[2] “... but on coming across the works of Democritus [Epicurus] turned to 
philosophy.” p. 10. 

[4] (Posidonius the Stoic and Nicolaus and Sotion in the twelfth book of the work 
entitled Dioclean Refutations allege)* “... that he put forward as his own the doctrines 
of Democritus about atoms and of Aristippus about pleasure.” p. 11. 

[6] “I [Epicurus] know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of 
taste, [sexual pleasures,] the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form.” 
p. 12. 

[12] “Among the early philosophers ... his favourite was Anaxagoras, although 
he occasionally disagreed with him...’ p. 16. 

[29] “It [Epicurean philosophy] is divided into three parts—The Canon, 
Physics, Ethics” [p. 25.] 

I. The Canon 

[31] “Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions 
(prolepseis) and our feelings are the standards of truth; the Epicureans generally make 
perceptions of mental presentations to be also standards.” pp. 25-26. “His own statements 
are also to be found ... in the Principal Doctrines.” p. 26. 

I. “‘...the sensations are true. Every sensation ... is devoid of reason and incapable of 
memory; for neither is it self-caused nor, regarded as having an external cause, can it add 
anything thereto or take anything therefrom, neither judge nor deceive.” 

[31-32] “Nor is there anything which can refute sensations: one sensation cannot 
convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid (aequipollentiam); nor 
can one sensation refute another which is not kindred, for the objects which the two 
judge are not the same; nor can one sensation refute another, since we pay equal heed 
to all; nor again can reason refute them, for reason is dependent on sensation. 

“And the reality of ... perceptions guarantees the truth of our senses. But seeing 
and hearing are just as real as feeling pain. Between being true and being a reality, there is 
no difference.” p. 26. 

“Hence it is from phenomena that we must seek to obtain information about the 
unknown. For all our notions are derived from perceptions, either by actual contact or by 
analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning.” p[p]. 
26[-27]. . 

“And the objects presented to madmen as well as presentations in dreams are true, for they ... 
produce movements, which that which does not exist never does.” p. 27. 

II. [33] “By preconception they [the Epicureans] mean a sort of apprehension or a 
right opinion or notion or universal idea stored in the mind; that is, a recollection of an 
external object often presented, e. g., such and such a thing is a man; for no sooner is the 
word man uttered than we think of his shape by an act of preconception in which the senses 
take the lead. Thus the object primarily denoted by every term is then evident. And we could 
not seek what we do seek, unless we knew it before. ... we could not name anything at all, if we 
did not previously know its form by way of preconception. It follows, then, that preconceptions 
are evident. Mere opinion also depends on a previous evident presentation, by reference to 
which we form a judgment [...]. Opinion they also call ... assumption. They say it is 
sometimes true, sometimes false by something being added to it or taken away from it, or 
by its being confirmed or contradicted as being evident or not. For if it is confirmed or not 
contradicted, it is true, and if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false. Hence the 
introduction of ‘that which awaits’, for example, when one waits and then approaches 
the tower and establishes whether it looks from close quarters as it does from afar.” 
[plp. (27-128. 

“They affirm that there are two feelings: pleasure and pain.... The first is favourable to 
nature, the second hostile; according to these is determined what we must strive after 
and what we must avoid.” [p]p. [28-]29. 

“There are two kinds of inquiry, the one concerned with things, the other with the 
mere word,’ p. 29. 

Epicurus to Menoeceus 

{123] “First believe that God is a ... being indestructible and blessed according to the 
universal notion of God, and do not ascrible to him anything which is incompatible with his 
immortality, or that agrees not with his blessedness....” p. 82. 

“For gods verily there are. For the notion of them is evident” (cf. “the universal 
notion of God”, consensus omnium, c [onsensus] gentium*), “but they are not such as the 
multitude believe, seeing that men do not steadfastly maintain the notions they form 
respecting them. | 

“Not the man who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the 
gods what the multitude believe about them is truly impious. [124] For the utterances 
of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions, but false accumptions; hence 
the multitude believe that the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest 
blessings happen to the good from the hand of the gods. For being entirely prejudiced in 
favour of their own virtues, they grant their favour to those who are like themselves and 
consider as alien whatever is not so.” p. 83. 

“Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for all that is good or bad is 
based on sentience, and death is the loss of sentience. 

“Therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes transient life 
worth living, not by adding indefinite time to life, but by putting an end to the yearning 
after immortality. [125] For life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly apprehended that 
ceasing to live has no terrors. Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears 
death not because it causes suffering when it comes, but because it causes suffering when 
it is yet to come. For that which causes no annoyance when it is present causes only 
- imaginary suffering when it is expected. Death, which is indeed the most terrifying of all 
evils, is nothing to us since, as long as we are, death is not come, and as soon as death is 
come, we are no more. It is nothing then, either to the living or to the dead, since for the former it 
is not, and the latter are no longer.” pp. 83-84. 

[126] “He who admonishes the young to live honourably and the old to die honourably, is 
foolish, not merely because of the desirableness of life, but also because the striving to live 
honourably and the striving to die honourably are one and the same thing.” p. 84. 

[127] “We must however remember that the future neither depends on us nor is 
altogether independent of us, so that we must not expect it as something which will 
certainly be nor give up hope of it as of something which will certainly not be.” p. 85. 

“some desires are natural, others are vain, and among the natural ones some are 
necessary, others natural only. And among the necessary ones some are necessary for 
happiness (as the desire to free the body of uneasiness), others for very life.” p. 85. 

[128] “An error-free consideration of these things can lead ... to health of body and 
ataraxy of soul, for these are the aim of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to 
be free from pain and not to live in confusion. And when once we have attained this, 
every tempest of the soul is laid, for man no longer needs to seek for something which he still 
lacks or for anything else through which the welfare of the soul and the body will be 
complete. For we need pleasure when the lack of pleasure causes us pain, but when we feel 
no pain, we no longer need pleasure.” p. 85. 

“Wherefore we say that pleasure is the beginning and the end of the blessed life. [129] 
We apprehend pleasure as the first and innate good and we proceed from it in all that 
we do or refrain from doing and to it we come back, inasmuch as this feeling serves 
us as the guide-line by which we judge of everything good.” [p]p. [85-]86. 

“And since pleasure is our first and innate good for that reason we do not choose 
every pleasure... 

“All pleasure therefore, because it is suited to us by nature, is a good, yet not every 
pleasure is choiceworthy, just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain is to be avoided 
under all circumstances. [130] All these matters must rather be decided by weighing one 
against another and from the standpoint of advantage and disadvantage, for what is 
good proves at certain times to be an evil for us, and conversely what is evil proves to be 
a good.” p. 86. 

“Again we regard independence of outward things as a great good, not so as to be 
satisfied in every case with little, but in order to be contented with little when 
abundance is lacking, being honestly convinced that those who least need luxury 
enjoy it most and that everything which is natural is easy to obtain, while that which 
is vain and worthless is hard to procure.” p. 86. 

[131] “[...] By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble 
in the soul...” p. 87. 

[132] “Of all this the beginning and the supreme good is reasonableness, and hence 
it is more precious even than philosophy, from which all other virtues spring, and they 
teach us that one cannot live pleasantly unless one lives reasonably, honourably 
[and justly], {and that one cannot live reasonably, honourably] and justly without 
living pleasantly. For the virtues are closely connected with pleasant living, and pleasant 
living is inseparable from them.” p. 88. 

[133] “Who, then, in your opinion, is superior to him who thinks piously of the 
gods and is quite fearless of death, who has reflected on the purpose of nature and 
understands that the greatest good is easy to reach and to attain whereas the worst 
of evils lasts only a short time or causes short pains? Necessity, which has been 
introduced by some as the ruler over all things, is not the ruler, he maintains, over that 
some of which depends on chance and some on our arbitrary will. Necessity is not subject to 
persuasion; chance, on the other hand, is inconstant. But our will is free; it can entail 
blame and also the opposite.” p. 88. 

[134] “It would be better to accept the myth about the gods than to bow 
beneath the yoke of fate imposed by the Physicists, for the former holds out hope 
of obtaining mercy by honouring the gods, and the latter, inexorable necessity. 
[135] But he [the wise man] must accept chance, not god as the multitude do ... and 
not an uncertain cause.... He considers it better to be unhappy but reasonable than 
to be happy but unreasonable. It is, of course, better when in actions a good 
decision attains a good issue also through the favour of circumstances.” [p]p. 
[88-]89. 

| “{...] you will never be disturbed, but will live as a god among men. For a man 
who lives in the midst of intransient blessings is not like a mortal being.” p. 89. 

“Elsewhere he [Epicurus] rejects the whole of divination.... There is no divination, 
and even if there is, what happens does not rest with us....” [p. 89]. 

[136] “He differs from the Cyrenaics in his teaching on pleasure. They do not 
recognise pleasure in a state of rest, but only pleasure in motion. But Epicurus admits both, the 
pleasure of the mind as well as the pleasure of the body ... for one can conceive pleasure 
in a state of rest as well as in motion. But Epicurus says ... the following: ‘Ataraxy and 
freedom from pain are sensations of pleasure in a state of rest, joy and delight are seen to be 
effective only in motion.” p. 90. 

[137] “He further differs from the Cyrenaics in this: they hold that bodily pains 
are worse than mental pains ... whereas he holds mental pains to be worse, since the 
flesh is tormented only by that which is present, the mind by that which is past as 
well as by that which is present and that which is coming. So also are the pleasures 
of the mind greater.” p. 90. 

“And as proof that pleasure is the end he adduces the fact that living beings, as 
soon as they are born, naturally and unaccountably to themselves find satisfaction in 
pleasure but reject pain. Instinctively, then, we shun pain....” [pp. 90-91.] 

[138] “And the virtues too are chosen on account of pleasure and not for themselves ... 
he says also that only virtue is inseparable from pleasure, all the rest is separable, for 
instance human things.” p. 91. 

[Principal Doctrines] 

[139] “A blessed and immortal being has no trouble himself nor brings it on anybody 
else; hence he knows no anger or partiality, for the like exists only in the weak.” 
“Elsewhere he says that the gods are discernible by reason alone, not, indeed, being 
numerically distinct, yet through resemblance (as a result of the continuous influx of similar 
images made pricisely for this purpose) human in appearance.” pp. 91-92. 
“The highest peak of pleasure is the exclusion of all pain. For wherever pleasure reigns, as 
long as it continues, there is no pain or grief, nor both together.” p. 92. 
[140] “It is impossible to live pleasantly without living reasonably, honourably and 
| justly, and it is impossible to live reasonably, honourably and justly without living 
pleasantly.” p. 92. 
[141] “No pleasure is in itself an evil, but that which produces certain pleasures 
_ causes manifold disturbances of pleasure.” p. 93. 

{142] “If all pleasure were accumulated and with time had become compact, this 
concentrate would be just as [perfect] as principal parts of nature, and the 
sensations of pleasure would never differ one from another.” p. 93. 

[143] “It is impossible to banish fear over matters of the greatest importance if 
one does not know the essence of the universe but is apprehensive on account of 
what the myths tell us. Hence without the study of nature one cannot attain pure 
pleasure.” p[p]. 93[-94]. 

[142] “If we were not alarmed by the meteors and by death, as to how it might 
in some way or other affect us, and if we were moreover able to comprehend the 
limits of pain and desire, we should need no study of nature.” p. 93. 

[143] “It is useless to provide security against men so long as we are alarmed by 
things up above and things under the earth and in general things in the boundless 
universe. For security against men exists only for a definite time.” p. 94. 

“The same security which we attain by quiet and withdrawal from the multitude 
arises through the possibility of banishing [by moderation those desires which are 
not necessary} and through the very simple [and very easy] attainment of [the 
necessary things].” p. 94. 

[144] “The wealth of nature is limited and easily obtainable, but that which 
arises from vain fancies extends into infinity.” p. 94. 

“Pleasure of the flesh does not increase any more once the pain of privation 
has been removed, it is then subject only to variation.” p. 94. 

“The peak of thought (as far as joy is concerned) in fathoming precisely those 

| questions (and those related to them) which most alarm the mind.” p. 94. 

{145} “Unlimited time contains the same pleasure as the limited if its limits are- 
measured with the necessary discernment.” p. 95. 

“Limits of pleasure are prescribed to the flesh, but the yearning for unlimited 
time has made them recede to infinity; but the mind, which has made clear to itself 
the aim and the limits of the flesh and has extinguished desires concerning 
eternity, has made a complete life possible for us and we no longer need infinite 
time. And it does not shun pleasure, even when circumstances cause a parting from 
life, accepting the end of the best life as a consummation.” p. 95. 

[146] “We must always have before our mind’s eye the set aim to which we 
refer all our judgments; if not, everything will be full of disorder and unrest.” p. 95. 

“If you fight against all sensations, you will have nothing by which to be guided 
in judging those which you declare to be false.” p. 95. 

[148] “Unless on every occasion you refer all your actions to the end prescribed 
by nature, but swerve and (whether in shunning or in striving after something) turn to 
something else, your actions will not be in harmony with your words.” p. 96. 

[149] “Some desires are natural and necessary, others natural [but] not 
necessary, and others again neither natural nor necessary, but the offspring of vain 
fancy.” p. 96. 

[148] “The same knowledge which fills us with assurance that terrors are 
neither eternal nor of long duration enables us to see that in our limited lifetime 
the security of friendship is the most reliable.” p. 97. 

The following passages represent Epicurus’ views on spiritual 
nature, the state. The contract (cuy x7, ) he considers as the basis, 
and accordingly, only utility (cvpgépev) as the end. 

[150] “Natural right is a mutual agreement, contracted for the purpose of 
utility, not to harm or allow to be harmed.” p. 97. 

“For all living beings which could not enter into mutual contracts not to harm 
each other or allow each other to be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice. 
It is the same, too, with peoples who have been either unable or unwilling to enter 
into contracts not to harm each other or allow each other to be harmed.” p. 98. 

“Justice is not something existing in itself, it exists in mutual relations, wherever and 
whenever an agreement is concluded not to harm each other or allow each other to 
be harmed.” p. 98. 

[151] “Injustice is not in itself an evil, but the evil lies in the fearful anxiety over 
its remaining concealed from the guardians of the law appointed to deal with it... 
For whether he [the transgressor of the law] will remain undiscovered until death, 
is uncertain.” p. 98. 

“In general, the same justice is valid for all (for it is something useful in mutual 
intercourse); but the special conditions of the country and the totality of other possible 
grounds bring it about that the same justice is not valid for all.” p. 98. 

[152] “That which proves to be useful for the needs of mutual intercourse, that 
which is considered just, has the essence of right when the same is valid for 
everyone. If, however, somebody stipulates this, but it does not turn out to be to 
the advantage of mutual intercourse, then it no longer has the essence of justice.” 

. 99. 
: “And when the usefulness which is contained in right has ceased to exist but for 
a certain time continues to correspond to the conception of right, then it has 
nevertheless during that time remained right for those who do not let themselves 
be deluded by empty talk, but take many things into account.” p. 99. 

[153] “Where, without any new circumstances having arisen, that which is 
considered as right proves in practice not to correspond to the conception of right, 
then it is not right; but where, new circumstances having arisen, the same valid right is 
no longer useful, it was indeed formerly right, when it was useful for the mutual intercourse 
of citizens, but later when it was no longer useful, it was no longer right.” p. 99. 

[154] “He who knew how best to gain self-assurance from the external 
circumstances procured for himself that which was possible, as something not alien to 
himself, and considered that which was not possible as alien to himself.” p. 99 

End of the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius? 

Epicurus to Herodotus 

[37] “In the first place ... we must understand what it is that words denote, so 
that we have something to which we can refer opinions or inquiries or doubts, and 
by which we can test them, and so that everything does not slip from us into 
infinity without our having a judgment on it and that we are not left with mere 
empty words. [38] For it is necessary that the original meaning of every word 
should be perceived and need no proof, if we want to have something to which we 
can refer inquiries or doubts or opinions.” pp. 30-31. 

It is significant that Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, makes the same 
remark on the relation of language to philosophising. Since the 
ancient philosophers, not excluding the Sceptics, all begin by 
presupposing consciousness, a firm foothold is necessary. This is 
provided by the concepts presented in knowledge in general. 
Epicurus, being the philosopher of the concept, is most exact in 

this and therefore defines these fundamental conditions in greater 
detail. He is also the most consistent and, like the Sceptics, he 
completes ancient philosophy, but from the other side. 

[38] “Further we must observe everything both on the basis of sensations and 
also simply of present impressions, whether of the mind or of any criterion 
whatever, and equally on the basis of actual feelings, so that we have something by 
which we can characterise what is to be expected and what is unknown. Once this is 
done, one must begin reflections on the unknown.” p. 31. 

“[...] the common opinion of the physicists that nothing comes into being 
from not-being [...].” Aristotle, Physics, Book I, Chap. 4, Commentary of Coimbra 
[Jesuit] College, p[p]. 123[-125]. 

“[...] In one sense things come-to-be out of that which has no ‘being’ ... yet in 
another sense they come-to-be always out of ‘what is’. For coming-to-be necessarily 
implies the pre-existence of something which potentially ‘is’, but actually ‘s not’; 
and this something is spoken of both as ‘being’ and as ‘not-being’.” Aristotle, De 
generatione et corruptione, Book I, Chap. 3, Commentary of Coimbra College, p. 26. 

[Diogenes Laertius, X, 39] “[...] the universe was always such as it is now, and 
such it will ever remain.” p. 31. 

“{...] the universe consists of bodies and space.” [p. 32.] 

[40] “[...] of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these 
composite bodies are made.” p. 32. 

[41] ‘““These [elements] are indivisible and unchangeable ... if things are not all to 
be destroyed and pass into non-existence [...].” [p]p. [32-]33. “[...] the universe is 
infinite. For what is finite has an extremity [...].” p. 33. “[...] the universe is 
unlimited by reason of the multitude of bodies and the extent of the void.” p. 33. 
(“(...] the infinite body will obviously prevail over and annihilate the finite, body....” 
Aristotle, Physics, Book III. Chap. 5, Commentary of Coimbra College, p. 487.) 

[Diogenes Laertius, X, 42] “[...] they [the atoms] ... vary indefinitely in their 
shapes”. p[p]. 33[-34]. 

[43] ‘““The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity.” p. 34. 

[44] “Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from all 
eternity.” p. 35. 

“[...] atoms have no quality at all except shape, size and weight [...].” p. 35. “... 

they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our 
senses.” p. 35. [45] “[...] there is an infinite number of worlds [...].” p. 35. [46] 
“Again there are impressions which are of the same shape as the solid bodies but 
far thinner than what we can perceive.” p. 36. “These impressions we call images.” 
p. 36. [48] “Besides this, ... the production of the images is as quick as thought. For 
the continual streaming off from the surface of the bodies is evidenced by no visible 
sign...” p. 37. 

j aad deve are other modes in which these natural phenomena may be formed. For 
there is nothing in them which contradicts the sensations if we in some way take into account 
what is evident in order to refer the impressions produced on us from outside.” p. 38. 

[49] “But it must also be assumed that when anything streams in from outside, we see 
and apprehend the shapes.” p. 38. 

[50] “Every presentation received either by the mind or through sensation, but 
not judged (non judicata), is true. The illusion and error, whether it is not confirmed or 
is even refuted, always lies in what is added by thought, following a motion in ourselves 
which, though connected with a certain effort of presentation, has its own perception, nreet 
which the error arises.” p. 39. 

[51] “For there would be no error if we did not experience also a certain other 
motion in ourselves which is connected [with the effort of presentation], but has its 
own perception.” p. 39. “It is through this [inner movement which is connected 
with] the effort of presentation, but has its own perception, that, if it is not 
confirmed or is refuted, illusion arises; but if it is confirmed or not refuted, truth 
results.” [p]p. [39-]40. 

[52] “Again, hearing takes place when a current passes from the object which 
emits sounds, etc.” p. 40. 

[53] “Also concerning smell we must assume (as I have said about hearing) ....” 
p. 41. 

[54] “Every quality which is inherent in and proper to them (the atoms), meaning those 
named above (magnitudo, figura, pondus*), is unchangeable just as the atoms also do not 
change.” p. 41. 

[55] “Again one should not suppose that there are atoms of every size, lest this be 
contradicted by phenomena; but some changes in size must be admitted. For if this is so, 
the processes in feelings and sensations will be more easily explained.” 
[plp. (42-143. 

[56] “Besides, one must not suppose that in a limited body there is an infinite 
number of atoms, and of every size [...].” p. 43. 

[60] “[...] one motion must be assumed which must be thought of as directed 
upwards to infinity, and one directed downwards [...].” p. 45. 

See end of page 44 and beginning of page 45, where, strictly 
speaking, the atomistic principle is violated, and an internal 
necessity is attributed to the atoms themselves. Since they have a 
certain size, there must be something smaller than they are. Such 
are the parts of which they are composed. But these are necessari- 
ly to be considered together as a xotvotyg  evuTapyousa .” Thus 
ideality is transferred to the atoms themselves. The smallest thing 
in them is not the smallest imaginable, but is likened to it without 
anything definite being thought of. The necessity and ideality 
attributed to them is itself merely fictitious, accidental, external to 
them. The principle of Epicurean atomistics is not expressed until 
the ideal and necessary is made to have being only in an imaginary 
form external to itself, the form of the atom. Such is the extent of 
Epicurus’ consistency. 

[61] “When they are travelling through the void and meet with no resistance, 
the atoms must move with equal speed.” p. 46. 

Just as we have seen that necessity, connection, differentiation, 
within itself, is transferred to or rather expressed in the atom, that 
ideality is present here only in this form external to itself, so it is 
with motion too, the question of which necessarily arises once the 
motion of the atoms is compared with the motion of the xaté tag 

auyxpiaetc* bodies, that is, of the concrete. In comparison 
with this motion, the motion of the atoms is in principle absolute, 
that is, all empirical conditions in it are disregarded, it is ideal. In 
general, in expounding Epicurean philosophy and its immanent 
dialectics, one has to bear in mind that, while the principle is an 
imagined one, assuming the form of being in relation to the 
concrete world, the dialectics, the inner essence of these ontologi- 
cal determinations, as a form, in itself void, of the absolute, can 
show itself only in such a way that they, being immediate, enter 
into a necessary confrontation with the concrete world and reveal, 
in their specific relation to it, that they are only the imagined form 
of its ideality, external to itself, and not as presupposed, but rather 
only as ideality of the concrete. Thus its determinations are in 
themselves untrue and self-negating. The only conception of the 
world that is expressed is that its basis is that which has no 
presuppositions, which is nothing. Epicurean philosophy is impor- 
tant because of the naiveness with which conclusions are expressed 
without the prejudice of our day. 

[62] “And not even when it is a question of composite bodies can one be said to be 
faster than the other, etc.” p. 46. “{...] it can only be said that they often rebound until 
the continuity of their movement becomes perceptible to the senses. For what we conjecture 
of the invisible, namely, that periods of time contemplated through speculation 
may also contain continuity of movement, is not true for things of this kind, since 
only all that which is really perceived or is comprehended from an impression by thinking 
is true.” p. 47. 

The question must be considered, why the principle of the 
reliability of the senses is disregarded and what abstracting 
conception is set up as a criterion of truth. 

[63] ‘[...] the soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine particles, which is 
spread (diffusum) over the whole of the body (corpus) [...].” p. 47. 

Interesting here again is the specific difference between fire 
and air, on the one hand, and the soul, on the other, showing that 
the soul is adequate to the body, analogy being used and 
nevertheless discarded, which is in general the method of imagina- 
tive consciousness; thus all concrete determinations collapse and a 
mere monotonous echo takes the place of development. 

[63] “Further we must keep in mind that the soul is the chief cause of sensation.[64] 
It would not be, if it were not in a manner of speaking enveloped by the rest of the 
mass of the body. The remaining mass of the body, which makes it possible for the soul to be 
this cause, itself shares through the sou] in this quality (yet not in all of what the soul 
possesses). That is why it has no longer any sentience when the soul has departed. 
For it did not have this ability in itself, but served as an intermediary for it to another 

being which emerged simultaneously with it and which, owing to the ability it had 
achieved to produce immediately a sensation corresponding to the specific stimulation, 
imparted sentience both to itself and to the remaining mass of the body by reason 
of neighbourhood (vicinia) and sympathy.” p. 48. 

We have seen that the atoms, taken abstractly among them- 
selves, are nothing but entities, imagined in general, and that only 
in confrontation with the concrete do they develop their ideality, 
which is imagined and therefore entangled in contradictions. They 
also show, by becoming one side of the relation, that is, when it 
comes to dealing with objects which carry in themselves the 
principle and its concrete world (the living, the animate, the 
organic), that the realm of imagination is thought of now as free, 
now as the manifestation of something ideal. This freedom of the 
imagination is therefore but an assumed, immediate, imagined 
one, which in its true form is the atomistic. Either of the 
determinations can therefore be taken for the other, each consid- 
ered in itself is the same as the other, but in respect of each 
other too the same determinations must be ascribed to them, from 
whichever viewpoint they are considered; the solution is therefore 
the return to the simplest, first determination, where the realm of 
the imagination is assumed as free. As this return takes place in 
regard to a totality, to what is imagined, which really has the ideal 
in itself, and is the ideal itself in its being, so here the atom is 
posited as it really is, in the totality of its contradictions; at the 
same time, the basis of these contradictions emerges, the desire to 
apprehend the thing imagined as the free ideal thing as well, while 
only imagining it. The principle of absolute arbitrariness appears 
here, therefore, with all its consequences. In its lowest form, this is 
already essentially the case with the atom. As there are many 
atoms, each one contains in itself a difference in respect of the 
many, and hence it is in itself many. But that is already contained 
in the definition of the atom, so that the plurality in it is 
necessarily and immanently a oneness; it is so because it is. But it 
still remains to be explained, with regard to the world, why it 
develops freely from a single principle into a plurality. Therefore 
what is to be proved is assumed, the atom itself is what is to be 
explained. Then the difference of the ideality could be introduced 
only by comparison; in themselves both sides come under the 
same definition, and ideality itself is again posited by the external 
combination of these many atoms, by their being the principles of 
these compositions. The principle of this composition is therefore 
that which initially was composite in itself without any cause, that 
is, what is explained is itself the explanation, and it is thrust into 

the nebulous space of imaginative abstraction. As already said, this 
emerges in its totality only when the organic is considered. 

It must be noted that the fact that the soul, etc., perishes, that it 
owes its existence only to an accidental mixture, expresses in 
general the accidental nature of all these notions, e. g., soul, etc., 
which, not being necessary in ordinary consciousness, are accounted 
for by Epicurus as accidental conditions, which are seen as something 
given, the necessity of which, the necessity of the existence of 
which, is not only not proved, but is even admitted to be not 
provable, only possible. What persists, on the other hand, is the 
free being of the imagination, which is firstly the free which itself 
exists in general, and secondly, as the thought of the freedom of 
what is imagined, a lie and a fiction, and hence in itself an 
inconsistency, an illusion, an imposture. It expresses rather the 
demand for a concrete definition of the soul, etc., as immanent 
thought. What is lasting and great in Epicurus is that he gives no 
preference to conditions over notions, and tries just as little to save 
them. For Epicurus the task of philosophy is to prove that the 
world and thought are thinkable and possible. His proof and the 
principle by which it proceeds and to which it is referred is again 
possibility existing for itself, whose natural expression is the atom 
and whose intellectual expression is chance and arbitrariness. 
Closer investigation is needed of how all determinations may be 
exchanged between soul and body and how either of them is the 
same as the other in the bad sense that neither one nor the other 
is at all conceptually defined. See end of page 48 and beginning of 
page 49: Epicurus stands higher than the Sceptics in that not only 
are conditions and presentations reduced to nothing, but their 
perception, the thinking of them and the reasoning about their 
existence, proceeding from something solid, is likewise only a 
possibility. 

[67] “It 1s impossible to conceive anything that is incorporeal as self-existent, except 
empty space. (The incorporeal is not thought by the imagination, it pictures it as the 
void and as empty.*) And empty space can neither act nor be acted upon, but by 
virtue of its existence makes motion possible for the bodies.” p. 49, “Hence those 
who say the soul is incorporeal talk nonsense.” [p]p. [49-]50. 

It is necessary to study the passage on page 50 and the 
beginning of page 51, where Epicurus speaks of the determina- 
tions of concrete bodies and seems to refute the atomistic principle 
by saying: 

[69] “... that the whole body in general receives its specific being out of all that; 
not as though it were a composite of it, as, for instance, when out of conglomera- 

tions of atoms themselves a larger formation is made up ... but only that, as stated, 
_ it receives its specific being out of all that. And all these things demand specific 
consideration and judgment, in which the whole must constantly be considered and 
not in any way be separated, but, apprehended as a whole, receives the designation 
of body.” pp. 50 and 51. 

[70] “Again, the bodies often encounter non-specific accidentals, some of which, of 
course, are invisible and incorporeal. Thus, by using this word in the manner in 
which it is most frequently used, we make it clear that the accidentals neither pos- 
sess the nature of the whole to which, as the composite whole, we give the name of 
body, nor that {of the] specific qualities without which a body is unthinkable.” p. 51. 

[71] “[...] we must regard them as that which they appear to be, namely, as 
accidental attributes of the body which, however, neither are in themselves 
concomitants of the body nor possess the function of an independent being; we see 
them such as sensation itself makes their individuality appear.” p. 52. 

It is a matter of certainty for Epicurus that repulsion is posited 
with the law of the atom, the declination from the straight line. 
That this is not to be taken in the superficial sense, as though the 
atoms in their movement could meet only in this way, is expressed 
at any rate by Lucretius. Soon after saying in the above-quoted 
passage: © 

Without this clinamen atomi*? there would be neither “offensus 
natus, nec plaga creata”” {II, 223], he says: 

“Again, if all movement is always interconnected, the new arising from the old in 
a determinate order—if the atoms never swerve so as to originate some new move- 
ment that will snap the bonds of fate, the everlasting sequence of cause and effect — 
what is the source of the free [will]...’’ ((On the Nature of Things,] Book II, 251 ff.) 

Here another motion by which the atoms can meet is posited, 
distinct from that caused by the clinamen. Further it is defined as 
absolutely deterministic, hence negation of self, so that every 
determination finds its being in its immediate being-otherwise, in 
the being-negated, which in respect of the atom is the straight line. 
Only from the clinamen does the individual motion emerge, the 
relation which has its determination as the determination of its self 
and no other. 

Lucretius may or may not have derived this idea from Epicurus. 
That is immaterial. The conclusion from the consideration of 
repulsion, that the atom as the immediate form of the concept is 
objectified only in immediate absence of concept, this same is true 
also of the philosophical consciousness of which this principle is 
the essence. 

This serves me at the same time as justification for giving a 
quite different account of the matter from that of Epicurus. 

EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHY 
Second Notebook