Johann Georg Eccarius
Record of Karl Marx's and Frederick Engels's speeches
on the renunciation of the Paris Declaration of 1856

at the meeting of the General Council, March 14, 1871

The Eastern Post.
Nr. 129, 18. März 1871

... Dr. Marx ... said it was of the greatest possible consequence to find an antagonist for the military powers of the north who had virtually revived the Holy
Alliance. The only power that could oppose them was England, and she could
only do it by resuming her maritime rights. Confiscating the enemy's goods in
neutral ships would ruin them in five weeks. If this were done the German middle-class would not be so warlike. It was one of the means to carry on war, and it
was more humane than war in its general aspect. By the Paris declaration the
military powers of the Continent told England, "You must make war in our way,
not in yours." Much had been said against privateers, but they were as good as
franc-tireurs on land, and required less government power. The English people
must have that power and employ it for the benefit of the people of the Continent. The principal aim of Russia in the conference had been to have the declaration of Paris sanctioned, because, on the part of England, it had only been a
private agreement between Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon, and it seemed
that the agreement of the conference about stipulations included it. The ministry
ought to declare whether it is so or not.

Mr. Engels, in replying, said the declaration of Paris had never been acknowledged by any statesman nor Parliament, no one had ever said that it was binding.
In 1862 Cornewall Lewis had declared in the House of Commons that it was not
binding, and the present Lord Derby had stated that England was only bound in
a way, but that the necessity of self-defence overawed all compacts. The declaration had never been ratified, and rested only on the private letter of a minister;
nobody was bound by it. In the subsequent wars the belligerent powers had
bound themselves by special agreements. But the conference on the Black Sea
question had agreed that henceforth all treaties and stipulations should be binding until they were relinquished by common consent. He then pointed to the
military preparations going on in Russia. The Polish fortresses were to be protected by detached forts, and the armaments generally were continued with unabated zeal, and had reached the last stage, from a peace to a war footing. The
telegraph and sanitary companies were being organised, everything looked serious, and it was possible that war might break out before the summer was over.
The £12,000,000 Russian loan now in the English market was probably the last
Russia would get.

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Record of Marx's and Engels's speeches on the renunciation of the Paris Declaration

Referring to what had been said, in the course of the discussion about English
intervention, he reiterated that it would have been useless. Counting up the military forces of England, he was certain that no more than 30.000 men could have
been sent into the field. Only on one occasion during the Crimean War, at the
Battle of Alma, had the English numbered 33,000 men, this was only equal to one
Prussian Army Corps. To suppose that such a force could have turned the scale
was absurd. As to individual bravery, the English were as brave as any, and there
was individual bravery in every country, but the men of different countries possessed different qualifications, some were better for attack, some better for defence. The Irish were best for light infantry and the English for heavy infantry,
but [in] the English system of training they were all treated alike. The English
system was so incomplete and antiquated that no one had ever thought of training for out-post duty until now. It had been said that 100,000 English would not
have put up with being locked up in Paris—what would they have done? 400,000
got together like the French in Paris, and led by the same kind of officers, would
have done the same. England could not compete with the military powers of the
continent, and there was no reason why she should, it was not necessary or
desirable to wage war on equal terms. An English soldier cost £100, a Prussian
only £30 a year. England could not, therefore, keep up an army on the Prussian
pattern, and he hoped she never would. The following resolution was then unanimously carried— "That England remains incapable, not only of interfering with
effect in continental affairs, but also of defending herself against the continental
military despotisms, so long as she does not recover the liberty of using her real
war power, that is to say her naval power, which she can recover only by the
renunciation of the declaration of Paris."

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