Friedrich Engels 

The Manchester Guardian. 
Nr. 6194, 25. Juni 1866 

No. IL. 

People begin to grow impatient at the apparent inactivity of the two great 
armies on the Bohemian frontier. But there are plenty of reasons for this 
delay. Both the Austrians and the Prussians are perfectly aware of the im- 
portance of the impending collision, which may decide the result of the 
whole campaign. Both are hurrying up to the front whatever men they can 
lay their hands on; the Austrians from their new formations (the fourth and 
fifth battalions of the infantry regiments), the Prussians from the landwehr, 
which at first was intended for garrison duty only. 

At the same time, there appears to be on either side an attempt to out- 
manoeuvre the opposing army, and to enter upon the campaign under the 
most favourable strategical conditions. To understand this, we shall have to 
look at the map and examine the country in which these armies are placed. 

Taking it for granted that Berlin and Vienna are the normal points of re- 
treat of the two armies, and that therefore the Austrians will aim at the 
conquest of Berlin and the Prussians at that of Vienna, there are three 
routes by which they might operate. A large army requires a certain extent 
of country from the resources of which it has to live on the march, and is 
compelled, in order to move quickly, to march in several columns on as 
many parallel roads; its front will, therefore, be extended on a line which 
may vary between, say sixty and sixteen miles, according to the proximity 
of the enemy and the distance of the roads from each other. This will have 
to be kept in mind. 

The first route would be on the left bank of the Elbe and Moldau, by 
Leipsic and Prague. It is evident that on this route each of the belligerents 
would have to cross the river twice, the second time in the face of the en- 
emy. Supposing either army to attempt to turn, by this route, the flank of 
its opponent, the latter, having the shorter, because straighter road, could 
still anticipate the turning force on the line of the river, and if successful in 
repelling it, could march straight upon the enemy's capital. This route, 
equally disadvantageous to both parties, may therefore be dismissed from 
consideration. 

The second route is on the right bank ofthe Elbe, between it and the Su- 
detic mountain chain which divides Silesia from Bohemia and Moravia. 
This is almost on the straight line from Berlin to Vienna; the portion now 
lying between the two armies is marked out by the railway from Lobau to 
Pardubitz. This railway passes through that portion of Bohemia which is 

Notes on the War (1866) + II 

bounded by the Elbe to the south and west, and the mountains to the 
north-east. It has plenty of good roads, and ifthe two armies were to march 
straight at each other, here would be the point of collision. 

The third route is that by Breslau, and thence across the Sudetic chain. 
This chain, ofno considerable elevation, on the Moravian frontier, where it 
is crossed by several good roads, rises to greater elevation and abruptness 
in the Riesengebirge, which forms the boundary of Bohemia. Here there 
are but few roads across; in fact, between Trautenau and Reichenberg, a 
distance of forty miles, the whole north-eastern portion ofthe range is not 
traversed by a single military road. The only road in existence there, that 
from Hirschberg to the valley ofthe Iser, stops short at the Austrian fron- 
tier. It follows, then, that this whole barrier of forty miles in length, is im- 
passable, at least for a large army, with its innumerable impedimenta, and 
that an advance upon or by Breslau must pass the mountains to the south- 
west ofthe Riesengebirge. 

Now, what are the relative positions of the two armies, with regard to 
their communications, if engaged on this route? 

The Prussians, by advancing due south from Breslau, lay open their com- 
munications with Berlin. The Austrians might, if strong enough to com- 
mand the almost absolute certainty ofvictory, leave them to advance as far 
as the intrenched camp of Olmutz, which would stop them, while they 
themselves could march upon Berlin, trusting to re-open any temporarily- 
interrupted communications by a decisive victory; or they might meet the 
Prussian columns singly as they debouch from the mountains, and, if suc- 
cessful, drive them back upon Glogau and Posen, whereby Berlin and the 
greater portion ofthe Prussian states would be at their mercy. Thus an ad- 
vance by Breslau would be advisable for the Prussians in case ofa great nu- 
merical superiority only. 

The Austrians are in a far different position. They have the advantage 
that the bulk ofthe monarchy lies south-east of Breslau;, that is, in the di- 
rect prolongation of a line drawn from Berlin to Breslau. Having fortified the 
northern bank ofthe Danube near Vienna, so as to shelter the capital from 
a surprise, they, may, temporarily and even for a length of time, sacrifice 
their direct communication with Vienna, and draw their supplies of men 
and stores from Hungary. They can, therefore, with equal safety operate by 
way of Lobau and by way of Breslau, to the north or to the south of the 
hills; they have far greater freedom in manoeuvring than their opponents. 

The Prussians, moreover, have further reasons to be cautious. From the 
northern frontier of Bohemia, the distance to Berlin is not much more than 
half ofthat to Vienna; Berlin is so much more exposed. Vienna is sheltered 
by the Danube, behind which a beaten army can find protection; by the 

Friedrich Engels 

fortifications erected to the north ofthat river; and by the intrenched camp 

of Olmutz, which the Prussians could not pass unnoticed with impunity, if 
the mass of the Austrian army, after a defeat, were to take up a position 
there. Berlin has no protection of any kind, except the army in the field. 
Under these circumstances, and those detailed in our first number, the part 5 
destined for the Prussians appears to be clearly marked out as a defensive 
one. 

The same series of circumstances, and strong political necessity besides, 
almost compels Austria to act on the offensive. A single victory may ensure 
to her great results, while her defeat would not break her power of resis- 10 
tance. 

The strategical plan of the campaign in its fundamental features is nec- 
essarily very simple. Whichever of the two attacks first, he has only this al- 
ternative: either a false attack north-west of the Riesengebirge, and the true 
attack south-east of it, or vice versa. The forty-mile barrier is the decisive 15 
feature of the seat of war, and round it the armies must gravitate. We shall 
hear of fighting at both its extremities, and a very few days afterwards will 
clear up the direction of the true attack, and probably the fate of the first 
campaign. Yet, with two such unwieldy armies opposed to each other, we 
feel inclined to think that the most direct route is the safest, and that the 20- 
difficulty and danger of moving such large bodies of troops in separate co- 
lumns on different roads through a difficult mountain country, will almost 
naturally draw both opposing armies on the route Lobau-Pardubitz. 

The actual movements which have taken place are as follows:—The 
Prussians, in the first week of June, massed their army of Saxony along the 25 j 
Saxon frontier, from Zeitz to Görlitz, and their Silesian army from Hirsch- 
berg to Neisse. By the 10th June they drew nearer together, having their 
right wing on the Elbe near Torgau, and their extreme left near Walden- 
burg. From the 12th to the 16th, the army of Silesia, now consisting of the 
Ist, 5th, and 6th corps and the Guards, were again extended to the east, 
this time as far as Ratibor, that is to say, into the extreme south-eastern 
corner of Silesia. This looks like a feint, especially the parading of the 
Guards, which are supposed to be always with the main army. Ifit be more 
than a feint, or if measures have not been taken to move these four corps 
back towards Görlitz at the shortest notice and in the shortest time, then 
this massing of more than 120,000 men in a remote corner is a palpable 
mistake; they may be cut off from all possibility of retreat and certainly 
from all connection with the remainder of the army. 

Of the Austrians we know little more than that they were concentrated 
around Olmutz. The Times correspondent in their camp states that their 
sixth corps, 40,000 strong, arrived on the 19th from Weisskirchen at 01- 

Notes on the War (1866) - II 

mutz indicating a movement to the westward. He adds that on the 21st 
head-quarters were to be shifted to Trubau, on the frontier between Mora- 
via and Bohemia. This move would point in the same direction, if it did 
not look exceedingly like a canard sent on to London with the intention of 
being thence telegraphed to the Prussian head-quarters in order to mislead 
them. A general who acts with such secrecy as Benedek, and who has such 
objections to newspaper correspondents, is not likely to inform them on the 
19th where his head-quarters will be on the 21st, unless he has his reasons 
for it. 

Before concluding, we may be allowed to cast a glance at the operations 
in North-western Germany. The Prussians had more troops here than was 
at first known. They had 15 battalions disposable in Holstein, 12 in 
Minden, and 18 in Wetzlar. By rapid concentric moves, during which the 
troops showed a quite unexpected capability of supporting forced marches, 

they took possession in two days of all the country north of a line from Co- 
blentz to Eisenach, and of every line of communication between the east- 
ern and western provinces of the kingdom. The Hessian troops, about 
7,000 strong, managed to escape, but the Hanoverians, 10,000 or 12,000, 
had their direct line of retreat towards Frankfort cut off, and already on the 
17th the rest of the 7th Prussian army corps, 12 battalions, together with 
the two Coburg battalions, arrived in Eisenach from the Elbe. Thus the 
Hanoverians appear to be hemmed in on all sides, and could escape only 
by a miracle of stupidity on the part of the Prussians. As soon as their fate 
will be settled, a force of 50 Prussian battalions will be available against the 
Federal army which Prince Alexander of Darmstadt is forming at Frank- 
fort, and which will consist of about 23,000 Wurtembergers, 10,000 Darm- 
stadters, 6,000 Nassauers, 13,000 Badeners (only mobilising now), 7,000 
Hessians, and 12,000 Austrians, now on the road from Salzburg; in all 
about 65,000 men, who may be possibly reinforced by from 10,000 to 
20,000 Bavarians. About 60,000 men of these are now reported as already 
concentrated at Frankfort, and Prince Alexander has ventured upon a for- 
ward move by re-occupying Glessen on the 22d. This, however, is of no 
consequence. The Prussians will not advance against him until they are 
well concentrated, and then, with 70,000 men of all arms, and their supe- 

rior armament, they ought to make short work of this motley army.