London, July 14. Our last report but one* treated Lord John 
Russell’s resignation, whether voluntary or under duress, as a fait 
accompli. It took place yesterday afternoon, and it is in fact a 
composite resignation, both voluntary and under duress. For the 
section of the Whigs most eager to obtain posts, headed by 
Bouverie, were driven by Palmerston into a minor revolt. They 
stated that they would be obliged to vote for Bulwer’s motion 
unless Lord John resigned. No resistance could be offered to this. 
Not satisfied with their grand deed, the disloyal Whig mob 
collected signatures in the lobby of the House of Commons for a 
petition requesting Palmerston to induce the Queen to accept 
Russell’s resignation which had already been submitted. At any 
rate Russell may have gained one satisfaction from these base 
manoeuvres, namely that of having created a party in his own 
image. 

The resignation of a man who, as Urquhart says, is in the habit 
of clasping his hands behind his back to give himself moral 
support, would hardly have affected the continued existence of 
the Cabinet had not the majority of the House of Commons been 
eager to use any pretext allowing it to postpone the fateful 
dissolution. And _ dissolution of the House is the inevitable 
consequence of passing Bulwer’s motion. If Palmerston were to 
retain his post despite the vote of no-confidence, he would have to 

For further details of Bulwer’s motion, tabled on July 10, 1855, see this 

dissolve the House, and if he were succeeded by Derby, the latter 
would likewise have to dissolve it. The House seems hardly 
inclined to sacrifice itself on the altar of patriotism. 

Sir George Grey has set up a commission to investigate the 
police brutalities. It consists of the Recorders* of London, 
Liverpool and Manchester and will meet next Tuesday. 

If in commerce time is money, in warfare time is victory. The 
greatest blunder that can be committed in warfare is to miss the 
favourable momemt, the moment when superior forces can be 
hurled against the enemy. The blunder is magnified if it is 
committed not during defensive operations, when the conse- 
quences of neglect can be repaired, but during offensive operations, 
in a war of invasion, where such carelessness can cause the loss of 
an army. These aré truisms which, as every cadet knows, are 
self-evident. And yet no other rule of strategy or tactics is 
transgressed as frequently as this one, and General Peélissier, the 
impetuous man of action, the “Marshal Forward” **? of the 
Crimean army, seems to be destined by his action to illustrate the 
common disregard of these commonplace rules. 

The road to Sevastopol leads through Inkerman to the northern 
side of the fortress. No one knows this better than Pélissier and his 
staff. But in order to conquer the northern side, the Allied armies 
have to take the field with their main forces, beat the Russians, 
encircle the north side and detach a corps to keep the Russian 
field army at a distance. The favourable moment to do this came 
when the Sardinian corps and the Turks under Omer Pasha 
arrived. The Allies were then considerably stronger than the 
Russians. But nothing of the sort was undertaken. The expedition 
to Kerch and the Sea of Azov was launched and one assault after 
another attempted. Field operations were restricted to reconnoitr- 
ing and extending the camp up to the entrance to the valley of 
Baidar. The alleged reason for this inactivity is now at last 
revealed. Means of transport are said to be lacking, and after a 
campaign of fifteen months the Allies are just as much confined to 
the Sea, Kamysh and Balaklava as ever. This is indeed unsurpass- 
able. The Crimea is not a desolate island somewhere near the 
South pole. It is a country whose food supplies are undoubtedly 
not inexhaustible, but which is capable of providing large quantities 
of fodder, draught-animals and carts if one has sufficient skill and 
daring to take them. Timorous and slow forward and backward 
movements within a circle of a few English miles around the 

Chernaya are of course not a suitable means to get hold of them. 
But even if we leave the camels, ponies and arbas of the Crimea 
completely out of account, there still remain ample means of 
transport on the European and Asian shores of the Black Sea 
which steamers can reach within two days. Why are they not 
commandeered for use by the Allies? The Russians have certainly 
given them enough lessons demonstrating how they ought to act. 
The 3rd, 4th and 5th army corps and several reserve divisions were 
transported to the Crimea at a time when the Allies had despaired 
of bringing provisions from Balaklava to the trenches. Some of 
the troops were moved in carts across the steppe, and they seem 
to have suffered acutely from lack of food. And yet the country 
within a radius of 200 miles from Perekop is only thinly populated. 
But the resources of the more distant provinces were requisitioned, 
and it is certainly more difficult for the Russians to send carts from 
Yekaterinoslav, Poltava, Kharkov, etc., to the Crimea, than for the 
Allies in the Crimea to procure means of transport in Anatolia 
and Rumelia. In any case, under the pretext of lack of transport, 
the Allies let the chance to conquer the Crimea up to Simferopol 
slip. Now the position has changed. The Russians have formed a 
reserve army for the Crimea located between Odessa and Cherson. 
The strength of this army can only be estimated by us on the basis 
of the detachments made from the western army; these consist 
of the entire 2nd army corps and two infantry divisions. Together 
this amounts to five infantry divisions (82 battalions), one cavalry 
division (32 squadrons) and 80 cannon. Infantry and cavalry 
reserves have to be added to this. Taking into account the losses 
it suffered during the march, the army destined for the Crimea 
and assembled between Odessa and Perekop can therefore be 
assessed at approximately 70,000 to 80,000 men. The vanguard 
of their columns must by now have already passed through Perekop, 
and their weight will be felt by the Allies before the end of 
July. 

What can the Allies set against these reinforcements? Their 
ranks are being thinned again by cholera and fever just as much 
as by the various attempted assaults. British reinforcements are 
rather slow in arriving—very few regiments have in fact sailed. 
The 13,000 men reported by us* to have left some time ago have 
proved to be a government bluff. The French government for its 
part declares that it does not intend to send fresh divisions but 
merely detachments from the depots to make good the losses 

incurred at the theatre of war. These reinforcements, provided 
they arrive in time, will hardly be sufficient to bring the Allied 
army up to the strength it had in June, i.e. 200,000 men, 
including Turks and Sardinians. It will probably amount to no 
more than 180,000 men, who at the beginning of August will be 
opposed by at least 200,000 Russians in good positions, in 
command of the country in their rear and holding the south side 
of Sevastopol as a bridgehead. If under these circumstances the 
allied army were again squeezed into the narrow plateau behind 
the Chernaya, these human masses would by their momentum 
turn the restricted space into a graveyard. 

There is still time to take the offensive. True the most 
favourable moment has been missed, but nevertheless a bold 
advance by the allied army would even now ensure an extension 
of their living space. But there is no indication that they intend to 
use this opportunity. 

Finally, in justification of Pélissier one might mention that 
public opinion here and in Paris has sought and found the cause 
of the wretched state of the second Crimean campaign in the 
intervention of Louis Bonaparte, the general from afar.