Johann Georg Eccarius
Record of Frederick Engels's speech on the War
at the meeting of the General Council, January 31, 1871

The Eastern Post.
Nr. 123, 5. Februar 1871

... Mr. Engels, persuant to notice, rose to open the discussion on the war. As a
basis of discussion he proposed the following: —

1. That the working-class movement, in support of the French Republic, ought
to have concentrated his efforts, at the beginning, upon the enforcement of the
recognition of the Republic by the British Government.

2. That the military intervention of England, in favour of France, as understood by those proposing it, could not have been of any use whatever except at a
certain moment, which had long since passed away.

3. That England will remain incapable, not only of intervening with effect in

10 Continental affairs, but also of defending herself against the continental military

despotisms, so long as she does not recover the liberty of using her real power
that is to say her naval power, which she can recover only by the renunciation of
the declaration of Paris.

He said—The policy of the General Council was indicated in the second ad-

15 dress on the war. It was distinctly stated that every effort ought to be made to

compel the Government to recognise the Republic, and it was, moreover, stated
that the English working-men had already begun to create a pressure upon the
Government for that purpose. Had the movement been confined to that, the
working-men could have agreed, and it might have succeeded. If the English
Government had recognised the Republic, other governments would have been
obliged to follow, and it would have given France a standing which even Bismarck would not have been able to ignore. But there were others, friends of
working men, who were not satisfied with this—they asked for intervention. As
soon as that was done, the working-class movement was split up. An opposition
sprung up, who said that war would postpone everything that all social and
political progress and movement would be put aside, and that every war had
hitherto tended to give the aristocracy a new lease of power. There was a great
deal of truth in that, and, further, how could people, who were unable to compel
the Government to recognise the Republic, force the same Government to go to
war?

But supposing the Government had gone to war, what would have been the
upshot? By leaving only 10,000 men in Ireland, by clearing Scotland and England

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almost entirely of soldiers, perhaps 30,000 could have been started to assist the
French. But they could only have been useful at a certain moment. At one time,
the French and German forces were nearly equal, and Moltke was thinking of
raising the siege. At that moment an English army of 30,000 might have turned
the scales against the Prussians besides invigorating the French army. But since 5
then the Germans have been largely re-inforced, and anytime in December or
January the Germans would have laughed at an English army of 30,000; it could
only have made Chanzy's retreat a little more orderly. An English army on land
can only act in alliance with others. It was so in Spain and was so in the Crimea.

It has always been found impossible to carry on a war far from home with a large 10
army. Owing to the military system, to voluntary recruiting, the system of drilling, the length of time it takes to make the soldiers efficient, England cannot keep
up a large army abroad. However, there was a time when England could have
stepped in to save France, and that was when Russia repudiated the treaty of
Paris. In our first address on the war it was said, "In the background of this 15
suicidal strife looms the dark figure of Russia. It is an ominous sign, that the
signal for the present war should have been given at the moment when the Muscovite Government had just finished its strategic lines of railway, and was already
massing troops in the direction of the Pruth." In the second address we said, "As

in 1865 promises were exchanged between Louis Bonaparte and Bismarck, so in 20
1870 promises have been exchanged between Gortschakoff and Bismarck. The
secret understanding between Russia and Prussia has been proved by the fact that
no sooner had Russia declared that she considered herself no longer bound by the
treaty of Paris than Bismarck repudiated the Luxembourg treaty. Prussia has
never been anything else but the tool of Russia." Had England declared war 25
against Russia at that moment, Russia and Prussia would have made common
cause, and the rest of Europe would have joined England. Austria, Italy, and
Turkey were ready, and if Turkey had not been interfered with, she would have
defended herself against Russia, whilst the other European powers had driven the
Prussians out of France. The French were not quite as low down then as they are 30
now, and a European war would have saved France and Europe, and might have
overthrown despotism on the continent. But when this opportunity arose, the
gentlemen who were going to help France had nothing to say.

Now seeing the way in which Jules Favre had thrown up the sponge for the
whole of France, and let me add, without consulting France, there is no doubt 35
that Bismarck's conditions of peace will be complied with. Peace will soon be
made, and then we shall see what Russia will do. The Emperor of Russia requires
war as much as Napoleon and Bismarck, to keep his position at home and to
keep down the popular movement and to restore his finances.

I now come to the navy. The navy is the main war power of England, but by 40
the declaration of 1856 a new naval code was established, by which the war
power of England was maimed. The object of that declaration was to do away
with privateering, to abandon the right of search, to make enemy's goods safe in
neutral bottoms and neutral goods in enemy's bottoms. There was a similar

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Record of Frederick Engels's speech on the War

attempt made once before by the Empress Catherine of Russia, but England
refused till after the Crimean war. At the Paris Conference the late Lord Clarendon signed away by one stroke of the pen all the naval rights that England had
acquired in the course of centuries, and the whole power to hurt Russia in time of
5 war. To cripple Russia it is necessary to stop her export trade, which is principally
carried on in foreign bottoms and could not be touched under existing regulations. To make war on Russia with effect this power must be regained. It was
abandoned on the pretence that private property should be made as safe at sea as
it was on land. How safe it is on land, and how the Prussians respect it we see in
10 France. By whose instructions Lord Clarendon signed away this power has never
yet been made clear. Whether he acted under instructions from the Cabinet, the
Prime Minister, or on his own responsibility, no one knows, and Parliament has
never cared to inquire. The working classes have an interest in regaining this
power, and to keep it intact, at least so long as Russia is a danger to Europe. No
15 other country can oppose Russia so effectually as England, and she must keep
her naval power at least until Poland is restored. Had war been declared against
Russia, it would have been the salvation of France, and Poland could have been
restored, which would be an effectual bar against Russia. Now Russia will enter
on a war of conquest when it suits her, perhaps before twelve months are over,
20 and Europe will have to fight minus France.

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