Karl Marx

[Notes on the Reform of 1861 and the Associated Development in Russia]

Written end of 1881 to 1882.

From the manuscript.

I Course of the Preparation of the Reform

II Three Working Periods of the Editorial Commissions

III Zemstvo

IV Russia

[I]

Course [of the Preparation of the Reform]

How pleasant that Alexander II (the commission’s notice could not alter this) effected the purchase of the peasant farmsteads in the very first imperial rescripts of 1857 (Skaldin 117 note and 118). Under the same Alexander, defrauding of the peasants through purchases made before and after 1848 (123).

1. <After the proclamation of the Emancipation Manifesto on 19 February 1861 (3 March), general agitation and unrest among the peasants; they considered it a forged, spurious document; military executions; general flogging of the serfs during the first 3 months after the “Manifesto”. Why this strange “overture” to a spectacle announced with so much noise?>

The following points must later contain other numerals alongside the Latin ones, in order to see how they follow one another.

a) With reference to the *Editorial Commission* and its *freedom* (Notebook p. 102). On *4 March 1859* the Editorial Commission opened its sessions, on 5 March the first proper session. *15 April 1859* ( *alleged consultation of the people* ) (p. 106). In the sessions of *6, 9, 13 May and 20 May 1859*, a *temporarily-bound* state was adopted with *protests from Count Peter Shuvalov* and *Prince Paskevich*: the *personal emancipation of the peasants* must not be made dependent on the conditions *prescribed for them* (forcibly imposed) of acquiring landed property. Immediately, by the most high command, entry of their protests in the minute book was *refused on 21 May* (p. 107, 108). Phrase of the commission: “as the slightest deviation from the imperial will is pernicious” (p. 108 top). *5 January 1859*, the *provincial noble committees* were *prohibited from admitting the public, etc.*. Bans on printing, etc., to the same dated 21 January 1859 and 3 March 1859 (p. 106).

<Finally: The Emperor had publicly promised that, before the project became law, deputies from the provincial committees would be invited to St. Petersburg to raise objections and propose improvements... They were summoned to the capital, but were not allowed to hold a public assembly for discussion of the question. All their efforts to hold meetings were thwarted: they were only asked to answer in writing a list of printed questions on matters of detail. Those who dared to discuss particulars were summoned to attend commission sessions in person, where they were rudely rebuffed; several groups of deputies submitted petitions to the Tsar containing a protest against the way they were treated; they received a formal reprimand through the police.> They then wanted to <protest in the triennial provincial assemblies of the nobility. A circular forbade them to touch on the question of emancipation. Some assemblies nevertheless represented to the Tsar that the time had come for other reforms as well.> Thereupon <several marshals of the nobility were reprimanded, others dismissed. Of the leaders, two were banished to distant provinces, others placed under police surveillance.>

In fact, everything proceeded *par ordre du moufti* [by the most high command]. Alexander II <was from the very beginning determined to give the owners as much as possible (and the peasants as little as possible), in order to reconcile them to the *formal abolition of serfdom*; he wanted to make only the redemption of the peasant’s homestead obligatory – his cottage, his vegetable gardens, his flax fields and, in addition, usufruct of fields (where it existed); he even wished to retain a kind of jurisdiction of the landlords over the peasants; he insisted that they should undergo a 12‑year transitional period of serfdom, etc. See his rescript of 20 November 1857 to the Adjutant-General Nazimov, Governor-General of the three provinces of Vilna, Kovno and Grodno, in reply to their noble committees (p. 103).>

Through his hesitation – while already in March 1855, after the levy en masse of 29 January 1855, he had spoken to the provincial marshal and the district marshals of the *abolition of serfdom*, which, however, he had no intention of carrying out *immediately* (!) – he allowed the landowners to greatly worsen the actual conditions of the peasants. See circulars p. 105; p. 110 Skaldin and p. 114.

On 3 January 1857, on the proposal of Lanskoy, a Secret Committee was formed under the chairmanship of Alexander, in his absence of Prince Orlov. It was decided to invite noble committees to co-operate, etc. (p. 103). In its sessions of 14, 17 and 18 August it immediately resolved to improve the condition of the peasants only *slowly* and *cautiously* (l.c.).

8 January 1858. The “Secret Committee” was transformed into the “Main Committee”, to which a “Special Commission” was added for the preliminary examination of the *drafts of the provincial committees*. Furthermore, a *Zemstvo* < *agricultural* > department of the Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of the Interior was set up for the appraisal of the (agrarian) conditions of the empire, likewise for the preliminary examination of the provincial committee drafts (p. 303).

I (2)

21 April (1858) – with a circular from Lanskoy the *imperially confirmed programme for the activities of the provincial committees* was sent out, etc. (p. 105).

Further, in the same < vein >, the decisions adopted by the Main Committee on *18 October 1858* form the *starting point* for the *Editorial Commissions* (p. 105).

17 February 1859, the 2 Editorial Commissions under the chairmanship of Rostovtsev (p. 105).

27 April 1859 (a Finance Commission was also added) consisting only of specialists and officials of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior (p. 105). *The 3 periods of the Editorial Commissions* (p. 105). (On 6 February 1860 Rostovtsev died.)

[II]

[Three Working Periods of the Editorial Commissions]

1st period 4 March – 5 September 1859

}

Together 1 year and 7 months

2nd period 5 September 1859 – 12 March 1860

3rd period 12 March – 10 October 1860.

Alleged principles (established earlier by an imperial letter, etc., and the Main Committee).

Practice

a) *Redemption must be voluntary on both sides* (excluding the peasant farmsteads).

a) *Redemption compulsory only for the peasants*; the < *landowner* > can compel them to redeem (cf. p. 108 note and 109, ibid., p. 109 Golovachev).

( *29 April 1859 Rostovtsev* ) (p. 106). Ditto (20 May 1859) – l.c.).

Further on redemption (p. 106). <*Proposals* of the Main Committee of *4 December 1858* (introduced by Rostovtsev into the commission session. Session of 27 May 1859) (p. 107 note).>

Redemption with <government assistance> already hypothetically in the Journal of the Main Committee of 4 Dec. 1858 (p. 108).

Count Peter Shuvalov and Prince Paskevich very rightly remarked in their protests, etc., that Rostovtsev’s draft made the ‘final emancipation of the peasant estate’ dependent on redemption; and ‘it is unnatural to compel a free man, against his will, to acquire landed property’ (p. 108).

}

Conditions of the redemption ibid. The *400 million debts* of the landowners.

14 February 1859, Rostovtsev’s draft. At that time the redemption period was to be *only 37 years* ( *later 49* ), and ... to be precise, “on the basis of the peasants’ customary obrok”.

Financial side of the redemption operations (p. 109 Golovachev). *Profits of the stockjobbers* (l.c.). *Fall of securities*; <landowners> who voluntarily agree to redemption demand < *additional payment* > from peasants (Skaldin p. 110, p. 117) (Skrebitsky p. 123).

b) <The *serf* is not to pay for his personal freedom.>

b) <The *serf* has to pay for his personal freedom (113 Skaldin) (ditto p. 115). p. 124 Janson, Janson p. 125 note.>

c) *The existing obrok was not to be raised.*

c) *The existing obrok is raised* (already through the reduction of the nadyel, p. 116).

d) *The peasants are to receive allotments such that their existence is fully secured*, alongside the redemption of the quit-rent payments.

d) <In reality> such allotments (even the highest included) that the peasant’s existence is not covered by the nadyel, but he remains *dependent* temporarily on the <landowner>.

1.

b) The *temporarily bound*

Sessions of 6, 9, 13 May 1859 (p. 107). At that time *12 years* were fixed for the *temporarily bound* (p. 107).

Until the beginning of redemption, the *peasant land allotment* was to be retained in its existing extent, “with the necessary exceptions and restrictions” (p. 107), not so in the case of redemption (see Rostovtsev, p. 108 under redemption).

Payments by the temporarily bound (p. 111 Skaldin; in the non-black-earth zone).

Peasants in the middle and southern zone prefer <*labour service*> which they formerly hated so much (p. 115, Skaldin, beginning).

Those fettered to the soil for 9 years cannot get out (Skaldin 117, 118).

Where the peasants, for local reasons, particularly wish to redeem the farmsteads, this is prevented by <landowners>, etc. (p. 118 ad 2) Skaldin. *In fact it never happens* (ibid.). Why, before the expiry of the first 9‑year period, the <landowners> accelerate redemption (p. 119 Skaldin).

1878 number of the temporarily bound (Janson p. 119).

2. The peasants on redemption. For 49 years <fettered to the soil> (p. 118 and 119 Skaldin). *Impossible conditions of exit* (l.c.).

c) *Growing soul taxes* on the peasant, etc., under Alexander II (p. 109) (Golovachev), (p. 111 Skaldin and 112), (p. 113 note) (p. 114 beginning).

System of gratuities for officials for *collection of < arrears>* (l.c.) (109).

On the soul tax in general (112, Skaldin).

Just as little as the nobility do merchants pay tax on land which they have been able to buy since 1861 (112, Skaldin).

Starovertsy [Old Believers] against the soul tax (112) (Skaldin).

At the same time the passport system (l.c. and 113), (*since 1863 passport fees payable to the <village commune>*. l.c.).

State danger arising from the system (note 112 l.c. Skaldin).

The landless are also inscribed in the communes (p. 113) (Skaldin).

d) Cutting off of <peasant land>. Effect of taking away woodland, meadow, pasture and the cutting off of pieces of the peasant nadyel. Material dependence of the peasants on the manorial <*absurdity*> (114 Skaldin). Leasing from <landowners> and the state (110 Skaldin). Purchase of these cut-off pieces by merchants, etc., state tenants, etc. (110) (Skaldin) id. p. 114. He must lease from the <landowner> (110) (Skaldin).

Cut-off pieces from <peasant land>, in at least more than one half of the <estates, reduction of the land allotments and increase of the payment on them> (114 Skaldin) and <under 2. (p. 114) (and annexed to the landowner’s lands)>.

Insufficiency of the nadyel (<hence> necessity to lease and to obtain wage labour).

Hardly sufficient for subsistence (even in the black-earth zone) (111 Skaldin), <*infertility of the fields* assigned to the peasants and *unfavourable location*> (114) (Skaldin).

According to Skaldin: *the more fertile the soil, the smaller the nadyel* (l.c. Skaldin).

Commission fixings of the maximum nadyel (116, Skaldin). Further reduced by the <*State Council*> (ibid. Skaldin).

Janson, p. 124. In addition, making resettlement more difficult (l.c.).

Originally the inadequacy of the nadyel was to be compensated by <*government*>-facilitated *resettlement*; this was later dropped altogether (125).

a) *Through the conditions in which the government has placed the peasant*, his plundering by kulaks and merchants (p. 110 Skaldin).

Famines (note under p. 113, 114), (compared with serfdom, p. 114 quoted Skaldin p. 205).

b) *Overburdening of the nadyel.*

See examples in the northern zone (p. 113) likewise too high in central and southern Russia (loc. cit.).

The ridiculous monstrosities in the

1.
fixing of the obrok
(
Skaldin
pp. 115 and 116) for
corvée labourers
(p. 116).

System of gradation per desyatina per soul (
p. 116 Skaldin
) (highest in black-earth). (The smaller the land, the larger the obrok.)

Lowest
1/3
nadyel
(
last lines p. 116 Skaldin
). Where there was less, it should have been
shorn off
, but the State Council did not permit that (
p. 116 Skaldin, beginning
).

The
terrain
fixed for obrok on redemption (117, Skaldin).

General
raising of the obrok
(
p. 125 Yanson
).

2.
Fixing of the highest allotments and the lower ones.

The lower allotments for the temporarily obligated (1/2, 1/4) (pp. 117, 118,
Skaldin
).

Lowest allotment for [quitrent] peasants:
1/3
(
Skaldin p. 118
), (see
118 ad 2.
; redemption of mere garden-plots
virtually never occurs
(118).

Fixing of the nadyel – the governing considerations (
p. 124 Yanson
).

1/3
as minimum for
landlord
(more on this Yanson p. 125). This later significantly worsened
and eventually [sc. the peasants']
[sc.
nadyel
] (ibid.).

System of gradations (
p. 125 Yanson
).

3.
"
Orphan
"-
nadyel
.
In the purely agricultural gubernias (p. 115
Skaldin
).

a)
Capitalisation of the excessive obrok for [quitrent] peasants;
<hence> overvaluation of the land (Skaldin p. 117, example of Smolensk). In
non-black-earth zone
(117).
In black-earth ibid.

b)
Bank and redemption
(pp. 126-130) (
p. 132, end
).

c)
Present situation of the peasants:
(
Yanson
)
Condition of resettlement
only for the better-off,
Yanson 143;
<in fact> "prohibition" of resettlement, Yanson p. 144).

±)
Black-earth
three-field
zone
(p. 120
Yanson
).

²)
Steppe zone
<western part>:
Kherson, Taurida, Yekaterinoslav
(Yanson, end 120 and beginning 121).

³)
The western gubernias
(119, Skaldin;
p. 121, Yanson, 126
ditto).

[III]

Zemstvo

The
obligatory
expenditures (for the local civil and military administration) swallow up the greatest part; to that extent these institutions are mere instruments of government administration. The government expenditures rise annually. Continual loans merely to pay the interest on earlier loans.

In the short period from 1862 to 1868 the ordinary government expenditures rose from 1862 to 1868 by 42%, or by an average of 20
1/3
million roubles. (In 1862 the ordinary annual expenditures amounted to

295,532,000 roubles; 1868: 418,930,000 roubles.) As an example of the
growth of the obligatory gubernia and uyezd expenditures
we may take one of the poorest Russian gubernias, that of
Novgorod
, whose
obligatory
expenditures in 1861 came to 80,000 roubles, in 1868 to 412,000 roubles.

Real content of the emancipation

Guerilla war between peasants and landlords.

The liberation comes down simply to the fact that the noble landowner no longer has control over the
person of the peasant
, cannot sell him, etc. This
personal bondage is abolished
. They have lost their
personal power over the person of the peasant
.

Scarcely had rumours about the intended emancipation of the peasants reached the outside than the government found itself compelled to take measures against the attempts of the landowners forcibly to expropriate the peasants or to allot them the most barren land.

Formerly, in the times of bondage, the landowners had an interest in preserving the peasant as an indispensable
labour-power
; that has ceased. The
peasant came into economic dependence on his former landlord
.

Redemption

Because of the fall <of the redemption (exchange) bonds issued by the government, to 80%, many landowners did not proceed with the "obligatory" redemption; they demanded from the peasants
additional payments
in order to compensate this loss. In some places the peasants paid these additional sums by voluntary agreement with the landowners, but after 1
1/2
years they stopped paying the redemption money to the government. This additional payment 27 roubles> per revision soul.

The redemption-period 49
(and <not> 41)
years; the peasants already then sceptical (whether the promise would be kept, that after the lapse of this time no [obrok] would have to be paid for the land that they had bought from the government).

Deduction of debts upon payment to the <landowners>

The government immediately deducted the debts of the landowners to the Guardianship Council (Guardianship Office), which had served them as a bank, without any compensation for the time that still remained until the maturity of the loans.

For example
:
On 1 April 1870,
of the 505,652,107 roubles that had been paid on account of the peasants,
235,032,183 roubles were deducted
which the landowners owed to the state credit institutions.

Increase of the soul tax

Since 1864 the soul tax has been growing <about> 80%; at the same time the
state zemstvo tax
. Greatest increase of the soul tax 1867.

Evident from the labours of the Commission on Direct Taxes:

1862: Out of the total Russian tax sum (direct and indirect), namely out of 292,000,000 roubles, 76% or 232 million roubles lay on the poor classes (peasants and artisans). But since that time this has considerably worsened, in that the soul tax for peasants of all categories, the
quitrent
on the
crown peasants
and the
state zemstvo tax
are paid almost solely by the
taxable souls
.

1863: Soul tax per head 25 kopecks; 1867: already
50
kopecks. The head
tax
for state
zemstvo obligations
since 1865 increased by 20 kopecks, now amounts on average to 98 k. per soul.

The
quitrent
of crown peasants increased from
1862 to 1867
from
25,256,000
to
35,648,000 roubles
(more than 1 rouble per soul).
1 July 1863
the soul tax on the
petty bourgeoisie
abolished, shifted with surcharge onto immovable property in towns, suburbs, market towns, in which the petty bourgeoisie and peasants have their share, and the
tax
on certificates for petty trade and
industrial tickets
falls almost entirely on the tax-paying classes.

From 1862 to 1867 the <ordinary government> expenditures (apart from the <extraordinary>) grew from 295,532,000 roubles to 398,298,000 roubles, i.e. <about> 35%. The
state debt
<, however, grew by about 461,160,000 roubles, by 60%; (thus) payment for that annually more: 25,315,000 (
whole state debt 1867:
1,219,443,000 roubles, annually: payment on it 73,843,000 roubles).

1874 already state debt: (consolidated and not entered in the great book) over
1,471
1/2
million roubles.

In addition over
1,208 million floating debt

(= 4,833 million fr.
).

In 1867 there lay on the directly taxable classes 111 million direct taxes; in addition lying on the mere souls
(
soul tax
,
state zemstvo tax
and
communal
tax
on crown peasants) over

62 million roubles. Not included are neither redemption monies nor
gubernia and uyezd zemstvo tax
nor the
special tax
for the maintenance of the justices of the peace for
peasant affairs
in the gubernias where the zemstvo institution has not been introduced.

(
Skaldin
)

According to Yanson (Professor at the Imperial St. Petersburg University)
(
Essay
etc. 1877) the peasants pay in direct taxes: 176 million roubles: <namely>

63.6 million soul tax, communal and state zemstvo taxes,

37.5 million quitrent

over
7 million
gubernia and uyezd taxes,

over
3 million
local taxes in gubernias where the zemstvo has not been introduced,

over
39 million
redemption payments;
included payments in kind
.

Almost entirely to be added are excise
on spirits and salt
(180 million) and
quitrent of former peasants of the landlords
– over 25 million.

Together over 372 million, over 56% of the imperial budget.

In the hands of

the State:

151,684,185 desyatinas

(=
165,335,763
hectares)

Peasants:

120,628,246 desyatinas

(= 131,484,744 hectares)

Landowners
:

100,000,000 desyatinas

(= 109,000,000 hectares)

Appanage:

7,528,212 desyatinas

or 8,205,859 hectares

1.
The crown peasants
(excluding Arkhangelsk and the Baltic provinces):

9,194,891 souls

- 77,297,029 desyatinas

2.
Appanage peasants
:

862,740 souls

- 4,336,454 desyatinas

3.
Former private serfs

35,149,048 desyatinas

for
all categories of the same
.

Up to
1 January 1878
purchased with the
aid of the
<
government
> in 37 gubernias (minus the 9 western ones, Bessarabia and 3 Baltic provinces)

4,898,073 souls (74.6% of all [former peasant quitrent payers]) and
17,109,239
desyatinas.

At the
demand of the
<
landowners
> in all non-black-earth gubernias, where redemption value
far above the real value
of the land. In the purely
black-earth gubernias
by
agreement of the peasants
<
with
>
the
<
landowners
>.

To 3. – partly obrok, partly corvée.

4.
Temporarily obligated
. (
January 1878 = 1,882,696
souls with
6,657,919
desyatinas soul allotment.)

Crown ministry (1 April 1870) counts: 5,830,005 former [landlords’] peasants redeemed,
desyatinas
20,123,940.

State debt

State debt 1867 = 1,219,443,000 roubles.

Had grown since
1862
[by]
461,160,000

758,283,000 was thus the latter 1862.

1869 state debt:
1,907.5 million roubles.

1878 state debt:
3,474 million roubles.

Advantages of the <
government
> in the emancipation:

1.
Transfer of the debt from the banks standing under the guarantee of the
<
government
>
(later all dissolved into the State Bank) to the
government
, for which the peasants pay the interest.

2. In the labours of the
Editorial Commission
(Skrebitsky: Letter from Rostovtsev to the Emperor: “The government receives many candidates for the highest posts, both in the provincial and central administration”).

3. Direct collection of the taxes from peasants (formerly
the
[landlords]
were answerable for this
) and thereby great facilitation of the
raising of taxes
.

4. Breaking of the power domain of the landed nobility.

5.
Conscription territory
(and general reform of the army) thereby extended.

6. Connected with the emancipation, the so-called
zemstvo
institutions: burden of the state shifted onto the provi ces and uyezds to a large extent (without diminution, rather increase of direct state taxes).

According to the <statements in Volume 22 of the official publications of the “Investigation Commission for Direct Taxation” and also according to the
Blue Books
published by the “Agricultural Commission” we see>:

1.
The
<
state peasants and the peasants of the imperial family
> (appanage peasants) <in 37 gubernias (the western gubernias here excluded) paid from the so-called
net revenue
92.75%, so that for all their other needs for themselves out of their agricultural revenue only 7.25% remained.

2.
The former serfs of the landowning nobility
paid out of their agricultural revenue 198.25%, so that they must hand over to the government not only their entire revenue from the land, but also have to pay almost an equal sum out of the wages (salaries) they receive for various occupations, agricultural
and other kinds
.>

1862
Budget:
292,000,000 roubles

1878
Budget:
626.9 million roubles

Soul tax 1852 some 18
1/2
million roubles.
1855 it sank, as a result of the Crimean War, to below 15 million roubles.

1862
it reached
28
1/2
million.

1867
through the tax screw to 40
1/2
million, now over 94
1/2
million.

From a publication of the Ministry of State Domains we see, e.g., that from 
1871 to 1878, 
despite great fluctuations in grain yields from year to year, production, taking the averages, 
absolutely stagnated. 
(Meanwhile the grain export increased on the largest scale, only slightly interrupted by the famines which occurred about every 5 years, and finally checked by the famine year 1880.)

At the same time, the 
grain export in 1877-78 
increased by about 86%, compared with the 
grain export of 1871-72. 
What the West Europeans saw was the immense increase in grain export 
through the development of the railway network; what they did not see was that this export 
was offset 
by the contraction of the recurrent 
periods of famine, 
which now occur every 5 years and reached their peak in 1880.>

Status of the <emancipated peasants

After establishing that the economic situation of the peasants in the 
black-earth zone 
(in its three-field system part, not the 
steppe area) 
is in general “worse than it was under the bondage order,” 
Janson draws the following 
from the official publications 
on livestock production (likewise in the black-earth zone):

In the Government of 
Kazan, 
the quantity of livestock> (among the <former serfs, who previously could drive their stock onto the pastures of their seigneurs) has considerably decreased; hence the reasons for the decrease: lack of pasture land, sale of stock in order to pay the taxes, poor harvests. In the Government of 
Simbirsk, 
the quantity of livestock somewhat decreased; the wealthier peasants sell the stock that they do not unconditionally need, at a favourable opportunity, in order not to be forced to sell it for tax arrears, for which they are liable under the general solidarity of the commune (several at once or all together) (joint liability). Another cause: the cutting off of pasture land from the —, chiefly woodland shares. The same in the Government of 
Samara, Saratov, Penza> 
(where horses are also declining); (in the (Government of) Ryazan, decrease of livestock by 50% from lack of pasture. 
In the Government of Tula, 
from the same cause, forced sale by the tax collectors and stock disease, the rearing of horses and stock reduced. In the Government of 
Kursk, 
the same pitiless sale of stock for tax arrears, from lack of pastures, division within the family, etc. (see p. 75).

Non-black[
earth
] 
zone 
(northern governments). One example will suffice.

In the Government of Novgorod, according to the estimate by the Zemstvos, the payments relate to the receipts per desyatina for the former state peasants – 100% (i.e. the entire revenue);

the former appanage peasants – 

161%

the former serfs of the landed proprietors – 

180%

the temporarily obligated> – 

210%

further, <those with 
small parcels of land> 
and <
high taxes 
for the formerly redeemed serfs – 

275%;

for the 
temporarily obligated 
– 

565%.

(Publication of the “Tax Commission,” Volume 22.)

Their land shares are for the most part insufficient> – in the non-<black-earth district – for the bare sustenance of the peasants. These northern governments are at the same time the industrial ones, but their local industrial wages do not suffice to offset the deficit {also through land labour for landed proprietors}; they must seek wage labour far away from their home localities, in the south, in New Russia, beyond the Urals, in Siberia and Central Asia.>

(
1 desyatina = 1.092 hectares.

1 pood 
= 40 Russian pounds = 16.38 kilograms.

1 chetvert 
= 209.901 litres or 0.72 English quarters.)

[IV]

<Russia>

I. 
State revenue and expenditure for 1877.

Revenue = 
548
mill. <roubles>

Of which: 117 mill. <
direct taxes 
paid by the peasants>.

Main indirect taxes

{

189,676,000 mill. <
indirect taxes 
> again fall mostly on (peasants).

10 mill. <
indirect taxes 
> 
ditto 
.

52 <
million 
> 
for 
<
customs duties 
>.

Expenditure = 585 <
million 
(
deficit = 37 million 
)>

Of which:

115 mill.

for <
interest and amortisation of the state debt 
>.

220 mill.

for war and navy.

86 mill.

for <
Ministry of Finance 
>.

421 mill.

- principal expenditure of the state

Then the <
extraordinary expenditure caused by the war 
>.

The budget for 
1864 
was: 
354,600,000 
roubles: <
Thus taxes increased by 55% since 1864. 
>

II. <
Budget of the railway fund, 
which is included in the state budget.> – At present the railways are private property; the state railways have been converted into the property of private companies, but these companies did not furnish the means for their construction.

<The government holds back> for <its> own account a part of the capital in 
shares 
and 
debentures 
and, in order to realise these, it issues the <
consolidated debentures of the Russian railways 
>. The sums that <it> derives from this form the <
“railway fund” 
> and 
out of this 
<
the government 
>
pays for the shares and debentures that 
<
it 
>
has retained, 
and moreover makes 
advances 
<
on the railway paper 
>.

On 1 January 1878> there were 
1,388 million 
<issued railway 
shares and debentures 
>, of which the government retained for its account 
720 millions 
and 
577 mill. frcs. 
or 144,433,000 <metallic roubles>, for the <debentures of the 
Nicholas Railway Petersburg – Moscow 
>, i.e. <about> 52% of the total capital, <excluding the paper on which the government has made advances>.

From the <
railway fund 
> the government paid: 
1877 
... 80 mill., but the 
total sum 
which the government paid up to 1 January 1878 = 
554,475,000 
(roubles and) for the <
Nicholas Railway Debentures 
> 577 mill. frcs.

In order to cover these payments, <the 
government issued 5 consolidated Russian railway loans 
> for the sum of 
69 mill. 
£ stlg., <the realisation of which 
yielded 385 mill. metallic roubles; 
two Nicholas Railway loans 
for the sum of> 
577 mill. frcs. 
, finally <
the internal loan with premiums of 1866 
, the> realisation of which yielded 
107,650,000 
.

Besides these subsidies, also the 
guarantee 
. <In 1877 the 
guarantee sum paid 
by the government> = 16,617,000. The <Fiscus> furnished this sum, likewise the <
interest and amortisation of the railway debentures 
>. The latter sum in 1877 = 324,800,000 roubles.

Total therefore given by the state for the <railway>: 139,034,000.

The <
Railway Fund 
> advanced 
60 mill. 
more than it received.

The <
Fiscus 
> – 37,800,000 more than it received.

The <
debts of the railway to the Fiscus 
> 
increased by 39,500,000 etc.

January 1878 all <
debts 
> to the <
Fiscus 
> amounted to: 
469,900,000 
roubles. 
The 
<
debts of the peasants 
> = 
32.5 mill. 
= 6.9%.

The <
debts of the railway 
> = 315,500,000 = 67% or 
57 
% <
of all state revenues 
>.

III. 
Banks 
. Apart from <by the government> the <
railway 
supported> by the <
banks 
>.

Up to 1864 there were only <
state credit institutes 
>.

In 1864 the first <
private credit 
institute>; since that time rapidly multiplied, <
they attracted considerable sums on current accounts, at term and without term, bearing interest 
. These sums had to be advanced:> then appeared <
joint-stock companies 
>;
at the head of all these 
<
companies 
> 
that of the 
<
railways 
>.

The capital of all shares (
of the companies 
) 
and debentures 
<
in 
>
1877 = 2,043 mill. 
<
roubles 
>
.

The <
railways 
>
of that 67.91% = 1,388 mill. rbls.

<
Up to 1864, the State Bank and its branches advanced 18.6 mill. on the public funds, shares and debentures. Up to 
>
1877 
all <banks advanced 360 mill. on 
the public funds, shares and debentures 
, which means an increase of 2007%>.

One cannot <see from the bank reports how much of these advances> falls to the <railway>. However, Danielson knows of cases

where <the government>
owned a part 
<
of the paper 
of a 
railway company 
>, while a 
private credit company made its 
<
advances 
> 
for the rest of the shares 
.

However, it happened that the <
railway enterprises 
>, whose 
income not guaranteed by government, 
did not yield 
any profit 
. In this case, the State Bank comes to the aid of the private banks, <where these shares are deposited, 
by giving advances on them or buying them up 
>.

<
The State Bank 
> never <
without means 
; the Fiscus> e.g. pumps from the bank, without bothering about its cash position; the bank, for its part, <
increases the most productive manufacture in the world 
. The 
credit notes 
which were issued in this way figure in the bank balance sheet under No. 18 (
balance sheet 
of 1 January 
1879 
= 467,850,000; in addition the 
credit notes, 
which 
figure in the 
balance sheet under No. 1> = 
720,265,000 
;
thus the total sum of these 
<
credit notes in circulation 
>
= 1,188,000,000 roubles 
).

IV. 
Revenue of the railways.

No complete statistics of the railways have yet appeared for the 
year 1877 
. In the preceding years the <
total revenue 
> constantly growing;

was:

1865

24 millions,

1877

190 millions,

1878

220 millions

(
estimated 
), so that <the 
total revenue per verst 
increased 
by 17%, 
while the 
net revenue per verst decreased 
>.

Nevertheless, the 
net revenue of the last years amounted to 48-52 millions 
annually; i.e. if the whole revenue <of the railways flowed back to the Fiscus, 
the deficit of the railways would have considerably decreased 
>. But the 
whole profit 
<
flows to the private persons 
>
and the whole burden of the deficit falls on the 
<
Fiscus 
>.

What profit, then, has <the government> from these enormous expenditures?

They have as a result considerable development of trade, to which also contributed at the same time the <
credit banks 
> and <the 
mortgage banks 
>– founded in this same epoch.

V. 
Banks; Commercial Classes 
(
export of 
<
grain 
> 
etc. 
).

All 
deposits 
(
bearing interest 
) and 
current accounts of the State Bank and its branches in 1864 – 262 
million roubles,

of which 
42 mill. 
applied to the 
profit of trade 
, namely:

[

23 mill. for bills of exchange

]

18 mill. for <advances on government securities, shares, debentures etc.>

1877:

723.8 mill. 
in all credit institutions, 
increase 
of 
175% 
.

Of which 360 mill. 
for <
advances 
> on <
shares 
>,
debentures, 
<
public funds 
>,

for 
489 mill. 
for 
discounting 
<
bills of exchange 
>, increase of 
1,900% 
.

The 
most important branch of trade 
: 
grain trade 
; most rapid development of the same.

1864 
...
9.25 mill. chetverts 
exported to Europe for

54.7 mill. rbls.

<
Value 
>
of all exported commodities 
=

164.9 mill. rbls.

<
Value of the exported grain 
> = about 
33% of the total export 
.

1877 ...
30.5 mill. chetverts 
exported =

264 mill. rbls.

<
Value of all exported commodities 
> =

508 mill. rbls.

<Value of the grain> = 
51.8% of the total export 
.

<
Value of the grain increased by 382%.

The 
number of chetverts by 241%.
>

<At the same time> the <
value of the grain 
> exceeded the value 
of the total export of 1864 by 100 mill. rbls 
.

In 1869 
the railways carried 149 mill. poods of grain = 33.4% of all their freight 
.

1877 ... 547.8 mill. poods <of grain>
= 41.28% 
<
of all freight 
>.

Alongside <grain>, 
main export articles 
:

Increase %

1864

... <
cattle

for

1,821,000 rbls.

1877

for

15,724,000

rbls.

763%

"

...
linen

15,985,000 rbls.

"

"

67,690,000

"

323%

"

...
hemp
>

8,993,000 rbls.

"

"

16,820,000

"

87%

Imported <
cotton 
>

21,824,000 rbls.;

imported cotton>

35,500,000 [
rbls.
]

62%

VI. <
Mortgage credit institutions 
.>

In 1864, <debts in the old mortgage credit institutes> for 
395.5 mill. rbls.

of which a considerable part fell on peasants for 
<
redemption of land shares 
>.

<
Mortgage debts of the Russian proprietors 

(Poland> and Baltic provinces)

a)

<
Mortgage debts in the old credit institutes 
> up to 
1874

99,614,000

b)

The <
mortgage credit companies have lent 
up to 1874

102,692,000

c)

the mortgage banks>

63,668,000

d)

the <mutual credit banks> (?)

7,182,000

273,156,000

Against that, 1877
the same institutes

sub

a)

73,393,000

Consequently, in the course of 3 years,
added to the debts
(peasants excluded): 34%

b)

163,505,000

c)

118,322,000

d)

11,250,000

366,470,000

Rbl.

VII. Let us now take all the credit institutions (and railways) and see what sum they have attracted, and how they are grouped around 1877:

1.

2.

3.

4.

<Founding capital
%
Interest-bearing deposits etc.
Mortgage bonds of mortgage credit societies
Bonds
Rbl.

Credit institutions
167,778,800
18.8
723,790,000

Mortgage institutions up to 1878
27,753,000
5.6
6,848,000
460,000,000

Railways up to 1878
474,183,000
34.3
669,726,000
25
915,706,000>

[ D[anielson] reckons
the debts of the various companies
under 2,3 and 4 together =

2,006,440,000 rubles,
but makes it 2,106,344,000
.

]

For the <credit institutions, capital obligations compared to capital>
= 81.2%

for the <mortgage institutions
= 94.4%

railways>
= 65.97%