a) La Russie et l’Angleterre. 1854 

Prediction, the penetration of destiny, through the medium of a 
critical assessment of conditions in the states of Europe, their 
mutual relations and, deriving from them, contemporary history — 
is one of the claims made by these pamphlets. The method used in 
tackling this problem commends itself by a measure of cunning. 
Since the knowledge and foreknowledge displayed by Criticism *”* 
is to be tested in the light of contemporary history nothing would 
seem simpler than to compare the conclusions of Criticism and the 
facts of contemporary history, measuring the first against the 
second and thus convincing oneself of the justification or 
presumption of Criticism’s claims. E.g., in the above-named 
pamphlet we read: 

“La pratique constitutionnelle a gagné infiniment du terrain, et la résistance passive 
des assemblées nationales, issues de la révolution de l'année 1848, a pris de plus 
grandes proportions. Toute |’Europe s’est partagé, en ce moment, les différents 
roles du drame constitutionnel: !’Occident s’est chargé du role de lopposition 
honnéte; la Russie représente le gouvernement, armé de la force et usant de son 
autorité.” ? 

(“Europe has apportioned itself roles in the constitutional drama; 
the West has assumed the role of stalwart opposition; to Russia has 

fallen the role of an energetic government armed with might.”) 

We shall not linger over the ill-turned phrase which, by means 
of an “and”, lumps together “constitutional practice” and “the 
passive resistance” of the “non-constitutional” assemblies of 1848, 
etc. Of all those assemblies, this might apply only to the “assemblée 
législative”* But let us take the proposition as it stands. Western 
Europe, the assemblée législative, confines itself to passive resistance, 
and Russia, the “government armed with might”, “asserts hee 
authority” by means of a coup d'état, as did Bonaparte, Francis 
Joseph and Frederick William IV respectively.“? Such was Criti- 
cism’s assessment of the position in the month of April—an 
interpretation of the immediate past which at the same time 
purports to be a prediction of the immediate future. The weeks 
that immediately ensued controverted both the interpretation and 
prediction and demonstrated that, in its superficial precipitation, 
Criticism has transformed the physiognomy of a moment into a” 
permanent feature. Not only do the western powers abandon 
“passive resistance” and turn to aggressive acts but, before they 
have so done, Russia’s Danubian campaigns reveal that she is nol 
“armed” with might; rather, her arms are powerless and, instead 
of “asserting her authority”, she withdraws—beats a retreat.*” 
The analogy he draws with the dictatorial, coup d’état- 
perpetrating governments and the assemblies of 1848 falls to the 
ground. Was Criticism’s prediction wrong, therefore? Its interpre- 
tation of the circumstances delusory? By no means. After the 
occurrence of the disagreeable facts which at a stroke demolished 
the findings of Critical pamphlet a), B.B., unabashed, opens 
brochure 6) (Die jetzige Stellung Russlands, 1854) with the following 
diplomatic pronouncement: 

“This proposition (quoted above) 226 which we advanced as late as (!) April, was 
fully realised by the turn things took beneath the walls of Silistria: the drama being 
performed by Europe is truly and in every respect a constitutional one; the 
government has come to resemble the opposition, it too has shown itself 
constitutional and has made no use of force, or, » if it has, it has not been with intent 
to effect a decision.” 

The ambiguous nature of the satisfaction derived by Criticism 
from the “turn things took” finds expression in the peculiar 
“turn” of speech, ‘advanced as late as April”. Does Criticism 

retract the proposition it advanced in April, the Russians having 
retreated from Silistria in March? By no ‘means. The as ee as 
should therefore read as early as. Our proposition, advanced ‘ 
early as” April, before the occurrence of the event, was 
corroborated during March. Rather, one should say, it was not 
_ corroborated. So not ‘as early as” —rather, “as late as”, but “as 
late as” with a corollary which turns it into a grammatical 
impossibility. “The view I-held as late as April was fulfilled in 
March.” But Criticism does not say that its “proposition advanced 
as late as April” was “corroborated” as early as March. Indeed no. 
Rather, the new “turn things took” gave Criticism’s proposition a 
new “turn” of which there had been no suspicion “as late as” 
April. That proposition was not “corroborated” but, it would 
appear, “fully realised” by ensuing events. Very wet." This casts a 
new light on the relation of events to Criticism. Even if they do 
not provide proof of Criticism’s assertion, they. do at least help 
towards the further “realisation” of that assertion and reveal a 
content in it hitherto concealed and not suspected even by 
Criticism itself. Not only does Criticism stand in_ theoretical 
relation to events, but events stand in practical relation to 
Criticism. And what is now the position as regards the “full 
realisation” “conferred” by events in March on the proposition 
advanced in April? 

“The drama being performed by Europe is truly and in every respect a constitutional 
one!” 

Truly and in every respect! Does the “in every respect” add 
anything new to the “truly’’? It vitiates and trivialises. That is all. 
But the floridity of the style, the “truly and in every respect”, 
simply betray the same perplexed ineptitude as previously the 
unfortunate “as late as”. In the proposition advanced in April, 
firstly, the “passive resistance” of the national assemblies of. 1848 
and after was erroneously equated with “constitutional practice” 
and, secondly, the clash in the East was transformed into a 
“constitutional” drama in which, because of their “passive 
resistance”, the western powers are compared with the national 
assemblies of 1848 and after and Russia. with the coup d’état- 
perpetrating governments. This was not, in fact, a constitutional 
drama, since constitutionalism was confined solely to the national 
assemblies, whereas the governments were concerned solely with 
overthrowing constitutions. Now, however, when Russia has 

received a drubbing, her armed aggression having been repelled 
by force of arms, and has adopted a “parliamentary” tack, now 
the drama, formerly constitutional only in an “unreal” sense, has 
become “truly” and “in every respect constitutional”. But the 
moment the government becomes “constitutional”, as in England 
or Belgium or the France of Louis Philippe, it ceases to resemble 
the national assemblies of 1848 and after or the governments 
opposing them. Nor is that all. While Russia has begun to dally 
with “parliamentarianism” and hence, according to B.B., to 
assume the role of a “constitutional government”, the western 
powers have, for their part, ceased to offer “passive resistance” 
and turned to active hostility, to an invasion. If, prior to this, the 
term “constitutional” was [not] applicable to Russia, it is no longer 
applicable to the western powers. And this Criticism describes as 
the “full realisation” of its proposition advanced in April! 
Nevertheless, there still remains the matter of the “realisation” of 
the term “constitutional” contained in the proposition advanced in 
April. Criticism’s predictions, it is clear, are as ambiguous as those 
of the ancient oracles. If its propositions seem to have been 
controverted by events,* then it merely seems so. As soon as the 
opposite happens, it transpires that, in point of fact, the original 
critical dictum meant the “opposite” of what it said and that 
events have simply revealed its dialectical nature. Thanks to this 
sort of dialectics which proves a prognostication to have been 
fulfilled by the occurrence of its opposite, Criticism’s prophecies 
are, in all circumstances, proof against attack. Urquhart adopts a 
different method. If his prophecies come to pass, their truth is 
confirmed by their having come to pass. If they do not come to 
pass, this is because the mere statement of what was bound to 
happen has prevented their fulfilment. In the first case the 
theoretical truth, and in the second the practical purpose, of the 
prediction has been fulfilled. 

Criticism reproaches the daily press for its total addiction to the 
present instant. As for itself, it sees the instant as a moment in the 
context of the whole, i.e. takes a general view. What in fact 
transpires is that, if the daily press is, in practice, dominated by 
day-to-day events, Criticism experiences the same defeat in the 
realm of theory. The isolated event is immobilised by it and 
turned into the incarnation of a general proposition, which every 

turn of events strips of even a semblance of verisimilitude. 
(Similarly Proudhon. When, in 1850 (?) the bank’s bullion reserve 
increased more than £20 million sterling and the bank rate fell to 
2'/y (?) per cent, that event instantly denoted the realisation of a 
new phase in the history of civil society, the time of the Banque du 
Peuple had come.”’ To him, in Paris, the event was a new one, 
absolutely mint-new, because his views were bounded by the 
southern shore of the Channel). While, therefore, the “era” of 
Russia was, as late as April, seen as the immediate expression of a 
new phase in world history (in pamphlet a), Russia’s actions of as 
early as March prompted Criticism to ask (in pamphlet 6) this 
pusillanimous question: 

“Has the era of the West dawned in Russia, too? Does she already belong to the 
West, etc.?” (Die jetzige Stellung Russlands, p. 18). 

In fact, since the proposition, advanced by Criticism ‘‘as late as” 
April concerning the constitutional drama, in which Russia 
assumes the role of power-wielding government and the western 
powers that of passive resistance, of stalwart opposition, constitutes 
the whole point of brochure a), and since events deprived it of 
that point as early as March, this effectively and “in every respect” 
brings our criticism of it to a close. However, let us consider some 
individual details. 

In the first place, the alleged historical illustrations. Inter alia, a 
parallel is drawn between the events that paved the way for the 
French Revolution of 1789 and the events now supposedly paving 
the way for revolution in England. Turgot imagined that 
everything would be put right by “free corn trade” (p. 72). 
Likewise England at the time of the Anti-Corn Law League.”” 
Would it be possible to coax into an analogy any two things of a 
more disparate kind? France was above all an agricultural and 
England an industrial country. Free trade in corn meant 
something altogether different in either country. In France the* 
“fait précis and positif’—‘‘financial deficit and bankruptcy” 
(72). In England? Well, in England there was war,” the 
government perplexed by a financial surplus and a_ twofold 
increase in imports and exports! Is that the analogy? Not so: 

“in England likewise a moral and political deficit”. 

What an analogy! On the one hand a “precise and positive 
fact”, on the other the merely subjective assessment of a situation 
by the Criticism. The analogy lies in the word deficit. X died 
because he broke his leg. Prophetic analogy: Y will die because he 
breaks his word. The precise and positive fact of financial deficit 
and public bankruptcy preceded the French Revolution. In Louis 
XV’s reign, if not before, a moral and political deficit had 
preceded financial deficit and public bankruptcy. In France, the 
reforms proposed by the government to the notables and the 
Parlements proved insignificant as compared with the presentiment 
of revolution. Similarly in England, no one took any interest in 
Russell’s Reform Bill (p. 73). What an analogy! In the proposals of 
the French government the issue at stake was a break with the past 
of French monarchy, in Russell’s proposals of 1831 it was a 
ministerial intrigue; on the one hand, a break with a centuries’ old 
past, on the other the consequences of a measure not three 
decades old; on the one hand, the government’s proposals were of 
no interest to the bourgeoisie because incommensurable with the 
revolution which they [the bourgeoisie] needed; on the other, 
despite their own interest in the petty manoeuvrings of the Whigs, 
they did not succeed in arousing the interest of the popular 
masses, whose disillusionment with Whig reforms was not born 
yesterday but goes back to the morrow of the Reform Bill.” And 
now Necker and Palmerston constitute an analogy! To please 
Criticism, Palmerston loses “boldness and vigour”, he is “imbued 
with his mission” and “regards himself as his country’s last 
saviour.” Not even an analogy between Robespierre and Russell 
could be more consummately absurd. Accordingly it need no 
longer taal us when Quren Victoria turns into reine An- 
toinette” 

In no sense do we a that major clashes are impending in 
England; all we deny is that the “historical illustrations” presented 
show the remotest understanding of them. The most common 
pothouse politics is ‘infinitely superior to this empty profun- 
dity. 

In order to prove that ‘the English are mistaken in their view of 
an “influence étrangére’***' in their Cabinet, Br. B. turns his 
attention to Fox who he says, discovered in Russia a protector and 
guarantor of peace in Europe. In support he quotes a passage 

from Fox’s speech of May 24, 1803.* He should have gone 
further, and mentioned the “secret” despatch of Adair by Fox in 
1790** on the occasion of the impending 2nd partition of Poland. 
And what is proved by Fox’s “secret” and illicit liaison with 
Catherine II?**? That Palmerston is not in secret and illicit liaison 
with Nicholas.” Come to that, there was no discovery for Fox to 
make in regard to Russia. It had already been made under 
William III by the Marquis of Carmarthen *** and under George I 
by the ruling Whigs. Diplomatic documents show that, since that 
time, Russian influence has been a tradition in Whig Cabinets.**° 
Good reason, perhaps, to suggest that Palmerston should have 
broken with the Whig tradition? Why should he not rather have 
“realised” it in all its implications and sold himself to Russia lock, 
stock and barrel? No less false than this “defence” of Palmerston 
is the assertion that it was Fox who discovered the Anglo-French 
alliance. Stanhope had already done so immediately after the 
Peace of Utrecht.?*° 

As proof of Russia’s positive effect we find the allegation that, 
by adopting the attitude she did, she created “the décadence de 
Vantagonisme anglo-frangais”* or, alternatively, the “alliance 
anglo-frangaise”. In 1717 there already existed an Anglo-French 
alliance which, a few years later, George I endeavoured to turn 
into a European alliance against Russia. The Quadruple Alliance 
of 18348’ was England’s second alliance with France and it was 
directed, albeit vainly, also against Russia. Hence there was 
nothing new or unprecedented for Russia to create in this 
direction. But if the mere fact of an alliance between France and 
England is to be regarded as an enormous success on Russia’s 
part, what was the alliance between England, Russia, Prussia and 
Austria against the France of Louis Philippe, the coalition of 
18408? Proof, according to the construction put upon it by B.B., 
that the France of Louis Philippe was even more dangerous than 
the Russia of Nicholas. | 

England, or so Criticism goes on to discover, having, by her war 
with revolutionary France, delivered the Continent into the hands 
of Russia—a discovery which at least has the merit of not being 
new—felt impelled 

. “de se charger elle-méme de la tache révolutionnaire de la France. C’est 
Canning qui a rempli ce vide. II leva en Angleterre l’étendard de la révolution, 
pour en faire le véritable adversaire de la Russie”. 

By way of proof, Criticism cites the rhetorical flourish which 
Canning borrowed from Virgil (the dieu Eole’s “Quos ego”’)”, as 
though a dictum by the “captain of Eton”? were any proof. It 
accords absolute credence and validity to the dictum concerning 
the “policy” of “principles” °, which was even more false than 
the earlier dicta concerning the “policy of interests”. For that 
matter, Pitt’s war’ was also blazoned abroad as a “war. of 
principles” and “believed” to be such by a large part of the 
English population. And so indeed it was, in part, since the power 
of the oligarchy shortly before and during the outbreak of the 
French Revolution was threatened by movements inside the 
country. Canning’s dictum, by the by, was not, to begin with, 
directed against Russia but against France. The intervention in 
Portugal was a riposte to France’s intervention in Spain, and this 
“policy of principles” in its execution—recognition of the 
independence of what was previously Spanish America***— 
accorded singularly well with British commercial interests. Because 
Palmerston uses Canning’s dictum as a mask for a_ policy 
determined by altogether different motives, B. B. is convinced that 
Canning’s dictum concerning the “intervention révolutionnaire” ‘ 
has become Britain’s real policy and brought down every kind of 
misfortune on her. head. In this connection we are told that the 
Reform Bill has so greatly altered the nature of the British 
Constitution 

“que les Anglais mémes ne reconnaissent plus en quoi se distingue leur 
constitution de celles du continent”4 (p. 9). 

Since George I’s time, the British Constitution has altered only 
in so far as 1) the distribution of the rotren Boroucus**? has been 
modified in favour of the Whigs, a faction of the aristocracy, 
2) the industrial bourgeoisie increased their parliamentary influ- 

ence in 1831 to the same degree as did the financial bourgeoisie 
by means of the “Grortous Revotution” of 1689.74* Another thing 
B.B. discovers is that 

“Yabrogation des lois des céréales, comme la proclamation du principe de la 

liberté du commerce renferment lPaveu que sa suprématie (of lindustrie anglaise) 
est perdue”.? . 

What, on the contrary, they proved was 1) that the interests of 
the industrial bourgeoisie triumphed over those of the landed 
aristocracy; 2) that English industry needs no other monopoly 
than that of its own capital as such; it means that English industry 
believes it can only at present rely on its real supremacy. When war 
broke out, he says, England was not yet 

(p. 10). 

Needless to say, the England of the modern industrial 
bourgeoisie cannot, without degrading herself, enter into any 
alliances that run counter to the interests and prejudices of what 
was once the ruling class. England is always “the same” moral 
personage. The depths of degradation to which England has 
descended in this respect is demonstrated in the sentence: 

“Les peuples ne sauraient oublier Jeur passé qu’en renongant a l’avenir.” ¢ 

As if the constant “unmaking” of the past were not the 
“making” of the future. 

Thus the future of Pitt’s England and the future of England are 
seen as identical. As soon as a “people” overcomes what was once 
the ruling class and thus breaks with the political past created by 
that class, it demolishes its future. 

England’s nationality consists, according to B. B., in hating 
France and vice versa. This, England’s “nationality” ,—the earlier 
feudal wars between France and England having, of course, quite 
a different import—was first brought into existence by the 

“Griorious Revotution” and hence “cannot be abolished”. What 
profundity! | | | 

Russia’s nationality consists in allying herself, now with France 
against England, now with England against France... But England 
and France cannot form an alliance against Russia without 
renouncing their “future”. What Bruno is actually trying to say is 
this: With the exception of Russia, the national peculiarities of the 
European states are disappearing. France and England fight as 
“the West” against Russia. In this way their nationality 1s 
dissipated. But did not Russia, England, Austria, Prussia, Naples 
and Spain fight as Europe against France? And did this not serve 
to reconstruct their nationality? Criticism, needless to say, is not 
concerned with civil society. English and French society pass 
through stages of political pupation. If one of these pupae is cast 
off, Criticism sees this as a clear sign of decadence on the part of 
those societies. What, for instance, does the politically jejyune 
chapter on the “calculs” and “arriére-pensées des alliés”*’ prove, save 
that those societies are still battling with political traditions which 
belong wholly to their preceding phases, and that they have not 
yet acquired the political form suited to the needs of the new 
phase. And this he takes as proof that the alliance, being so 
wretched, cannot be a means towards the attainment of that 
higher form? To say that the society of modern production calls 
for international conditions different from those of feudal society 
is a tautology. 

What makes him think that Russia 

“a formé le plan de consolider son influence sur la Turquie, sans l’aide d’un 

Did she not successively seek an alliance with France, England 
and Austria for the late war, and consistently conserve that with 
Prussia? And whatever the views and intentions of the French and 
English peoples may have been, how can he tell that Russia was 
not all the time certain of effecting a secret alliance with the 
English government? and saw therein a warranty for her 
insolence? 

The worthy B. B. believes Russia’s pretext, 

“the cause des populations gréco-slaves de la Turquie” (p. 11), 

to have been her true motive. So great faith is not found, no, not 
in Israel.” 

A large part of the pamphlet is devoted to a portrayal of the 
prevarications of the British government (likewise of the French) 
and its concessions to Russia. It was not, in fact, the British 
governments fault if Russia failed to carry out her designs :n 
Turkey. And what does this prove? That the governments of — 
England and France, in particular the former, were constrained by 
the masses? No. That England is aware of “her weakness” and 
that the government and society, while factually divided, must in 
theory be identified. 

Russia’s demandes!© The Russian government’s real aim was to 
replace the autonomy of the Greco-Slav populations,” such as it 
was, with government by her consuls. In its gullibility, Criticism must 
needs mistake Russia’s empty phrases for her true motives, only to 
note with chagrin in a subsequent pamphlet that the Russian 
government is now dropping its rats prerences “. He reproaches the 
newspapers with ignorance of the late Turkish affair. He proves his 
own ignorance by overlooking the repeated attempts of the 
Russians—e.g. in Serbia and Greece—to undermine the autonom- 
ous administration of the communes. What Russia is seeking to 
conserve is the theocracy of Greek priests under Turkish suzerainty 
which shackles and smothers any independent civic development of 
the Greco-Slav communes. Criticism’s erudition finds particularly 
brilhant expression in the 

“gages que la Russie posséde dans sa participation a l’oeuvre de l’organisation 
en Servie”© and in her “réglement organique”’ 

she has conferred through Kisseleff upon the Danubian prin- 
cipalities! 4° C’est par trop fort.’ The southern Slavs must, according 
to B. B., become Russians 1) en vertu “de la nature des choses” — a 
most profound demonstration, the reference to this abstraction; 
and then, alongside the “nature des choses”, by virtue of “l’histoire’’ 

which, in Serbia, demonstrates precisely the reverse; finally, by 
virtue of the “position géographique”* whereby they are cut off from 
Russia by the Magyars and Romanians. And what bathos! From 
the “nature des choses” he descends to “Uhistoire”, and from that 
abstraction to the particular of the “position géographique”’. 

Austria must, or so he maintains, confine herself to the role of 
médiateur. This proposition, which was correct “as late as” April, 
had already become “incorrect” by June, despite Criticitsm’s 
absolute proof deriving from the nature of things. He maintains 
that Austria will not “pourra se ranger du cété des alliés”.” Additional 
proof of the assertion. In his lucubrations on past relations 
between Austria and England, he falsifies history in true Russian 
fashion. As regards the Treaty of Adrianople he takes very good 
care not to give us the real story. Namely, that the Russian army 
had been destroyed and would never have returned from 
Adrianople—not even the minute proportion of it that did so—if 
England had not, under false pretences, extorted the treaty from 
the Porte. His account of the matter of Lieven’s despatch is equally 
false. It was not, as he says, the “traité de paix”* which was the 
main cause of Aberdeen’s and Wellington’s perplexité, but the 
blockade of Enos,*” which was, in fact, relinquished by the 
Russians for fear of forcing Wellington into opposition. Incidental- 
ly Lieven remarks 

“that the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen have put everything in 
motion to extort from us confidences as to the conditions of our future peace with 
the Turks”.4 

Lieven’s answer to this was far from being the boastful remark 
which B. quotes from his despatch***; rather he went on: 

“It appeared to us useful to repeat the assurances which on this point all the 
declarations of the Emperor contained, and even to add some developments to 
them. We shall confine ourselves to these generalities, for every circumstantial 
communication on a subject so delicate would draw down real dangers, and if once we 
discuss with our allies the articles of a treaty with the Porte, we shall only content 
them, when they would have believed that they had imposed upon us irreparable 
sacrifices.” © 

Only then does there occur the boastful passage which, seen in 
the context of this nasty piece of equivocation, would have 
forfeited its heroism, which was not at all what Criticism intended. 
All Pam’s knaveries are then adduced to prove his sense of 
“England’s weakness” and the latter, too. They betray, rather, the 
secret of Russia’s “strength” vis-a-vis England. At the same time 
he distorts the facts, as in the story of the Vixen.** According to 
him, it was enough for Russia 

“a lui rappeler que ce forfait inoui avait été commis dans la mer Noire, pres de la cote de la 
Circassie”’* 
I have shown elsewhere what complicated manoeuvres Pam and 

Nesselrode resorted to on that occasion.> 
In the chapter on Austria we also learn that in 1848-49, 

“toute l’Allemagne, réduite & la passivité par les illusions du principe national, aurait 
taxé de crime politique chaque tentative d’intervenir dans cette lutte des nationalités’’< 

“As though” the Frankfurt National Assembly had not taken a 
stand against Italy? Likewise against Poland! **° It would be otiose 
to say anything further about this pamphlet, save that Criticism 
considers Omar Pasha’s Danubian campaigns to be a figment on 
the part of the Press.