[The Manchester Guardian, No. 6190, June 20, 1866] 

The following notes are intended to comment impartially, and 
from a strictly military point of view, upon the current events of 
the war, and, as far as possible, to point out their probable 
influence upon impending operations. 

The locality where the first decisive blows must be struck is the 
frontier of Saxony and Bohemia. The war in Italy can scarcely 
lead to any decisive results so long as the Quadrilateral '?? remains 
untaken, and to take that will be rather a lengthy operation. There 
may be a good deal of warlike action in Western Germany, but 
from the strength of the forces engaged, it will be altogether 
subordinate in its results to the events on the Bohemian frontier. 
To this neighbourhood, therefore, we shall, for the present, 
exclusively direct our attention. 

In order to judge of the strength of the contending armies it 
will suffice, for all practical purposes, if we take into account the 
infantry only, keeping in mind, however, that the strength of the 
Austrian cavalry will be to the Prussian as three to ‘two. The 
artillery will be, in both armies, in about the same proportion as 
the infantry, say three guns per 1,000 men. 

The Prussian infantry consists of 253 battalions of the line, 83 /, 
depot battalions, and 116 battalions of the Landwehr (first levy, 
containing the men from 27 to 32 years of age).'** Of these, the 
depot battalions and Landwehr form the garrisons of the 
fortresses, and are intended, besides, to act against the smaller 
German states, while the line is massed in and around Saxony to 
oppose the Austrian army of the north. Deducting about 15 
battalions occupying Schleswig-Holstein, and another 15 battal- 
ions—the late garrisons of Rastatt, Mainz, and Frankfurt, now 

Notes on the War in Germany 165 

concentrated at Wetzlar—there remain about 220 battalions for 
the main army. With cavalry and artillery, and such Landwehr as 
may be drawn from the neighbouring fortresses, this army will 
contain about 300,000 men, in nine army corps. 

The Austrian army of the north counts seven army corps, each 
of which is considerably stronger than a Prussian one. We know 
very little at present of their composition and organisation, but 
there is every reason to believe that they form an army of from 
320,000 to 350,000 men. Numerical superiority, therefore, seems 
assured to the Austrians. 

The Prussian army will be under the command-in-chief of the 
King *—that is to say, of a parade soldier of at best very mediocre 
capacities, and of weak, but often obstinate, character. He will be 
surrounded, firstly, by the general staff of the army, under 
General Moltke, an excellent officer; secondly, by his “private 
military cabinet”, composed of personal favourites; and, thirdly, 
by such other unattached general officers as he may call to his 
suite. It is impossible to invent a more efficient system for 
ensuring defeat at the very headquarters of an army. Here is, at 
the very beginning, the natural jealousy between the staff of the 
army and the Cabinet of the King, each of which sections will 
struggle for supreme influence and will concoct and advocate its 
own pet plan of operations. This alone would render almost 
impossible all singleness of purpose, all consistent action. But then 
come the interminable councils of war, which are unavoidable 
under such circumstances, and which, in nine cases out of ten, end 
in the adoption of some half measure—the very worst course in 
war. The orders of to-day, in such cases, generally contradict those 
of yesterday, and when matters become complicated or threaten to 
go wrong, no orders at all are given out, and things take their own 
course. “Ordre, contre-ordre, désordre,’’ as Napoleon used to say. 
Nobody is responsible, because the irresponsible King takes all 
responsibility upon himself, and, therefore, nobody does anything 
until distinctly ordered to do so. The campaign of 1806 was 
commanded in a similar way by the father of the present King’; 
the defeat of Jena and Auerstadt, and the destruction of the whole 
Prussian army within three weeks,’” was the consequence. There 
is no reason to suppose that the present King is superior in mettle 
to his father; and if he has found in Count Bismarck a man whose 
political direction he can implicitly follow, there is no man of 

a Wilham I.— Ed. 
b Frederick William I1I.— Ed. 

sufficient standing in the army to take exclusive charge, in a 
similar way, of military matters. 

The Austrian army is under the unconditional command of 
General Benedek, who is an experienced officer and who, at least, 
knows his mind. The superiority of supreme command _ is 
decidedly on the side of the Austrians. 

The Prussian troops are subdivided into two “armies”; the first, 
under Prince Frederick Charles, composed of the Ist, 2d, 3d, 4th, 
7th, and 8th corps; the second, under the Crown Prince,* of the 
5th and 6th corps. The Guards, forming the general reserve, will 
probably join the first army. Now this subdivision not only breaks 
the unity of command, but it also induces, very often, the two 
armies to move on two different lines of operation, to make 
combined movements, to lay their mutual point of junction within 
the reach of the enemy; in other words, it tends to keep them 
separated whereas they ought, as much as possible, to keep 
together. The Prussians in 1806, and the Austrians in 1859, under 
very similar circumstances, followed the same course, and were 
beaten.'”° As to the two commanders, the Crown Prince is an 
unknown magnitude as a soldier; and Prince Frederick Charles 
certainly did not show himself to be a great commander in the 
Danish war.'’ 

The Austrian army has no such subdivision; the commanders of 
the army corps are placed directly under General Benedek. They, 
are, therefore, again superior ¢to their opponents as far as the 
organisation of the army goes. 7 

The Prussian soldiers, especially the men of the reserve and 
such Landwehr men as had to be taken to fill up vacancies in the 
line (and there are many) go to war against their will; the 
Austrians, on the contrary, have long wished for a war with 
Prussia, and await with impatience the order to move. They have, 
therefore, also the advantage in the morale of the troops. 

Prussia has had no great war for fifty years; her army is, on the 
whole, a peace army, with the pedantry and martinetism inherent 
to all peace armies. No doubt a great deal has been done latterly, 
especially since 1859, to get rid of this; but the habits of forty 
years are not so easily eradicated, and a great number of incapable 
and pedantic men must still be found, particularly in the most 
important places—those of the field officers. Now the Austrians 
have been fundamentally cured of this complaint by the war of 
1859, and have turned their dearly-bought experience to the very 

a Frederick Willtam.— Ed. 

Notes on the War in Germany 167 

best use. No doubt, in organisation of detail, in adaptation for, 
and experience in, warfare, the Austrians again are superior to the 
Prussians. 

With the exception of the Russians the Prussians are the only 
troops whose normal formation for fighting is the deep close 
column. Imagine the eight companies of an English battalion in a 
quarter-distance column, but two companies instead of one 
forming the front, so that four rows of two companies each form 
the column, and you have the “Prussian column of attack”. A 
better target for rifled fire-arms than this could not be imagined, 
‘and, since rifled cannon can throw a shell into it at 2,000 yards 
range, such a formation must render it almost impossible to reach 
the enemy at all. Let one single shell explode in the midst of this 
mass, and see whether that battalion is fit for anything afterwards 
on that day. 

The Austrians have adopted the loose open column of the 
French, which is scarcely to be called a column; it is more like two 
or three lines following each other at 20 or 30 yards distance, and 
is scarcely, if anything more exposed to losses by artillery than a 
deployed line. The advantage of tactical formation is, again, on 
the side of the Austrians. 

Against all these advantages the Prussians have but two points to 
set off. Their commissariat is decidedly better, and the troops will 
therefore be better fed. The Austrian commissariat, like all 
Austrian Administration, is one den of bribery and _ peculation 
scarcely ‘better than in Russia. Even now we hear of the troops 
being badly and irregularly fed; in the field and in the fortresses it 
will be worse still, and the Austrian Administration may happen to 
be a more dangerous enemy to the fortresses in the Quadrilateral 
‘than the Italian artillery. 

The second set-off the Prussians have is their superior 
armament. Although their rifled artillery is decidedly better than 
that of the Austrians, this will make very little difference in the 
open field. The range, trajectory, amd accuracy of the Prussian 
and Austrian rifles will be about on a par; but the Prussians have 
breech-loaders, and can deliver a steady well-aimed fire in the 
ranks at least four times in a minute. The immense superiority of 
this arm has been proved in the Danish war, and there is no doubt 
the Austrians will experience it in a far higher degree. If they, as 
it is said Benedek has instructed them to do, will not lose much 
time with firing, but go at the enemy at once with the bayonet, 
they will have enormous losses. In the Danish war, the loss of the 
Prussians was never more than one fourth, sometimes only one 

168 , Frederick Engels 

tenth, of that of the Danes; and, as a military correspondent of 
The Times a short time ago very correctly pointed out, the Danes 
were almost everywhere beaten by a minority of troops actually 
engaged.* 

Still, in spite of the needle gun, the odds are against the 
Prussians; and if they refuse to be beaten in the first great battle 
by the superior leadership, organisation, tactical formation, and 
morale of the Austrians, and last, not least, by their own 
commanders, then they must certainly be of a different mettle 
from that of which a peace army of 50 years’ standing may be 
expected to be. 

No. II 
[The Manchester Guardian, No. 6194, June 25, 1866] 

People begin to grow impatient at the apparent inactivity of the 
two great armies on the Bohemian frontier. But there are plenty 
of reasons for this delay. Both the Austrians and the Prussians are 
perfectly aware of the importance of the impending collision, 
which may decide the result of the whole campaign. Both are 
hurrying up to the front whatever men they can lay their hands 
on; the Austrians from their new formations (the fourth and fifth 
battalions of the infantry regiments), the Prussians from the 
Landwehr, which at first was intended for garrison duty only. 

At the same time, there appears to be on either side an attempt 
to out-manoeuvre the. opposing army, and to enter upon the 
campaign under the most favourable strategical conditions. To 
understand this, we shall have to look at the map and examine the 
country in which these armies are placed. 

Taking it for granted that Berlin and Vienna are the normal 
points of retreat of the two armies, and that therefore the 
Austrians will aim at the conquest of Berlin and the Prussians at 
that of Vienna, there are three routes by which they might operate. 
A large army requires a certain extent of country from the 
resources of which it has to live on the march, and is compelled, in 
order to move quick, to march in several columns on as many 
parallel roads; its front will, therefore, be extended on a line 
which may vary between, say, sixty and sixteen miles, according to 
the proximity of the enemy and the distance of the roads from 
each other. This will have to be kept in mind. 

a “Austrian and Prussian Armaments”, The Times, No. 25507, May 25, 1866, 
p. 5, c. 4.— Ed. 

Notes on the War in Germany — 169 

The first route would be on the left bank of the Elbe and 
Moldau, by Leipzig and Prague. It is evident that on this route 
each of the belligerents would have to cross the river twice, the 
second time in the face of the enemy. Supposing either army to 
attempt to turn, by this route, the flank of its opponent, the latter, 
having the shorter, because straighter road, could still anticipate 
the turning force on the line of the river, and if successful in 
repelling it, could march straight upon the enemy’s capital. This 
route, equally disadvantageous to both parties, may therefore be 
dismissed from consideration. | 

The second route is on the right bank of the Elbe, between it 
and the Sudetic mountain chain which divides Silesia from 
Bohemia and Moravia. This is almost on the straight line from 
Berlin to Vienna; the portion now lying between the two armies is 
marked out by the railway from Lobau to Pardubitz. This railway 
passes through that portion of Bohemia which is bounded by the 
Elbe to the south and west, and the mountains to the north-east. It 
has plenty of good roads, and if the two armies were to march 
straight at each other, here would be the point of collision. 

The third route is that by Breslau, and thence across the Sudetic 
chain. This chain, of no considerable elevation, on the Moravian 
frontier, where it is crossed by several good roads, rises to greater 
elevation and abruptness in the Riesengebirge, which forms the 
boundary of Bohemia. Here there are but few roads across; in 
fact, between Trautenau and Reichenberg, a distance of forty 
miles, the whole north-eastern portion of the range is not 
traversed by a single military road. The only road in existence 
there, that from Hirschberg to the valley of the Iser, stops short at 
the Austrian frontier. It follows, then, that this whole barrier of 
forty miles in length, is impassable, at least for a large army, with 
its innumerable impediments, and that an advance upon or by 
Breslau must pass the mountains to the south-west of the 
Riesengebirge. 

Now, what are the relative positions of the two armies, with 
regard to their communications, if engaged on this route? 

The Prussians, by advancing due south from Breslau, lay open 
their communications with Berlin. The Austrians might, if strong 
enough to command the almost absolute certainty of victory, leave 
them to advance as far as the intrenched camp of Olmitz, which 
would stop them, while they themselves could march upon Berlin, 
trusting to re-open any temporarily-interrupted communications 
by a decisive victory; or they might meet the Prussian columns 
singly as they debouch from the mountains, and, if successful, 

8* 

drive them back upon Glogau and Posen, whereby Berlin and the 
greater portion of the Prussian states would be at their mercy. 
Thus an advance by Breslau would be advisable for the Prussians 
in case of a great numerical superiority only. 

The Austrians are in a far different position. They have the 
advantage that the bulk of the monarchy lies south-east of 
. Breslau; that is, in the direct prolongation of a line drawn from 
Berlin to Breslau. Having fortified the northern bank of the 
Danube near Vienna, so as to shelter the capital from a surprise, 
they may, temporarily and even for a length of time, sacrifice their 
direct communication with Vienna, and draw their supplies of 
men and stores from Hungary. They can, therefore, with equal 
safety operate by way of Lébau and by way of Breslau, .to the 
north or to the south of the hills; they have far greater freedom in 
manoeuvring than their opponents. 

The Prussians, moreover, have further reasons to be cautious. 
From the northern frontier of Bohemia, the distance to Berlin is 
not much more than half of that to Vienna; Berlin is so much 
more exposed. Vienna is sheltered by the Danube, behind which a 
beaten army can find protection; by the fortifications erected to 
the north of that river; and by the intrenched camp of Olmütz, 
which the Prussians could not pass unnoticed with impunity, if the 
mass of the Austrian army, after a defeat, were to take up a 
position there. Berlin has no protection of any kind, except the 
army in the field. Under these circumstances, and those detailed 
in our first number, the part destined for the Prussians appears to 
be clearly marked out as a defensive one. 

The same series of circumstances, and strong political necessity 
besides, almost compels Austria to act on the offensive. A single 
victory may ensure to her great results, while her defeat would not 
break her power of resistance. 

The strategical plan of the campaign in its fundamental features 
is necessarily very simple. Whichever of the two attacks first, he 
has only this alternative: either a false attack north-west of the 
Riesengebirge, and the true attack south-east of it, or vice versa. 
The forty-mile barrier is the decisive feature of the seat of war, 
and round it the armies must gravitate. We shall hear of fighting 
at both its extremities, and a very few days afterwards will clear up 
the direction of the true attack, and probably the fate of the first 
campaign. Yet, with two such unwieldy armies opposed to each 
other, we feel inclined to think that the most direct route is the 
safest, and that the difficulty and danger of moving such large 
bodies of troops in separate columns on different roads through a 

Notes on the War in Germany 1721 

difficult mountain country, will almost naturally draw both 
opposing armies on the route Lobau-Pardubitz. 

The actual movements which have taken place are as follows: — 
The Prussians, in the first week of June, massed their army of 
Saxony along the Saxon frontier, from Zeitz to Gorlitz,and their 
Silesian army from Hirschberg to Neisse. By the 10th June they 
drew nearer together, having their right wing on the Elbe near 
Torgau, and their extreme left near Waldenburg. From the 12th 
to the 16th, the army of Silesia, now consisting of the Ist, 5th, 
and 6th corps and the Guards, were again extended to the east, 
this time as far as Ratibor, that is to say, into the extreme 
south-eastern corner of Silesia. This looks like a feint, especially 
the parading of the Guards, which are supposed to be always with 
the main army. If it be more than a feint, or if measures have not 
been taken to move these four corps back towards Gorlitz at the 
shortest notice and in the shortest time, then this massing of more 
than 120,000 men in a remote corner is a palpable mistake; they 
may be cut off from all possibility of retreat and certainly from all 
connection with the remainder of the army. 

Of the Austrians we know little more than that they were 
concentrated around Olmütz. The Times correspondent in their 
camp states that their sixth corps, 40,000 strong, arrived on the 
19th from Weisskirchen at Olmutz indicating a movement to the 
westward. He adds that on the 2lst headquarters were to be 
shifted to Triibau, on the frontier between Moravia and Bohemia.’ 
This move would point in the same direction, if it did not look 
exceedingly like a canard sent on to London with the intention of 
being thence telegraphed to the Prussian headquarters in order to 
mislead them. A general who acts with such secrecy as Benedek, 
and who has such objections to newspaper correspondents, is not 
likely to inform them on the 19th where his headquarters will be 
on the 21st, unless he has his reasons for it. 

Before concluding, we may be allowed to cast a glance at the 
operations in North-western Germany. The Prussians had more 
troops here than was at first known. They had 15 battalions 
disposable in Holstein, 12 in Minden, and 18 in Wetzlar. By rapid 
concentric moves, during which the troops showed a quite 
unexpected capability of supporting forced marches, they took 
possession in two days of all the country north of a line from 

a “The Austrian Army (from our military correspondent). Headquarters of the 
Army of the North, Olmitz, June 19”, The Times, No. 25532, June 23, 1866, p. 9, 
c. 4.— Ed. 

Coblenz to Eisenach, and of every line of communication between 
the eastern and western provinces of the kingdom. The Hessian 
troops, about 7,000 strong, managed to escape, but the 
Hanoverians, 10,000 or 12,000, had their direct line of retreat 
towards Frankfurt cut off, and already on the 17th the rest of the 
7th Prussian army corps, 12 battalions, together with the two 
Coburg battalions, arrived in Eisenach from the Elbe. Thus the 
Hanoverians appear to be hemmed in on all sides, and could 
- escape only by a miracle of stupidity on the part of the Prussians. 
As soon as their fate will be settled, a force of 50 Prussian 
battalions will be available against the Federal army which Prince 
Alexander of Darmstadt is forming at Frankfurt, and which will 
consist of about 23,000 Wiirttembergers, 10,000 Darmstadters, 
6,000 Nassauers, 13,000 Badeners (only mobilising now), 7,000 
Hessians, and 12,000 Austrians, now on the road from Salzburg; 
in all about 65,000 men, who may be possibly reinforced by from 
10,000 to 20,000 Bavarians. About 60,000 men of these are now 
reported as already concentrated at Frankfurt, and Prince 
Alexander has ventured upon a forward move by re-occupying 
Giessen on the 22d. This, however, is of no consequence. The 
Prussians will not advance against him until they are well 
concentrated, and then, with 70,000 men of all arms, and their 
superior armament, they ought to make short work of this motley 
army. 

No. Il 

[The Manchester Guardian, No. 6197, June 28, 1866} 

The first great battle has been fought, not in Bohemia, but in 
Italy, and the Quadrilateral has again given the Italians a lesson in 
_ strategy. The strength of this famous position, as indeed of all 
fortified positions of any value, consists, not so much in the high 
defensive capabilities of its four fortresses, but in their being so 
grouped in a country with strongly-marked military features that 
the attacking force is almost always induced, and often compelled, 
to divide itself and attack on two different points, while. the 
defending force can send its whole combined strength against oné 
of these attacks, crush it by superior numbers, and then turn 
against the other. The Italian army has been induced to commit 
this fault. The King stood with eleven divisions on the Mincio, 
while -Cialdini with five divisions faced the Lower Po, near Ponte 

Notes on the War in Germany 173 

Lagoscuro and Polesella. An Italian division counts 17 battalions of 
700 men each; consequently, Victor Emmanuel would have, with 
cavalry and artillery, at least 120,000 or 125,000 men, and Cialdini 
about half that number. While the King crossed the Mincio on the 
23d, Cialdini was to cross the Lower Po and act upon the rear of 
the Austrians; but up to the moment we write, no certain news 
has arrived of this latter movement having been effected. At all 
events, the 60,000 men whose presence might, and probably 
would, have turned the scale on Sunday last at Custozza,'”* cannot, 
so far, have obtained any advantage at all.commensurate to the 
loss of a great battle. 

The Lake of Garda lies encased between two spurs of the Alps, 
forming, to the south of it, two clusters of hills, between which the 
Mincio forces its way towards the lagoons of Mantua. Both of 
these groups form strong military positions; their slopes towards 
the south overlook the Lombard plain, and command it within 
gun-range. They are well known in military history. The western 
group, between Peschiera and Lonato, was the scene of the battles 
of Castiglione and Lonato in 1796, and of Solferino in 1859 '”°; 
the eastern group, between Peschiera and Verona, was contested 
during three days in 1848,'°° and again in the battle of last 
Sunday. 

This eastern group of hills slopes down on one side towards the 
Mincio, where it ends in the plain at Valeggio; on the other side, 
in a long arc, facing south-east, towards the Adige, which it 
reaches at Bussolengo. It is divided, from north to south, in two 
about equal portions by a deep ravine, through which flows the 
rivulet Tione; so that a force advancing from the Mincio will have 
first to force the passage of the river, and immediately afterwards 
find itself again arrested by this ravine. On the edge of the slope, 
facing the plain, and east of the ravine, are the following villages: 
Custozza, on the southern extremity; further north, in succession, 
Somma Campagna, Sona, and Santa Giustina. The railway from 
Peschiera to Verona crosses the hills at Somma Campagna, the 
high road at Sona. . 

In 1848, after the Piedmontese had taken Peschiera, they 
blockaded Mantua and extended their army from beyond that 
place to Rivoli, on the Lake of Garda, their centre occupying the 
hills in question. On the 23d July Radetzky advanced with seven 
brigades from Verona, broke through the centre of this over- 
extended line, and occupied the hills himself. On the 24th and 
25th the Piedmontese tried to re-take the position, but were 
decisively beaten on the 25th, and retreated at once through Milan 

beyond the Ticino. This first battle of Custozza decided the 
campaign of 1848. 

The telegrams from the Italian headquarters about last Sunday’s 
battle are rather contradictory; but, with the assistance of those 
from the other side, we get a pretty clear insight into the 
circumstances under which it was fought. Victor Emmanuel 
intended his Ist corps (General Durando, four divisions or 68 
battalions), to take up a position between Peschiera and Verona, so 
as to be able to cover a siege of the former place. This position 
must, of course, be Sona and Somma Campagna. The 2d corps 
(General Cucchiari, three divisions or 51 battalions) and 3d corps 
(General Della Rocca, of the same strength as the second) were to 
cross the Mincio at the same time, to cover the operations of the 
Ist. The lst corps must have crossed near or south of Saliongo, 
and taken the road of the hills at once; the 2d seems to have 
crossed at Valeggio, and the 3d at Goito, and advanced in the 
plain. This took place on Saturday the 23d. The Austrian brigade 
Pulz, which held the outposts on the Mincio, fell slowly back on 
Verona; and on Sunday,’ the anniversary of Solferino, the whole 
of the Austrian army debouched from Verona to meet the enemy. 
They appear to have arrived in time to occupy the heights of Sona 
and Somma Campagna, and the eastern edge of the ravine of the 
Tione before the Italians. The struggle then would principally be 
fought for the passage of the ravine. At the southern extremity 
the two corps in the plain could co-operate with the Ist Italian 
corps in the hills, and thus Custozza fell into their hands. 
Gradually the Italians in the plain would advance more and more 
in the direction of Verona, in order to act upon the Austrian flank 
and rear, and the Austrians would send troops to meet them. 
Thus the front lines of the two armies, which were originally 
facing east and west respectively, would wheel round a quarter 
circle, the Austrians facing south and the Italians north. But, as 
the hills retreat from Custozza to the north-east, this flank 
movement of the Italian 2d and 3d corps could not immediately 
affect the position of their lst corps in the hills, because it could 
not be extended far enough without danger to the flanking troops 
themselves. Thus the Austrians appear merely to have occupied 
the 2d and 3d corps by troops sufficient to break their first 
impetus, while they launched every available man upon the Ist 
corps, and crushed it by superior numbers. They were perfectly 
successful; the first corps was repulsed, after a gallant struggle, 

a June 24, 1866.— Ed. 

Notes on the War in Germany 175 

and at last Custozza was stormed by the Austrians. By this, the 
Italian right wing advanced east and north-east beyond Custozza, 
appears to have been seriously endangered; consequently a new 
struggle for the village took place, during which the lost 
connection must have been restored, and the Austrian advance 
from Custozza checked, but the place remained in their hands, and 
the Italians had to re-cross the Mincio the same night. 

We give this sketch of the battle, not as a historical account—for 
which every detail is as yet wanting—but merely as an attempt, 
map in hand, to reconcile the various telegrams relating to it 
amongst each other, and with military common sense; and if the 
telegrams were anything like correct and complete, we feel 
confident that the general outline of the battle would appear to be 
not very different from what we have stated. 

The Austrians lost about 600 prisoners, the Italians 2,000, and a 
few guns. This shows the battle to have been a defeat, but no 
disaster. The forces must have been pretty equally matched, 
although it is very probable that the Austrians had less troops 
under fire than their opponents. The Italians have every reason to 
congratulate themselves that they were not driven back into the 
Mincio; the position of the Ist corps between that river and the 
ravine, on a strip of land between two and four miles wide, and a 
superior enemy in front, must have been one of considerable 
danger. It was undoubtedly a mistake to send the main body of 
the troops into the plain; while the commanding heights, the 
decisive points, were neglected; but the greatest mistake was, as we 
pointed out before, to divide the army, to leave Cialdini with 
60,000 men on the Lower Po, and to attack with the remainder 
alone. Cialdini could have contributed to a victory before Verona, 
and then, marching back to the Lower Po, have effected his 
passage much more easily, if this combined manoeuvre was to be 
insisted upon at all hazards. As it is, he seems no further advanced 
than on the first day, and may now have to meet stronger forces 
than hitherto. The Italians ought, by this time, to know that they 
have a very tough opponent to deal with. At Solferino, Benedek, 
with 26,000 Austrians, held the whole Piedmontese army of fully 
double that number at bay for the whole day, until he was ordered 
to retreat in consequence of the defeat of the other corps by the 
French. That Piedmontese army was much superior to the present 
Italian army; it was better schooled, more homogeneous, and 
better officered. The present army is but of very recent formation 
and must suffer from all the disadvantages inherent to such; while 
the Austrian army of to-day is much superior to that of 1859. 

National enthusiasm is a capital thing to work upon, but until 
disciplined and organised, nobody can win battles with it. Even 
Garibaldi’s “thousand” '*' were not a crowd of mere enthusiasts, 
they were drilled men who had learnt to obey orders and to face 
powder and shot in 1859. It is to be hoped that the staff of the 
Italian army, for their own good, will refrain from taking liberties 
with an army which, if numerically inferior, is intrinsically 
superior to theirs, and, moreover, holds one of the strongest 
positions in Europe. 

No. IV 

[The Manchester Guardian, No. 6201, July 3, 1866] 

Suppose a young Prussian ensign or cornet, under examination 
for a lieutenancy, to be asked what would be the safest plan for a 
Prussian army to invade Bohemia? Suppose our young officer 
were to answer,— “Your best way will be to divide your troops into 
two about equal bodies, to send one round by the east of the 
Riesengebirge, the other to the west, and effect their junction in 
Gitschin.” What would the examining officer say to this? He 
would inform the young gentleman that this plan sinned against 
the two very first laws of strategy:—Firstly, never to divide your 
troops so that they cannot support each other, but to keep them 
well together; and, secondly, in case of an advance on different 
roads, to effect the junction of the different columns at a point 
which is not within reach of the enemy; that, therefore, the plan 
proposed was the very worst of all; that it could only be taken into 
consideration at all in case Bohemia was quite unoccupied by 
hostile troops; and that, consequently, an officer proposing such a 
plan of campaign was not fit to hold even a _ lieutenant’s 
commission. 

Yet, this is the very plan which the wise and learned staff of the 
Prussian army have adopted. It is almost incredible; but it is so. 
The mistake for which the Italians had to suffer at Custozza, has 
been again committed by the Prussians, and under circumstances 
which made it ten-fold worse. The Italians knew at least that, with 
ten divisions, they would be numerically superior to the enemy. 
The Prussians must have known that if they kept their nine corps 
together they would be at best barely on a par, as far as numbers 
went, with Benedek’s eight corps; and that by dividing their troops 
they exposed the two armies to the almost certain fate of being 
crushed in succession by superior numbers. It would be completely 

Notes on the War in Germany . 177 

inexplicable how such a plan could ever be discussed, much less 
adopted, by a body of such unquestionably capable officers as 
form the Prussian staff—if it was ‘not for the fact of King William 
being in chief command. But nobody could possibly expect that 
the fatal consequences of kings and princes taking high command 
would come out so soon and so strong. The Prussians are now 
fighting, in Bohemia, a life-and-death struggle. If the junction of 
the two armies at or about Gitschin is prevented, if each of the 
two, being beaten, has to retire out of Bohemia, and, by retiring, 
to get further away again from the other then the campaign may 
be said to be virtually over. Then Benedek may leave the army of 
the Crown Prince* unnoticed while it retires towards Breslau, and 
follow up, with all his forces, the army of Prince Frederick 
Charles, which can hardly escape utter destruction. 

The question is, Will this junction have been prevented? Up to 
the moment we write we have no news of events later than Friday 
evening, the 29th. The Prussians, beaten out of Gitschin (the name 
of the place, in Bohemian, is spelt Jicin) on the 28th by General 
Edelsheim, claim to have stormed the town again on the 29th, and 
this is the last information we possess. The junction was not then 
effected; at least four Austrian and parts of the Saxon army corps 
had then been engaged against about five or six Prussian corps. 

The various columns of the army of the Crown Prince, as they 
descended into the valley on the Bohemian side of the hills, were 
met by the Austrians at favourable points where the valley, 
widening out, allowed them to offer a larger front to the Prussian 
columns, and to attempt to prevent them from deploying; while 
the Prussians would send troops, wherever practicable, through 
the lateral valleys, to take their opponents in flank and rear. This 
is always the case in mountain warfare, and accounts for the great 
number of prisoners that are always made under such cir- 
cumstances. On the other side, the armies of Prince Frederick 
Charles and Herwarth von Bittenfeld appear to have got through 
the passes almost unopposed; the first engagements took place on 
the line of the Iser river, that is almost midway between the 
starting points of the two armies. It would be idle to try to 
disentangle and bring into harmony the fearfully contradictory, 
and often totally unauthenticated, telegrams which have come to 
hand these last three or four days. 

The fighting has been necessarily very much chequered in its 
results: as new forces came up, victory favoured first one and then 

2 Frederick William.— Ed. 

178 . | Frederick Engels 

the other side. Up to Friday, however, the general result appears 
to have been, so far; in favour of the Prussians. If they maintained 
themselves in Gitschin, no doubt the junction was effected on 
Saturday or Sunday, and then their greatest danger would be 
passed. The final fight for the junction would probably be fought 
with concentrated masses on both sides, and decide the campaign 
for some time, at least. If the Prussians were victorious, they 
would be at once out of all their self-begotten difficulties, but they 
might have obtained the same, and even greater, advantages 
without exposing themselves to such unnecessary dangers. 

The fighting appears to have been very severe. The very first 
Austrian brigade which met the Prussians in battle, was the “black 
and yellow” brigade, which, in Schleswig, stormed the K6nigsberg, 
near Oberselk, the day before the evacuation of the Dannevirke. It 
is called black and yellow after the facings of the two regiments 
composing it, and was always considered one of the best brigades 
in the service. They were, however, beaten by the needle-gun, and 
above 500 men of one of its regiments (Martini) were taken 
prisoners after they had charged the Prussian lines five times in 
vain. In a later engagement, the colours of the 3d battalion, of the 
Deutschmeister regiment were taken. This regiment, recruited in 
Vienna exclusively, is considered the best in the whole army. Thus 
the very best troops have been already in action. The Prussians 
must have behaved splendidly for an old peace army. When war 
was actually declared, a totally different spirit came over the army, 
brought on, chiefly, by the clearing-out of the small fry of 
potentates in the north-west.'*? It gave the troops—rightly or 
wrongly, we merely register the fact—the idea that they were 
asked to fight, this time, for the unification of Germany, and the 
hitherto sullen and sulky men of the reserve and Landwehr then 
crossed the frontier of Austria with loud cheers. It is owing to this 
chiefly that they fought so well; but at the same time we must 
ascribe the greater portion of whatever success they have had to 
their breech-loaders; and if they ever get out of the difficulties 
into which their generals so wantonly placed them, they will have 
to thank the needle-gun for it. The reports as to its immense 
superiority over the muzzle-loaders are again unanimous. A 
sergeant from the Martini regiment, taken prisoner, said to the 
correspondent of the Cologne Gazette’: 

“We have surely done whatever may be expected from brave soldiers, but no 
man can stand against that rapid fire.” 

a “Reichenberg, 27. Juni, Mittags”’, Kdélnische Zeitung, No. 179, June 29, 
1866.— Ed. 

Notes on the War in Germany 179 

If the Austrians are beaten, it will be not so much General 
Benedek or General Ramming as General Ramrod who is to blame 
for the result. 

In the north-west, the. Hanoverians, brought to a sense of their 
position by a sharp attack from General Manteuffel’s advanced 
guard under General Flies, have surrendered, and thereby 59 
Prussian battalions will be at liberty to act against the Federal 
troops. It was high time, too, that this should be done before 
Bavaria had completed all her armaments, for otherwise much 
stronger forces would be required to subdue South-western 
Germany. Bavaria is notoriously always slow and behindhand with 
her military arrangements, but when they are complete, she can 
bring into the field from 60,000 to 80,000 good troops. We may 
now soon hear of a rapid concentration of Prussians on the Main 
and of active operations against Prince Alexander of Hesse 
Darmstadt and his army. 

No. V 

[ The Manchester Guardian, No. 6204, July 6, 1866] 

The campaign which the Prussians opened with a signal 
strategic blunder has been since carried on by them with such a 
terrible tactical energy that it was brought to a victorious close in 
exactly eight days. 

We said in our last note that the only case in which the Prussian 
plan of invading Bohemia by two armies separated by the 
Riesengebirge could be justified was that in which Bohemia was 
unoccupied by hostile troops. The mysterious plan of General 
Benedek appears to have mainly consisted in creating a situation 
of that sort. There appear to have been but two Austrian army 
corps—the lst (Clam-Gallas) and the 6th (Ramming)—1in the 
north-western corner of Bohemia, where, from the beginning, we 
expected the decisive actions would be fought. If this was intended 
to draw the Prussians into a trap, Benedek has succeeded so well 
that he got caught in it himself. At all events, the Prussian advance 
on two lines, with from forty to fifty miles of impassable ground 
between them, towards a point of junction two full marches from 
the starting points, and within the enemy’s lines,—this advance 
remains a highly dangerous manoeuvre under all circumstances, 
and one which would have been followed by signal defeat but for 
. Benedek’s strange slowness, for the unexpected dash of the 
Prussian troops, and for their breech-loading rifles. 

180 ; - Frederick Engels 

The advance of Prince Frederick Charles took place with three 
corps (the 3d, 4th, and 2d, the latter in reserve) by Reichenberg, 
north of a difficult range of hills, on the southern side of which 
General Herwarth advanced with a corps and a half (the 8th and 
one division of the 7th). At the same time, the Crown Prince 
stood, with the Ist, 5th, and 6th corps, and the Guards, in the 
mountains about Glatz. Thus the army was divided into three 
columns—one on the right, of 45,000, one in the centre, of 
90,000, and one on the left, of 120,000 men—none of which 
could support either of the others for at least several days. Here, 
if ever, there was a chance for a general commanding at least an 
equal number of men to crush his opponents in detail. But 
nothing appears to have been done. On the 26th Prince Frederick 
Charles had the first serious engagement, at Turnau, with a 
brigade of the Ist corps, by which he established his communica- 
tion with Herwarth; on the 27th, the latter took Miinchengratz, 
while, of the army of the Crown Prince, a first column, the 5th 
corps, advanced beyond Nachod, and beat the 6th Austrian corps 
(Ramming) severely; on the 28th, the only slightly unlucky day for 
the Prussians, Prince Frederick Charles’s advance guard took 
Gitschin, but was again dislodged by General Edelsheim’s cavalry, 
while the Ist corps of the army of the Crown Prince was checked 
with some loss at Trautenau by the 10th Austrian corps of 
Gablenz, and only disengaged by the advance of the Guards 
towards Eipel, on an intermediate road between the Ist and 5th 
Prussian corps. On the 29th, Prince Frederick Charles stormed 
Gitschin, and the army of the Crown Prince totally defeated the 
6th, 8th, and 10th Austrian corps. On the 30th, a fresh attempt of 
Benedek’s to re-take Gitschin by the 1st corps and the Saxon army 
was signally foiled, and the two -Prussian armies effected a 
junction. The Austrian loss represents men to the number of at 
least a corps and a half, while that of the Prussians is less than one 
fourth that number. 

Thus we find that on the 27th there were only two Austrian 
army corps, of about 33,000 men each, at hand; on the 28th, 
three; on the 29th, four, and if one Prussian telegram be correct, 
part of a fifth (the 4th corps); while on the 30th the Saxon army 
corps only had been able to come up in support. There were, 
then, two, if not three, corps absent from the contested ground 
during all that time, while the Prussians brought every man down 
into Bohemia. In fact, up to the evening of the 29th, the whole of 
the Austrian troops on the spot were barely superior in numbers 
to either of the two Prussian armies, and being brought into line 

Notes on the War in Germany 18] 

successively, the supports arriving after the defeat only of the 
troops first engaged, the result was disastrous. 

The 3d army corps (Archduke Ernst), which fought at Custozza, 
is reported to have been sent to the north by rail immediately 
after that battle, and is, in some accounts, set down among 
Benedek’s available forces. This corps, which would make the 
whole force, including the Saxons, nine corps, could not have been 
up in time for the battles in the latter days of June. 

The Prussians, whatever the faults of their plan of operations 
were, made up for them by their rapidity and energy of action. 
No fault can be found with the operations of either of their two 
armies. Short, sharp, and decisive were all their blows, and 
completely successful. Nor did this energy forsake them after the 
two armies were joined; on they marched, and already on the 3d 
they met Benedek’s combined forces with the whole of theirs, and 
gave them a last crushing blow.’ 

It is hardly possible to suppose that Benedek accepted this battle 
of his own free will. No doubt the rapid pursuit of the Prussians 
compelled him to take a strong position with all his army, in order 
to re-form his troops, and to give a day’s start to his retiring army 
train, expecting not to be attacked in force during the day, and to 
be able to draw off during the night. A man in his position, with 
four of his corps completely shattered, and after such tremendous 
losses, cannot have desired, there and then, to deliver a decisive 
battle, if he could draw off in safety. But the Prussians appear to 
have compelled him to fight, and the result was the complete rout 
of the Austrians, who, if the armistice be not granted, will now be 
trying to make towards Olmütz or Vienna, under the most 
disadvantageous circumstances, for the slightest out-flanking 
movement of the Prussians on their right must cut off numerous 
detachments from the direct road, and drive them into the hills of 
Glatz, to be made prisoners. The “army of the north”, as splendid 
a host as there was in Europe ten days ago, has ceased to exist. 

No doubt the needle-gun, with its rapid fire, has done a great 
part of this. It may be doubted whether without it the junction of 
the two Prussian armies could have been effected; and it is quite 
certain that this immense and rapid success could not have been 
obtained without such superior fire, for the Austrian army is 
habitually less subject to panic than most European armies. But 
there were other circumstances co-operating. We have already 
mentioned the excellent dispositions and unhesitating action of the 
two Prussian armies, from the moment they entered Bohemia. We 
may add that they also deviated, in this campaign, from the 

column system, and brought their masses forward principally in 
deployed lines, so as to bring every rifle into activity, and to save 
their men from the fire of artillery. We must acknowledge that the 
movements both on the march and before the enemy were carried 
out with an order and punctuality which no man could have 
expected from an army and administration covered with the rust 
of fifty years’ peace. And, finally, all the world must have been 
surprised at the dash displayed by these young troops in each and 
every engagement without exception. It is all very well to say the 
breech-loaders did it, but they are not self-acting, they want stout 
hearts and strong arms to carry them. The Prussians fought very 
often against superior numbers, and were almost everywhere the 
attacking party; the Austrians, therefore, had the choice of 
ground. And in attacking strong positions and barricaded towns, 
the advantages of the breech-loader almost disappear; the bayonet 
has to do the work, and there has been a good deal of it. The 
cavalry, moreover, acted with the same dash, and with them cold 
steel and speed of horse are the only weapons in a charge. The 
French canards of Prussian cavalry lines first peppering their 
opponents with carbine fire (breech-loading or otherwise) and 
then rushing at them sword in hand, could only originate among a 
people whose cavalry has very often been guilty of that trick, and 
always been punished for it by being borne down by the superior 
impetus of the charging enemy. There is no mistaking it, the 
Prussian army has, within a single week, conquered a position as 
high astever it held, and may well feel confident now to be able to 
cope with any opponent. There is no campaign on record where 
an equally signal success, in an equally short time, and without any 
noteworthy check, has been obtained, except that campaign of 
Jena which annihilated the Prussians of that day, and, if we except 
the defeat of Ligny,'** the campaign of Waterloo. 

Written between June 19 and July 5, Reproduced from the newspaper 
1866 

dian, Nos. 6190, 6194, 6197, 6201 and 
6204, June 20, 25 and 28, July 3 and 6, 
1866