“So what we today assume to have been the frenzy of a few excited maniacs, was 
the general feeling of a whole people and in a way its manner of life.” P. 21. 

“Later one saw different opinions dividing the nation, but it was not like this in 1788: all 
those in France who were not making a living out of abuses were united in a 
unanimous wish to destroy a rule of the sword; all those who were not devourers of 
the national wealth wished to see its management entrusted to the representatives of 
the people; all those who were not members of the privileged castes wished to see the 
law applied equally to all and to make all citizens liable to the same burdens.” P. 27. 

“The Constitution was revised” (after the King’s flight) “in a less popular way than 
it had been originally drawn up; the changes made were not very important but they 
sufficed to make the Assembly lose all its popularity and the Constitution its most 
desirable sanction, that of the nation.” P. 32. 

“The session of the Legislative Assembly was nothing but a barely concealed war of 
the popular power against the royal authority. A war in which each of the two 
contenders used the Constitution in turn either as a sword or as a shield. An 
implacable war in which the Constitution, ceaselessly invoked by both sides, was for 
both sides only an empty word in which nobody believed. For the rest, this impotent 
Assembly, wrapped by the Constitution in swaddling-clothes, was unable to do anything 
useful... consequently the numerous events which happened during its lifetime did not 
originate from this body. Constitutionally speaking, or according to the limits of their 
legal powers, the court and the Assembly could do nothing, and they did nothing. These 
two great colossi regarded one another in silence and demanded of secret conspiracies 
what they could not expect from the law.” Pp. 37, 38. 

“Neither the one nor the other” (party) “was honest.... Hence the crisis in which 
France had been left by the Constituent Assembly could only be solved in one of two 
ways: the toppling of the throne or the return to the old regime. Thus for each of the 
two parties it was a question of their very existence.” P. 38. 

“This great epoch of 1791 to 1792 which decided France’s destiny was not marked 
by outstanding parliamentary struggles. It was between the people and the rulers that 
the battle continued to be waged. June 20, Pétion’s triumph on July 14, and the 
movements which marked the entry of the volunteers from Marseilles into Paris, these 
events led to important results 118 without the Assembly playing the least part in them. 

The deputies acted as conspirators and not as deputies. Even the declaration of war, the 
major event of this period, was decided by the Jacobins.” !!9 Pp. 39. 

La Fayette.’ P. 40. 
August 10.'?) P. 41. 

“The insurrection, which had replaced all existing authorities on August 10, continued 
.. it was an active force and it crushed the enemies of liberty. P. 43, 

.“The only force which existed in France during the interregnum which began on 
August 10!22 was the popular élan, insurrection, anarchy.... The only means of 
salvation still remaining was, therefore, to make use of the resources offered by 
anarchy and to direct against our enemies the brutal force which it aroused.” Pp. 43, 
44. 

“The decrees which it” (the Legislative Assembly) “issued had not the slightest 
authority. The Ministry, product of an impotent Assembly, was not itself a real 
power.... The government therefore passed into the hands of those who knew how to 
separate themselves from it, that is, to the popular societies and the municipalities. But 
these improvised centres of government, products of anarchy itself and having no basis in 
law or in the Constitution, were simply the leaders of the people, powerful as 
long as they restricted themselves to directing the line of march of the people and 
giving effect to its wishes; they would not have been able to enforce obedience had 
they come into conflict with the people and wished to impose on it the rule of law.” Pp. 
44, 45. 

“It is the Gironde which has separated itself from us. It is Buzot who left the place 
he had occupied in the Constituent Assembly; it is Vergniaud who abandoned the seat 
he had recently occupied in the Legislative Assembly” (i.c., on the left). P. 49. “We 
were far from seeking divisions... Pétion was nominated President [of the Convention] 
almost unanimously; the other members of the committee !*8 were chosen from 
amongst the most influential deputies of the previous Assembly*” P. 49, 

The new deputies (belonging to the Mountain) knew nothing of 
the internal split. P. 50. 

“Thus when we met, the new deputies ... who formed the great majority in the 
Mountain, did not even know that there were two camps and that the Republicans 
were not all inspired by the same sentiments and the same aspirations.” P. 51. 

“The Centre was made up of all those who have the constant habit of declaring 
themselves in favour of the winning side and who, before they show their colours, look 
for ways of not compromising themselves and without incurring any risk await further 
developments. This kind of deputy, who first concealed himself in the Centre, later 
became an ardent Montagnard and then an even more ardent reactionary. There 
were also ... men of talent: Barére ... Sieyés, Dulaure ... Boissy d’Anglas.” P. 52. 

“The only party which came to the Convention with a complete system and a 
previously worked-out plan took their place on the seats on the right.” (The 
Girondists.) P. 52. “By swarming on to the seats opposite ours, they declared 
war on us, before they even knew us.” P. 53. 

The main speakers for the Girondists [were] lawyers from the Bordeaux Bar; the 
Girondists [were] all-powerful in the Legislative Assembly where they [had] 
controlled the majority; they also dominated the Jacobin Club, that is, public opinion; 
at the time of the insurrection of August 10 [they] believed they had France in their 

a 

i.e., the Legislative Assembly — Ed. 

From the Mémoires de R. Levasseur 363 

hands; when the National Convention was convoked they concluded therefore that no 
majority independent of them could come about. But the forty-two-day interregnum 
changed the position. The energy which the Legislative Assembly, that is, the 
Girondists, had displayed in the struggle with the Crown vanished after August 10. 
“Feeble and irresolute as soon as the helm of the state was indisputably in their hands” 
... [In their] speeches, declamations, they divorced themselves from public opinion 
without being able to prevent disorder, “merely depriving themselves of the means 
available to them for controlling the torrent. The Jacobin Club then became the 
thermometer of public opinion. It very rarely happened that the majority of 
Frenchmen opposed its decisions”. For a long time the word of the Girondists had 
been law in the Jacobin Club; even before the end of the Constituent Assembly they 
expelled the Lameths and drove the Constitutionals “into the unpopular precincts of 
the Feuillants”.!”4 After August 10 they were superseded and went into opposition to 
the Jacobins. The Provisional Council of Ministers, entrusted with executive power by 
the Gironde on August 10, was powerless “since the party on which it depended had 
made itself unpopular”, “executive power was in fact exercised by the Communes, 
especially by the Commune of Paris, composed of men of vigour and beloved of the 
people. The elections in the capital took place under the influence of the Commune 
whose leading members were elected”. Pp. 53, 54. Hence the hostile attitude of the 
Girondists. “On their arrival in Paris all the deputies who were known to have energy 
and patriotism were admitted to the Jacobin Club in which the Commune had great 
influence. These deputies sat on the left-hand side, which was sufficient to make the 
men of the Gironde take their seats on the right. The Jacobins, having spurned their 
authority, had become their enemies”, and also those deputies who sat on the side of 
the Commune and the deputies of Paris. P. 55. 

“Thus at the beginning of the session, the Convention was not divided into 
parties.... But there arose in its midst an ambitious clique which wished to impose its 
opinions on the assembly and prepared to fight to avenge the wounds which its 
self-conceit had suffered and to satisfy its particular resentments.” P. 55 

Danton, pp. 56, 57. Robespierre, Marat, pp. 57, 58.'° 

“The majority of the party of the Gironde were by no means traitors but some 
were concealed in its ranks. No, it did not desire the ruin of the Republic, but its 
theories led in that direction.” P. 59. The Girondists were the aggressors, the 
Montagnards were at first on the defensive. ibid. 

On September 21. 1792, the session of the Convention begins. The President is 
Pétion. 

Danton, pp. 60, 61, 62.2 

The first two decrees passed by the assembly had been proposed by Danton: 1) “No 
Constitution without the approval of the people.” 2) “Safety of persons and property 
to be protected by the nation.” Unanimous adoption of Grégoire’s motion: 3) Abolition 
of the monarchy. ; 

The Girondists begin the struggle. P. 63. 

“On September 24, Kersaint, speaking of the dangers facing the Convention in the 
capital, proposes to surround it {the Convention} with a force drawn from the 
Departments. P. 63. The Girondists are against the Commune, which has been 

* This refers to a speech of Danton (see this volume, p. 368).— Ed 
This sentence is in German in the manuscripts.— Ed. 

effacing them since August 10, as well as against Danton, who dominated the 
Executive Council. [P. 64.] Before the convocation of the Convention the [members of 
the] deputation of Paris had nearly all been part of the Commune of August 10. P. 63. 

Hence the wrath of the Girondists “against that redoubtable Commune and 
particularly against the deputation of Paris”. Pp. 63, 64. 

Thus one sees: the Girondists wanted to avenge themselves for 
their defeat and insignificance during the interregnum beginning on 
August 10. 

Joseph Egalité [Duke of] Orléans and Jean Paul Marat. Pp. 64, 65. 

“Such a man” (Marat) “would never have exercised: the least influence if the 
Girondists had not increased his importance by attacking in his person the very 
principle of energy and provided him with the opportunity at least to display the 
calmness, the consistency, sang-froid and contempt for insults characteristic of real 
conviction and devotion.” P. 65, 

September 24, Concealed attack on the Commune and on a number of Paris 
deputies “for seeking to organise a dictatorship”. 

September 25. Barbaroux and Rebecqui accuse Robespierre.> 
Danton pleads for harmony. Pp. 66, 67. The Girondists continue with 
their denunciations. Vergniaud against Marat. P. 67. 

Marat, pp. 68, 69.176 

The dissensions continue every day: “the differences between the Ministers 
Roland and Danton, the offences ascribed to the Commune of Paris, Marat’s posters, 
were the pretexts for these useless struggles”. P. 69. Victory seemed almost always to 
go to the Girondists. P. 70. The majority are as yet not firmly organised and vacillate 
undecidedly. “Thus for a long time a large number of firm Republicans voted with the 
Right—they included Philippeaux, Cambon, Cambacérés, etc.” P. 70.° 

September 29. Roland, elected deputy of the Somme Department, announces to the 
Convention his intention of resigning his position as Minister of the Interior. Buzot 
demands “that the Minister be invited to remain at his post; all the Girondists support 
him”. Philippeaux proposes “to ask Danton to support this invitation”. Danton is 
against this: “the only possible way in which Roland can be retained in his post is to 
pronounce his election invalid”. 

Struggle, Roland’s letter, etc. Pp. 70, 71°. 
Decree dissolving the Commune of Paris. Pp. 73, 74, 75.4 

“The mutual accusations were repeated each day with renewed fury. The Right 
always began the attack, basing itself on facts that occurred prior to the meeting of 
the Convention, constantly exploiting the kind of repugnance which Marat aroused 
in the assembly as a whole in order to incriminate the entire Mountain.” P. 78, cf. 
p. 79. “... inter-party strife in the course of which the elected representatives of the 
people wasted precious time and consumed energies which they ought to have 
directed entirely against the enemies of France.” P. 79. 

* Cf. this volume, pp. 368-69.— Ed. 
> Cf. this volume, p. 369.— Ed. 
© Cf. this volume, p. 369.— Ed. 
* Cf. this volume, p. 369.— Ed. 

From the Mémoires de R. Lévasseur 365 

October 29. Roland’s, Louvets accusation against Robespierre. P. 
80 sqq. 

“... he” (Louvet) “and Barbaroux were, quite undoubtedly, the only men of action in 
their party”. P. 81. 

“The long-winded and garrulous eloquence of the latter” (Robespierre). P. 89.32? 

“The committees of the Convention and the Convention itself déalt with all the 
branches of administration and performed through decrees numerous and. fre- 
quent acts of executive authority. On the other hand, the municipalities had also 
taken over a large section of the administration. Civil power, military power, even 
judicial power, nothing was properly organised... As soon as, for any reason 
whatsoever, a gathering of citizens was called upon to deal with a matter of public 
concern, it would at the same time interfere in matters quite unconnected with the 
task it had been given.... If there existed an infinity of powers in practice, a single 
collective entity, the Convention, legally united in itself all the authority of the social body, 
and it frequently used it: it acted as the legislative authority through its decrees, as 
the administration through its committees, and besides it exercised judicial power 
through the manner in which it extended the right of indictment.” P. 85. 

“As a transitional state between the monarchy which had been destroyed and 
the Republic which was being organised, as a weapon of war against the aristocracy, 
the emigration and foreign invaders, this concentration of all powers was a happy 
symptom and, I would say, even indispensable.” P. 86. 

“It is they” (the Girondists) “who demanded bills of indictment against their 
colleagues; it is they who in handing over Marat to the Revolutionary Tribunal 
violated the immunity of the elected representatives of the people.” P. 87.° 

December 16. Buzots motion for the expulsion of [the Duke of] 
Orléans and his sons; Buzot was supported by Louvet and 
Lanjuinais.'** 

Roland’s intrigues. Pp. 88, 89.° 

“In spite of their prejudices against us, Louvet, Roland, Guadet, Pétion, Gensonné 
were true and sincere Republicans.” P. 90. 

About the Girondists, pp. 90, 91.1” 

“The dissensions which hampered the deliberations of the National Convention 
soon manifested themselves in the Executive Council. When Servan was compelled to 
relinquish the Ministry of War on account of ill health, the Convention, on 
Roland’s suggestion, unhesitatingly appointed citizen Pache, then working in the 
Ministry of the Interior, to take his place. The new Minister did not share the 
aversions and the views of his patron.” P. 91. 

“During these interminable quarrels, the committees of the Convention were not 
as inactive as the Convention itself. The Committee of National Defence, under the 
influence of Carnot, assisted our armies and paved the way for our victories; the 
Committee of Accounts, for which Cambon was the regular reporter, created 
resources with the aid of the paper money, which under the name of assignats was 
so greatly and so frequently devalued, and by the sale of national property.” 
Pp. 92, 93. 

“By the end of January 1793 ... the Montagnards had abandoned the defensive 
which they had maintained perhaps too long and gone over in their turn to the 
attack on the Gironde.” P. 100. 

* Cf. this volume, p. 373.— Ed. 
© Cf. this volume, p. 370-371.— Ed. 

After the death of Michel de Le Peletier Saint-Fargeau ... “the Girondists ceased to 
have an assured majority”. P. 101. 

Danton, p. 143 sqq? 

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE MONTAGNARDS 
AND THE GIRONDISTS 

An interregnum begins on August 10, 1792. Impotence of the 
Legislative Assembly, impotence of the Ministry to which it had 
given rise. Government passes over to the public meetings and 
municipalities; improvised centres of government, products of 
anarchy, they were bound to be the expression of the popular 
movement, for their power was only the power of popular opinion 
(pp. 44, 45). From now on division amongst those with influence. 

One party wishes to re-establish the order disrupted by August 
10 and to ensure the implementation of the existing laws. The 
principal members of the Ministry and of the Legislative Assembly 
are the leaders of this party. 

The other party sees in anarchy the only mobile d’action”, in the 
enthusiasm which it produces the substitute for a ready-made 
organisation, the only power of resistance externally and internally. 
These men are the masters of the Commune of Paris and of nearly 
all other municipalities in France, they possess one voice (Danton) in 
the Ministry (pp. 45, 46). 

The Girondists (the first party) do not oppose any effective 
means to the popular movement. Their theories are limited in 
practice to speeches and declamations, which make their unpopu- 
larity almost universal without having the slightest effect on 
developments. 

“During this period, the Commune of Paris drives the citizens towards the 
frontiers; the alarm guns, thundering away hour after hour, proclaim the public 
danger; all citizens enrol in the sections in order to march against the enemy.” 

During this period occur the September days. 

Had they been quelled, all public life would have been extin- 
guished (pp. 46, 47). 

The provinces detest the September murders but they are grateful 
to the men who are maintaining the insurrectionary fever in order to 
fill the army camps with citizen soldiers. 

The Girondists are despised; lacking the courage to drive the citizens against 
the foreign troops, they do not even know how to organise an energetic resistance 
to the crimes which they denounce and which they use as a means of recrimination 
against their vigorous enemy. 

* Cf. this volume, p. 373-74.— Ed. 
> Driving force.— Ed. 

From the Mémoires de R. Levasseur 367 

The elections took place during this stormy period. 

When the Convention opened, Paris was still in the grip of the 
insurrectionary movement and the Commune was all-powerful. 

The Girondists were the first to separate themselves from the Montag- 
nards. The almost unanimous election of Pétion as President of the 
Convention shows how little the newly-arrived men of the Moun- 
tain were looking for divisions; the other members of the 
committee were likewise elected from amongst the most influential 
members of the previous Assembly? Almost all the newly-arrived 
deputies knew nothing of the inner dissensions. Robespierre and 
Pétion, Danton and Guadet equally enjoyed their respect. 

The only party which came to the assembly with a complete 
system and a previously worked-out plan (the Girondists), took 
their place on the right-hand side. By leaving their former seats 
(on the left) and rushing en masse to the right-hand side, they 
declared war on the newly-arrived Republicans who surged on to 
the left as the traditional side of patriotism. 

The Girondists had controlled the majority in the assemblée 
legislative as well as in the Jacobin Club. They thought they had 
France in their hands at the time of August 10. In summoning the 
National Convention they never suspected for a moment that a 
majority independent of them could arise. But the forty-two-day 
interregnum altered the state of affairs and the character of the 
elections. 

“The Legislative Assembly, that is, the Girondists, had displayed some energy in 
the struggle against the Court. They showed themselves to be weak and irresolute as 
soon as they obtained undisputed control of the state. They did not know how to 
restrain the current unleashed by August 10; they were inept enough to oppose it with 
declamations. They isolated themselves from public opinion without being able to 

prevent any disorder whatsoever. They only deprived themselves of the means they 
had to direct events. The Jacobin Club was the thermometer of public opinion at that 
time. [...] The word of the Gironde had been law there for a long time. Even before 
the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly they had dethroned the Lameths and 
driven the Constitutionals into the unpopular precincts of the Feuillants. After August 
10, they allowed themselves in their turn to be superseded: they lost their popularity, 
nearly all of them left a society whose merits they had loudly proclaimed as long as it 
applauded their views but which they regarded as nothing more than a den of rebels 
as soon as it thought differently than they did. 

“The Gironde had, moreover, on August 10 vested executive power in a 
Provisional Council of Ministers. Without any support in the nation, this Council 
was powerless as soon as the party to which it belonged became unpopular. The 
executive power was in fact exercised by the Communes, and especially by the 
Commune of Paris, composed of vigorous men of the people. The elections in the 
capital took place under the influence of the Commune. Its leading members were 
elected [to the Convention].” : 

2 

ie., the Legislative Assembly.— Ed. 

Hence the hostile attitude of the Girondists from the very first 
moments of the Convention. 

“All new deputies who were known to have energy or patriotism, were admitted 
on their arrival to the Jacobin Club, in which the Commune had great influence. 
These deputies took their seats on the left side. This sufficed to drive the 
Girondists to the right. The Jacobins {...] had become their enemies [...]; they 
called their new opponents Jacobins. [...] Originally only enemies of the Commune 
and of the deputation of Paris, they extended their hatred to include all who sat on 
the side used by the Jacobins and who were ardent Republicans. Thus at the 
beginning of the session, the Convention was not divided; a solid mass of 
Republicans united by a common feeling, in other respects however differing on 
many points. But an ambitious clique arose in its midst, which wished to impose its 
opinions on the assembly and prepared to fight to avenge the wounds which its 
self-conceit had suffered and to satisfy its private resentments.” 

The majority of the Girondists were not traitors, but there were 
traitors in their ranks; the ruin of the Republic was not their aim 
but the consequence of their theories; the few Royalists in the 
Convention therefore joined forces with them. They were the 
attackers; the Mountain was on the defensive for a long time; the 
Girondists were unable to sacrifice their egotism for the public 
cause (pp. 47-59). 

On September 21, 1792, opening of the Convention. Pétion 
President. Danton resigns his post as Minister of Justice. A conci- 
liatory speech. No Constitution could exist unless it was accepted 
by a majority of the primary meetings. A declaration regarding 
security of property ought to be decreed. Both Danton’s proposals 
became decrees (the first decrees promulgated by the Convention). 
In his speech Danton declared that the popular agitation was 
temporarily necessary; now, however, the constituted power of 
the Convention should replace it, excesses should be abandoned. 

Unanimous abolition of the monarchy on Grégoire’s motion. 

The first session of the Convention shows the desire of the 
Mountain for general reconciliation in the interests of order and 
of freedom. The Girondists immediately demonstrate their urge to 
take revenge. 

On September 24, Kersaint, speaking of the dangers in the capital, 
proposes to surround it [the Convention] with force recruited -from 
the Departments. This is the first declaration of war by the 
Girondists who are full of anger against the deputation of Paris 
because the Girondists who had been members of the Legislative 
Assembly were annihilated as a result of the activities of the 
Commune and because of Danton’s domination in the Executive 
Council. 

Jean Paul Marat and Joseph Egalité in particular gave the 
Girondists the opportunity of making spiteful charges against the 

From the Mémoires de R. Levasseur 369 

Mountain, charges of blood-thirstiness and anarchy on the one 
side and of ambition and Royalism on the other. 

September 24. Indirect accusations that the Commune of Paris is 
striving for a dictatorship. 

September 25: Rebecqui and Barbaroux name Robespierre as the 
candidate of the dictatorship. Danton again preaches concord and 
defends the Commune: an extra-legal power had been necessary 
under the weak leadership of the assemblée legislative, now there 
should be a return to order. Girondists do not pay attention to 
Danton’s admonitions; they keep returning to the past in order to 
seek continual grounds for recrimination. 

Vergniaud and Boileau attack Marat. Marat’s courageous reply. 
The assembly turns to the business of the day. But the hostilities 
already initiated are continued. 

“While (the Assembly] waited for a decisive act and a split between Roland and 
Danton, the alleged outrages by the Commune of Paris and Marat’s posters served 
as pretexts for these useless conflicts. Victory seemed almost always to favour the 
side of the Girondists. The majority was not yet organised during these first 
conflicts, swaying uncertainly this way and that. For a considerable time many firm 
Republicans, e. g., Philippeaux, Cambon, Cambacérés, voted with the Right. 

September 29: Roland, elected deputy of the Somme Department, 
informs the Assembly that he would relinquish his position as 
Minister of the Interior. Those on the right express their regrets. 
Buzot proposes to request Roland to remain at his post, Philip- 
peaux would like Danton to support this request; Danton opposes; 
an invitation is below the dignity of the Convention; the only way 
to keep Roland at his post is to declare his election null and void. 
The Girondists insist on an invitation. Valazé declares that Ro- 
land’s name is holy to him. Louvet, Barbaroux overwhelm him 
with praise. This time the men of the Centre, Barére, Lacroix, 
Tureau,* who often provided the Right with a majority without 
actually belonging to them, are against Buzot’s proposal. 

September 30: Roland writes a letter to the Convention in which 
he states that he wants to remain Minister, he praises himself a 
great deal in this letter, lectures his opponents, accuses Danton 
indirectly; all these reproaches against Danton and the Commune 
refer to facts which occurred prior to the meeting of the 
Convention; evidence of the hatred of a vanquished party for the 

victors. 

Each day the Right persecutes the Commune, which is defended by the deputies 
of Paris. Finally this revolutionary authority is ordered to dissolve; it is requested to 
give an account of itself. New source of strife emerges. The comité de surveillance of 
the Commune gives notice to the Convention of the seizure of important papers 

* This is evidently a misprint, it refers to Thuriot— Ed. 

which will throw light on the treacheries of the Court, in which several deputies 
will find themselves compromised. It asks that it should not be compelled to part 
with these documents and to be allowed to continue to function until a favourable 
moment for their use. [...] The Girondists regard this as an open wish on the part 
of the Commune to perpetuate its functions; the Montagnards see in their 
opponents people interested in stifling the truth. The discussion confirms each 
party in its prejudices. [...] The documents are finally handed over to a commission 
of 25 representatives, which comprises no members either of the Commune and 
the deputation of Paris, or of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies. 

Nothing emerges either against the Commune or against the 
Gironde. Even the report of Joseph Delaunay (a Girondist deputy) 
comes out, in the main, in favour of the Commune. 

“The mutual accusations are repeated daily with renewed fury, the Right always 
initiating the attack, basing themselves on facts which occurred before the 
convocation of the Convention. [...] Freedom of opinion is always misconstrued 
when a representative of the Left wishes to speak; Robespierre was driven from the 
rostrum by uproar and insults.” 

Marat was only able to make his reply by dint of perseverance. 

Up to now the Right has always had a majority; the Mountain 
votes with it whenever questions of principle, establishment of 
order, implementation of laws, etc., are involved. 

In his reports to the Convention, Roland constantly repeats that 
the crimes of the interregnum still have to be punished, and 
introduces indirect accusations against Robespierre and Danton, 
and also against the deputation of Paris. 

Roland is furious because Danton’s supremacy in the Council 
has crushed him. 

On October 29 Roland makes a report to the Convention in 
which Robespierre is again accused. While on the rostrum seeking 
to defend himself, Robespierre is interrupted by the clamour of 
the Girondists and by constant interjections by President Guadet. 

Louvet’s attack on Robespierre. 

November 5.* Robespierre’s reply. 

“Return to the order of the day demanded on all sides, even Vergniaud, Guadet 
and Pétion support this. Only Salles, Barbaroux, Lanjuinais, Lariviére stand by Louvet 
[...]. The return to the agenda is adopted almost unanimously. Barbaroux still 
demands the floor in order to support the accusations [...] and then goes down to the 
bar and wants to speak as plaintiff and even as the accused. This unseemly scene is 

prolonged and, as usual, ends without the assembly having made any decisions 
whatsoever” (pp. 60-83). 

December 16. Thuriot brings about the proclamation of the unity 
and indivisibility of the Republic. Buzot proposes a motion for the 
expulsion of the Duke of Orléans and his sons and is supported by 
Louvet and Lanjuinais. In this way the Girondists make the first 
attempt to decimate the National Assembly. Incidentally, the 

* Marx has: “November 6”, apparently a slip of the pen — Ed. 

From the Mémoires de R. Levasseur 371 

Girondists are on friendly terms with Orléan’s creatures — 
Dumouriez, Sillery, Biron, Valence. 

The Ministers showed open bias in favour of the Girondists. 

“When Louvet accused Robespierre, the Convention ordered the printing of 
both the indictment and the defence. Roland had Louvet’s speech distributed in 
large quantities with the words: Imprimé par ordre de la Convention, and restricted the 
distribution of Robespierre’s speech to members of the Convention. Thus the 
impression was to be produced among the public that a kind of censure had been 
pronounced on Robespierre. A similar knavish trick was repeated over the decree 
concerning the banishment of the Bourbons. Before the reading of the minutes, 
which signified its adoption, i.e., before the final wording had been approved by 
majority decision as was the rule, its printing was speeded up and its dispatch to 
the 84 Departments carefully arranged by Roland, while the postponement of any 
decision regarding the fate of Philippe Egalite was not given the same publicity. 
Thus one could believe that the supporters of Orléans brought about the repeal 
of a decree which concerned him by a surprise move on the next morning [...].” 

The dissensions which interfered with the deliberations of 
the National Convention soon crept into the Executive Council 
itself. Servan retiring on account of ill health, the Convention on 
Roland’s recommendation appointed Pache, then working in the 
Ministry of the Interior. Pache wanted to be independent, in 
addition he associated with the Jacobins. Pache was a good patriot 
but a bad Minister of War. By accusing him of treason, the 
Girondists caused a redoubling of the recriminations which for a 
long time had been levelled against Roland. 

Assignats, law concerning the practice of worship (cf. p. 93), decree 
concerning food, compare Levasseur’s speech, p. 94 sqq.!! 

Shortly after the decree on means of subsistence, discussions in 
connection with the trial of Louis XVI. This occasioned further 
acrimony. 

End of January 1793. Baseless animosities, just as at the begin- 
ning of the Convention. But a big change has taken place in the 
temper of the assembly. The Mountain has now gone over from 
the defensive to the offensive. The war of the parties is at fever 

heat. 

“There is a feeling that from now on it is impossible to advance towards any 
organisation of the Republic without the complete destruction of one of the two 
parties. 

“The assassination of Michel de Le Peletier Saint-Fargeau led to an argument and an 
open breach between the two extremes.” 

The Marsh, tired of the capricious intrigues and the conceit of 
the Girondists, frequently allies itself with the Mountain against 
them. Roland’s resignation accepted. 

January 28: Buzot denounces the comité de stireté générale’ (in 

* Printed by order of the Convention.— Ed. 
b Committee of Public Safety.— Ed. 

which apart from the Girondists there are several Montag- 
nards—Tallien, Chabot, Bazire) on account of the arrest of a 
journalist and demands its dissolution. 

“The Girondists were in the habit of sacrificing any institution rather than allow 
it to flourish in the hands of their opponents” (pp. 84-103). 

March 8. Great agitation because of the military set-backs in 
Belgium under Dumouriez. Commissioners are sent to all the 
sections [of] Paris to call the citizens to arms, and also to the 
Departments. 

March 9. The Commissioners present their reports. Guarantees 
are demanded against internal conspiracies. Decree for the estab- 
lishment of an extraordinary criminal court, from whose findings 
there is no appeal, for the hearing of all cases involving traitors, 
conspirators and counter-revolutionaries. Great excitement in the 
capital. The printing-presses belonging to Gorsas are smashed up; 
he is forced to flee. The people were so worked up that it 
required a decree of the Convention to get the bakers to return to 
the bakeries and the Post-Office clerks to the telegraph office. 

March 10. Debates about the organisation of the Revolutionary 
Tribunal. 

Great excitement in Paris. Evening session of the Convention at 
9 o’clock. The seats on the right almost empty. After midnight the 
combined crowds in the Champs Elysées assume a rebellious 
character. They go to the Jacobin and Cordelier Clubs, they 
preach insurrection against the Convention. These proposals are 
rejected by the Montagnards.!” 

March 11. Decree relating to the Revolutionary Tribunal. 

March 12. Marat speaks against the assaults made on the 10th. 

March 13. Complaints and attacks by the Girondists in connec- 

tion with March 10. 

“The rebellious movements of March 10 in Paris were nurtured by all the 
parties, because all of them took part in the agitation—an agitation stirred up in 
order to drive the people to the frontiers; the scenes on March 10 were a necessary 
consequence of this impassioned state. The Mountain, sitting alone in the 
Chamber, had quietened the threatening disorders in a few hours. Pache and 
Santerre [...] | were praised for their ardour; Marat and Dubois-Crancé pacified 
both the Jacobin and the Cordelier Clubs and persuaded them to abandon their 
sinister plans. Marat first of all denounced the March 10 disorders, he initiated a 
decree of indictment against Fournier |’Américain, one of their instigators; 
La Source, an impassioned Girondist, addressed eulogies to him during the March 
12 session. Finally, [...] a member of the Right who had insulted Marat during 
the same sitting [...] was censured and it was unanimously decided to enter this 
in the official record despite the revolting partisanship against the ami du peuple 
which people were in the habit of displaying” [pp. 122-23]. 

When it was first established, the comité de stireté générale was 

composed overwhelmingly of Girondists. 

From the Mémoires de R. Levasseur 373 

A few days after March 10, the Girondists wanted to shift 
responsibility for it on to the Mountain. 

“Stormy sessions became the customary state of affairs in the Convention. 
Tumultuous scenes. [...] The galleries often participated in these scandalous 
interruptions. Then the Girondists screamed that they were no longer safe in Paris, 
they called the Departmental forces to their aid. The Mountain, from their side, 
accused their opponents of preaching civil war. Sometimes whole days and nights 
passed in these wretched debates” [p. 127]. 

Nevertheless the immunity of deputies was still respected on all sides until now. 
The Right was the first to depart from this rule. On Guadet’s motion, Marat was 
committed for trial. The Legislation Committee prepared a bill of indictment in which 
his condemnation was anticipated. Marat was unanimously acquitted by the 
Revolutionary Tribunal, and led back to the Convention by the people in triumph [pp. 
127-29]. 

This event had important results. Party conflicts of the deputies 
assumed the form of legal proceedings. The persecution of Marat 
was the immediate prelude to May 31.’ 

March 18. Defeat of Dumouriez near Neerwinden; his letters to 
the Executive Council contain insults against the Convention 
(Danton’s opinion regarding Dumouriez, p. 133).'** The Girondists 
applaud his insolent letters. 

March 29. A letter from Dumouriez evokes the greatest indigna- 
tion. Decree ordering Dumouriez to appear before the bar of the 
House, etc. The treason of Dumouriez. 

April 3. La Source dares to denounce Danton as an accomplice of 
Dumouriez. (Cf. p. 137.) Danton declares war on the Girondists. 
Danton’s speech makes great impression. Danton had tried to 
bring about a reconciliation between the two sides of the assembly. 

“Although he was sitting on the summit of the Mountain, he was, to some 
extent, the leader of the Marsh. He had often criticised the passion of the 
Montagnards, fought against Robespierre’s suspicions, maintained that instead of 
fighting the Girondists one should compel them to support the Mountain in order 
jointly to save the common cause. Even a few days before La Source’s attack, Danton 
had had a conference with the chief leaders of the Right at which agreement was 
reached to work together in harmony and to concentrate on the struggle against 
the foreigners and the aristocrats. The whole of the Mountain loved Danton but 
the majority thought that he misjudged the situation if he hoped to establish an 
alliance between the Mountain and the Gironde.” [p. 143]. 

“The discussions assumed a much more serious character toward the end of 
April and the beginning of May. No more parliamentary bickering but a life and 
death struggle. Each side began to seek help from outside in order to win. But [...] 
the Mountain, in spite of this internal discord, paid serious attention to matters 
concerning France while the Gironde only thought about the destruction of its 
opponents and abandoned completely the direction of the state. During these two 
months the question of the maximum was dealt with.135 [...] The Right fought [...] 
this measure by means of slanders. It made accusations about violation of the right 
to own property and threats to the life of property owners. These declamations 

were aimed at turning the middle classes against the Mountain. The maximum was 
adopted” [p. 147, 150]. 

The Girondists always had the majority when party wrangling 
was involved, as, for example, when such questions as the 
impeachment of Marat, the March disorders, the petitions of the - 
sections, the Commission of the Twelve, were being discussed. The 
Mountain had the majority when big questions of general interest 
were involved, such as the maximum, means for revolutionary 
recruitment, the extraordinary tribunal, forced loans, etc. 

An incident occurred during the discussion of the maximum. 
Ducos was on the rostrum criticising the proposed measure, 
counterposing the sansculottes to the middle classes, when a 
violent uproar broke out in one of the public galleries. Guadet 
demands the transfer of the Convention to Versailles. Acclamation 
on the right. Levasseur demands that the rules should be observed 
and the galleries cleared. Resistance by the Right. Philippeaux, 
Danton, Lacroix vainly call on the assembly to remember its 
dignity and its urgent obligations. In vain they demand that 
matters of the greatest importance should not be interrupted on 
account of an insignificant incident. The Girondists had to give 
vent to their rage. Animated discussion, attacks on the Paris 
authorities, threats that the provinces would take vengeance. 

Thus the tocsin of civil war was sounded at the very moment when it was a 
question of interests which had roused the people. The intention was to incite the 
two classes of the people against one another. The Mountain went with the party of 
the popular masses, where the sinewy arms and strong devotion are to be found 
[pp. 152-53]. 

Disorders in the Vendée had developed into a real civil war. 
New enrolments and renewed expenditure of funds became 
necessary. Danton, Desmoulins, Philippeaux, Couthon tried to 
find means to make this possible. The only possible means of 
meeting the urgent expenditure was the mobilisation of the 
national wealth, an emprunt force (cf. p. 161 sqq.), which was 
derived from superfluous wealth in the hands of citizens. 

The Girondists, who denounced the measures of the Mountain, 
did not even propose an alternative plan. They did nothing at all.