Cologne, August 4. The Berlin Assembly from time to time
unearthes all sorts of old-Prussian dirt and just now when the
black-white knighthood becomes daily more insolent, such revelations come in very handy.

The session of July 21st dealt again with the feudal obligations.
Following a deputy’s motion, the central section proposed that the
pending negotiations or court hearings on redemptions and the
division of common property be suspended either by the authorities
or on application by one of the interested parties.

Deputy Dierschke examined the mode of redemption existing up to
now. He explained, to begin with, how the method of redemption
itself already takes advantage of the peasant:

“Compensation for corvée” (compulsory labour),” “for instance, has been fixed in
a very partial manner. It has not been taken into account that the wages for corvée,
which in former centuries were stipulated at 1 or 2 silver groschen, corresponded to
the then prevailing prices of natural produce and the conditions of the times, and that
they represented, therefore, an appropriate equivalent for work done, so that neither
the lords of the manor nor the serfs should have a preponderant advantage. A free
labourer, however, must now be paid 5 to 6 instead of 2 silver groschen per day. If
now one of the interested partners of a service relationship requests redemption he
will have to pay, after first converting corvée days into substitute days, a differential
amount of at least 3 silver groschen per day, which will amount to a yearly rent (based
upon 50 days) of 4 to 5 talers. The poor peasant cannot afford such payments since he
often possesses barely a quarter of a morgen’ of land and cannot find sufficient
opportunity for work elsewhere.”

* Dierschke used the word Robotdienste (corvée). Engels has inserted Frondienste
(compulsory labour) in brackets.— Ed.

b An old German land measure, varying in different localities between 0.25 and
1.23 hectares.— Ed.

This passage of Herr Dierschke’s speech leads to all sorts of
observations about the famous enlightened legislation of 1807-11,7*
none of which made it appear in a very favourable light.

First of all, it is evident from this that the compulsory labour
services (especially those in Silesia of which Herr Dierschke is
speaking) are certainly not a rent or fee which is paid in kind, they
are not a compensation for the use of the land; despite Herr Patow
and Herr Gierke they are nothing but an “outcome of seigniory and
serfdom” and hence ought to be abolished without compensation
according to the very own principles of these great statesmen.

Wherein consisted the obligation of the peasant? In placing
himself at the disposal of the lord of the manor during certain days
of the year or for certain specified duties. But certainly not
gratuitously. He received a wage for this which originally completely
equalled the daily wage of free labour. Thus the advantage of the
landlord consisted not in the gratuitous or merely cheaper labour of
the peasant but in the fact that he had labourers at his disposal for
the usual wage whenever he needed them without being obliged to
employ them when he did not need them. The advantage to the
landlord did not consist in the monetary value of the service in kind
but rather in its compulsory nature. It did not consist in the economic
disadvantage but rather in the constraint of the peasant. And this
obligation is not supposed to be an “outcome of seigniory and
serfdom”!

If Patow, Gierke and Co. want to be consistent, there is no doubt
that in accordance with their original character, these labour services
must be abolished without compensation.

But what is the situation if we take their present nature into
account?

For centuries the compulsory services remained the same and so
did the wages for these services. But the price of food increased and
so did the wages for free labour. The compulsory service, which at:
the beginning brought equal economic advantage to both parties and
often even resulted in well-paid work during the peasant’s idle days,
gradually became, to use the language of Herr Gierke, an “actual
charge on his land” and a direct monetary gain for the gracious
landlord. To the certainty that he will always have a sufficient
number of labourers at his disposal, he could now add a hefty cut
which he made in the wages of these workers. By means of a
consistent, century-old trickery the peasants were cheated of a
steadily growing part of their wage so that they finally received only a
third or a quarter of it. Let us assume that a farmstead is obliged to
supply only one worker for only 50 days a year and that the daily

wage has increased on the average by only 2 silver groschen for the
past 300 years. Then the gracious landlord will have earned a full
1,000 talers off this one worker. The interest on 500 talers over 300
years at 5 per cent will be 7,500 talers. Altogether he will have made
8,500 talers off one worker, and that according to an estimate which
does not take into account half the actual position!

What deduction can be made from all this? A rent ought to be paid
not by the peasant to the gracious lord but by the gracious lord to the
peasant, that is not by the farmstead to the manor, but by the manor
to the farmstead.

The Prussian liberals of 1848, however, do not judge like this. On
the contrary, the Prussian judicial conscience declares that it is not
the nobleman who must indemnify the peasant but the peasant who
must pay compensation to the nobleman for the difference between
statute wages and free wages. It is exactly because the peasant has
been cheated out of the wage difference for so long by his gracious
lord that he has now to indemnify his gracious lord for the cheating.
For whosoever hath, to him shall be given; but whosoever hath not,
from him shall be taken away even that he hath.*

The difference in wages is therefore calculated and the annual
amount is regarded as rent of land. It flows in this form into the
pockets of the gracious lords. If the peasant wants to redeem it, it will
be capitalised at 4 per cent (not even at 5 per cent) and this capital,
which is 25 times the amount of the rent, will have to be paid off. It is
obvious that the peasant is being dealt with in a thoroughly
businesslike fashion. Our foregoing estimate of the aristocracy’s
profits was thus entirely justified.

The upshot is that peasants often have to pay from 4 to 5 talers
rent for a quarter of a morgen of bad land whereas one morgen of
good land free from corvée can be had for three talers rent per
annum!

The redemption can also be achieved by surrendering a piece of
land of the same value as the capital sum that is outstanding. Only
the more prosperous peasants, of course, can do this. In that case,
the lord of the manor gets a piece of land as premium for the skill
and persistence with which he and his ancestors have defrauded the
peasants.

That is the theory of redemption. It corroborates entirely what has
taken place in all other countries where feudalism has gradually
been abolished, in particular in England and Scotland: the
transformation of feudal into bourgeois property and of seigniory

* Matthew 13:12.— Ed.

into capital means in every case a new crass defrauding of the
bondsman to the advantage of the feudal lord. The bondsman must
purchase his freedom every time and he must buy it dearly. The
bourgeois state acts according to the principle: only death is
gratuitous.

The theory of redemption, however, proves even more.

As Deputy Dane observes, the inevitable result of these enormous
demands upon the peasants is that they fall into the hands of
usurers. Usury is the inevitable companion of a class of free small
peasants as has been demonstrated in France, the Palatinate and the
Rhine Province. The Prussian science of redemption managed to let
the small peasantry of the old provinces partake of the joys of being
squeezed by usurers even before they were freed. The Prussian
Government, in general, has always had a knack for subjecting the
oppressed classes to the pressure of feudal and of modern bourgeois
conditions at the same time, thus making the yoke twice as heavy.

One has to add to this another matter, to which Deputy Dane also
calls attention: the tremendous costs which mount in proportion to
the negligence and inaptness of the commissioner who is paid by the
term.

“The town of Lichtenau in Westphalia paid 17,000 talers for 12,000 morgen and.
this has not yet covered the costs (!!).”

Even more telling proof is provided by the practice of redemption.

The land commissioners, continues Herr Dierschke, i.e. the officials
who prepare the redemption,

“appear in three capacities. First, they appear as examining officials. In this capacity
they interrogate the parties, determine the factual basis of the redemption and
calculate the amount of compensation. They often carry out their task in a very
one-sided manner and often do not take into account the existing legal conditions for
in part they lack legal knowledge. Furthermore, they appear in part as experts and
witnesses by themselves autonomically appraising the value of the redeemable objects.
In the end they give their testimony which almost amounts to a decision since the
general commission must as a rule rely on their opinions which are derived from local
conditions.

“Finally there is the fact that the land commissioners do not enjoy the confidence
of the rural population because they often put the parties at a disadvantage by letting
them wait for hours while they eat with relish at the table of the landlord” (who is himself a
party) “whereby they particularly arouse the mistrust of the parties against
themselves. When after a waiting period of three hours, the threshing gardeners
are finally admitted, the land commissioners often roar at them and brusquely reject
their rejoinders. Here I can speak from my own experience because I assisted the
interested party of peasants in my capacity as attorney-at-law in cases involving
redemptions. The dictatorial power of the land commissioners must therefore be
removed. The combination of the threefold capacity as examining magistrate, witness
and judge in one and the same person cannot be justified either.”

Deputy Moritz defends the land commissioners. Herr Dierschke
answers: I can state that there are very many among them who
disregard the interests of the peasants. I myself have even called for
the investigation of some of them and I can give proof of this if
demanded.

Minister Guzerke, of course, appears again as defender of the
old-Prussian system and the institutions which have emerged from it.
The land commissioners must, of course, also be praised again:

“T must leave it to the judgment of the Assembly, however, to decide whether it is
just to use this rostrum to make accusations which lack all proof and are entirely
unsubstantiated!”

And Herr Dierschke is offering proofs!

Since, however, his Excellency Gierke seems to be of the opinion
that notorious facts can be knocked down by ministerial assertions,
we shall shortly submit a few “proofs” which will show that Herr
Dierschke, far from exaggerating, has not by a long way condemned.
the conduct of the land commissioners sufficiently strongly.

So much for the debate. The amendments submitted were so
numerous that the report accompanied by them had to be referred
back to the central section. Thus the definitive decision of the
Assembly has yet to be made.

Among these amendments, there is one by Herr Moritz which calls
attention to a further edifying measure of the old Government. He
proposes the cessation of all negotiations concerning mill dues.

For when in the year 1810 it was decided to abolish the feudal
prerogatives and banalities,”” a commission was appointed simultaneously to compensate the millers for the fact that they were now
exposed to free competition. This was already a paradoxical
decision. Were the guild masters compensated for the abolition of
their privileges? But there are special circumstances in this case. The
mills paid extraordinary dues for the enjoyment of feudal prerogatives and banalities. Instead of simply abolishing these, they were
given a compensation and the dues were continued. The form is
paradoxical but there remains at least a semblance of justice in this
case.

It so happens, however, that in the provinces added since 1815,
the mill dues have been kept, the feudal prerogatives and banalities
have been abolished and yet no compensation has been given. This is
old-Prussian equality before the law. The industrial law, to be sure,
abolishes all business taxes but under the trade regulations of 1845
and the law on compensation all mill dues are in case of doubt to be
regarded not as business taxes but as land taxes. Innumerable law

cases have resulted from this jumble and these violations of the law.
The law-courts have contradicted each other in their sentences and
even the Supreme Court has pronounced the most contradictory
judgments. Just what was formerly regarded by the ex-legislative
power as “land tax” emerges from a case cited by Herr Moritz: a mill
in Saxony to which belongs, except for the mill buildings, only the
water power but not the land, is burdened with a “land tax” of four
wispels* of grain!

Indeed, say what you like, Prussia has always been the most wisely,
most justly and best administered state!