(M. Thiers' ceasefire of October 30, 1870)

It took all the stupidity and deceitfulness of the men of 
September 4°’ to call the news of this ceasefire “good news”. 
Good indeed—for the Prussians. 

The capitulation of Metz had just restored freedom of action to 
6 Prussian army corps—120,000 men. Nobody but Trochu and 
Jules Favre could have failed to see that the imminent arrival of 
this new army in the centre of France would make any attempt to 
relieve Paris almost impossible, that this was not the moment for 
concluding ceasefires but for mounting a supreme military effort. 
Only a fortnight remained to do this; but this fortnight was 
precious, it was the critical phase of the war. 

This was the situation. 

In order to effect the blockade of Paris, the Germans had had 
to employ all their troops, with the exception of 3 divisions of 
infantry. They had no reserves, for these 3 divisions had, by 
occupying Orléans and Chateaudun forfeited this capacity, being 
held in check by the army of the Loire. To the west, north and 
east there was nothing but cavalry which, despite observing and 
covering a wide expanse of country, was incapable of holding it 
against infantry. 

By the end of October the German line encircling Paris was 
already very heavily fortified towards the city; but any attack 
coming from outside would of necessity encounter the Prussians in 
open country. The appearance of 50,000 men, even young troops 
such as those which France then had at its disposal, would have 
been sufficient to break the blockade and restore communications 
between Paris and the rest of the country. But we have seen that it 
was necessary to act swiftly, and this is what happened: 

The Paris government accepted a ceasefire which, although of 
short duration, gave relief to the German troops exhausted by the 
labours and sleepless nights of the blockade (October 30). 

For his part, d’Aurelle de Paladines concentrated his army on 
November 2 at Vierzon with the intention of marching on 
Beaugency, of crossing the Loire there and advancing between the 
Prussians (22nd _ Division) occupying Chateaudun and _ the 
Bavarians who were holding Orléans. The march from Vierzon to 
Beaugency was about 45 kilometres and could easily be accom- 
plished in two days. But if we are to believe a German source 
(Militarische Gedanken und Betrachtungen etc.*), Gambetta was 
simple enough to believe that an army of 40,000 men could travel 
by railway at the same speed as an ordinary person. So he ordered 
the general—instead of making his army march—to transport it 
by railway from Vierzon to Tours and from there to Beaugency. 
The general protested; Gambetta insisted. So instead of a march 
of two days and 45 kilometres, the army of the Loire made a 
railway journey of 180 kilometres which took it five days and 
which, moreover, could not remain hidden from enemy reconnais- 
sance. Not until the 7th was it once again concentrated at 
Beaugency and ready for action. But three precious days had been 
lost, and the enemy had knowledge of the movement carried out. 

And what days! November 3 was the most critical day: the 
Prussian cavalry, a whole brigade, was forced to abandon Mantes 
and to retire to Vert in the face of numerous francs-tireurs”; on the 
other hand, considerable French forces of all the arms were 
observed marching from Courville in the direction of Chartres. If 
the army of the Loire, instead of riding around in railway 
carriages, had attacked on the 4th, which it could have done; if it 
had pushed on between the Bavarians and the 22nd Prussian 
Division, which was an easy matter; if it had used its great 
numerical superiority to inflict a comprehensive defeat on them in 
turn and then to advance on Paris—then Paris would almost 
certainly have been liberated. 

Moltke was by no means oblivious to the danger and had 
decided, if need be, to act as Napoleon had acted at Mantua”: to 
lift the blockade, to sacrifice the siege park under formation at 
Villacoublay, to concentrate his army for action in open country 
and not to restore the blockade until victory was won, that is, after 
the arrival of the Metz army. The baggage of the Versailles 
headquarters had already been loaded on to waggons; all was 
ready for departure, all that remained was to harness the horses 
(according to the Swiss colonel von Erlach, an eye-witness *). 

If the Prussians had been forced to lift the blockade of Paris, 
this might have given rise to pressure from the rest of Europe and 
an honourable peace.” In any event, the moral effect of such a feat 
would have been immense, first on Europe and then particularly 
on France and finally, in the opposite sense, on the Germans. And 
the material effects of such a feat! Paris would have had fifteen to 
twenty days at least to take in fresh supplies by all the railway lines 
from the south and the west, which would have enabled it to 
prolong its defence by one or two months. Moreover, an 
equivalent respite would have been obtained to organise the 
armies of the provinces; it would then no longer have been 
necessary to send them into battle without discipline, without 
training, without equipment, almost without arms. To give France 
a chance of success all that was needed was time; the opportunity 
to obtain it occurred on November 3 and 4; we have seen how this 
opportunity was missed. 

Let us, however, follow the course of events. 

Paris did not even make a sortie. 

For a week the forces approaching Paris from the west made no 
attempt to attack. This is not surprising. These forces must have 
been rather weak; Gambetta’s decree instructing M. de Kératry to 
organise the army of the west is dated October 22! 

There remained the army of the Loire, which had come into the 
line on November 7 at Beaugency. Not until the 9th did d’Aurelle 
attack the Bavarians at Coulmiers; as soon as the latter saw that 
the retreat of the 22nd Prussian Division, which was marching 
towards them from the direction of Chartres, was assured, they 
retired to Tours, where this division joined them the following 
day, November 10. D’Aurelle moved no more. Meanwhile, three 
corps, 60,000 men, of the Metz army were approaching from the 
Seine by forced marches. Two more Prussian divisions (the 3rd 
and the 4th), which had been sent by rail from Metz, had already 
arrived outside Paris. Moltke could therefore afford to direct the 
17th Prussian Division to Tours, where it arrived on the 12th. 
There were thus 4 German divisions, about 35,000 men, in the 
line against the army of the Loire, which henceforth ceased to 
cause them any anxiety. 

However, on November 14 considerable French forces moved 
from Dreux towards Houblon, two days’ march from Versailles. 
Moltke, who still had nothing but his cavalry in this direction, was 
unable to conduct sufficient reconnaissance to discover what forces 
might lie behind this advance guard. On that day he was once 
again about to abandon Versailles and to lift the blockade 
(Blume’). This time, however, it was not a matter of days but of 
hours only. The first corps of the Metz army (IXth) reached 
Fontainebleau the same day; the IIIrd was due at Nemours 
between the 16th and the 18th; and the Xth on the 19th at Joigny 
sur Yonne. Moltke directed the 17th Division to Rambouillet, the 
22nd to Chartres, the Bavarians to Auneau, that is between the 
army of the Loire, to which he left open the road to Paris, and the 
troops who were threatening Versailles from the west. This time 
d’Aurelle’s inactivity was his salvation; if he had advanced into the 
gap that had opened up in front of him he would have been 
crushed between the two German forces ready to fall on his 
flanks. On November 19 the three corps of the 2nd Prussian army 
occupied Fontainebleau and Nemours, with their reserves on the 
Yonne; on November 20 the Ist army under Manteuffel had 
assembled on the line of the Oise from Compiégne to Noyon; the 
Metz army was protecting the blockade of Paris to the north and 
the south; the last chance of lifting the blockade had been lost, 
thanks to Trochu, Gambetta and d’Aurelle, whose mutual failings 
complemented one another, one might say, with the much- 
vaunted precision of the Prussian battalions.