London, 25-26 October 1886 

My dear Lafargue, 

The Eastern affair is rather lengthy, and I shall be obliged to enter 
into a mass of detail in view of the absurdities which the French press, 
including the C7i,* has been disseminating on the subject, under the 
Russian patriotic influence. 

In the winter of 1878” Disraeli sent 4 ironclads into the Bosphorus, 
this being sufficient to halt the Russian advance on Constantinople 
and to tear up the Treaty of San Stefano.  For a time the Treaty of 
Berlin stabilised the situation in the Orient. Bismarck succeeded in ef- 
fecting a settlement between the Russians and the Austrians, in ac- | 
cordance with which Austria was tacitly given dominion over Serbia, 
while Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia were to be left exposed to the 
predominant influence of Russia. In other words, if the Russians were 
later permitted to take Constantinople, Austria would get Salonika 
and Macedonia. 

But on top of that, Bosnia was allotted to Austria, just as the great- 
er part of Poland proper had been handed over to the Prussians and 
Austrians by Russia in 1794, only to be taken back by the latter in 
1814. °*” Bosnia represented a constant drain on Austria, a bone of 

* Cri du Peuple-” 1879 in the original 

contention between Hungary and Western Austria and, in particu- 
lar — proof, where Turkey was concerned, that the fate awaiting it at the hands 
of Austria no less than at those of Russia, would be that suffered by Poland. 
Henceforward there could be no question of mutual trust between 
Turkey and Austria—a tremendous victory, this, for Russia. 

Though Serbia’s sympathies were Slavophil and, consequently, 
Russophil it had, since its emancipation, looked to Austria for all its 
means of bourgeois development. Its young men went to university in 
Austria, its bureaucratic system, its statute books, its judicial pro- 
cedure and its schools all conformed to the Austrian model, as was 
only natural. But Russia thought it necessary to prevent the same 
thing happening in Bulgaria and, besides, had no desire to act as 
Austria’s cat’s paw there. Thus, from the very outset, Bulgaria was 
organised along the lines of a Russian satrapy. The administration was 
Russian, as were the officers and non-commissioned officers in the ar- 
my, the whole body.of government officials and, indeed, the entire 
system, while Battenberg, imposed upon it as satrap, was a cousin of 
Alexander III’s. 

Russian domination, direct at first, then indirect, succeeded in stif- 
ling, within less than 4 years, all the sympathy Bulgaria had once felt 
for Russia, whole-hearted and enthusiastic though that sympathy 
had been. The people increasingly jibbed at the insolence of their ‘l- 
berators’, so that even Battenberg, a man of weak character and de- 
void of political ideas, who asked nothing better than to serve the 
Tsar on condition that he himself was accorded some measure of re- 
spect —even Battenberg was becoming increasingly rebellious. 

In the meantime things were taking their course in Russia. The 
government had succeeded, by draconian measures, in temporarily 
dispersing and disorganising the Nihilists. 95° But this could not last 
forever; what was needed was to gain the support of public opinion 
and to distract people’s minds from social and political miseries at 
home-—in other words, a bit of chauvinist phantasmagoria. And just as, 
under Louis Napoleon, the left bank of the Rhine had served to divert 
revolutionary fervour to foreign policy matters, so, too, in Russia the 
image of a Constantinople subdued, of oppressed Turkish Slavs ‘libe- 
rated’ to form part of a great federation under Russian Jeadership, 
was conjured up before the eyes of the anxious and restive people. But 
merely to evoke that phantasmagoria was not enough; something 
would have to be done to make it enter the domain of reality. 

Circumstances were favourable. The annexation of Alsace- 

Lorraine had thrown an apple of discord between France and Ger- 
many so that those two powers appeared to cancel each other out. 
Austria on her own was scarcely in a position to fight Russia, since 
her most effective offensive weapon — an appeal to the Poles — must, 
thanks to Prussia, remain permanently in the scabbard. And the oc- 
cupation— or theft-— of Bosnia constituted another Alsace between 
Austria and Turkey. Italy fell to the highest bidder, that is to say 
Russia, whose stake was the Trentino and Istria, if not also Dalmatia 
and Tripoli. And England? Gladstone, that peaceable Russophil, had 
hearkened to Russia’s siren call and had occupied Egypt in time of 
peace,  thus ensuring not only continual discord between En- 
gland and France, but also and into the bargain the impossibility of 
any alliance between the Turks and the English who had just despoiled them 
by appropriating Egypt, a Turkish fief. Moreover, Russia’s prepara- 
tions in Asia were sufficiently advanced to keep the English, in case 
of war, fully occupied in India. Never had the moment presented 
so many and such favourable opportunities to the Russians; their 
diplomacy was proving victorious all. along the line. 

The revolt of the Bulgarians against Russian domination provided 
the pretext for instituting a campaign. In the summer of 1885 a carrot 
was dangled before the Bulgarians of North and South— the possibil- 
ity of unification, as pledged by the Peace of San Stefano and revoked 
by the Treaty of Berlin. They were told that, if they again entrusted 
themselves to the liberating arms of Russia, that country would ac- 
complish her mission by accomplishing the said unification, but the 
Bulgarians, for their part, must first rid themselves of Battenberg. 
Duly forewarned, the latter reacted with unwonted promptitude and 
vigour. Off his own bat and on his own account he effected the unifi- 
cation which the Russians had intended to bring about in his despite. 
From that moment it was implacable war between him and Russia. 

To begin with, that war was conducted covertly and by indirect 
means. The small Balkan states were reminded of Louis Bonaparte’s 
splendid doctrine which held that, when a nation hitherto disunit- 
ed—say Italy or Germany—constituted itself a nation, other pow- 
ers—say France—were entitled to territorial compensation. 
Serbia swallowed the bait and went to war with Bulgaria. Russia’s tri- 
umph was the greater in that the war, instigated by her in her own 
interests, appeared to the rest of the world to be taking place under 
the auspices of Austria, which had failed to prevent it for fear this 
should bring the Russian party to power in Serbia.— Russia, for her 

part, disrupted the Bulgarian army by recalling all its senior officers, 
including battalion commanders. 

But contrary to all expectations the Bulgarians, deprived of Rus- 
sian officers and with two men to the enemy’s three, inflicted a re- 
sounding defeat on the Serbs and won the respect and admiration of 
an astonished Europe. For those victories there were two reasons. 
In the first place Alexander Battenberg, though a weak politician, 
was a good soldier who waged war as he had learned to do in the 
Prussian school, whereas the Serbs, in both strategy and tactics, 
turned to Austria for their model. Secondly, the Serbs had lived for 60 
years under a bureaucratic Austrian régime which, while failing to 
give them a strong middle class and an independent peasantry (by 
now all their property was mortgaged), had succeeded in undermin- 
ing and disorganising what remained of the gentile communism 
which had lent them strength in their struggles against the Turks. In 
Bulgaria, on the other hand, these more or less communist institu- 
tions had been left intact by the Turks, and this is the explanation for 
their superior courage. 

So Russia was foiled again and had to make a fresh start. And the 
Slavophil chauvinism which had been encouraged in the hope that it 
would counterbalance the revolutionary element, continued to grow 
day by day and had already begun to pose a threat to the govern- 
ment. So the Tsar betook himself to the Crimea* where, or so the 
Russian press maintained, he would achieve great things. He attempt- 
ed to entice the Sultan? there so as to involve him in an alliance by 
demonstrating that his erstwhile allies— Austria and England— 
were traitors and robbers and that France was in tow to, and at the 
mercy of, Russia. But the Sultan did not come and, for the time be- 
ing, there was no employment for the vast armaments Russia had ac- 
cumulated in the west and the south. 

The Tsar returned (last June) from the Crimea, © but in the mean- 
time the tide of chauvinism had continued to rise and the govern- 
ment, far from controlling this upward surge, found itself increasingly 
carried away by it. So much so that, on the Tsar’s return to Moscow, 
there was no preventing the mayor, ‘ in his address, ° of speaking loud 

on | April 1886-" Abdul-Hamid II-* Alexander III returned to Gatchina 
(near St Petersburg) on 30 May 1886 (see [Tpasumenscmeennviti eocmuuxe, No. 108, 20 May 
(1 June) 1886). -% Nikolai Alexeyev-° See Hosoe spema, No. 3666, 15 (27) 
May 1886. 

and clear about the conquest of Constantinople. #9 Under the influ- 
ence of the generals, and under their aegis, the press openly expressed the 
expectation that the Tsar would take action against Austria and Ger- 
many which were hampering him, nor did the government have the 
courage to muzzle it. In short, Slavophil chauvinism was stronger 
than the Tsar. Either the latter must give way or else— the Slavo- 
phils would rebel. 

All this was compounded by a shortage of cash. No one was willing 
to lend money to a government which between 1870 and 1875 had 
borrowed 70 million pounds sterling (1,750 million frs) in London 
and was posing a threat to the peace of Europe. Only three years be- 
fore, in Germany, Bismarck had raised a loan of 375 million frs on its 
behalf, but that had been frittered away long since; and without 
Bismarck’s signature the Germans wouldn’t give another farthing. But 
that signature was no longer to be had save at the cost of humiliating 
conditions. At home, the government paper-mill had already been 
producing to excess; the rouble in silver was worth 3 fr. 80, but in pa- 
per-money only 2 fr. 20. And armaments were diabolically expensive. 

Finally action became imperative. Either a successful move against 
Constantinople, or revolution. Which is why Giers went to call on 
Bismarck to explain the situation to him. And Bismarck understood 
him perfectly. He would have restrained the Russians, first because of 
their insatiability and secondly out of consideration for Austria. But 
‘revolution in Russia might involve the fall of Bismarck’s régime in Ger- 
many. Without the large reserves of the reactionary army, the rule of 
the cabbage Junkers in Prussia would not last a day. Revolution in 
Russia would, at a stroke, change the situation in Germany; it would 
put an end to that blind faith in Bismarck’s omnipotence which had 
rallied to his standard all the propertied classes; it would foment revo- 
lution in Germany. 

Bismarck, who had no illusions but that the existence of tsarism in 
Russia was the base upon which the whole of his system rested, 
understood very well; he hastened to Vienna to tell his Austrian 
friends that, in the face of such a danger, it would not be opportune 
either for him or for them to place undue insistence on questions of 
amour-propre; that the Russians must be allowed at least a semblance 
of victory, and that it was in their own interests that Germany and 
Austria should bow the knee before the Tsar. Moreover, were his es- 
teemed friends the Austrians to insist on meddling in Bulgarian af- 
fairs, he would wash his hands of them and then they’d see what 

would happen. Kalnoky finally gave way, Alexander Battenberg 
was sacrificed, and Bismarck went in person to announce the fact 
to Giers. 

There followed the kidnapping of Battenberg by military conspira- 
tors in circumstances which could not but shock any monarchically- 
minded conservative, in particular those princes who had armes of their 
own. But at this point Bismarck proceeded to the next item on the 
agenda, glad to have got off at so little cost. 

Unfortunately, the Bulgarians gave evidence of a political aptitude 
and an energy which, in the circumstances, were highly inopportune, 
not to say intolerable in a Slav nation ‘liberated’ by Holy Russia. 
They arrested the conspirators and nominated an efficient govern- 
ment, energetic and — incorruptible (a quality wholly intolerable in 
a nation as yet barely emancipated!) which reinstated Battenberg. 
The latter thereupon proceeded to exert all his weakness by taking to 
his heels. But the Bulgarians proved incorrigible. Battenberg or no 
Battenberg, they resisted the supreme orders of the Tsar and forced 
even the heroic Kaulbars to make an ass of himself in the eyes of all 
Europe. °34 

Imagine the fury of the Tsar! Having curbed Bismarck, having 
broken the resistance of Austria, to find oneself brought up short by 
this runt of a nation, weaned only yesterday, which owes its ‘inde- 
pendence’ to oneself or to one’s father * and fails to see that the afore- 
said independence means nothing more than blind obedience to the 
‘liberator’! The Greeks and Serbs have not shown themselves wanting 
in ingratitude, but the Bulgarians exceed all possible bounds. Taking 
their independence seriously — has such a thing ever been heard of 
before? 

To save himself from revolution, the hapless Tsar was compelled to 
take another step forward. But with every new step the peril in- 
creased, for it brought closer the risk of European war— something Rus- 
sian diplomacy had always been at pains to avoid. There could be no 
doubt that, if Russia intervened in Bulgaria, and if such intervention 
subsequently led to complications, the moment would come when the 
mutually inimical interests of Russia and Austria would lead to an 
open clash. And this time there could be no question of localising the 
affair. There would be general war. And, given the rascals who were 
at that juncture governing Europe, there was no foreseeing what the 

4 Alexander II 

composition of the two camps might be. Bismarck was capable of ally- 
ing himself with the Russians against Austria if that was the only 
way of postponing revolution in Russia. What seemed more prob- 
able, however, was war between Austria and Russia, and that Ger- 
many would come to the help of Austria only in case of need, to pre- 
vent her being crushed. 

While waiting for the spring for before April the Russians can- 
not embark on a major war on the Danube — they did everything 
they could to lure Turkey into their snare, and Austria and England, 
by their treachery towards Turkey, furthered this ploy. Their object 
was to gain the right to occupy the Dardanelles, thus turning the 
Black Sea into a Russian lake, an unassailable haven for the organisa- 
tion of powerful fleets which would sail out of it to dominate the 
French lake, as Napoleon called the Mediterranean. But in this they 
never succeeded, even though the cat had been let out of the bag by 
the few adherents they had in Sofia. 

Such was the situation. To avoid revolution in Russia, the Tsar 
must have Constantinople. And Bismarck prevaricated, wishing to 
find some way of avoiding one or the other eventuality. And what of 
France? 

For those Frenchmen whose thoughts, for 16 years, had centred sole- 
ly on revenge, it would seem natural enough to seize on what might 
be a possible opportunity. But for our party it is not so simple, nor yet 
even for Messrs the chauvinists. War against Germany in alliance 
with Russia might lead to either revolution or counter-revolution in 
France. If a revolution were to bring the socialists to power, the al- 
hance with Russia would collapse. In the first place, the Russians would 
immediately conclude peace with Bismarck so that they might together fall 
upon revolutionary France. And in the second, France would not put the 
socialists in power so that they might fight to prevent revolution in 
Russia. But such an eventuality is unlikely to arise. What is far more 
likely is @ monarchist counter-revolution, promoted by the Russian al- 
liance. You know how greatly the Tsar desires the restoration of the 
house of Orleans, and that this alone would enable him to conclude 
a good, stable alliance with France. Well, the war once embarked 
upon, good use would be made of the monarchist officers in the army 
who would help pave the way for the said restoration. For any partial 
defeat, however slight—and such there would be—they would 

blame the Republic, saying that, if victories were to be achieved and 
the whole-hearted cooperation of their Russian ally secured, there 
must be a stable, monarchical government — in short, Philippe VII *; 
the monarchist generals would themselves act irresolutely so that 
their failures could be laid at the door of the republican govern- 
ment-—and hey presto, you’ve got your monarchy! And, Philippe 
once installed, all those kings and emperors would suddenly be of one 
mind and, instead of killing each other, share out Europe between 
them, swallowing up the smaller states. Once the French Republic 
had been killed there’d be another Congress of Vienna at which 
France’s republican and socialist sins might, perhaps, be made a pre- 
text for refusing her Alsace-Lorraine, whether in whole or in part, 
and at which the princes would deride the stupidity of the republi- 
cans for believing in the possibility of a genuine alliance between tsar- 
ism and anarchy. 

Is it true, by the bye, that General Boulanger is saying to anyone 
who chooses to hear that war is to France a necessity, in that wt ts the only 
way to kill social revolution? If so, let it be a warning to you. The 
good Boulanger has a swashbuckling air, excusable perhaps in a sol- 
dier, but which gives me a low opinion of his political nous. It is not 
he who will save the Republic. If he had to choose between the social- 
ists and the house of Orleans he would, if needs be, come to terms 
with the latter, especially if it secured the Russian alliance for him. 
Whatever the case, the bourgeois republicans in France are in the same boat 
as the Tsar in Russia; they see before them the spectre of revolution and can see 
only one means of salvation: war. 

In France as is Germany things are going so well for us that all we 
can wish for is the continuation of the status quo. And if revolution 
were to break out in Russia it would create a combination of circum- 
stances which could hardly be more favourable. Whereas if there 
were to be general war, we should find ourselves back in the realm of 
uncertainty and of unpredictable events. Revolution in Russia and 
France would be averted, our party’s splendid development in Ger- 
many would be violently interrupted, and the monarchy would prob- 
ably be restored in France. Doubtless all this would eventually re- 
dound in our favour, but what a waste of time, what sacrifices, what 
fresh obstacles to be overcome! 

* Louis Philippe Albert d’Orléans 

The temptation to go to war is everywhere great. In the first place 
the Prussian military system, universally adopted, takes some 12 to 16 
years to complete its development; after that period, all reserve for- 
mations are made up of men trained in the handling of weapons. 
Everywhere the !2-16-year period has elapsed; everywhere there are 
12-16 classes which have passed through the army each year. Thus 
everywhere people are prepared, and the Germans no longer enjoy 
any particular advantage in that respect. And in the second place, 
old William * is probably about to die; then the system will undergo 
certain changes. Bismarck will see his position to some extent under- 
mined and may himself press for war as the only means of maintaining it. 
For others this would represent a further temptation to attack Ger- 
many which would seem to them less strong and less stable at a time 
when internal affairs were in a state of flux. Indeed, the Stock Ex- 
change everywhere believes there will be war as soon as the Old Man 
has closed his eyes. 

As for myself, I believe we must take for granted the fact that the 
war, if war there be, will be conducted simply with a view to prevent- 
ing revolution: in Russia, to forestall common action by all malcon- 
tents —Slavophils, Constitutionals, Nihilists?°° and peasants; in 
Germany to keep Bismarck in power; in France to stem the victorious 
progress of the socialists and (or so all the big bourgeoisie hopes) to 
re-establish the monarchy. Hence I am for ‘peace at any price’, seeing 
that it is not we who will pay that price. 

Yours ever, 

F.E. 
I return La France Juive. What a tiresome book! 
26 October, Tuesday, 3.30 p.m. 

So this letter will reach you tomorrow morning.