Re p. XXXIX.* The antithesis between lack of property and 
property, so long as it is not comprehended as the antithesis of 
labour and capital, still remains an indifferent antithesis, not 

grasped in its active connection, in its internal relation, not yet 
grasped as a contradiction. It can find expression in this first form 
even without the advanced development of private property (as in 
ancient Rome, Turkey, etc.). It does not yet appear as having been 
established by private property itself. But labour, the subjective 
essence of private property as exclusion of property, and capital, 
objective labour as exclusion of labour, constitute private property as 
its developed state of contradiction— hence a dynamic relationship 
driving towards resolution. 

Re the same page. The transcendence of self-estrangement follows 
the same course as self-estrangement. Private property is first 
considered only in its objective aspect—but nevertheless with 
labour as its essence. Its form of existence is therefore capital, 
which is to be annulled “as such” (Proudhon). Or a particular form 
of labour—labour levelled down, fragmented, and therefore 
unfree—is conceived as the source of private property’s pernicious- 
ness and of its existence in estrangement from men. For instance, 
Fourier, who, like the Physiocrats, also conceives agricultural labour 
to be at least the exemplary type, whereas Saint-Simon declares in 
contrast that industrial labour as such is the essence, and according- 
ly aspires to the exclusive rule of the industrialists and the 
improvement of the workers’ condition. Finally, communism is the 
positive expression of annulled private property —at first as univer- 
sal private property. By embracing this relation as a whole, 
communism is: 

(1) In its first form only a generalisation and consummation of it 
{of this relation]. As such it appears in a twofold form: on the one 
hand, the dominion of material property bulks so large that it 
wants to destroy everything which is not capable of being possessed 
by all as private property. It wants to disregard talent, etc., in an 
arbitrary manner. For it the sole purpose of life and existence is 
direct, physical possession. The category of the worker is not done 
away with, but extended to all men. The relationship of private 
property persists as the relationship of the community to the 
world of things. Finally, this movement of opposing universal 
private property to private property finds expression in the 
brutish form of opposing to marriage (certainly a form of exclusive 
private property) the community of women, in which a woman 
becomes a piece of communal and common property. It may be said 
that this idea of the community of women gives away the secret of this 
as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism. Just as 

woman passes from marriage to general prostitution,* so the 
entire world of wealth (that is, of man’s objective substance) passes 
from the relationship of exclusive marriage with the owner of 
private property to a state of universal prostitution with the 
community. This type of communism—since it negates the person- 
ality of man in every sphere—is but the logical expression of 
private property, which is this negation. General envy constituting 
itself as a power is the disguise in which greed re-establishes itself 
and satisfies itself, only in another way. The thought of every piece 
of private property as such is at least turned against wealthier 
private property in the form of envy and the urge to reduce 
things to a common level, so that this envy and urge even 
constitute the essence of competition. Crude communism‘ is only 
the culmination of this envy and of this levelling-down proceeding 
from the preconceived minimum. It has a definite, limited standard. 
How little this annulment of private property is really an appro- 
priation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire 
world of culture and civilisation, the regression to the unnatural 
IIVI simplicity of the poor and crude man who has few needs 
and who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but 
has not yet even reached it. 

The community is only a community of labour, and equality 
of wages paid out by communal capital—by the community as the 
universal capitalist. Both sides of the relationship are raised to an 
imagined universality—labour as the category in which every 
person is placed, and capital as the acknowledged universality and 
power of the community. 

In the approach to woman as the spoil and handmaid of 
communal lust is expressed the infinite degradation in which man 
exists for himself, for the secret of this approach has its unambigu- 
ous, decisive, plain and undisguised expression in the relation of 
man to woman and in the manner in which the direct and natural 
species-relationship is conceived. The direct, natural, and neces- 
sary relation of person to person is the relation of man to woman. In 
this natural species-relationship man’s relation to nature is im- 
mediately his relation to man, just as his relation to man is 
immediately his relation to nature—his own natural destination. In 

* Prostitution is only a ea be expression of the general prostitution of the 
labourer, and since it is a relationship in which falls not the prostitute alone, but also 
the one who prostitutes—and the latter's abomination is still greater—the 
capitalist, etc., also comes under this head— Note by Marx. 

this relationship, therefore, is sensuously manifested, reduced to an 
observable fact, the extent to which the human essence has become 
nature to man, or to which nature to him has become the human 
essence of man. From this relationship one can therefore judge 
man’s whole level of development. From the character of this 
relationship follows how much man as a species-being, as man, has 
come to be himself and to comprehend himself; the relation of 
man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to 
human being. It therefore reveals the extent to which man’s 
natural behaviour has become human, or the extent to which the 
human essence in him has become a natural essence—the extent to 
which his human nature has come to be natural to him. This 
relationship also reveals the extent to which man’s need has become 
a human need; the extent to which, therefore, the other person 
as a person has become for him a need—the extent to which 
he in his individual existence is at the same time a social 
being. 

The first positive annulment of private property—crude 
communism—is thus merely a manifestation of the vileness of 
private property, which wants to set itself up as the positive 
community system. 

(2) Communism (a) still political in nature—democratic or 
despotic; (B) with the abolition of the state, yet still incomplete, 
and being still affected by private property, i. e., by the estrange- 
ment of man. In both forms communism already is aware of 
being reintegration or return of man to himself, the transcen- 
dence of human self-estrangement; but since it has not yet 
grasped the positive essence of private property, and just as 
little the human nature of need, it remains captive to it and 
infected by it. It has, indeed, grasped its concept, but not its 
essence. 

(3) Communism as the positive transcendence of private property:as 
human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of 
the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as the 
complete return of man to himself as a social (i. e., human) 
being—a return accomplished consciously and embracing the 
entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully 
developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed 
humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the 
conflict between man and nature and between man and man—the 
true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, 
between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom 
and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism 

is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this 
solution. 

Vl The entire movement of history, just as its [communism’s] 
actual act of genesis—the birth act of its empirical existence—is, 
therefore, also for its thinking consciousness the comprehended and 
known process of its becoming. Whereas the still immature commun- 
ism seeks an historical proof for itsel{—a proof in the realm of 
what already exists—among disconnected historical phenomena 
opposed to private property, tearing single phases from the 
historical process and focusing attention on them as proofs of its 
historical pedigree (a hobby-horse ridden hard especially by Cabet, 
Villegardelle, etc.). By so doing it simply makes clear that by far 
the greater part of this process contradicts its own claim, and that, 
if it has ever existed, precisely its being in the past refutes its 
pretension to reality. 

It is easy to see that the entire revolutionary movement 
necessarily finds both its empirical and its theoretical basis in the 
movement of private property—more precisely, in that of the 
economy. 

This material, immediately perceptible private property is the 
material perceptible expression of estranged human life. Its move- 
ment—production and consumption—is the perceptible revelation 
of the movement of all production until now, i. e., the realisation 
or the reality of man. Religion, family, state, law, morality, science, 
art, etc., are only particular modes of production, and fall under its 
general law. The positive transcendence of private property, as the 
appropriation of human life, is therefore the positive transcen- 
dence of all estrangement—that is to say, the return of man from 
religion, family, state, etc., to his human, i. e., social, existence. 
Religious estrangement as such occurs only in the realm of 
consciousness, of man’s inner life, but economic estrangement is that 
of real life; its transcendence therefore embraces both aspects. It is 
evident that the initial stage of the movement amongst the various 
peoples depends on whether the true recognised life of the people 
manifests itself more in consciousness or in the external world — is 
more ideal or real. Communism begins from the outset (Owen) 
with atheism; but atheism is at first far from being communism; 
indeed, that atheism is still mostly an abstraction. 

The philanthropy of atheism is therefore at first only philosophi- 
cal, abstract philanthropy, and that of communism is at once real 
and directly bent on action. 

We have seen how on the assumption of positively annulled 
private property man produces man—himself and the other man: 

how the object, being the direct manifestation of his individuality, 
is simultaneously his’ own existence for the other man, the 
existence of the other man, and that existence for him. Likewise, 
however, both the material of labour and man as the subject, are 
the point of departure as well as the result of the movement (and 
precisely in this fact, that they must constitute the point of 
departure, lies the historical necessity of private property). Thus the 
social character is the general character of the whole movement: 
just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by 
him. Activity and enjoyment, both in their content and in their 
mode of existence, are social: social? activity and social enjoyment. The 
human aspect of nature exists only for social man; for only 
then does nature exist for him as a bond with man—as his exist- 
ence for the other and the other’s existence for him—and as 
the life-element of human reality. Only then does nature exist as 
the foundation of his own human existence. Only here has what is 
to him his natural existence become his human existence, and na- 
ture become man for him. Thus society is the complete unity of 
man with nature—the true resurrection of nature—the accom- 
plished naturalism of man and the accomplished humanism of 
nature. 

HVII Social activity and social enjoyment exist by no means only 
in the form of some directly communal activity and directly 
communal enjoyment, although communal activity and communal 
enjoyment—i. e., activity and enjoyment which are manifested 
and affirmed in actual direct association with other men—will 
occur wherever such a direct expression of sociability stems from 
the true character of the activity’s content and is appropriate to 
the nature of the enjoyment. 

But also when I am active scientifically, etc—an activity which I 
can seldom perform in direct community with others—then my 
activity is social, because I perform it as a man. Not only is the 
material of my activity given to me as a social product (as is even 
the language in which the thinker is active): my own existence is 
social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make 
of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a 
social being. 

My general consciousness is only the theoretical shape of that of 
which the living shape is the real community, the social fabric, 
although at the present day general consciousness is an abstraction 
from real life and as such confronts it with hostility. The activity of 

my general consciousness, as an activity, is therefore also my 
theoretical existence as a social being. 

Above all we must avoid postulating “society” again as an 
abstraction vis-a-vis the individual. The individual is the social being. 
His manifestations of life—even if they may not appear in the 
direct form of communal manifestations of life carried out in 
association with others—are therefore an expression and confir- 
mation of social life. Man’s individual and species-life are not 
different, however much—and this is inevitable—the mode of 
existence of the individual is a more particular or more general 
mode of the life of the species, or the life of the species is a more 
particular or more general individual life. 

In his consciousness of species man confirms his real social life and 
simply repeats his real existence in thought, just as conversely the 
being of the species confirms itself in species consciousness and 
exists for itself in its generality as a thinking being. 

Man, much as he may therefore be a particular individual (and it 
is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a 
real individual social being), is just as much the totality—the ideal 
totality—the subjective existence of imagined and experienced 
society for itself; just as he exists also in the real world both as 
awareness and real enjoyment of social existence, and as a totality 
of human manifestation of life. 

Thinking and being are thus certainly distinct, but at the same 
time they are in unity with each other. 

Death seems to be a harsh victory of the species over the 
particular individual and to contradict their unity. But the particu- 
lar individual is only a particular species-being, and as such mortal. 

{(4)* Just as private property is only the perceptible expression of 
the fact that man becomes objective for himself and at the same 
time becomes to himself a strange and inhuman object; just as it 
expresses the fact that the manifestation of his life is the alienation 
of his life, that his realisation is his loss of reality, is an alien 
reality: so, the positive transcendence of private property—i. e., 
the perceptible appropriation for and by man of the human essence 
and of human life, of objective man, of human _achieve- 
ments—should not be conceived merely in the sense of immediate, 
one-sided enjoyment, merely in the sense of possessing, of having. 
Man appropriates his comprehensive essence in a comprehensive 
manner, that is to say, as a whole man. Each of his human relations 
to the world—seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, 

observing, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving—in short, all the 
organs of his individual being, like those organs which are directly 
social in their form, |[VIII are in their objective orientation, or in 
their orientation to the object, the appropriation of the object, the 
appropriation of human reality. Their orientation to the object is 
the manifestation of the human reality,* it is human activity and 
human suffering, for suffering, humanly considered, is a kind of 
self-enjoyment of man. 

Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an 
object is only ours when we have it—when it exists for us as 
capital, or when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, 
inhabited, etc.—in short, when it is used by us. Although private 
property itself again conceives all these direct realisations of 
possession only as means of life, and the life which they serve as 
means is the life of private property—labour and conversion into 
capital. 

In the place of all physical and mental senses there has 
therefore come the sheer estrangement of all these senses, the 
sense of having. The human being had to be reduced to this 
absolute poverty in order that he might yield his inner wealth to 
the outer world. (On the category of “having”, see Hess* in the 
Einundzwanzig Bogen.) 

The abolition of private property is therefore the complete 
emancipation of all human senses and qualities, but it is this 
emancipation precisely because these senses and attributes have 
become, subjectively and objectively, human. The eye has become a 
human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object—an 
object made by man for man. The senses have therefore become 
directly in their practice theoreticians. They relate themselves to the 
thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective 
human relation to itself and to man,** and vice versa. Need or 
enjoyment has consequently lost its egotistical nature, and nature 
has lost its mere utility by use becoming human use. 

In the same way, the senses and enjoyment of other men have 
become my own appropriation. Besides these direct organs, there- 
fore, social organs develop in the form of society; thus, for 

* For this reason it is just as highly varied as the determinations of human essence 
and activities.— Note by Marx. 

** In practice I can relate myself to a thing humanly only if the thing relates 
itself humanly to the human being.—Note by Marx. 

instance, activity in direct association with others, etc., has become 
an organ for expressing my own life, and a mode of appropriating 
human life. 

It is obvious that the human eye enjoys things in a way different 
from the crude, non-human eye; the human ear different from 
the crude ear, etc. 

We have seen that man does not lose himself in his object only 
when the object becomes for him a human object or objective man. 
This is possible only when the object becomes for him a social 
object, he himself for himself a social being, just as society 
becomes a being for him in this object. 

On the one hand, therefore, it is only when the objective world 
becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man’s 
essential powers—human reality, and for that reason the reality of 
his own essential powers—that all objects become for him the objectifi- 
cation of himself, become objects which confirm and realise his 
individuality, become his objects: that is, man himself becomes the 
object. The manner in which they become his depends on the 
nature of the objects and on the nature of the essential power 
corresponding to it; for it is precisely the determinate nature of this 
relationship which shapes the particular, real mode of affirmation. 
To the eye an object comes to be other than it is to the ear, and the 
object of the eye is another object than the object of the ear. The 
specific character of each essential power is precisely its specific 
essence, and therefore also the specific mode of its objectification, 
of its objectively actual, living being. Thus man is affirmed in the 
objective world not only in the act of thinking, VIII] but with all 
his senses. 

On the other hand, let us look at this in its subjective aspect. 
Just as only music awakens in man the sense of music, and just as 
the most beautiful music has no sense for the unmusical ear—is 
[no] object for it, because my object can only be the confirmation 
of one of my essential powers—it can therefore only exist for me 
insofar as my essential power exists for itself as a subjective 
capacity; because the meaning of an object for me goes only’so far 
as my sense goes (has only a meaning for a sense corresponding to 
that object)—for this reason the senses of the social man differ from 
those of the non-social man. Only through the objectively un- 
folded richness of man’s essential being is the richness of subjec- 
tive human sensibility (a musical ear, an eye for beauty of 
form—in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses 
affirming themselves as essential powers of man) either cultivated 
or brought into being. For not only the five senses but also the 

so-called mental senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), in a 
word, human sense, the human nature of the senses, comes to be by 
virtue of its object, by virtue of humanised nature. The forming of 
the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down 
to the present. The sense caught up in crude practical need has 
only a restricted sense.) For the starving man, it is not the 
human form of food that exists, but only its abstract existence as 
food. It could just as well be there in its crudest form, and it 
would be impossible to say wherein this feeding activity differs 
from that of animals. The eare-burdened, poverty-stricken man 
has no sense for the finest play; the dealer in minerals sees only the 
commercial value but not the beauty and the specific character of 
the mineral: he has no mineralogical sense. Thus, the objectifica- 
tion of the human essence, both in its theoretical and practical 
aspects, is required to make man’s sense human, as well as to create 
the human sense corresponding to the entire wealth of human and 
natural substance. 

{Just as through the movement of private property, of its wealth 
as well as its poverty—of its material and spiritual wealth and 
poverty—the budding society finds at hand all the material for 
this development, so established society produces man in this entire 
richness of his being—produces the rich man profoundly endowed 
with all the senses—as its enduring reality.) 

We see how subjectivity and objectivity, spirituality and material- 
ity, activity and suffering, lose their antithetical character, and thus 
their existence as such antitheses. only within the framework of 
society; <we see how the resolution of the theoretical antitheses is 
only possible in a practical way, by virtue of the practical energy of 
man. Their resolution is therefore by no means merely a problem 
of understanding, but a real problem of life, which philosophy could 
not solve precisely because it conceived this problem as merely a 
theoretical one. 

We see how the history of industry and the established objective 
existence of industry are the open book of man’s essential powers, the 
perceptibly existing human psychology. Hitherto this was not con- 
ceived in its connection with man’s essential being, but only in an 
external relation of utility, because, moving in the realm of 
estrangement, people could only think of man’s general mode of 
being—religion or history in its abstract-general character as 
politics, art, literature, etc.—IIIX| as the reality of man’s essential 
powers and man’s species-activity. We have before us the objectified 
essential powers of man in the form of sensuous, alien, useful objects, 
in the form of estrangement, displayed in ordinary material industry 

(which can be conceived either as a part of that general move- 
ment, or that movement can be conceived as a particular part of 
industry, since all human activity hitherto has been labour—that 
is, industry—activity estranged from itself). 

A psychology for which this book, the part of history existing in the 
most perceptible and accessible form, remains a closed book, cannot 
become a genuine, comprehensive and real science) What indeed 
are we to think of a science which airily abstracts from this large part 
of human labour and which fails to feel its own incompleteness, while 
such a wealth of human endeavour, unfolded before it, means 
nothing more to it than, perhaps, what can be expressed in one 
word—‘need”, “vulgar need”? 

The natural sciences have developed an enormous activity and 
have accumulated an ever-growing mass of material. Philosophy, 
however, has remained just as alien to them as they remain to 
philosophy. Their momentary unity was only a chimerical illusion. 
The will was there, but the power was lacking. Historiography itself 
pays regard to natural science only occasionally, as a factor of 
enlightenment, utility, and of some special great discoveries. But 
natural science has invaded and transformed human life all the 
more practically through the medium of industry; and has pre- 
pared human emancipation, although its immediate effect had to 
be the furthering of the dehumanisation of man. Industry is the 
actual, historical relationship of nature, and therefore of natural 
science, to man. If, therefore, industry is conceived as the exoteric 
revelation of man’s essential powers, we also gain an understanding 
of the human essence of nature or the natural essence of man. In 
consequence, natural science will lose its abstractly material—or 
rather, its idealistic—tendency, and will become the basis of 
human science, as it has already become—albeit in an estranged 
form—the basis of actual human life, and to assume one basis for 
life and a different basis for science is as a matter of course a lie. 
(The nature which develops in human history—the genesis of 
human society—is man’s real nature; hence nature as it develops 
through industry, even though in an estranged form, is true 
anthropological nature.) 

Sense-perception (see Feuerbach) must be the basis of all science. 
Only when it proceeds from sense-perception in the twofold form 
of sensuous consciousness and sensuous need—that is, only when 
science proceeds from nature—is it true science. All history is the 
history of preparing and developing “man” to become the object of 
sensuous consciousness, and turning the requirements of “man as 

man” into his needs. History itself is a real part of natural 

history—of nature developing into man. Natural science will in time 
incorporate into itself the science of man, just as the science of 
man will incorporate into itself natural science: there will be one 
science. 

|X| Man is the immediate object of natural science; for 
immediate, sensuous nature for man is, immediately, human sensu- 
ousness (the expressions are identical)—presented immediately in 
the form of the other man sensuously present for him. Indeed, his 
own sense-perception first exists as human sensuousness for 
himself through the other man. But nature is the immediate object 
of the science of man: the first object of man—man—is nature, 
sensuousness; and the particular human sensuous essential powers 
can only find their self-understanding in the science of the natural 
world in general, just as they can find their objective realisation 
only in natural objects. The element of thought itself—the 
element of thought’s living expression—language—is of a sensu- 
ous nature. The social reality of nature, and human natural science, 
or the natural science of man, are identical terms. 

(It will be seen how in place of the wealth and poverty of political 
economy come the rich human being and the rich human need. The 
rich human being is simultaneously the human being in need of a 
totality of human manifestations of life—the man in whom his 
own realisation exists as an inner necessity, as need. Not only 
wealth, but likewise the poverty of man—under the assumption of 
socialism *°—receives in equal measure a human and therefore 
social significance. Poverty is the passive bond which causes the 
human being to experience the need of the greatest wealth—the 
other human being. The dominion of the objective being in me, 
the sensuous outburst of my life activity, is passion, which thus 
becomes here the activity of my being.) 

(5) A being only considers himself independent when he stands 
on his own feet; and he only stands on his own feet when he owes 
his existence to himself. A man who lives by the grace of another 
regards himself as a dependent being. But I live completely by the 
grace of another if I owe him not only the maintenance of my life, 
but if he has, moreover, created my life—if he is the source of my 
life. When it is not of my own creation, my life has necessarily a 
source of this kind outside of it. The Creation is therefore an idea 
very difficult to dislodge from popular consciousness. The fact 
that nature and man exist on their own account is incomprehensible 
to it, because it contradicts everything tangible in practical life. 

The creation of the earth has received a mighty blow from 
geognosy—i.e., from the science which presents the formation of the 

earth, the development of the earth, as a process, as a self-genera- 
tion. Generatio aequivoca is the only practical refutation of the theory 
of creation. 

Now it is certainly easy to say to the single individual what Aristotle 
has already said: You have been begotten by your father and your 
mother; therefore in you the mating of two human beings—a 
species-act of human beings—has produced the human being. You 
see, therefore, that even physically man owes his existence to man. 
Therefore you must not only keep sight of the one aspect—the 
infinite progression which leads you further to inquire: Who begot 
my father? Who his grandfather? etc. You must also hold on to the 
circular movement sensuously perceptible in that progress by which 
man repeats himself in procreation, man thus always remaining the 
subject. You will reply, however: I grant you this circular movement; 
now grant me the progress which drives me ever further until I ask: 
Who begot the first man, and nature as a whole? I can only answer 
you: Your question is itself a product of abstraction. Ask yourself 
how you arrived at that question. Ask yourself whether your 
question is not posed from a standpoint to which I cannot reply, 
because it is wrongly put. Ask yourself whether that progress as such 
exists for a reasonable mind. When you ask about the creation of 
nature and man, you are abstracting, in so doing, from man and 
nature. You postulate them as non-existent, and yet you want me to 
prove them to you as existing. Now I say to you: Give up your 
abstraction and you will also give up your question. Or if you want to 
hold on to your abstraction, then be consistent, and if you think of 
man and nature as non-existent, || XI| then think of yourself as 
non-existent, for you too are surely nature and man. Don’t think, 
don’t ask me, for as soon as you think and ask, your abstraction from 
the existence of nature and man has no meaning. Or are you such an 
egotist that you conceive everything as nothing, and yet want 
yourself to exist? 

You can reply: I do not want to postulate the nothingness of 
nature, etc. I ask you about its genesis, just as I ask the anatomist 
about.the formation of bones, etc. 

But since for the socialist man the entire so-called history of the world 
is nothing but the creation of man through human labour, nothing 
but the emergence of nature for man, so he has the visible, 
irrefutable proof of his birth through himself, of his genesis. Since the 
real existence of man and nature has become evident in practice, 
through sense experience, because man has thus become evident for 
man as the being of nature, and nature for man as the being of man, 
the question about an alien being, about a being above nature and 

man—a question which implies the admission of the unreality of 
nature and of man—has become impossible in practice. Atheism, as 
the denial of this unreality, has no longer any meaning, for atheism is 
a negation of God, and postulates the existence of man through this 
negation; but socialism as socialism no longer stands in any need of 
such a mediation. It proceeds from the theoretically and practically 
sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as the essence. Socialism 
is man’s positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through the 
abolition of religion, just as real life is man’s positive reality, no longer 
mediated through the abolition of private property, through commu- 
nism. Communism is the position as the negation of the negation, 
and is hence the actual phase necessary for the next stage of histor- 
ical development in the process of human emancipation and 
rehabilitation. Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic 
principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not 
the goal of human development, the form of human society.” |XIII