals of carbon.... The weight of the belt round 
the private’s waist, full of rupees and gold mohurs, assures him the vision” (of a 
comfortable independency at home) “can be realized, and it is no wonder he 
resents the ‘fall in, there, fall in!’ ... Two battas, two shares of prize-money, the 
plunder of two cities, and many ‘pickings by the way’, have made some of our men 
too rich for easy soldiering.” 

Accordingly, we hear that above 150 officers have sent in their 
resignations to Sir Colin Campbell—a very singular proceeding 
indeed in an army before the enemy, which in any other service 
would be followed up in twenty-four hours by cashiering and 
severest punishment otherwise, but which, we suppose, is consid- 
ered in the British army as a very proper act for “an officer and 
a gentleman” who has suddenly made his fortune. As to the 
private soldiers, with them the proceeding is different. Loot 
engenders the desire for more; and if no more Indian treasures 
are at hand for the purpose, why not loot those of the British 
Governmentr Accordingly, says Mr. Russell: 

“There has been a suspicious upsetiing of two treasure tumbrils under a 
European guard, in which some few rupees were missing, and paymasters exhibit a 
preference for natives in the discharge of the delicate duty of convoy!’ 

Very good, indeed. The Hindoo or Sikh is better disciplined, 
less thieving, less rapacious than that incomparable model of a 
warrior, the British soldier! But so far we have seen the individual 
British only employed. Let us now cast a glance at the British 
army, “looting” in its collective capacity: 

”Every day adds to the prize property, and it is estimated that the sales will 
produce £600,000. [...] The town of Cawnpore is said to be full of the plunder of 
Lucknow, and if the damage done to public buildings, the destruction of private 
property, the deterioration in value of houses and land, and the results of 
depopulation could be estimated, it would be found that the capital of Oude has 
sustained a loss of five or six millions sterling.” * 

The Calmuck hordes of Jenghiz Khan and Timur, falling upon 
a city like a swarm of locusts, and devouring everything that came 

4 Italics by Engels.— Ed. 

in their way, must have been a blessing to a country, compared 
with the irruption of these Christian, civilized, chivalrous and 
gentle British soldiers. The former, at least, soon passed away on 
their erratic course; but these methodic Englishmen bring along 
with them their prize-agents, who convert loot into a system, who 
register the plunder, sell it by auction, and keep a sharp look-out 
that British heroism is not defrauded of a tittle of its reward. We 
shall watch with curiosity the capabilities of this army, relaxed as 
its discipline is by the effects of wholesale plunder, at a time when 
the fatigues of a hot weather campaign require the greatest 
stringency of discipline. 

The Hindoos must, however, by this time be still less fit for 
regular battle than they were at Lucknow, but that is not now the 
main question. It is far more important to know what shall be 
done if the insurgents, after a show of resistance, again shift the 
seat of war, say to Rajpootana, which is far from being subdued. 
Sir Colin Campbell must leave garrisons everywhere; his field 
army has melted down to less than one-half of the force he had 
before Lucknow. If he is to occupy Rohilcund what disposable 
strength will remain for the field? The hot weather is now upon 
him, in June the rains must have put a stop to active campaigning, 
and allowed the insurgents breathing time. The loss of European 
soldiers through sickness will have increased every day after the 
middle of April, when the weather became oppressive; and the 
young men imported into India last Winter must succumb to the 
climate in far greater numbers than the seasoned Indian 
campaigners who last Summer fought under Havelock and 
Wilson. Rohilcund is no more the decisive point than Lucknow 
was, or Delhi. The insurrection, it is true, has lost most of its 
capacity for pitched battles; but it is far more formidable in its 
present scattered form, which compels the English to ruin their 
army by marching and exposure. Look at the many new centers of 
resistance. There is Rohilcund, where the mass of the old Sepoys 
are collected; there is Northeastern Oude beyond the Gogra, 
where the Oudians have taken up position; there is Calpee, which 
for the present serves as a point of concentration for the 
insurgents of Bundelcund. We shall most likely hear in a few 
weeks, if not sooner, that both Bareilly and Calpee have fallen. 
The former will be of little importance, inasmuch as it will serve to 
absorb’ nearly all, if not the whole of Campbell’s disposable forces. 
Calpee, menaced now by General Whitlock, who has led his 
column from Nagpoor to Banda, in Bundelcund, and by General 
Rose, who approaches from Jhansi, and has defeated the advanced 

The British Army in India 559 

guard of the Calpee forces, will be a more important conquest; it 
will free Campbell’s base of operations, Cawnpore, from the only 
danger menacing it, and thus perhaps enable him to recruit his 
field forces to some extent by troops set at liberty thereby. But it is 
very doubtful whether there will be enough to do more than to 
clear Oude. 

Thus, the strongest army England ever concentrated on one 
point in India is again scattered in all directions, and had more 
work cut out than it can conveniently do. The ravages of the 
climate, during the Summer’s heats and rains, must be terrible; 
and whatever the moral superiority of the European over the 
Hindoos, it is very doubtful whether the physical superiority of the 
Hindoos in braving the heat and rains of an Indian Summer will 
not again be the means of destroying the English forces. There 
are at present but few British troops on the road to India, and it is 
not intended to send out large re-enforcements before July and 
August. Up to October and November, therefore, Campbell has 
but that one army, melting down rapidly as it is, to hold his own 
with. What if in the mean time the insurgent Hindoos succeed in 
raising Rajpootana and Mahratta country in rebellion? What if the 
Sikhs, of whom there are 80,000 in the British service, and who 
claim all the honor of the victories for themselves, and whose 
temper is not altogether favorable to the British, were to rise? 

Altogether, one more Winter’s campaign, at least, appears to be 
in store for the British in India, and that cannot be carried on 
without another army from England.