Manchester, 25 July 1866 

Dear Moor, 

I think you will now have received the notes all right; in a 
moment of distraction I must have put in, in their stead, the piece 
of paper on which I had noted the Nos. The notes themselves I 
had slipped inside the cover of my writing-case, which is where I 
found them when I had recovered from the initial shock of your 
telegram. I hope they still arrived in time. 

The business in Germany now seems fairly straightforward to 
me. From the moment of Bismarck’s so colossal success in using 
the Prussian army to put the bourgeois plan for Little Germany 
into effect,’ developments in Germany have moved so decisively 
in that direction that we shall have to accept the fait accompli just 
like everybody else, we may Like It or Not. As regards the national 
aspect of the question, at all events, Bismarck will set up a Little 
German Empire of the dimensions envisaged by the bourgeoisie, 
i. e., including South-West Germany, the phrases about the Main 
boundary and the option of a South German SEPARATE CONFEDERACY, at any 
rate, only being intended for the French; meanwhile the 
Prussians are marching on Stuttgart. Incidentally, before very 
long, the German provinces of Austria will join this Empire too, 
since Austria is certain to go Hungarian now,” and the Germans 
will become the 3rd nation in the Empire—lower even than the 
Slavs. 

Politice* Bismarck will be forced to rely on the bourgeoisie, 
whom he needs against the Imperial Princes. Perhaps not at this 
moment, as his prestige and the army are still sufficient. But 
simply to ensure that parliament will grant the necessary 
conditions for central power, he will have to give something to the 
bourgeoisie, and the natural course of events will constantly 
compel him or his successors to appeal to the bourgeoisie again; so 
that, even if Bismarck perhaps gives the bourgeoisie no more than 
he absolutely has to now, he will, nevertheless, be driven 
increasingly in a bourgeois direction. 

@ Politically 

The good aspect to the affair is that it simplifies the situation 
and makes revolution easier by putting an end to the brawling 
among the smaller capitals and, at all events, hastens develop- 
ments. A German parliament is after all quite a different thing 
from a Prussian Chamber. All the little states will be drawn into 
the movement, there will be an end to the worst localised | 
tendencies, and the parties will at last become truly national 
instead of merely local. 

The chief disadvantage—and it is a very substantial one—is the 
inevitable swamping of Germany by Prussianism. Also the 
temporary exclusion of German Austria, a consequence of which 
will be an immediate advance of the Slav cause in Bohemia, 
Moravia and Carinthia. Unfortunately, nothing can be done to 
prevent either. 

In my view, therefore, we can do nothing whatsoever but simply 
accept the fact, without approving of it, and use, as far as we can, 
the increased opportunities which are, at all events, bound to arise 
now, to organise and unite the German proletariat nationally. 

I did not need Stumpf’s letter to tell me that protuer Liebknecht 
would launch himself into fanatical support of the Austrian cause, 
it was absolutely inevitable.” Incidentally, there was no mistaking 
his furious despatches from Leipzig in the Neue Frankfurter 
Zeitung. This N. F. Zeitung, with its Blind-ish regicidal tendencies, 
went so far as to reproach the Prussians for their disgraceful 
treatment of ‘His Highness the Elector of Hesse’* and was beside 
itself with enthusiasm for the poor blind Guelph.? 

Nothing more of mine in the Guardian.*” 
Your 
F. E. 
Best wishes to the tapres.