“Of what use are allies to thee, O Russian? 
Stride forth, and thine is the whole world!”’* 

Times appear to be changed since Derjavin, the poet-laureate of 
Catherine II, could venture this proud appeal to his people. At 
that period, indeed, the Russians had made giant strides. The 
whole of South, or New Russia, from the Don to the Dniester, and 
the whole of West Russia, from the Dniester to the Niemen, were 
added to the Empire. Odessa, Cherson, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, 
and Sevastopol were founded; and indeed so long as the “great 
nation” of the East had no more dangerous opponents to fight 
than Turkish janissaries and Polish volunteers, every march 
appeared to imply a conquest and every declaration of war to be a 
sure guarantee of a speedy and glorious treaty of peace. It 1s true 
the Russian legions, on venturing beyond their favorite and 
favorable ground received a terrible lesson at Zorndorf, and were 
saved from even a severer one at Kunersdorf by the intervention 
of the Austrian Loudon only. It is true that in 1798-99 even 
Suvaroff found his match in Masséna, and had to pay dearly for 
his Italian victories with the defeat of Zurich and the disastrous 
retreat across the Saint Gothard.**’ But for all that, the time of 
Catherine and Suvaroff was the great and glorious epoch of the 
Russian arms, and never since then has a similar splendor 
surrounded them. At Austerlitz, at Friedland, the inferiority of the 
Russian army, as compared with the French, was_ signally 
manifested; and if at Eylau they were saved from similar disgrace, 
it was because Lestocq, with the remnants of the Prussian army, 
rendered them the same service Loudon had done at Kuners- 
dorf.*88 At Borodino an inferior number of Frenchmen defeated 

them **°; and had not Napoleon kept his guards in reserve, the 
defeat would have been decisive. The battles fought by the 
Russians during the French retreat from Moscow were far more 
glorious to the latter than to the former. And in the campaigns of 
1813 and 1814, it was the Germans who had not only to supply 
the numerical force, and to bear the brunt of every battle, but to 
find the generals who could plan them. 

Of the campaigns against Napoleon, however, it might be said 
that there was no disgrace in being beaten by a man who was in 
himself a host; but when the campaign of 1828-29, against the 
Turks, and of 1831, against the Poles,*” showed again what 
superiority of numbers and what great efforts and waste of time it 
cost the Russians to overcome opponents far less formidable than 
Napoleon and his well-seasoned troops, the decline of Russian 
military glory was evident. It cannot be denied that at the very 
time when Russian influence in European politics was stronger 
than ever, the actual feats of the Russian army justified anything 
but such a political position. And though Russia, in consequence 
of the events of 1848-50, was actually raised to the position of 
arbiter and protector of all Europe east of the Rhine, the 
campaign which seemingly elevated her to such omnipotence, the 
Hungarian campaign, was positively disgraceful to Russian gener- 
alship, and did not add a single laurel leaf to the crown of victory 
of the “invincible” Russian army. 

This “young, powerful, irresistible nation,” this “people of the 
future,” as the Russians modestly called themselves, in a military 
sense at least culminated long ago, and was even declining when 
the present war began. The Russian army was ranked as a 
respectable force from the tenacity and solidity of its infantry, 
though with many shortcomings which more than made up for 
these advantages. It appeared imposing by its numbers, professed- 
ly ready for war at any moment, and by the implicit obedience 
which held this vast machine together. But alas! what has become 
of this mighty army, this “stern fact” which so frightened Western 
Europe! Three of its eight corps, on the Danube, were checked by 
what Turkey could find to oppose to them; and when the 
Crimean campaign began, division after division, corps after corps 
was drawn into the insatiable whirlpool, never to disentangle 
themselves again. Indeed the army was drained to its very reserves 
and élite troops. The innate bravery as well as the innate 
clumsiness of the Russian soldiers was aided by the engineering 
skill of a truly gifted man, Todtleben; it was favored by the sins of 
omission and commission of the allied generals; it achieved a 

passive defense, glorious and even unparalleled of its kind, kept 
up full eleven months; but with all that, there was not a single 
actual success, not a single victory, and, indeed, invariable and 
inglorious defeat wherever the Russians attempted to take the 
initiative, no matter against what sort of enemies. 

Except the truly incredible bravery displayed by the French and 
English soldiers, and in some instances by the Turks, also, the 
whole of this war does not afford to the Allies much matter for 
bragging; from the Alma**! to the present day, their generalship 
has been worse than indifferent, and in no single instance have 
they ever seized time by the forelock. But such days as Inkerman 
and the Chernaya prove irretrievably the superiority of western 
armies over the Russians, while the repelled assaults on Silistria 
and Kars prove that under certain circumstances even the Turks 
are more than a match for them.*” This war has been 
distinguished by more hand to hand encounters than all the wars 
of Napoleon together. Not an action but the troops have actually 
closed,. even in the open field. Everywhere the bayonet has 
decided in the last instance. Now the bayonet— Russki styk— 
always was the great boast of the Russians. And precisely with the 
bayonet have the Russians been beaten in every instance, and by 
inferior numbers too. Russki styk belongs to bygone days, and the 
men who had to shrink back at Silistria, Kars, and even from the 
small bridge-head of Oltenitza, are no longer the same as those 
who took Akaltzik, Erzeroum and Warsaw, much less the same 
whom Suvaroff made to storm Ismail and Praga.*” “Stride forth a 
Russian” is bitter irony when applied to the step of the soldiers 
retiring over the bridge from South to North Sevastopol. 

That the position of the Russians in the Crimea is not very 
enviable is proved by the Emperor Alexander’s return to the north 
without having gone to see the army before the enemy. Had there . 
been any improvement in its position, any possibility of encourag- 
ing it by prospects of speedy reenforcements, of increased 
supplies, and of changes in the fortune of war, surely Alexander 
would not have lost the opportunity to visit that army which at all 
events has exhibited more patience and more passive resisting 
force than any previous army, even in Russia. As he has not done 
so, there is an increased probability that the rumors are true 
according to which the Russians are resolved to retire by small 
detachments from Sympheropol toward Perekop, leaving a rear- 
guard only to make a bold front against the enemy as long as may 
be necessary. There are, indeed, other circumstances tending to 
confirm these rumors. The fire of the north forts against 

Sevastopol, though not very effective, is on the increase, as if they 
intended to expend all their ammunition before leaving. The 
troops about Inkerman are daily diminishing; and at the same 
time, as if to make up for this, fresh batteries are daily erected on 
the north shore. The camp about Mackenzie’s even is reported to 
be peopled by diminished numbers. On the other hand, it is true, 
stronger columns have appeared on the Upper Belbek as soon as 
the French showed themselves there, and no progress of any note 
has been made by the Allies on that side. 

It is, however, not to be forgotten that the road through the 
steppe from Sympheropol by Perekop to Cherson, offers no 
means of subsistence whatever to a marching army, and very often 
not even water. Thus small detachments only can pass at a time, as 
everything for their consumption has to be brought from a 
distance; consequently the slower Gorchakoff effects his retreat, 
the more regularly supplied will be his columns and the fewer 
men will he lose on the long march. On the other hand, the allied 
generals will commit an unpardonable military sin if they allow 
this gradual retreat of the Russians, without even ascertaining, by 
strong reconnaissances, whether it is actually taking place or not. 
As far as we can judge, Pélissier is noways satisfied on this point, 
but it is his own fault exclusively. Should he go on with his 
offensive movements at the present slow rate, he may have finished 
his preliminary operations for an attack upon the Russian position 
by the time the last Russian passes the lines of Perekop. But the 
“conqueror of Sevastopol” has now a reputation to lose, and this 
has made him even more cautious than the defeat of the 18th of 
June did.** Napoleon finished his campaign of 1796 in the 
maritime Alps, in six days and four battles, and that’ was ground 
far more difficult than the Crimean chalk-hills; but then he was 
not an understrapper to his own nephew.* One attempt has, 
indeed, been made on the part of the Allies which displays a little 
more energy. The corps at Eupatoria, reenforced by Gen. de 
Failly’s French division, consisting of nine battalions, and Paget’s 
British light dragoon brigade, which counts four regiments, has 
now extended its feelers as far as half way to Sympheropol, but 
very soon retreated again. Gorchakoff, who sends this piece of 
news,” states the strength of the Allies at from thirty thousand to 
forty thousand men. We shall be nearer the mark if we take the 
first number. But with thirty thousand men disposable in the field, 

the Eupatoria corps might attempt far bolder movements, 
especially as its line of retreat to Eupatoria, either north or south 
of Lake Sasik, cannot be cut off. Thus, after all, we find the same 
languor at Eupatoria as on the Chernaya; and that this languor, 
instead of being lashed up into action, will rather become more 
languid, there can be no doubt, if it be certain, as the whole 
British press asserts, that Gen. Codrington is to succeed old Father 
Simpson in the command of the British forces. Codrington 
distinguished himself at the Redan on the 8th of September, 
where he commanded the assaulting divisions, by his magnificent 
imperturbability. So imperturbable was he that he could afford to 
look with the marble placidity of Horace’s honest man— si fractus 
wlabatur orbis*—on the defeat of his vanguard, without so much as 
even suspecting that it might not be amiss to send the reserves to 
their support! Codrington, no doubt, is the man for the 
moment—the great general who has been looked for so long in 
vain—and if he gets the command the British are safe from 
defeat, as he never would allow more than his outpost troops to be 
beaten in a single day. 

That the Russians are actually retreating from the Crimea is also 
indicated by another fact. When Alexander was at Nikolaieff, he 
inspected the 31st, 32d, 33d, 34th, 35th and 36th marine 
equipages recently arrived from Sevastopol. These marine equi- 
pages are battalions of sailors and marines, each of which serves at 
sea to man a ship-of-the-line, and one or more smaller vessels. 
That these troops left the Crimea when they could neither be 
missed nor replaced if any lengthened resistance was intended, 
clearly shows what is to be expected. The mission of Generals 
Benkendorf and Stackelberg to headquarters in the Crimea, in 
order to inquire into and report on the state of the army there is 
also significant, and from what we know of the doings of the allied 
generals, it may be expected that the Russian retreat, on the 
whole, will be effected unmolested and without any great loss. 

The London Times of course knows better than this.” If 
Pélissier does not act now, it is merely to induce the Russians to 
stop in the Crimea. If they were to retreat now, while the season is 
tolerable, what could he do to prevent them? what great injury 
could he inflict on them? No; Pélissier’s plan is far deeper. 

Pélissier not only intends to conquer the Crimea, but also to make 
the Russians perform a counterpart to the French retreat from 
Moscow. He is waiting for Winter to set in, and then he will 
pounce upon them, expel them from their position, drive them in 
heedless flight across the frozen steppe, or, as the Russians say of 
1812, turn against them “His Excellency Gen. Hunger, and his 
Excellency Gen. Frost;” and then have them stopped in their 
march by the flanking corps falling upon them from Eupatoria, 
from Kertch, from Kinburn, so that what cold and hunger have 
left, will have to surrender at discretion, and not a man escape to 
tell the tale of the Crimean catastrophe to his countrymen. 
Such is the strategy of the London Times.