Our readers cannot but be struck with the novel spirit breathing 
through the intelligence from the seat of war in the Crimea, 
received by the Baltic yesterday, and published in our columns this 
morning. Hitherto an overweening and arrogant confidence has 
distinguished the comments of the British press, and the reports 
of British and French correspondents concerning the movements 
and prospects of the war. But now this has given way to a feeling 
of anxiety and even of alarm. It is confessed on all hands that 
there is no such superiority as has been claimed on the part of the 
allied armies over their antagonists. That Sevastopol is stronger, 
Menchikoff an abler General, and his army far more farmidable 
than. was supposed; and that instead of certain and decisive 
victory, the French and English now stand exposed to possible 
failure and disgrace. Such is the feeling expressed by our 
correspondent at Liverpool, himself an Englishman, alive to all the 
patriotic impulses and prejudices of his country*; and this feeling 
is equally manifested by the very energetic action of both the 
French and English Governments. Desperate efforts are made to 
hurry reenforcements to Sevastopol; the United Kingdom is 
drained of its last soldier; many steamships are taken up as 
transports; and 50,000 French troops are sent forward, all in the 
hope of arriving at the scene of action before it shall be too late to 
take part in the final, decisive struggle. 

We published on Saturday a copious quantity of documents, 
relating principally to the earlier stages of the siege, and the 

November 27, 1854.— Ed. 

partially effective but yet disastrous cooperation of the fleets*; and 
we now add the official reports concerning Liprandi’s murderous 
attack on the allies near Balaklava, with other accounts of the 
subsequent progress of operations, all of them, we must say, quite 
unfavorable to the allies.” From a careful examination of these 
documents we conclude that though the position is, as we have 
often stated,° a difficult and even precarious one, it is hardly so 
bad as is implied by our Liverpool correspondent. We do not 
think that they are in danger of any worse disaster than a 
compulsory retreat and embarkation. And, on the other hand, 
there is still the possibility of their carrying the town by a 
desperate, and sanguinary assault. But however this may be, it 
must, we think, be decided long before the reenforcements leaving 
France and England can reach the Crimea. The campaign is 
evidently near its turning point; the movements, the errors and 
the omissions which have shaped its character and generated its 
results, are made; we are in possession of authentic and 
indisputable information as to the principal facts; and we 
accordingly propose succinctly and briefly to review the course of 
the contest. 

It is now established that when the allies landed at Old Fort, 
Menchikoff had under his command in the field only forty-two 
battalions and two regiments of cavalry, besides some Cossacks, 
while Sevastopol was garrisoned by the marines and sailors of the 
fleet. These forty-two battalions were of the 12th, 16th and 17th 
divisions of infantry; and supposing each battalion to have had its 
full complement of 700 men, there were in all 29,400 men of 
infantry; with 2,000 Hussars, the Cossacks, artillery, sappers and 
miners; in all some 32,000 men in the field. With these he could 
not oppose the landing of the allies, as by so doing he would have 
exposed his troops, without a sufficient reserve, to the fire of the, 
allied fleets. A powerful army, which could afford to have 
sacrificed a part of its strength, might have detached a force to 
open a petty war of surprises and night attacks against the invaders 
while landing; the Russians, in this instance, required every man 
for the great battle to come; besides, the Russian foot soldier is the 
clumsiest fellow alive for petty war operations; his forte is 
action in column by close order. As to the Cossacks, on the other 

“New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4245, November 25, 1854.— Ed. 
No. 4246, November 27, 1854.— Ed. 

hand, their mode of warfare is too petty, and is effective in 
proportion only as the chance of plunder increases. Besides, the 
campaign of the Crimea seems to prove that the regularization of 
the Cossacks, which has been gradually carried out for the last 
thirty years, has broken their individual spirit of enterprise, and 
reduced them to a subdued condition, in which they are spoiled 
for irregular and not yet fit for regular service. They seem 
incapable now either of outpost and detached duty, or of charging 
an enemy in line. The Russians, then, were quite right in reserving 
every sabre and bayonet for the battle of the Alma. 

On the banks of this river, the 32,000 Russians were attacked by 
55,000 allies. The proportion was almost one to two. When about 
30,000 allies had been engaged, Menchikoff ordered the retreat. 
Of the Russians, up to then, not more than 20,000 were engaged; 
a further attempt to hold the position would have converted the 
Russian retreat into a complete rout, for it would have required 
the engaging of the whole Russian reserve in the battle. The 
success of the allies, with their tremendous numerical superiority, 
being established beyond doubt, Menchikoff broke off the battle, 
covered his retreat by his reserves, and after overcoming the first 
disorder created on his left by Bosquet’s flank movement retired 
unpursued and unmolested, “in proud order,” from the field. 
The allies say they had no cavalry for the pursuit; but since we 
know that the Russians had but two regiments of Hussars—less, if 
anything, than the allies—this excuse falls to the ground. As at 
Zorndorf, at Eylau, at Borodino,**' the Russian infantry, though 
beaten, behaved up to the character given them by General 
Cathcart, who commanded a division against them, and who 
pronounced them “incapable of panic!” 

But if the Russian infantry remained cool and unterrified, 
Menchikoff himself was panic-struck. The great numerical force of 
the allies, coupled with their unexpected decision and impetuosity 
in the attack, deranged, for a moment, his plans. He abandoned 
the idea of retreating into the interior of the Crimea, and 
marched to the south of Sevastopol, in order to hold the line of 
the Chernaya. This was a great and unpardonable mistake. 
Overlooking, from the hights of the Alma, the whole allied 
position, he must have been able to make out the strength of his 
opponents within 5,000 men. He must have known that, whatever 
was their relative superiority over his own forces, they were not 
strong enough to leave an army to observe Sevastopol while 
following him into the interior. He must have known that if the 
allies were two to one against him on the sea-shore, he could bring 

two against their one at Simferopol. And yet he marched, as he 
himself confesses, to the south side of Sevastopol. But, after this 
retreat had been effected, without any molestation from the allies, 
and his troops had rested a day or two on the hills behind the 
Chernaya, then Menchikoff resolved to redress his mistake. He 
did this by a perilous flank movement from the Chernaya to 
Bakshiserai. It was contrary to one of the first rules of strategy; 
yet it promised great results. When a blunder is once committed in 
strategy, you can seldom get over its consequences. The question 
then merely is, whether it is less disadvantageous to abide by them 
or to get over them by a second, but intentional, erroneous 
movement. In this case we think Menchikoff was perfectly right in 
risking a flank-march within reach of the enemy, .in order to 
get out of his absurdly “concentrated” position around Seva- 
stopol. 

But in this contest between strategical mediocrities and routine 
generals, the movements of hostile armies assumed forms hitherto 
unknown in warfare. The fancy for flank-marches, like the 
cholera, was epidemic in both camps. At the same time that 
Menchikoff resolved on a flank-march from _ Sevastopol ' to 
Bakshiserai, Saint Arnaud and Raglan took it into their heads to 
move from the Kacha to Balaklava. The rear of the Russians and 
the van of the British met at Mackenzie’s farm (so called from a 
Scotchman, later an admiral in the Russian service), and, as a 
matter of course, the van beat the rear. The general strategical 
character of the flank-march of the allies having already been 
criticised in The Tribune, we need not now revert to it. 

On the 2d or 3d of October Sevastopol was invested, and the 
allies took up that very position from which Menchikoff had just 
extricated himself. From that moment the memorable siege of 
Sevastopol began, and at the same time a new era in the 
campaign. Hitherto the allies, by their uncontested superiority, 
had it all their own way. Their fleets, commanding the: sea, 
insured their landing. Once landed, their superior numbers, and 
certainly also their superior storming qualities, insured the victory 
at the Alma. But now the equilibrium of forces, which sooner or 
later is sure to be brought about in operations distant from their 
base and in an enemy’s country, began to develop itself. 
Menchikoff’s army, it is true, did not show itself yet; but it made 
necessary the placing of a reserve on the Chernaya, fronting to the 
east. Thus the actual besieging army was seriously weakened, and 

reduced to numbers not much superior to those of the gar- 
rison. 

Want of energy, want of system, especially in the cooperation of 
the different departments of the British land and sea forces, 
difficulties of ground, and, above all, an invincible spirit of 
routine, inherent, it appears, in the British administrative and 
scientific departments, delayed the commencement of actual siege 
operations to the 9th of October. At last the trenches were opened 
on that day, at the enormous distance of from 1,500 to 2,500 
yards from the Russian works. Such a thing was never seen nor 
heard of in any previous siege. It proves that the Russians were 
still able to dispute the ground around the fortress, to the distance 
of at least a mile; and they actually held it up to the 17th. On the 
morning of that day the siege-works were far enough advanced to 
allow the allies to open their fire. Probably this would have been 
delayed a few days longer, as the allies were by no means in a fit 
position to do so with success on that day, had it not been for the 
arrival of the glorious news that all England and France were 
rejoicing at the capture of Sevastopol on the 25th of October. This 
news, of course, exasperated the armies, and, in order to 
tranquilize them, the fire had to be opened. But it turns out that 
the allies brought 126 guns against 200 or 250. Now, the great 
axiom of Vauban, which has been again and again used by the 
Anglo-French to keep public opinion quiet, viz: 

“that a siege is an operation of mathematical certainty and success, a mere 
matter of time, unless interrupted from without.” 

This great axiom is based upon that other axiom of the same 
engineer that 

“in a siege the fire of the attack can be made superior to that of the defense.” 

Now, here at Sevastopol, we have exactly the reverse; the fire of 
the attack, when opened, was decidedly inferior to that of the 
defense. The consequences were very soon made apparent. In a 
couple of hours the Russians silenced the fire of the French 
batteries and kept up an almost equal contest, throughout the day, 
with the English. To create a diversion, a naval attack was made. 
But it was neither better conducted nor more successful. The 
French ships, attacking the Quarantine Fort and Fort Alexander, 
supported the land attack upon these forts; and had it not been 
for their aid, there is no doubt the French would have been far 
more roughly handled. The English ships attacked the north side 
of the harbor, including Fort Constantine and the Telegraph 
Battery, as well as a temporary battery constructed to the 

north-east of Constantine. That cautious man, Admiral Dundas, 
had ordered his ships to anchor at 1,200 yards from the forts—he 
“is evidently a friend of the long-range system. Now it is an old 
established fact that in a combat between ships and batteries on 
shore, the ships are beat unless they can close up within 200 yards 
or less to the batteries, so that their shot is certain to tell, and with 
the greater effect. Consequently, Dundas got his ships knocked 
about in a terrible manner and would have suffered a glorious 
defeat, had it not been for Sir Edmund Lyons, who, it appears, 
almost in defiance of orders, got three ships-of-the-line as close as 
he could to Fort Constantine and did it some damage in exchange 
for what he received. As, however, the British and French 
Admirals’ reports have not yet said a single word about the actual 
damage done to the forts, we must conclude that here, as well as 
{at} Bomarsund, Montalembert Coast—forts and casemated bat- 
teries— proved a match for twice their number of guns on board 
ship. This is the more remarkable, as it is now pretty certain that 
the exposed masonry of these forts, as was already partially 
proved at Bomarsund, cannot withstand the breaching fire of 
heavy ship guns, established on shore, for more than twenty-four 
hours. | 

The French were almost silent for a couple of days afterward. 
The English, having established their batteries at a greater 
distance from the Russian lines, and mounting heavier calibers 
than their allies, were enabled to maintain their fire and to silence 
the upper tier of guns in a masonry redoubt. The naval attack was 
not renewed—the best proof of the respect inspired by the 
casemated forts. The Russians made a defense which very much 
undeceived the conquerors of the Alma. For every dismounted 
gun a fresh one was brought up. Every embrasure destroyed 
during the day by the enemy’s fire was restored during the night. 
Earthworks against earthworks, the contest was very nearly equal, 
until measures were taken to give the allies the superiority. Lord 
Raglan’s ridiculous order “to spare the town” was revoked, and a 
bombardment opened which, by its concentric effect upon 
crowded masses of troops, and by its harassing nature, must have 
done the garrison great harm. Skirmishers were, besides, sent out 
in advance of the batteries, to pick off, from any covered position 
they could find, the Russian gunners, As at Bomarsund, the Minié 
rifle did its work well. In a few days, what with the heavy guns 
and the Minié rifles, the Russian artillerymen were mostly put hors 
de combat. So were the sailors from the fleet, the portion of the 

garrison best instructed in the use of heavy guns. The usual 
resource of besieged garrisons had then to be resorted to: the 
infantry were commanded to serve the guns, under the superin- 
tendence of the remaining artillerymen. But their fire, as may be 
imagined, was almost without effect, and thus the besiegers were 
enabled to push their trenches nearer and nearer the place. They 
have opened, it is stated, their third parallel at 300 yards from the 
outworks. We do not know yet what batteries they have erected in 
this third parallel; we can only say that a third parallel, in regular 
sieges, is always made at the foot of the glacis of the works 
attacked, that is, about 50 or 60 yards from the ditch. If this 
distance has been exceeded before Sevastopol, we can but see in 
this fact a confirmation of a report contained in several British 
papers, that the irregularity of the lines of defense, instead of 
giving the British engineers fresh scope for their inventive 
capacities, has but disconcerted these gentlemen who can demol- 
ish, upon the most approved principle, a regular bastioned front, 
but who seem to be badly off as soon as the enemy deviates from 
the rule prescribed by the best authorities on the subject. 

The southern attack once decided upon, the parallel and its 
batteries should have been directed against one, or at most two 
well-defined fronts of the defenses. Two of the outer forts next to 
each other—or, at the very outside, three—should have been 
attacked with concentrated forces; and, once demolished, then all 
the other outworks would have been useless. In this way, the allies, 
by bringing all their artillery to bear upon one point, could have 
easily established at once a great superiority of fire, and shortened 
the siege considerably. As far as can be judged from plans and 
maps, the front, from the Quarantine Fort to the upper end of 
the inner harbor, or the front against which the French now direct 
their efforts, would have been the best to attack, as its demolition 
would lay the town itself completely open. The one hundred and 
thirty guns of the allies would have at once insured them a 
superiority of fire on this limited front. Instead of this, the desire 
to let each army act independently of the other produced this 
unprecedented mode of siege, in which the whole of the ramparts, 
extending over a length of three miles, is simultaneously 
cannonaded on its whole extent. Such a thing has never been seen 
before. Who ever heard of an attack which allowed the defense to 
bring into play at once, from plain bastioned works and lunettes 
the enormous mass of two hundred and fifty guns? A. single 
bastioned front can hardly mount twenty guns; and in an ordinary 
siege no more than three or four fronts can contribute to the 

defense. Unless the allied engineers can show, hereafter, very 
substantial reasons for their curious proceedings, we must 
conclude that they were unable to find out the weakest points of 
the defenses, and, therefore, in order not to miss them, fired 
upon every portion of the line. 

In the meantime, reenforcements arrive to both parties. 
Liprandi’s harassing and partially successful attacks on the allied 
outposts have shown the presence of a stronger Russian force than 
Menchikoff had led to Bakshiserai. As yet, he does not, however, 
appear strong enough for a relieving battle. Considering the 
progress made by the besiegers, considering that the damage done 
to the defense increases in a geometrical ratio as the besiegers 
approach the ramparts, considering that the outworks still hold 
out, but that the inner wall appears to be weak, we may expect 
that something decisive will have occurred from the 9th to the 
15th of November; that either the south side of the town has 
fallen, or that the allies have suffered a decisive defeat and been 
obliged to raise the siege. But it must be recollected that all such 
predictions depend upon circumstances which cannot be fully 
known beforehand at such a distance from the spot.