The all-absorbing facts in the news brought by the Atlantic, are 
the breaking off of the Vienna Conferences, and the partial if 
not total separation of Austria from the Allies. For both of these 
events we were not unprepared. The rejection by Russia of any 
plan of settlement which should not substantially admit all she 
claimed before the war, was, in the present state of that war, a 
matter of course. The return of Austria to her old expectant, 
wavery policy was also the result of certain circumstances of great 
importance, which we proceed to explain. 

The French Government discovered some time since, and the 
fact could not be denied by the British Cabinet, that Lord John 
Russell had committed a great blunder at Vienna* in allowing 
those of the points before the Conference in which Austria was 
directly interested to be first disposed of. These points were the 
freedom of the Danube and the question of the Principalities. 
From this moment Austria appeared satisfied. Expecting, as she 
does, to share sooner or later in the partition of Turkey—Servia, 
Bosnia, and Albania are provinces which she cannot allow to fall 
into any other hands than her own. It ts her interest to keep the 
question respecting the Christians in Turkey an open one. And as 
she can never expect to cope with Russia’s naval power in the 
Black Sea, she has but little interest in humiliating her in that 
quarter. From this point of view, then, Austria has every reason to 
be satisfied with what she has obtained, and to turn the weight of 
her seemingly impartial arbitration against England and France. 
But this diplomatic success has very little to do with her present 

wavering. The cause of this is of a far more overpowering nature. 

Some six months ago we alluded to the private and confidential 
dispatch by which Nicholas informed both Austria and Prussia, 
that in case they allied themselves with the West against him he 
would reply to such a treaty of alliance by a proclamation of 
Hungarian independence and Polish restoration.* At that time, 
and whenever we have considered the chances of a war in Poland 
and Volhynia, we have always taken into consideration the great 
military advantage which such a proclamation might give to 
Russia, if put forth after the conquest of Galicia and from the 
hights of the Carpathians, with Hungary open to her victorious 
armies. On that account, especially, we have always pointed out 
the fact that Austria could not undertake a war against Russia 
unless she was in a state at once to take the offensive and to parry, 
by successful battles and an advance upon Russia, the effects of 
such a proclamation.” So long, therefore, as the Austrian army 
in Galicia and the Principalities was strong enough to march 
upon Warsaw or Kiev there was little immediate danger from such 
a step. 

This dispatch of Nicholas has, however, as we now learn, lately 
been followed up by another from his successor, which contains 
quite different and far more serious menaces. The moment 
Austria shall irrevocably ally herself to the West, it says, or commit 
any overt act of hostility against Russia, Alexander II will place 
himself at the head of the Panslavist movement, and change his title of 
Emperor of all the Russians into that of Emperor of all the 
Slavonians. 

At last! Let Alexander take such a step, and the struggle 
concerning the Christians in Turkey, the independence of the 
Porte, Sevastopol, the Principalities, and other such local trifles, 
may now be considered at an end. This declaration of Alexander’s 
is the first plain-spoken word since the war began; it is the first 
step toward placing the war upon the continental theater, and 
giving it, frankly and openly, that European character which has 
hitherto been lurking behind all sorts of pretexts and pretenses, 
protocols and treaties, Vattel phrases and Pufendorf quotations. 
Turkey—her independence and existence—is thrown into the 
back-ground. Who is to rule in Constantinople? would then no 

longer be the question—but who is to command all Europe? The 
Slavonic race, long divided by internal contests; repelled toward 
the East by Germans; subjugated, in part, by Turks, Germans, 
Hungarians; quickly reuniting its branches, after 1815, by the 
gradual rise of Panslavism, would then for the first time assert its 
unity, and, in doing so, declare war to the knife against the 
Romano-Celtic and Germanic races which have hitherto ruled the 
Continent. Panslavism is not a movement which merely strives 
after national independence; it is a movement which, thus acting 
upon Europe, would tend to undo what a thousand years of 
history have created; which could got realize itself without 
sweeping from the map Hungary, Turkey and a large part of 
Germany. Moreover, it must subjugate Europe in order to secure 
the stability of these results, if they are ever obtained. Panslavism 
is now, from a creed, turned into a political programme, or rather 
a vast political menace, with 800,000 bayonets to support it. 
Nor are these 800,000 soldiers all the forces it could command. 
A word from the Russian Emperor at the head of an army, 
marching upon the Carpathians, and nine or ten millions of 
Slavonians in Austria would be agitated as in 1848; a victory over 
the Austrians, and they would be in full insurrection; while 
Hungary and Italy would be hardly less plowed by revolutionary 
agitation. Here is a danger which might well make Francis Joseph 
pause; for unless he could at once defeat the great Slavonian army 
on his frontiers and carry the war into the enemy’s country, he 
might as well give up the contest before entering the lists.