THE NEW FRENCH COMMANDER" 


It is certain that Gen. Canrobert’s resignation of the command 
of the French army in the Crimea did not take place a moment 
too soon. The morale of the army was already in a_ very 
unsatisfactory and doubtful state. After they had been made to 
undergo the hardships and dangers of an unparalleled Winter 
campaign, the soldiers had been kept in something like order and 
good spirits by the return of Spring and by ever-repeated 
promises of a speedy and glorious termination of the siege. But 
day after day passed away without making any progress, while the 
Russians actually advanced out of their lines and constructed 
redoubts on the disputed ground between the two parties. This 
roused the spirit of the French soldiers, the Zouaves mutinied, and 
the consequence was that on February 23 they were led to the 
butchery on Mount Sapun. A little more bustlng—it can hardly 
be called activity—was then shown on the part of the allied 
commanders; but there was evidently no distinct aim, and no 
definite plan was followed up consistently. 

Again, the spirit of mutiny among the French was kept down by 
the continued sallies of the Russians and by the opening of the 
second bombardment which was—positively for the last ttme—to 
end in the grand spectacle of the assault. But the fire went on, 
slackened, and slackened still more, and at last ceased without any 
attempt at an assault. Then came engineering operations, slow, 
difficult and barren of those results which keep up the spirits of 
soldiers. Soon they got tired again of nightly trench-fighting, 
where hundreds fell to no visible purpose. Again the assault was 
demanded, and again Canrobert had to make promises which he 
knew he could not fulfill. Then Pélissier saved him from a renewal 


216 Frederick Engels 


of disorderly scenes by the night attack of the Ist of May; it is 
stated that not only did Pélissier plan this attack, but even execute 
it in spite of a counter-order from Canrobert arriving the moment 
the troops were put in motion. This affair is said to have revived 
the courage of the soldiers. 

Meantime the reserve and the Piedmontese arrived. The 
Chersonese became crowded. The soldiers considered that these 
reenforcements enabled them to do anything. Why was nothing 
done? The expedition to Kertch was resolved upon, and sailed. 
But before it had reached the offing of that town a dispatch from 
Paris induced Canrobert to recall it. Raglan of course gave in at 
once. Brown and Lyons, the commanders of the British land and 
sea forces on this expedition, besought their French colleagues to 
attack the place in disobedience to the order; in vain—the 
expedition had to sail back, and it is even stated that Canrobert 
had in his hurry misread the order, which was merely conditional. 
Now the exasperation of the troops was no longer to be mastered. 
Even the English spoke in unmistakable terms; the French were in 
a state bordering on mutiny. Accordingly there was nothing left 
for Canrobert but to resign the command of an army over which 
he had lost all control and influence. The only possible successor 
was Pélissier. The soldiers were sick of these young generals, 
advanced to the highest honors in the quick hotbed of Bonapar- 
tism. They had all the while been clamoring for a leader of long 
standing of the old African school—a man who had held a 
responsible command in the Algerian wars, and held it with credit. 
Pélissier was almost the only man of the sort at the command of 
the Emperor; he had been sent there with the evident intention of 
being, sooner or later, made the successor of Canrobert. Whatever 
else his qualifications might be, he had the confidence of the- 
troops, and that is a great deal. 

But he takes his command under difficult circumstances. He 
must act, and speedily too, before the men lose the freshness of 
the enthusiasm which the certainty of immediate action must have 
inspired them with. The assault being impossible, nothing remains 
but to take the field, and that can be done only by turning the 
Russian position in the manner we have previously described.* 
Indeed, we find our views on this subject confirmed by a British 
officer in the London Morning Herald, who says that it is the 
general opinion among competent men that there is no other way 
to take the field with success. 


* See this volume, pp. 201-07.— Ed. 


The New French Commander a7 


There is however one very serious difficulty in carrying out this 
plan. The French with all their army have no more means of 
transport than will supply 30,000 men for a very short distance 
from the coast. As to the English, their means of transport would 
be exhausted if they had to supply one single division no further 
off than Chorgun on the Chernaya. How then is the field to be 
taken, in case of success the north side of Sevastopol invested, the 
enemy pursued to Bakshiserai and a junction effected with Omer 
Pasha? Of course the Russians will take very good care to leave 
nothing but ruins behind them, and a supply of carts, horses or 
camels can only be obtained after the Allies have completely 
routed their enemy. We shall see how Peélissier will extricate 
himself from this difficulty. 


Written about May 24, 1855 Reproduced from the New-York 


; : ; ; Daily Tribune 
First published in the New-York Daily 


Tribune, No. 4414, June 12, 1855, re- 
printed in the New-York Semi-Weekly 
Tribune, No. 1049, June 15, 1855 as a 
leading article