Herr Hecker and the Neue Rheinische Zeitung

* Cologne, 3 August. We return to the reply of Herr State Prosecutor Hecker, printed in our yesterday’s issue, No. 65, 4 August 1848, of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, regarding the confusion of the two Herren Joseph Wolff.
Herr Hecker accuses us of “deliberate distortion”. Should not the remark of Deputy Borchardt in the session of the Berlin Assembly of 18 July be applied here: that “officials of the public ministry are accustomed, as a rule, to see things somewhat too black”?
When one has to deal with an official who not only has the press and the law of 17 May at his disposal, but also Articles 222 and 367 of the Penal Code, it requires a particularly good humour to make “deliberate distortions”.
We shall take care not to go into the correctness or incorrectness of the facts contested by Herr Hecker; we would embark upon a path before which Article 367 of the Penal Code stands as a warning signpost and indicates that this path leads straight to the new house of detention. We have written an article, Herr Hecker has written a second one in reply. Herr Hecker has proved to us that he knows how to appeal to the judiciary at the right time; all that remains for us is the appeal to the public.
Let us establish the fact: Herr Hecker admits to having signed a summons to commence a prison sentence in which a wrong person was named, namely Herr Joseph Wolff, Altenmarkt No. 54, instead of Herr Joseph Wolff, Kaufhaus No. 19 (and not No. 6, as we, probably out of “deliberate distortion”, stated in No. 62).
Herr Hecker explains how the mistake was possible, namely through a pencil gloss by the tax office on a judgment extract (while in the only document valid for the parquet, in the files, the house number was correct). He then excuses himself as follows: The summons “was signed by me in good faith, since I cannot possibly verify in the case of every letter presented to me for signature whether the correct house number of the addressee is given.”
Herr Hecker is certainly too good a jurist not to know that everyone is responsible for what he signs with his name. Who made the mistake, whether it was possible or impossible for Herr Hecker to discover the correct house number, is entirely irrelevant. Herr Hecker signed it and he alone is accountable to us. We readily admit that Herr Hecker signed the letter “in good faith”. Herr Hecker has, it is true, emphatically denied our “good faith”. That will not prevent us from being just.
Herr Hecker informs us: the summons to commence a prison sentence is never delivered and “its delivery is by no means legally prescribed”. We had asserted the opposite – deliberate distortion, of course! We thank Herr Hecker for this elucidation of the reprehensibility of the laws which he has to execute “in good faith”. If one is summoned as a witness, one receives a written citation; if one is summoned to commence a sentence, this is done only orally, and if the notification is delayed because of the convicted person’s accidental absence, one is fetched by gendarmes.
Furthermore Herr Hecker says: “No one has personally asked me for information about the error; I have seen neither Herr etc. Wolff nor the advocate Schürmann at the parquet, and, as the parquet secretary has assured me, no one has even asked for me. But if I had been asked for, one would have learned that I was at the session of the royal assize court.”
Here is the point we can go into without falling foul of Art. 367. We note therefore: 1) That Herr Hecker saw neither Herr Wolff nor Herr Schürmann at the parquet, we had precisely stated. 2) The assertion of the parquet secretary that no one had asked for Herr Hecker is contradicted by a declaration recently made expressly to us by Herr Wolff, Altenmarkt No. 54: that he did indeed ask for Herr Hecker, since he alone had signed the document in question; 3) Herr Wolff declares that he received the answer: Herr Hecker was not there. The Neue Rheinische Zeitung had asserted nothing beyond that, and Herr Hecker was indeed “not to be spoken to”, for the simple reason that he was not there.
Herr Hecker appeals, “on the basis of the foregoing account”, to the “judgment of every unprejudiced person”. We, for our part, appeal to the judgment of Herr Hecker as to whether officials would not be far better off if their exceptional position vis-à-vis the press ceased and if, above all, by the repeal of Art. 368 the proof of truth were admitted in so-called slander suits. Only when both parties stand on equal ground, when sun and wind are evenly shared, only then can it be determined through the press on which side right lies. We do not say that Herr Hecker is right in this case; we do not say that he is wrong. But were Herr Hecker right – who would believe him, so long as our tongue is tied?