The history of modern mountain wartare, of which we gave a 
short abstract in a previous article, most clearly proves that the 
mobility of the armies of our day is perfectly capable to overcome 
or to turn ali the natural obstacle which an alpine country like 
Switzerland may oppose to their manoeuvres. Suppose, then, a 
war actually to break out between the king of Prussia* and 
Switzerland, the Swiss must certainly look to other defences beside 
their much vaunted “mountain-fortresses” for the security of their 
country. 

in the case supposed above, the line on which Switzerland could 
be attacked, would extend from Constance along the Rhine to 
Basel: for we must consider both Austria and France as neutrals, 
as the active interference of either of them would secure such a 
crushing force to the attack that any strategical combinations 
against it would be useless. The northern frontier, therefore, is 
alone supposed to be open to invasion. It is protected in the first 
line by the Rhine, an obstacle of no great importance. This river 
runs along the attacked frontier for some 70 miles, and though 
deep and rapid, offers many favourable places for a passage. In 
the French revolutionary wars?’ its possession has never been 
seriously contested, and indeed, a strong attacking army may 
always torce the passage of any river on a portion of its course 70 
miles tong. False alarms, feigned attacks, followed up by sudden 
concentration of troops on the real points of passage are sure to 
succeed in each case. There are, besides, severa] stone bridges 

4a Frederick William IV.— Ed. 

across it which the Swiss would scarcely attempt to destroy so 
seriously as to make them useless for the period of a campaign; 
and lastly, Constance being a German town situated on the 
southern bank of the Rhine, offers a convenient bridge-head for 
the Prussians to turn the whole of the line. 

But there is another obstacle at a short distance behind the 
Rhine, which heightens its indirect defensibility in a similar way as 
the Balkans, in Bulgaria, heighten the defensibility of the Danube. 
Three affluents of the Rhine, the Aare from the Southwest, the 
Reuss and Limmat from the Southeast, unite near Brugg, the two 
latter forming a right angle to the Aare, and then run due north 
towards the Rhine which they join at Coblenz (this Coblenz on the 
Aare and Rhine is of course not to be confounded with the 
fortress of that name on the Moselle and Rhine) about 10 miles 
from their junction. Thus the Aare from Brugg to the Rhine cuts 
in two the country covered by this latter stream, so that an 
invading army, having passed the Rhine, either above or below 
Coblenz, has before its front either the Limmat or the Aare, and is 
therefore stopped again by a defensible river. The salient angle, 
formed by the junction of the Aare and the Limmat (the Reuss 
forming but a strong second line to that of the Limmat) thus 
offers an important second position for defence. Its flanks are 
covered, to the left (west) by the lakes* of Zurich, Wallenstadt, 
Zug and of the Four Cantons; neither of which a Prussian army, 
iinder the above-supposed circumstances, darest venture to turn. 
The position of the Aare and Limmat, with the Rhine in the rear 
of any army that came to attack it, therefore forms the principal 
strategical defence of Switzerland against an invasion from the 
North. Suppose the Swiss repulsed an attack on it, and followed 
up the victory by a countercharge and active pursuit, the beaten 
army would be lost, broken up, cut off, and ruined before it could 
retreat over the few bridges it might have on the Rhine. 

On the other hand, if the line of the lower Aare and Limmat 
were once forced, what would remain for the Swiss? Here again 
we must consult the configuration of the ground. Large armies 
cannot live in the high mountains, nor can they establish their 
chief bases of operations or magazines there. That some of the 
reasons why campaigns in alpine countries, if entered upon with 
considerable forces, have always been of very short duration. The 
Swiss could not, therefore, think of retreating in force into the 

4 An inaccuracy in the text. The lakes mentioned are situated on the right (east) 
flank of the position in question.— Ed. 

Mountain Warfare in the Past and Present 175 

high mountains; they must keep as long as possible to the more 
level territory where they find towns with all their résources and 
roads to facilitate transport. Now if a line is drawn from the point 
where the Rhone enters the lake of Geneva at Villeneuve, to the 
point where the Rhine enters the Lake of Constance near 
Rheineck, this line will cut Switzerland in two portions the 
northwestern of which (leaving the Jura out of consideration) will 
comprise the Swiss Lowlands, while the South Eastern comprises 
the Highlands or Alpine country. The strategy of the Swiss is 
thereby clearly defined. Their main body will have to retreat on 
the line Zurich — Berne — Lausanne — Geneva, defending the open 
country inch by inch, and leaving the Southeastern mountains to 
the protection of such portions of the army as may have been cut 
off, and to the irregular warfare fire of the mountaineer 
Landsturm?'’ and free corps. The main body would be supported 
in this line of retreat by all the Southern affluents of the Aare, all 
of which run parallel to the Reuss and Limmat, and at Berne by 
the Aare itself which in its upper course also runs from the East to 
the Northwest. The upper Aare once forced and Berne taken, 
there would remain but little chance to the Swiss to bring the war 
to a successful issue, unless the mountaineers and the new formed 
bodies from the South East succeeded in again occupying part of 
the plain and menacing the Prussian rear so seriously that a 
general retreat had to follow. But that chance may well be left out 
of consideration altogether. 

Thus the Swiss would have several good lines of defence: first, 
the Aare and Limmat, then the Aare and Reuss, third the Aare 
and Emme (not to mention the intervening smaller affluents of 
the Aare) and fourthly the upper Aare, the left wing behind the 
morass extending from the lake of Neuchatel to that river. 

The attack has its strategy equally as well prescribed by the 
configuration of the country as the defence. If the Prussians were 
to send their main body across the Rhine above Coblenz, and 
attack the position of the Limmat, they would take the bull by the 
horns; they would not only have to storm the position which 
Masséna in 1799 so successfully defended against the Austrians 
and Russians, but after taking it, find 5 miles further on the 
position of the Reuss, fully as strong; and then, from 2, 3, or 5 
miles, another mountain-current would bar their path, until at last, 
after a succession of delays, combats, and losses, they would again 
find the Swiss posted behind the Emme, which river forms as 
serious an obstacle nearly as the Limmat. Unless political reasons, 
which we leave entirely beside, induced the Prussians to remain at 

a respectful distance from the French frontier, this way of attack 
would, therefore, be absolutely faulty. The real road into 
Switzerland crosses the Rhine between Basel and Coblenz; or, if 
part of the army should cross above Coblenz, a communication 
across the Aare between Brugg and Coblenz would have to be 
established at once so as to concentrate the main body on the left 
bank of the latter river. The direct attack on the line of the Aare 
turns the lines both of the Limmat and the Reuss, and may be 
made to turn the lines, too, of all the minor southern affluents of 
the Aare, almost as far as the Emme river. The line of the 
Limmat, too, is short, extending on its attackable front, from 
Zurich to Brugg, not more than 20 miles while the line of the 
Aare, from Brugg to Solothurn, offers to the attack an extent of 
36 miles, and is not even absolutely secure from front attack above 
Solothurn. The left of the position, between Solothurn and 
Aarberg, is its weak point; once forced there, the line 1s not only 
lost to the Swiss, but they are cut off from Berne, Lausanne and 
Geneva, and have no retreat left but to the Southeastern highlands. 

The defence, however, is here supported by tactical obstacles. 
The more you ascend the Aare towards Solothurn, the more the 
higher ridges of the Jura approach the river, and obstruct military 
operations by their peculiar longitudinal valleys running all parallel 
to the Aare. The intervening ridges are far from being impassable, 
but yet the concentration of a large corps in such ground would 
presuppose very complicated manoeuvres always unpleasant i the 
face of the enemy and not easily undertaken by a general unless 
he has plenty of confidence in himself and his troops. The latter 
quality not being very common in the old Prussian generals who — 
scarcely can be said to have seen active service since 1815, it is not 
likely that they would risk such a manoeuvre, but rather stick to 
halfmeasures on the flanks and concentrate their chief efforts on 
the lower.