Johann Georg Eccarius
Record of Karl Marx's speech
on the recognition of the French Republic

at the meeting of the General Council, February 14, 1871

The Eastern Post.
Nr. 125, 19. Februar 1871

… Dr. Marx said the first condition to assist France was the recognition of the
Republic; if that failed, also the rest must fail. By the non-recognition France was
internationally paralysed without, and the Republic was paralysed within, while
her antagonist Prussia had Russia at her back. The moment the Republic was
proclaimed, everybody in France was enthusiastically Republican, but no-recog- 5
nition came, and a reaction set in. The bourgeoisie had no interest in making the
Republic succeed, they are well aware that sooner or later the social question
must be dealt with, and that in a Republic the socialists would stand a better
chance than under a military despotism. They therefore intrigued against the
Republic, which has done more for the success of the Prussians than Moltke 10
himself. None of the advocates of war have shown that the recognition of the
Republic was the first condition to all the rest.

The people who assembled in Cannon-street have no influence in public affairs. They were not the wealthy citizens of London, but the small middle class.
All they can do is either to support the great capitalists against the people, orjoin 15
the working-class, but in this case they must never be allowed to lead. They hate
the Republic, but they are afraid of Prussia. Their policy was a very queer one;
they wanted to make war on Prussia without recognising the Republic. The question of dismemberment, spoken of by Eccarius, had nothing to do with it, it was
rather a moral question, which could only be seriously taken up after the recog- 20
nition of the Republic, and it was impossible to believe that the English Government would seriously oppose the dismemberment of France.

Mr. Cohn seems to have rather a confused notion. He thinks the prime minister's opinion was an ultimatum, and nothing further could have been done; and
he also believes that if Parliament had been sitting, more could have been done. 25
The best thing was that Parliament was not sitting. The recognition of the Republic was a mere executive act, and if Parliament had been sitting, the responsibility would have been shoved on the shoulders of the majority who would have
found a thousand reasons to support the Government. A change of Government
might have entailed a dissolution, and the members are not over fond of buying 30
the votes of the free electors too often. I am quite sure if the agitation had been
confined to this single point of recognition, if the working-class had persevered

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Record of Karl Marx's speech on the recognition of the French Republic

and not allowed the cry for intervention to be mixed up with it, it would have
succeeded. All concessions in this country are obtained by pressure from without,
but there was not half the energy manifested this time as there was some years
ago in a beer-row.

Mr. Milner seems to be under an impression that the German workmen would
be offended at the English insisting on the recognition ofthe French Republic, on
the contrary they do believe that the English have not done enough. Hundreds
have been imprisoned in Germany, and they looked to the English workmen to
back up their demands with more effect than has been the case. As to the com-

10 parative strength of monarchy and republicanism there was one monarchical

29

army against another at the begining, and the French was supposed to be the
stronger. There was nothing about Republic until the whole French standing
army had disappeared. But no monarchy would have resisted the Prussia for five
months as the French have done. Everybody thought that the French would have
to give in in a few days, the absence of a monarch alone inspired the people to
hold out for five months, and they might have held out longer had there been no
treason. One thing has become evident in this struggle, that henceforth a middleclass Republic is impossible in Europe. Its advocates dare not take the revolutionary measures required for its defence. France and Germany prove that the
bourgeoisie considers itself safer under a military despotism than in a Republic.
A Republic must give more power to the working-class, and the middle-class is
afraid of that. In England there is the same fear. The Republic and middle-class
Government can no longer go together; the Republic is the political form of
Government under which the changes required by the working class can best be
effected. I now come to the war itself. After the capitulation of Sedan, Bismarck
was in a fix. The King had declared to the German Parliament and to the French
people that he only made war against Napoleon in self-defence. I am convinced
that Bismarck did as much to bring the war about as Napoleon. But after Sedan
Bismarck required a new pretext. The German middle class was doubtful about
going further, but Bismarck found that there was no Government to make peace
with, and then he had to go to Paris to make peace. He said the French had not
recognised that Government; it was the height of impudence for him to say what
Government would be recognised by the French, but the proclamation of the
Republic insured him the support ofthe German middle class, that of the aristocracy was sure beforehand. It was Bismarck's interest that England should not
recognise the Republic. England was the only power that could oppose him, but
he reckoned on the friendship of Gladstone, and the relationship of the court,
and England followed in the footsteps of the holy alliance. When taxed about the
hasty recognition of Napoleon, Gladstone baffled the workingmen's deputation

by mixing the dates. There were two recognitions. One after the coup d'etat and
the other after the Plebiscite. He ignored the former. He told the workingmen he
had gone as far as he could and made it rather a merit to have broken off
diplomatic relations, but he could have gone as far as America. But more than
that, Bruce, Lowe, and Cardwell made hostile demonstrations against the Re-

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Johann Georg Eccarius

public. England could only use more force without; England could do nothing
against the physical force of Prussia, the only place where the English Government can employ physical force is Ireland.

Not content with the services rendered by the English Government, Bismarck
ordered the German press to insult England for selling stores to the French. 5
When taken to task by Count Bernsdorf Lord Granville equivocated, but after
some inquiries found that things were all right, and that he could not interfere,
that it was legal. Then at the instance of Bernsdorf the British Government
confiscated a French cable, a service which was afterwards condemned as illegal
by an English judge. 10

After the capitulation of Metz, Russia thought it was time to avow the partnership in the war, and declared its renunciation of the treaty of Paris. In quick
succession followed the renunciation of the treaty of Luxemburg, and the stipulations about the principalities by Bismarck, and the Prince of Roumania, all
direct insults to England. What did the British Government do? [It] sent a pleni- 15
potentiary extraordinary to ask Bismarck's advice. Bismarck advised a conference in London. But Gladstone himself felt that such a conference without France would be no use, because the treaty-breakers would have it all to themselves.
But France could not attend without the Republic being recognised, her admission would have been tantamount to recognition, and therefore Bismarck took 20
care to prevent it. When Auberon Herbert put a question to Gladstone in the
House [of Commons,] he again shuffled and falsified the facts. Pious people generally do a deal of sinning. He did not state what appears from the blue-book
that Bismarck's objection to taking any steps to have France represented at the
conference was that the French Government was internationally incapable of 25
acting on account of the non-recognition. Non-recognition was the means of
isolating the English Government, and rendering the only great power of Europe
—that could have done anything for France — powerless. ...

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