Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

THE SITUATION
IN THE AMERICAN THEATRE OF WAR?'6

The capture of New Orleans, as the detailed reports now to
hand show, is distinguished as an almost unparalleled act of valour
on the part of the fleet. The Unionists’ fleet consisted merely of
wooden ships: about six warships, each having from 14 to 25 guns,
supported by a numerous flotilla of gunboats and mortar vessels.
This fleet had before it two forts which blocked the passage of the
Mississippi. Within range of the 100 guns of these forts the river
was barred by a strong chain, beyond which there was a mass of
torpedoes, fire-floats and other instruments of destruction. These
first obstacles had therefore to be overcome in order to pass
between the forts. On the other side of the forts, however, was a
second formidable line of defence, formed by ironclad gunboats,
among them the Manassas, an iron ram, and the Louisiana, a
powerful floating battery. After the Unionists had bombarded the
two forts, which completely command the river, for six days
without any effect, they resolved to brave their fire, force the iron
barrier in three divisions, sail up the river and risk battle with the
“ironsides”’.* ‘The hazardous enterprise succeeded. As soon as the
flotilla effected a landing before New Orleans, the victory was
naturally decided.

Beauregard now had nothing more to defend in Corinth. His
position there only made sense so long as it covered Mississippi
and Louisiana, and especially New Orleans. He now finds himself
strategically in the position that a lost battle would leave him no
other choice than to disband his army into guerillas, for without a

a The authors use the English word.— Ed.

The Situation in the American Theatre of War 905

large town, where railways and supplies are concentrated, in the
rear of his army, he can no longer hold masses of men together.

McClellan has irrefutably proved that he is a military incompe-
tent who, having been raised by favourable circumstances to a
commanding and responsible position, wages war not to defeat the
foe, but rather not to be defeated by the foe and thus forfeit his
own usurped greatness. He bears himself like the old so-called
“manoeuvring generals”, who excused their anxious avoidance of
any tactical decision with the plea that, by strategic flanking
manoeuvres, they obliged the enemy to give up his positions. The
Confederates always escape him, because at the decisive moment
he never attacks them. Thus, although their plan of retreat had
already been announced ten days before even by the New York
papers (for example, the Tribune*), he let them retire unmolested
from Manassas to Richmond. He then divided his army and ©
flanked the Confederates strategically by establishing himself with
one body of troops near Yorktown. Siege warfare always affords
an excuse for wasting time and avoiding battle. As soon as he had
concentrated a military force superior to the Confederates, he let
them retire from Yorktown to Williamsburg and from there
further, without forcing them to give battle. A war has never yet
been so wretchedly waged. If the rearguard action at Williamsburg
ended in defeat for the Confederate rearguard instead of in a
second Bull Run?!” for the Union troops, McClellan was in no way
responsible for this result.

After a march of about twelve miles (English) in a twenty-four
hours’ downpour and through veritable seas of mud, 8,000 Union
troops under General Heintzelman (of German descent, but born
in Pennsylvania) arrived in the vicinity of Williamsburg and met
with only weak enemy pickets. As soon, however, as the enemy
had assured himself of their numerically inferior strength, he
dispatched from his picked troops at Williamsburg reinforcements
that gradually increased the number of his men to 25,000. By nine
o'clock in the morning, battle was being waged in earnest; at half
past twelve General Heintzelman discovered that the engagement
was going in favour of the foe. He sent messenger after
messenger to General Kearny, who was eight miles to his rear, but
could only push forward slowly since the road had _ been
completely “dissolved” by the rain. For a whole hour Heintzelman
remained without reinforcements and the 7th and 8th Jersey

a “Movements of the Manassas Rebels”, New-York Daily Tribune, No. 6517,
February 22, 1862.— Ed.

regiments, which had expended their stock of powder, began to
run for the woods on either side of the road. Heintzelman now
made Colonel Menill with a squadron of Pennsylvanian cavalry
take up positions on both edges of the forest, under the threat of
firing on the fugitives. This brought the latter cnce more to a
standstill.

Order was further restored by the example of a Massachusetts
regiment, which had likewise expended its powder, but now fixed
bayonets to its muskets and calmly awaited the enemy. At length,
Kearny’s vanguard under Brigadier Berry (from the State of
Maine) came in sight. Heintzelman’s army welcomed its rescuers
with a wild “Hurrah”; he ordered the regimental band to strike
up Yankee Doodle* and Berry’s fresh forces to form a line almost
half a mile in length in front of his exhausted troops. After
preliminary musket fire, Berry’s brigade made a bayonet charge at
the double and drove the enemy off the battlefield to his
earthworks, the largest of which after repeated attacks and
counter-attacks remained in the possession of the Union troops.
Thus, the equilibrium of the battle was restored. Berry’s arrival
had saved the Unionists. The arrival of the brigades of Jameson
and Birney at four o’clock decided the victory. At nine o’clock in
the evening the retreat of the Confederates from Williamsburg
began; on the following day they continued it—in the direction of
Richmond—hotly pursued by Heintzelman’s cavalry. On the
morning after the battle, between six and seven o’clock, Heintzel-
man ordered Williamsburg to be occupied by General Jameson.
The rearguard of the fleeing enemy had evacuated the town from
the opposite end only half an hour before. Heintzelman’s battle
was an infantry battle in the true sense of the word. Artillery
hardly came into action. Musket fire and bayonet attack were
decisive. If the Congress at Washington wanted to pass a vote of
thanks, it should have been to General Heintzelman, who saved
the Yankees from a second Bull Run, and not to McClellan, who
in his wonted fashion avoided “the tactical decision” and let the
numerically weaker adversary escape for the third time.

The Confederate army in Virginia has better chances than
Beauregard’s army, first because it is facing a McClellan instead of
a Halleck, and then because the many rivers on its line of retreat
flow crosswise from the mountains to the sea. However, to avoid
breaking up into bands without a battle, its generals will sooner or
later be forced to accept a decisive battle, just as the Russians were

a English title in the original.— Ed.

The Situation in the American Theatre of War 207

obliged to fight at Smolensk and Borodino?™ against the will of

the generals, who judged the situation correctly. Lamentable as
McClellan’s manner of conducting the war has been, the constant
withdrawals, accompanied by abandonment of artillery, munitions
and other military stores, and simultaneously the small unsuccess-
ful rearguard engagements, have at any rate badly demoralised
the Confederates, as will become manifest on the day of a decisive
battle. To sum up:

Should Beauregard or Jefferson Davis lose a decisive battle,
their armies will then break up into bands. Should one of them
win a decisive battle, which is most unlikely, at best the disbanding
of their armies will be deferred. They are not in a position to
draw the least lasting benefit even from a victory. They cannot
advance 20 English miles without coming to a standstill and again
awaiting the renewed offensive of the enemy.

It still remains to examine the chances of a guerilla war. But
precisely in respect of the present war of the slaveholders it is
most amazing how slight or rather how wholly lacking is the
participation of the population in it. In 1813, the communications
of the French were continually cut and harassed by Colomb,
Liitzow, Chernyshev and twenty other leaders of partisans and
Cossacks. In 1812, the population in Russia vanished completely
from the French line of march; in 1814, the French peasants
armed themselves and slew the patrols and stragglers of the Allies.
But here nothing happens at all. People resign themselves to the
fate of the big battles and console themselves with “Victrix causa diis
placuit, sed victa Catoni” The tall talk of war even with knives is
going up in smoke. There can be hardly any doubt, it is true, that
the white trash,” as the planters themselves call the “poor whites”,
will attempt guerilla warfare and brigandage. Such an attempt,
however, will very quickly transform the propertied planters into
Unionists. They will even call the Yankee troops to their aid. The
alleged burnings of cotton, etc., on the Mississippi rest exclusively
on the testimony of two Kentuckians who are said to have come to
Louisville—certainly not on the Mississippi. The conflagration in
New Orleans was easily organised. The fanaticism of the New
Orleans merchants is explained by the fact that they were obliged
to take a quantity of Confederate treasury bonds for hard cash.
The conflagration at New Orleans will be repeated in other towns;

a “The conquering cause pleased the gods, but the conquered one pleased
Cato” (Lucan, Pharsalia, I, 128).— Ed.
b Here and below the English phrase is used.— Ed.

assuredly, also, there will be a lot more burning; but theatrical
coups like this can only bring the dissension between the planters
and the “white trash” to a head and therewith— finis secessiae!*

May 30, 1862

a The end of secession.— Ed.

Karl Marx