The Fædrelandet on the Armistice with Denmark

“Fædrelandet” on the Armistice  
with Denmark  
* Cologne, 20 July. So that the Fatherland may convince itself that through the so-called Revolution, with National Assembly, Imperial Regent, etc., it has attained nothing more than a complete renewal of the much-vaunted Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, we present the following article from the Danish “Fædreland.” It will, we hope, suffice to prove even to the most trusting friends of order that the forty million Germans have once again been cheated by the two million Danes, through English mediation and Russian threats, just as happened at every moment under the “Ever-Augmenters of the Empire.”

The Fædreland, Minister Orla Lehmann’s own paper, speaks as follows about the armistice:

“If one considers the armistice solely in relation to our hopes and wishes, one can naturally not consider oneself satisfied with it; if one assumes that the government had the choice between it and the prospect, with Swedish-Norwegian assistance, of driving the Germans out of Schleswig and compelling them to acknowledge Denmark’s right to regulate the affairs of this duchy jointly with its inhabitants – then one must certainly say that the government acted irresponsibly in entering into the armistice. But the choice was not like that. It must be assumed that both England and Russia, the two great powers most closely interested in this dispute and its settlement, demanded the conclusion of the armistice as a condition of their future sympathy and mediation, and that likewise the Swedish-Norwegian government demanded an attempt at a peaceful adjustment before it decided on any effective assistance; and that it will provide this assistance only within the limits laid down from the very outset: namely, not for the reconquest of Schleswig, but merely for the defence of Jutland and the islands. Thus the alternative was as follows: On the one hand, a respite gained, both to await the course of events abroad and to complete the internal political and military organisation; on the other, the prospect of a desperate single combat against a superior force which, even if the federal army in its advantageous positions were to be attacked by our army, only half its size, would be as good as impossible to lead to victory, but could very well, after the withdrawal of the Swedish-Norwegian army, lead to the occupation of the whole peninsula by the Germans; a struggle offering us, in the best case, dearly bought, useless victories, and in the worst, the exhaustion of all our defensive forces and a humiliating peace.”

The Danish paper now defends the conditions of the armistice as advantageous for Denmark. The fear that the resumption of the war would fall in the winter, when the German troops could cross the ice to Funen and Alsen, is said to be groundless; the Germans are just as incapable as the Danes of sustaining a winter campaign in this climate, while the advantages of a three-months’ suspension of hostilities for Denmark and the well-intentioned population of Schleswig are very great. If peace is not concluded within the three months, the armistice will of itself be prolonged until spring.

Then it says:

“That the blockade is lifted and the prisoners set free will be found in order; however, the surrender of the captured ships has perhaps aroused the dissatisfaction of some individuals. Incidentally, the seizure of German ships was rather a means of coercion to frighten Germany away from crossing our border and by no means had the purpose of enriching us through the appropriation of foreign private property; and besides, the value of these ships is far from being as great as many might think. If they were to be auctioned during the present stagnation in our own trade as well as in the whole of European trade, they would fetch at most 1 1/2 million, i.e., two months’ costs of war. And then the compensation for this is the evacuation of the two duchies by the Germans and the restitution of the requisitions levied in Jutland. The means of coercion used has thus achieved its purpose, and it is therefore in order that it should cease. And it seems to us that the evacuation of three countries by a superior army, which there was no prospect of driving out with our own power, outweighs tenfold the small advantage that the state could have derived from the sale of the captured ships.”

Section 7 is said to be the most questionable. It prescribes the continuation of the separate government of the duchies and thereby of “Schleswig-Holsteinism.” The King of Denmark is bound, for the two members of the provisional government to be appointed by him, to the Schleswig-Holstein Notables, and it will be difficult to find one who is not a “Schleswig-Holsteiner.” But on the other hand, the “entire insurrection” is expressly disavowed, all resolutions of the provisional government annulled, and the state of affairs before 17 March restored.

“We have thus considered the most essential conditions of the armistice from the Danish standpoint. Let us now for once try to place ourselves on the German standpoint.

All that Germany demands is the release of the ships and the lifting of the blockade.

What it gives up is the following:

First, the duchies, occupied by an army which has so far suffered no defeat and is strong enough to maintain its position against an army twice as strong as the one that has so far opposed it;

Second, Schleswig’s admission into the Confederation, which was indeed declared by the Diet and confirmed by the National Assembly through the admission of the Schleswig deputies;

Third, the provisional government, which it recognised as legitimate and with which it negotiated as such;

Fourth, the Schleswig-Holstein party, whose demands, supported by the whole of Germany, are left unresolved and transferred to the decision of non-German powers;

Fifth, the Augustenburg pretenders, to whom the King of Prussia personally pledged assistance, but who are not mentioned by a single word in the armistice, to whom no amnesty, no asylum is promised;

Finally, the costs caused by the war, which fall partly on the duchies, partly on the Confederation, but which, as far as they have been borne by Denmark proper, are to be reimbursed.

It seems to us as though our overwhelmingly superior enemies must have far more to object to in this armistice than we, the small despised people.”

Schleswig has had the incomprehensible desire to become German. It is in order that it is punished for this, and that it is left in the lurch by Germany.

We shall give the text of the armistice tomorrow.