The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach 
included) is that things ([Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness 
are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but 
not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in 
contradistinction to materialism, the active side was set forth 
abstractly by idealism—which, of course, does not know real, 
sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really 
distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human 
activity itself as objective activity. In Das Wesen des Christenthums, he 
therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely 
human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only in its 
dirty-Jewish form of appearance.? Hence he does not grasp the 
significance of “revolutionary”, of “practical-critical”, activity. 

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human 
thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man 
must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness 
of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality 
of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic 
question. 

* Original version.—Ed. 

3 

The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of cir- 
cumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed 
by men and that the educator must himself be educated. This 
doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which 
is superior to society. 

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human 
activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood 
only as revolutionary practice. 

4 

Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-estrangement, 
of the duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular 
one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular 
basis. But that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes 
itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by 
the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. 
The latter must, therefore, itself be both understood in its contradi- 
ction and revolutionised in practice. Thus, for instance, once the 
earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the 
former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in practice. 

5 

Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants [sensuous] 
contemplation; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, 
human-sensuous activity. 

6 

Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. 
But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single 
individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. 

Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real 
essence, is hence obliged: 

1. To abstract from the historical process and to define the 
religious sentiment [Gemüt] by itself, and to presuppose an 
abstract—isolated—human individual. 

2. Essence, therefore, can be regarded only as “species”, as an 
inner, mute, general character which unites the many individuals in 
a natural way. 

Theses on Feuerbach 5 

7 

Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the “religious senti- 
ment” is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual which 
he analyses belongs to a particular form of society. 

8 

All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory 
to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the 
comprehension of this practice. 

9 

The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is, 
materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical 
activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society. 

10 

The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the 
standpoint of the new is human society, or social humanity. 

11 

The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point is to change it. 


1924—in German and in Russian—by 
the Institute of Marxism-Leninism 

of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. 

Karl Marx 

[THESES ON FEUERBACH?] 

MARX ON FEUERBACH 

(Written in Brussels in the spring of 1845) 

! 

The chief defect of all previous materialism—that of Feuerbach 
included—is that things [Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness are 
conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as 
human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened 
that the activeside, in contradistinction to materialism, was set forth by 
idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know 
real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, 
really distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive 
human activity itself as objective activity. In Das Wesen des Christen- 
thums, he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only ge- 
nuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only 
in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance. Hence he does not grasp the 
significance of “revolutionary”, of practical-critical, activity. 

2 

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human 
thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man 
must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness 
of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality 
of thinking which isolates itself from practice is a purely scholastic 
question. 

* Edited by Engels.— Ed. 

Theses on Feuerbach 7 

3 

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances 
and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of 
other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men 
who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be 
educated. Hence, this doctrine is bound to divide society into two 
parts, one of which is superior to society (in Robert Owen, for 
example). 

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human 
activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as 
revolutionising practice. 

4 

Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-estrangement, 
of the duplication of the world into a religious, imaginary world and 
a real one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its 
secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, 
the chief thing still remains to be done. For the fact that the secular 
basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an 
independent realm can only be explained by the inner strife and 
intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must itself, 
therefore, first be understood in its contradiction and then, by the 
removal of the contradiction, revolutionised in practice. Thus, for 
instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the 
holy family, the former must then itself be criticised in theory and 
transformed in practice. 

5 

Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, appeals to sensuous 
contemplation; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, 
human-sensuous activity. 

6 

Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. 
But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single 
individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. 

Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real 
essence, is hence obliged: 

8 , Karl Marx 

1. To abstract from the historical process and to define the 
religious sentiment [Gemit] regarded by itself, and to presuppose an 
abstract— isolated—human individual. 

2. The essence of man, therefore, can with him be regarded only 
as “species”, as an inner, mute, general character which unites the 
many individuals only in a natural way. 

7 

Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the “religious senti- 
ment” is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual which 
he analyses belongs in reality to a particular form of society. 

8 

Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory 
into mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in 
the comprehension of this practice. 

9 

The highest point attained by contemplative materialism, that is, 
materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical 
activity, is the contemplation of single individuals in “civil society”. 

10 
The standpoint of the old materialism is “civil” society; the 

standpoint of the new is human society, or associated humanity. 

11 

The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point, however, is to change it.