Manchester, 10 April 1866 

Dear Moor, 

To all appearances, the Russians want war, their purpose 
seeming to be restoration of Poland under Russian rule and 
possibly annexation of Moldavia. The Kélnische Zeitung, which is, 
of course, in mortal fear of war, has sent J. von Wickede, its 
military man, to Bohemia, to inspect what is claimed to be 
Austria’s state of armament. The fellow arrives—on 3 April, that 
is 14 days after Bismarck’s note —and everywhere finds things 
on a profoundly pacific footing, except that some Bohemian 
regiments have been transferred to their western districts, so that 
they can put themselves on a war footing more quickly. No 
soldiers recalled from leave, no fortress armed. Nothing.? The 
whole disgraceful affair thus deliberately provoked by Bismarck. 

Furthermore: the Russians are concentrating troops on the 
Austrian and on the Prussian frontier with Poland, and the 
soldiers are saying quite openly that those who are positioned on 
the Prussian frontier will shortly occupy Posen as soon as the 
Prussian troops take the field against the Austrians. Apart from 
the fact that the Russians would thereby secure the rest of 
Prussian Poland for themselves immediately, their mission will also 
be to suppress any revolutionary movements in Berlin. However, 
that would in all probability be a miscalculation and, at any rate, 
disqualify the Hohenzollerns for the future. 

Finally, today’s Leaver in The Times which comes down stupidly, 
mendaciously, woodenly but decisively on Prussia’s side and 
represents Austria as the attacking party. That was written to 
order.” 

In view of all this, war seems to me certain; the situation within 
Germany also makes it inevitable, following the new Austrian note 
appealing to the Confederation, as well as Monsieur Bismarck’s 
proposal regarding a German parliament*?’—what a dunderhead 
the fellow must be to believe that that would assist him even in the 

a Engels refers to the report ‘Die Lage, K6ln, 7. April’, Kélnische Zeitung, 8 April 
1866. -> The Times, No. 25468, 10 April 1866, leader. 

very slightest! The Austrian note seems to be based on the 
assumption that the storm will break after all. Otherwise they 
would at least have left the back-door open to facilitate the 
Prussians’ retreat through Bismarck’s resignation. But the moment 
that they appeal to the Confederation, that’s an end to it; another 
ministry in Prussia would not submit to a Confederation majority 
either. 

Bonaparte will probably keep quiet, at least for the time being; 
Bismarck has already offered him Saarbrticken, etc., and, if need 
be, he would also make him a present of the Bavarian Palatinate. 
If he sees the Russians committed on the Prussian side, he won’t 
risk anything rash. 

If the storm really does break, for the first time in history the 
course of events will depend on the attitude taken by Berlin. If the 
Berliners hit out at the right time, things may turn out well—but 
who can rely on them? 

As regards the congress of the International, I don’t properly 
see how you can hope to avoid it.* Nor do I see how a further 
postponement would improve things much. Aprés tout? any 
demonstration of that kind would in a certain sense—at least as 
far as we ourselves are concerned—always be a fiasco. But in full 
view of Europe? I believe that could still be avoided even now. 
After all, the Germans with their polyglot capacities would have 
the whole thing under their control, and it is precisely the 
Germans who are on our side. Whether the congress decides 
anything useful is a secondary matter, as long as all scandal can be 
avoided; and that surely will now be the case. General resolutions 
of a theoretical kind or referring to international support for 
strikes, etc., can surely be passed without any danger. Neverthe- 
less, you must know that better than I, I cannot really judge of it 
from here. Meanwhile, I would definitely not go to Paris about it. 
You have no one to protect you, and the police will have no qualms 
about striking—emissary from a public workers’ association with 
distinctly revolutionary tendencies, which can easily be used to 
conceal other clandestine matters— cela suffit‘ The whole business 
is just not worth the risk. 

You would do much better to stay in Margate until the last scar 
is no longer in the slightest degree susceptible, and do plenty of 
walking in the fresh air. Who knows how soon you will once more 
have need of a stout constitution. The atmosphere is highly 
electric, and we shall perhaps soon be in the midst of the storm 

a See this volume, pp. 258-59. - > After all - ¢ that will suffice