Several important military movements have recently taken place 
in the seat of war in Turkey, which more clearly define the 
positions and plans of the respective parties. The Russians—to 
whom we first advert because they are the attacking party, and as 
such must be regarded as taking the initiative—have continued to 
extend their line of operations toward the West. Brigade after 
brigade has been sent in the direction of Widin, on the upper 
Danube; and now the front of the Russian army may be said to 
extend from Kalafat, opposite Widin, to Orasch, opposite Orsova, 
in a direction which equally menaces the road to Constantinople, 
and that to Servia and Macedonia. The first movement toward 
Kalafat was sufficient to establish the certainty of a Russian 
diversion toward the centers of the Slavonic and Greek population 
of Turkey. It made it probable, at the same time, that the plan of 
the campaign would be defensive action and mere demonstrations 
on the direct road to Constantinople, with energetic offensive 
action on the road to Sofia, in Servia and Macedonia. However, 
when these movements were made, the Turks had not declared 
war. This event has since taken place, and appears to have 
irritated the Czar* to such a degree that he is likely to impart a far 
more energetic impulse to his troops than was previously to be 
expected. Not only is Prince Paskiewich called to the command of 
the Russian forces, but he is also said to bring with him 40,000 
soldiers from the army in Poland, who next to the guards and 
grenadiers, are considered the best troops in the Russian pay. 
Such reenforcements would establish a superiority for the Russian 

arms which might justify offensive action, both on the Upper and 
Lower Danube, while at the same time they might be considered 
as a counterpoise against any French and British forces, that, 
according to rumor, are likely to be sent to the support of Turkey. 
At all events, these Russian reenforcements cannot arrive on the 
Danube in time for operations this season. From Warsaw to 
Bucharest, by way of Dubno, Chotin and Jassy, the distance is 
eight hundred miles across a country in which an army cannot 
move more than eight or ten miles a day. It will then be three 
months or till the beginning of January before these fresh troops 
can take up their positions; and considering the season of the 
year, it is even probable that it will take them longer. These 
troops, then, must remain entirely in the background until the 
beginning of the spring campaign. 

The Russian forces, now in the Principalities, have been 
estimated at from 130,000 to 150,000 men. Supposing they have 
lost by sickness and desertion from 20,000 to 30,000, they still 
maintain a numerical superiority over the Turks opposed to them. 
For if we know but little more of the actual strength of the 
Russians than what may be concluded from the number’ of 
divisions and brigades marched into Turkey, and from the 
effective numbers they ought to show on their rolls, the numbers 
of the Turkish forces on the Danube are very well known through 
the reports of British, French and Piedmontese officers sent there 
by their respective Governments. Now, all these reports agree in 
this fact, that even after the arrival of the Egyptian contingent, the 
Turkish active army, under Omer Pasha, did not number more 
than 110,000 combatants, of whom only 80,000 were regulars. 
Behind them, at Adrianople, an army of reserve was being formed 
which was to consist of 80,000 Redifs (old soldiers called in again), 
but of the state of this reserve we have no positive information. 
The fact, then, is this, that on the day when the first shot will be 
fired, Omer .Pasha will command an army numerically inferior to 
that of his opponent, and that nothing but blunders on the part of 
his enemy, or capital generalship on his own part, will save him 
from defeat. 

We have equally good information as to the position and the 
defensive preparations of the Turks. Three lines have been 
fortified: first, the Danube, to prevent its being passed by the 
enemy; second, that from Varna to Shumla; third, that a few 
leagues in the rear of the second, on the river KamCiya, where is 
the fort which guards the passes of the Balkan. These fortifica- 
tions are described by the foreign officers as formidable, and likely 

to frustrate any attempt of an enemy to carry them. Now, with all 
respect for the important art of field fortification, and for the 
judgment of the officers who give this report, we may be allowed 
to say that such opinions must be received with great caution. How 
many field-works considered to be impregnable have been carried, 
after a few rounds of grape-shot, on the first assault; and who 
does not know that the most celebrated field-works ever con- 
structed, the lines of Torres Vedras,** were strong, not by their 
passive capacity of resistance but because Wellington had 100,000 
men to defend them, while Masséna could only bring 30,000 men 
to the attack? Single, detached field-works, as in mountain passes 
for instance, have often done great service; but never in modern 
times has a superior army, commanded by an able General, been 
defeated in a general action on account of the passive resistance 
offered by field-works. And then the manner in which field-works 
are defended is almost everything; but half-disciplined troops, 
or soldiers without any discipline, are of little avail behind 
breastworks when a vigorous shower of grape is directed upon 
them. 

But let us look at the three lines of defense the Turks have 
fortified. The first is that of the Danube. Now, to fortify the line 
of the Danube can only mean to erect such works as will prevent 
the Russians from crossing that river. The course of the Danube, 
from Orsova to the sea, is nearly 600 miles long; to fortify such a 
line effectually and to garrison the fortifications, would require six 
times as many men as the Turkish General can command, and if 
he had them he would commit the greatest blunder should he put 
them to such a use. We conclude then that this first line of 
fortifications must be confined to works between Rustchuk and 
Orsova, by which the passage of the river is molested, but not 
effectually prevented. 

The second position from Shumla to Varna is exactly the same 
in which the Turks were routed in 1829, and in which they are 
again sure to be annihilated if they there accept a decisive battle. 
The position appears to possess striking advantages for defense, 
and to be susceptible of great additional strength by art; and the 
position on the Kamc¢iya, to the rear of Varna and Shuma, 
appears to be still stronger, and has the advantage of forcing the 
enemy to leave troops behind to blockade those fortresses. But 
both have this disadvantage, that they have a narrow pass in their 
rear as the only means of retreat, which outweighs, for an inferior 
army, all other advantages, and which would make it an egregious 
mistake to accept a battle unless the inferior army were as sure as 

the British were at Waterloo that at the decisive moment an allied 
army would fall upon the flanks of the attacking enemy.*” 

As to Omer Pasha we have no means of judging to what use he 
really intends turning these fortifications. We cannot doubt but he 
knows very well that his part in the war will be chiefly defensive; 
and he is, therefore, perfectly justified in strengthening his 
defensive position by all the means which the art of fortification 
places at his disposal. We do not know, whether he intends these 
fortifications to frighten the Russians from passing the Danube at 
those points by which Constantinople is most directly menaced or 
whether he proposes to accept a decisive battle in them. It is said 
that he has disposed his army in such a manner that at whatever 
point toward Shumla the Russians shall cross the river, he will be 
prepared to fall upon the head of their main column and beat it 
before support can arrive. In that case, the second line of 
fortifications would form a secure retreat if the operation should 
be frustrated. But the truth is that a great defensive battle on any 
of the three lines would be a mistake; for either the Russians will 
concentrate all their forces for the attack, and then Omer Pasha 
will stand but a poor chance; or they will divide themselves, and 
then he ought to leave his fortified lines in order to fall upon one 
of their columns. The best use to which he could turn these 
fortifications, and the only one consistent with the modern system 
of warfare, would be to use them as a provisional base for 
offensive operations against detached Russian columns, on their 
passing the Danube; to check the Russian advance by a more or 
less obstinate defense of each line; and to hold, by means of the 
third line, the most important passes of the Balkan as long as this 
can be done without a general engagement. At the same time it 
cannot be denied that any army, and particularly the Turkish 
army, would be exceedingly demoralized by the abandonment 
without a battle, of these fortifications; for if they cannot hold out 
behind ditches and bulwarks, how are they to beat the Russians in 
the open field? This is the way the private soldier always reasons, 
especially if only half-disciplined; and therefore, if the fortifica- 
tions in question actually have the importance ascribed to them, 
we cannot but consider them more dangerous to the Turks 
themselves than to the Russians. 

But the Russians have fortified themselves, too, in Wallachia? 
Certainly, and their case is different. They are the attacking party; 
their fortifications merely serve to cover retreat and check pursuit 
in case of disaster; and they have four lines of rivers, one behind 
the other, crossing their line of retreat, and forming as many lines 

of defense. These lines are, the Danube, the Arges, the Buzeu and 
the Sereth. Here is a fair case for precautionary fortifications; 
here are natural lines of defense which form, to a European army, 
no obstacle for retreat, while with a little artificial improvement 
they may become serious obstacles to pursuit; and above all, here 
is no intention of accepting a general battle with only one line of 
retreat in the rear. The Russian fortifications, as far as we can 
judge, belong decidedly to the European system of warfare, while 
the Asiatic spirit predominates in those of the Turks. This same 
unreflecting character is the ruling feature of the general position 
of the latter. They defend Constantinople by placing themselves 
across the nearest road which leads to it, while the Russians 
appear to direct their first attack, not upon that city, but upon the 
central parts of the peninsula, where Turkish dominion is most 
vulnerable, and where, after all, for a Russian army lies the 
shortest way to the capital. 

There is, however, one thing which we must not forget. The 
Russian army is, and ever has been, slow and cautious in its 
movements. It will most probably not act during the winter season. 
A few skirmishes may take place in order to secure this or that 
island of the Danube to either party. But unless the Czar 
commands extraordinary activity—-which command would most 
likely be frustrated by the passive pedantry of his generals—there 
is very litthke chance of decisive maneuvers before spring. The 
Danube might be passed but the Balkan cannot be traversed, and 
between the two, the position of the Russian army would be most 
dangerous. 

In the meantime, the Turks have sent their fleet to Varna. 
Admiral Slade, an Englishman, who commands it, appears to be in 
high spirits. But that movement, too, is full of risk. The Russian 
fleet, indeed, appears inferior to the Turkish in everything but 
numbers; but as long as the Russians have two guns and two ships 
of the line to one of the Turks, the latter cannot venture an action 
out of the reach of their strand batteries. And in that case, the 
fleet would be safer and better placed in the Bosphorus, where it is 
not likely the Russians will blockade it. Once at Varna, the Turkish 
fleet is exposed to be deprived of all possibility of movement; 
while in the Bosphorus, it retains its freedom of action, and might 
be used for expeditions to Trebizond, to the Caucasian coast, or 
against detached positions of the Russian fleet. 

In every respect, then, we are unwillingly compelled to believe 
the Russians to be superior to the Turks. Whether Omer Pasha, 
who is really an able soldier, will succeed by his personal qualities 

in changing the balance, remains to be seen. Old Paskiewich, 
however, although a slow, is an experienced general, and will not 
easily be caught. 

Written about October 21, 1853 Reproduced from the New-York 

Tribune, No. 3919, November 8, 1853, as 

Tribune, No. 635, November 12, 1853 

Frederick Engels 

THE HOLY WAR 

The war has at last opened on the Danube,—a war of religious 
fanaticism on both sides, of traditional ambition with the Russians, 
of life and death with the Turks. As was to have been expected, 
Omer Pasha has been the first to begin positive hostilities; it was in 
the line of his duty to make some demonstration toward the 
forcible expulsion of the invaders from the Ottoman territory; but 
it is by no means certain that he has thrown from thirty to fifty 
thousand men across the Danube, as is rumored from Vienna, and 
there is reason to fear that if he has done so he has committed a 
fatal blunder. On the shore he leaves, he has ample resources of 
defense and a good position; on the shore he seeks he has inferior 
power of attack and no retreat in case of disaster. The report of 
his crossing with such numbers must therefore be doubted till 
more positive advices. 

While the struggle in Europe is commenced under disadvan- 
tageous circumstances for the Turks, the case is otherwise in Asia. 
There, the frontier territories of Russia and Turkey divide 
themselves, in a military point of view, into two quite distinct 
theaters of operation. It is the high ridge, or rather concatenation 
of ridges, connecting the Caucasus with the table-land of Central 
Armenia, and dividing the waters that run toward the Black Sea 
from those which the Araxes leads to the Caspian Sea, or the 
Euphrates to the Persian Gulf; it is this ridge which formerly 
parted Armenia from Pontus that now forms the partition of the 
two distinct districts where the war is to be waged. This range of 
abrupt and generally barren rocks, is traversed by very few 
roads—the two principal of which are those from Trebizond and 
Batum to Erzerum. Thus for all military purposes, the hills in 

question may be considered as nearly impassable, forcing both 
parties to have distinct corps on either side, operating more or less 
independently of each other. 

The country on the shore of the Black Sea is intersected by a 
number of rivers and mountain torrents, which form as many 
military positions for defense. Both the Russians and the Turks 
have fortified posts on important points. In this generally broken 
country (the valley of the river Rioni is the only one which forms 
anything like a plain), a defensive war might be carried on with 
great success against a superior army (as very few positions are 
liable to be turned on the land side, on account of the mountains), 
were it not for the cooperation of the respective fleets. By 
advancing, and, in case of need, landing troops upon the flank of 
the enemy, while the army engages him in front, a fleet might 
turn al] these strong positions, one by one, and neutralize, if not 
destroy, fortifications which, on neither side of the frontier, are 
very respectable. Thus the possession of the Black Sea coast 
belongs to him who is master of the Sea; or, in other words, unless 
the allied fleets cooperate actively with the Turks, it will in all 
likelihood belong to the Russians. 

The country in the interior, on the inland side of the 
mountains, comprises the territory in which the Euphrates, the 
Araxes and the Kura (Cyrus) take their rise; the Turkish province 
of Armenia is on the’ one, the Russian province of Georgia on the 
other side of the frontier. This country, too, is extremely 
mountainous and generally impassable to armies. Erzerum on the 
part of the Turks, Tiflis on the part of the Russians, may be said 
to be the two immediate bases of operations, with the loss of which 
the possession of the whole neighboring country would be 
inevitably lost. Thus the storming of Erzerum by the Russians 
decided the Asiatic campaign of 1829. | 

But what is the immediate basts of operation for one party, will 
be the direct object of operations to the other. Thus the roads 
connecting: Tiflis and Erzerum will be the lines of operations for 
both. There are three roads; one by the upper Kura and 
Akhalzikh, the other by the upper Araxes and Erivan, the third in 
the midst between these two, across the mountains by way of Kars. 
All these roads are guarded on either side by fortified towns and 
posts, and it would be difficult to say which would be for Turks or 
Russians the most eligible. Suffice it to say that the road by 
Akhalzikh is the one which would lead a Turkish army most 
directly upon the insurgent districts of the Caucasus, but that very 
advance of the Turks would be turned by a Russian corps 

advancing from Batum up the valley of the Chorokh by Olti 
upon Erzerum; the road from Batum joins that from Tiflis only 
about 15 miles from Erzerum, which would enable a Russian corps 
advancing in the direction alluded to, to cut off the communi- 
cation of the Turks, and, if strong enough,to take possession even 
of Erzerum, the fortifications of which are of a merely Asiatic 
character and not capable of serious resistance. 

The key to the theater of war in Asia, and on either side of the 
hills, then, is Batum, and considering this, as well as its commercial 
importance, we need not wonder at the efforts the Czar* has 
always been making to get hold of it. And Batum is the key of the 
theater of war, nay, of all Turkey in Asia, because it commands 
the only passable road from the coast to the interior—a road 
which turns all the Turkish positions in advance of Erzerum. And 
whichever of the two fleets in the Black Sea drives the other back 
into its harbors, that fleet commands Batum. 

The Russians are perfectly aware of the importance of this post. 
They have sent, by land and by water, reinforcements to the 
Transcaucasian coast. A short time ago it might have been 
believed that the Turks, if weaker in Europe, enjoyed a decided 
superiority in Asia. Abdi Pasha, who commands the Asiatic army, 
was said to have collected 60,000 or 80,000, nay 120,000 men, and 
swarms of Bedouins, Kurds and other warlike irregulars were 
reported to flock daily to his standard. Arms and ammunitions 
were said to be in store for the Caucasian insurgents, and as soon 
as war was declared, an advance was to be made into the very 
heart of these centres of resistances to Russia. It may, however, be 
as well to observe that Abdi Pasha cannot possibly have more than 
about 30,000 regular troops, and that before the Caucasus is 
reached, with these, and with these alone, he will have to 
encounter the stubborn resistance of Russian battalions. His 
Bedouins and Kurdish horsemen may be capital for mountain 
warfare, for forcing the Russians to detach largely and to weaken 
their main body; they may do a great deal of damage to the 
Georgian and Colonist villages in the Russian territory, and even 
open some sort of an underhand communication with the 
Caucasian mountaineers. But unless Abdi Pasha’s regulars are 
capable of blocking up the road from Batum to Erzerum, and can 
defeat whatever nucleus of an active army the Russians may be 
enabled to bring together, the success of the irregulars will be of a 
very ephemeral nature. The support of a regular army is 

now-a-days necessary to the progress of all insurrectionary or 
irregular warfare against a powerful regular army. The position of 
the Turks on this frontier would be similar to that of Wellington 
in Spain, and it remains to be seen whether Abdi Pasha will know 
to husband his resources as well as the British general did, against 
an enemy decidedly his superior in regular warfare and the means 
of carrying it on. In 1829 the Russian forces in Asia, amounted, 
before Erzerum, to 18,000 men only, and considering the 
improvements that have since then taken place in the Turkish 
army (although that of Asia has least participated in them), we 
should say the Russians would have a fair chance of success if 
they could unite 30,000 men in a body before the same place 
now. 

Whether they will be able to do so or not, who can decide at the 
present time, when there is even less of real facts known, and 
more idle rumors spread as to the Russian army in Asia than as to 
that in Europe? The Caucasian army is officially computed at 
200,000 men, at its full complement; 21,000 Cossacks of the Black 
Sea have been marched toward the Turkish frontier; several 
divisions are said to have been embarked from Odessa for Redut 
Kale, on the South Caucasian coast. But everybody knows that 
the Caucasian army does not count half its official complement, 
that the reenforcement sent beyond the Caucasus cannot, from 
obvious causes, have the strength reported by Russian papers, and 
from the conflicting evidence we receive, we are absolutely at a 
loss to make anything like an estimate of the Russian forces on the 
Asiatic frontier. But that we may say, that in all probability the 
forces of both parties (an immediate general insurrection of the 
Caucasians left out of the question), the forces will be pretty nearly 
balanced, that the Turks may, perhaps, be a little stronger than the 
Russians, and therefore will be, on this theater of war, justly entitled 
to undertake offensive operations. 

The chances for the Turks are, indeed, far more encouraging in 
Asia than in Europe. In Asia they have but one important post to 
guard, Batum; and an advance, be it from Batum, or from 
Erzerum toward the Caucasus, opens to them in case of success a 
direct communication with their allies, the mountaineers, and may 
at once cut off the communication, at least by land, of the Russian 
army south of the Caucasus with Russia; a result which may lead 
to the entire destruction of that army. On the other hand, if 
defeated, the Turks risk losing Batum, Trebizond and Erzerum; 
but even if that be the case, the Russians will then not be strong 
enough to advance any further. The advantages are far superior to 

the loss to be undergone in case of defeat; and it is therefore, for 
sound and satisfactory reasons, that the Turks appear to have 
decided upon offensive warfare in those regions.