The Stupp Amendment

** Cologne, June 20. Herr Stupp of Cologne has moved an amendment to the law concerning the inviolability of deputies, which was not discussed in the Assembly of Agreement but may not be uninteresting to his fellow citizens of Cologne. We do not wish to withhold from them the undivided enjoyment of this legislative masterpiece.

Amendment of Deputy Stupp.

§ 1. “No member of the Assembly may be called to account in any way for his votes or for the words and opinions expressed by him in his capacity as deputy.”

Amendment: “Deletion of the word ‘words’ in the third line.”

Justification. “It suffices for the deputy to be free to express his opinion. The term ‘words’ may also be subsumed under defamations, which entitle the insulted party to bring a civil action. To protect deputies against such actions appears to me to be in contradiction with the standing and honour of the Assembly.” It suffices for the deputy to express no opinion at all, but to drum and to vote. For why not also delete “opinion”, since opinions must be expressed in “words” and can even be expressed in “defamatory” words, since defamatory opinions may also be “subsumed” under the term “opinions”?

§ 2. “No member of the Assembly may, during the duration of the same, without its consent, be called to account or arrested for an act threatened with punishment, except if he is apprehended either in the commission of the deed or within 24 hours thereafter. – The same consent is necessary for an arrest on account of debts.”

Amendment. “Deletion of the concluding sentence: The same consent is necessary for an arrest on account of debts.”

Justification. “This is an encroachment upon the private rights of citizens, the sanction of which appears to me questionable. However great the interest of the Assembly may be in having any deputy in its midst, I nevertheless consider the respect for private rights to be overriding.”

“But it is to be considered in particular that we are not adopting this law for the future, i.e. not for the members of a future Chamber, but for ourselves. Assuming there are members among us who might have to fear an arrest on account of debts, it would certainly make a bad impression on our constituents if we wished to protect ourselves, by a law we ourselves have passed, against the lawful pursuit of our creditors.”

Or rather the other way about! Herr Stupp gets a bad impression from the fact that the constituents have sent members “among us” who might be arrested for debt. What good fortune for Mirabeau and Fox that they did not live under the legislation of Stupp. One single difficulty gives Herr Stupp a moment’s pause, namely “the interest of the Assembly in having any deputy in its midst.” The interest of the people – but who will speak of that? It is only a matter of the interest of a “closed society” that wants to have someone in its midst, while the creditor wants him outside in the debtors’ prison. Collision of two important interests! Herr Stupp could have given his amendment a more succinct formulation. Individuals encumbered with debts may only be appointed as representatives of the people with the permission of their respective creditors. They are recallable at any time by their creditors. And in the last instance the Assembly and the government are subject to the supreme decision of the state’s creditors.

Second Amendment to § 2.

“No member of the Assembly may, without its consent, during the duration of its sessions, be prosecuted ex officio or arrested for a criminal act, unless the latter be committed in flagrante delicto.”

Justification. “In the first line the word Assembly is taken as a corporation, with which the expression – duration of the same – does not seem to fit, and I propose ‘duration of its sessions.’ Instead of ‘an act threatened with punishment’, ‘criminal act’ seems more suitable. I am of the opinion that we may not exclude civil actions for criminal acts, for then we would be allowing ourselves an encroachment upon private rights. Hence the addition ‘ex officio’. If the addition – ‘or within the next 24 hours etc.’ remains, the judge can arrest any deputy within 24 hours after any offence.”

The legislative proposal guarantees the inviolability of the deputy during the duration of the Assembly; Herr Stupp’s amendment guarantees it during “the duration of the sessions”, i.e. during 6, at most 12 hours per day. And what an ingenious justification. One may speak of the duration of a session, but the duration of a corporation?

Herr Stupp will not allow the deputy to be prosecuted or arrested ex officio without the consent of the Assembly. He thus permits himself an encroachment upon criminal law. But as for civil action! Only no encroachment upon civil law. Long live civil law! What the state is not entitled to, the private man must be entitled to! Civil action above all! Civil action is Herr Stupp’s idée fixe. Civil law is Moses and the Prophets! Swear by civil law, especially by civil action! Respect, people, for the Holy of Holies!

There is no encroachment of private law upon public law, but there are “questionable” encroachments of public law upon private law. Why a constitution at all, since we possess the Code civil and civil courts and advocates?

§ 3. “Every criminal proceeding against a member of the Assembly and every detention shall be suspended for the duration of the session if the Assembly so demands.”

To § 3. Motion for the following amended wording:

“Every criminal proceeding against a member of the Assembly and every arrest consequent upon it, if it has not taken place by virtue of a judicial sentence, shall be immediately suspended, provided the Assembly so resolves.”

Justification. “It is surely not the intention to release from the prison those deputies who have already been sentenced to imprisonment by a judicial sentence.”

“If the amendment is passed, the same applies to those who are in detention on account of debts.”

Could the Assembly entertain the treasonable intention of weakening “the force of a judicial sentence” or even summoning a man in “detention” on account of debts into its bosom? Herr Stupp trembles at this outrage against civil action and the force of a judicial sentence.

All questions of popular sovereignty have now been disposed of. Herr Stupp has proclaimed the sovereignty of civil action and of civil law. How cruel to tear such a man away from the practice of civil law and hurl him into the subordinate sphere of the legislative power! The sovereign people has committed this “questionable” encroachment upon “private law”. Herr Stupp is therefore bringing a civil action against popular sovereignty and public law.

But the Emperor Nicholas may calmly turn back. At the first crossing of the Prussian frontier, Deputy Stupp confronts him, in one hand the “civil action” and in the other the “judicial sentence”. For, he demonstrates with due solemnity: War, what is war? A questionable encroachment upon private law! A questionable encroachment upon private law!