Friedrich Engels

Waldersee on the French Army

Written in June 1861.

From the English.

[“The Volunteer Journal, for Lancashire and Cheshire” No. 42, June 22, 1861]

A short time ago a book was published at Berlin entitled “Die französische Armee auf dem Exercirplatze und im Felde” (The French Army on the Drill-ground and in the Field), which caused a great sensation and rapidly went through several editions. Although the author merely styles himself “an old officer”, it is no secret that the book was written by General Count Waldersee, formerly Prussian Minister of War. He is a man who enjoys very high esteem in the Prussian army, and has particularly distinguished himself by revolutionising the old pedantic system, seeing to it that the soldiers were taught skirmishing, patrolling, outpost duty, and the general duties of light infantry. His new method, to which we shall return on another occasion, is now introduced in the Prussian army. It is remarkable for doing away with all pedantry of forms and appealing exclusively to the intellectual powers of the soldier, every kind of service being capable of being well performed only by the intelligent and harmonious co‑operation of a number of men. An officer who lays so much stress on the intellectual training of each individual soldier could not fail to have at all times a great interest in the French army, as the one which is most distinguished by the personal military intelligence of its men. We need not, therefore, be astonished to find that this officer has made that army the special subject of his studies, and that he has many friends and acquaintances in its ranks from whom he can obtain valuable information. After the successes of the French against one of the best and bravest European armies in the Italian campaign of 1859, it became a question of European interest to what circumstances such extraordinary and constant victories were owing; and in the above-named publication General Waldersee gives what he considers an explanation of this subject.

The following is taken from an account of the general character of the French army:

“It shares all the good qualities, but also all the faults and weaknesses, of the French character. Inspired by a truly warlike spirit, it is full of combativeness, thirst for action, and love of glory, courageous and brave, as it has proved at all times, and again quite recently on the battlefields of Algeria, the Crimea, and Italy. Everywhere there were occasions on which both officers and soldiers, especially among the elite troops, performed miracles of bravery, just as the achievements of the French soldiers in these wars altogether deserve the greatest respect.

Endowed with great mobility in body and mind—which, however, often enough intensifies into continual restlessness—the French soldier is indefatigable and enduring in combat as well as in exertions of every kind.

Self-confident in the highest degree, full of ambition and vanity, every single soldier has but one desire: to march against the enemy. He knows no difficulties; he goes by the old French proverb: ‘If the thing is possible, it is as good as done; if it is impossible, it shall be done somehow.’ Without much reflection—not seldom, indeed, very recklessly—he rushes on, convinced that there are no difficulties he cannot overcome. Thus, with the élan and impetuosity peculiar to his nation, he always presses for the attack, in which his greatest strength lies. At the same time the French soldier is circumspect, adroit, especially skilled in individual combat, and accustomed to act on his own responsibility. He is resourceful and knows how to help himself in confusing situations. He understands with particular skill how to make himself comfortable in bivouac, to improvise bridges, etc., in battle, to arrange houses and villages for defence in a trice, and then to defend them with the greatest tenacity.

War is the element of an army. The French government very wisely regards war as the normal state of the troops, and treats them at all times and under all circumstances with the same earnestness and severity as in a state of war. The regiments are concentrated in camp as often as possible, and are, moreover, constantly changing garrison, so that no habits of peace can possibly arise among them. In the same spirit the training of the men is calculated solely for war, and nothing whatever is done for parade purposes. No corps is ever judged by its parade march, and it is therefore extremely striking to a foreign officer to see French battalions, even before the Emperor, execute the march past in careless bearing, in crooked lines, the soldiers without any step and at an arbitrary March pace, with the rifle over the right shoulder.

But the picture has its lights and its shadows. The many good military qualities which impetuously impel the French soldier forward show their brilliant effect only as long as the French soldier is permitted to advance. The sentiment individuel <personal feeling> which lies at the bottom of all his aptitude for the attack has also its great disadvantages. The soldier, mainly occupied with himself, goes along with the mass as long as this advances victoriously; but when this mass is violently, and perhaps still unexpectedly, forced to retreat, its cohesion, the connection of each individual with his comrade, is soon dissolved, and so much the more as, in such a case, the careless tactical training of the troops—of which more particulars will be discussed later—makes all steadfastness impossible and leads to disorder and external dissolution.

To this must be added that the French are by nature envious, and, with all their national levity, easily incline to mistrust in serious moments. The French soldier follows his officers willingly and with confidence in battle, but only so long as these officers go before him and literally lead him forward. The soldiers demand this, and when advancing in battle they say it aloud by the cry: ‘Epaulettes to the front!’ Thus superior officers and generals have always to put themselves at the head of their troops in action—for a general decisively the proper place—and this explains the considerable loss of officers which the French have suffered at all times. But when a retreat becomes unavoidable, trust in the officers soon vanishes and makes way, in the extreme case, for open disobedience. For these reasons, therefore, a retreat vigorously forced upon them has always been and will always be of the greatest danger for the French.”

General Waldersee might have added a great deal more about the ease with which the confidence of French soldiers in their officers melts away under adverse circumstances. The confidence of the men in their immediate superiors, even after repeated reverses, is the best measure of discipline. Measured by it, the French are not much better than wholly undisciplined recruits. They hold it to be a fixed fact that they can never be beaten except through “treason”; and whenever they have lost a battle and been forced to fall back more than a few hundred yards—whenever the enemy has surprised them by an unexpected movement, they have regularly raised the cry: “We are betrayed!” So much is this a part of the national character, that Napoleon, in his memoirs (written long after the events, at St. Helena), could by innuendo impute some treacherous act to most of his generals, and French historians—military as well as civil—have been able to puff up these innuendoes into the most astonishing fairy tales. As the nation thinks of the generals, so the soldier thinks of his regimental and company officers. A few hard blows, and discipline is at an end; and hence it is that, of all armies, the French have made the most disastrous retreats.

[“The Volunteer Journal, for Lancashire and Cheshire” No. 44, July 6, 1861]

On the mode of recruiting soldiers and officers, Waldersee gives the following account:

“The French soldier is destined for the service by lot among the young men; but everyone has the right to pay a sum fixed by the government for a substitute. This sum flows into a fund managed by the government, out of which the substitute receives a small sum as bounty on enlistment and the remainder at the expiration of his term; the interest is paid to him during his service. The sum due to him, however, may be wholly or partly withheld in the case of offences or bad conduct. The government thus has the selection of the substitutes entirely in its hands, and enlists as far as possible only men who have already served seven years, have proved reliable, and have conducted themselves well. A large number of trained soldiers is thus secured for the army, and they form a most excellent material for non-commissioned officers. The term of service is seven years; however, the greater number of the men are really under arms only four or five years during this period, and are on furlough for the remainder.

The non-commissioned officers are selected with particular circumspection, and are treated with great consideration and respect by their superiors. They are mostly distinguished, very advantageously, not only by outstanding efficiency and thorough knowledge of the detail service, but also by intelligence, independence, good soldierly bearing, and great earnestness, especially towards the privates, over whom they know very well how to maintain the great authority which the regulations give them. Since every non-commissioned officer may be promoted to officer, they exert themselves to keep the privates at a respectful distance, while, on the other hand, they make every effort to distinguish themselves and to set their subordinates a good example.

The greater part of the non-commissioned officers now consists of substitutes. Only a few are made corporals and sergeants during their first term of service, and among these especially such young men who bring a good education, but, owing to the great press of candidates at the military schools, have found no admission and voluntarily enter the army to try to obtain an officer’s position there. Such young men very soon rise to non-commissioned officer, and, after they have passed the service examination prescribed for the non-commissioned officer and have thereby obtained the certificate of qualification for second lieutenant, are not seldom promoted to officer after only two to four years.

The majority of the non-commissioned officers promoted to officers receive the officer’s commission after 9 to 12 years, and often only after 15 to 20 years’ service. Of 170 such officers taken at random, 16 were promoted to officer after 2 to 4 years’ service, 62 after 5 to 8, 62 after 9 to 12, and 30 after 13 to 20 years’ service. The first 16 belonged to the class of educated young men; the 62 who obtained the officer’s commission after 5 to 8 years were promoted for distinction before the enemy. Thus, even in France, promotion from the ranks of the privates goes on slowly in time of peace.”

The officers are composed, as stated above, partly of non-commissioned officers and partly (in peacetime mainly) of the pupils of the military schools, where they stay for two years and, after passing a rigorous examination, are immediately enrolled as officers in the army. These two categories of officers keep at a great distance from one another; the cadets of the military schools and the educated young men who have been promoted from the ranks after 2-4 years look down disdainfully upon the old sub-lieutenants and lieutenants who have earned their epaulettes by long service. The officers, even of the same battalion, form anything but that solid corps which they constitute in almost every other army. Yet those officers who come from the ranks of the relatively less educated men (which, particularly after the heavy losses in the Crimea and Italy, now probably make up more than half of the subaltern officers) are in their own way very useful. Although very often extremely ignorant, sometimes even coarse, and as regards their disposition not much different from the mass of non-commissioned officers in general, they know all the details of the service accurately and fulfil their sphere of duties conscientiously, with earnestness, severity and punctuality. They know excellently how the soldiers are to be treated, how one must care for them, how one must always lead them by personal example in garrison life, and especially in combat. Besides, most of them now possess good experience in camp life as well as marching and combat experience.

In general, the French officer is intelligent and eager for battle. He knows his way about – especially in combat, where he acts on his own responsibility and by his bravery always sets a good example to the soldiers. If one adds for the majority of them a good share of experience of war and combat, we must say that they possess qualities which make them very well suited for their profession.

Promotion takes place either by seniority or by selection. In peacetime, one reckons on three promotions two by seniority and one by selection; in wartime it is the reverse. But selection is generally restricted to the category of educated officers, while the mass of those who have risen from the ranks are promoted only by seniority and thus, already somewhat advanced in years, only reach the rank of captain. That is approximately the highest rank they can attain, and they are generally quite content to be able to retire on a captain’s pension.

Accordingly, in the French army one sees among the subaltern officers for the most part men of 30-40 years of age, among the captains even many nearly 50 years old; on the other hand, among the staff officers and generals a whole number of younger men. This is without doubt a great advantage; and the continuous wars in Africa, in the Crimea and in Italy, which brought relatively rapid promotions, have promoted still more young men to higher command.

In order to obtain a survey of the promotion conditions between the two categories of officers, the following statistics of officers killed and wounded in Italy or employed in higher command will be read with interest: From the military schools: 34 generals, 25 regimental commanders, 38 other staff officers, 24 captains, 33 lieutenants and sub-lieutenants. From the ranks: 3 generals, no commanding colonel, 8 staff officers, 66 captains, 95 subaltern officers.

The generals proceed less from the staff, the scientific or elite corps than from the field officers. They therefore mostly lack a higher military education, and only a few among them have les vues larges <broad outlook>. Fairly unfamiliar with strategic doctrine, they are often clumsy in the handling of large bodies of troops and therefore often need higher direction or specialist support, so that not infrequently in the field as on the exercise ground they receive a regular programme of the movements to be executed in the unfolding of an action. On the other hand, they are full of sound common sense and skilful in finding expedients, possess good knowledge of the service, zeal, earnestness and devotion to duty. The independence peculiar to them gives them the proper power to act. They know no difficulties, therefore generally act without waiting for orders or asking many questions, shun no responsibility, and, brave as the Frenchman in general, they always personally lead their troops.

The greater part of the generals has taken part in the wars in Algeria, in the Crimea and Italy, and therefore possesses good, often rich, war experience. Of the generals fighting in Italy in 1859, 28 were old Africans and 18 of these, moreover, veterans of the Crimea. Only one general (Partouneaux) made his first campaign in Italy.

This continuous fighting has given the French army a younger generation of generals than any other army can boast of. In order to prevent them from growing too old even in peacetime, lieutenant-generals are placed on half-pay and retired at 65, and major-generals at 60.

In short, the French generals may be characterised as relatively young and vigorous, circumspect, energetic, experienced in war and capable in war, even though up to now only a few of them have made themselves noticeable as especially gifted and conversant with the higher conduct of war, and even though neither in the Crimean War nor in the Italian War have any particular talents for high command developed.

["The Volunteer Journal, for Lancashire and Cheshire" No. 46 of July 20, 1861]

Our author now turns to the drill practice of the French and says:

The recruit, clumsy and awkward as he is on joining his regiment, yet not infrequently does guard duty after only 14 days – sometimes not yet fully accoutred – with the earnestness and authority of the old soldier, and develops especially quickly through the careful individual training, on which the chief accent is laid. While the company and battalion training leaves very much to be desired, the individual soldier is thoroughly trained in gymnastics, in fencing with foil and bayonet, and in sustained running at the double.

On the drill ground, the infantry is generally without a firm bearing, loose and thereby all the more clumsy; all the more mobile on the march, it is also excellently trained in route marching and covers stretches of many miles at the double, which it very often uses in combat with no little advantage. It is especially according to these performances, therefore, that the value of a troop in the French army is judged, not according to its performances in drill, still less in ceremonial march. But the French also cannot execute a good, correct ceremonial march because they lack the detailed training requisite for this and necessary for every good troop.

While our author is treating of the drill, he tells the following anecdote about Napoleon I.:

Napoleon was well aware of the disadvantages attaching to this loose drill system and did his best to remedy it. Under his iron rod the tactical forms were executed as correctly as is possible for the French, although he personally was no good drill-master. One day, in the year 1809 at Schönbrunn, he hit upon the idea of drilling a battalion of his guard himself, with drawn sword, to make them faire la théorie <literally: make them do theory>, as the French say. But after a few commands he had so completely disorganised his battalion that, sheathing his sword, he called out to a general: ‘The devil take your damned … theory! Put this piggery to rights again!’ (Que le diable emporte votre f … théorie! Redressez cette Cochonnerie!)

On the ‘Turkos’, the native Algerian troops, we find the following noteworthy statement:

According to reports of French officers, an engagement against the Austrian Jäger was above all very unpleasant for the Turkos, so that, when they learned of their presence, they not only refused to advance to the attack, but even threw themselves on the ground and, like the animals of the desert, the camels, could not be induced by threats or blows to rise and go forward.

On the drill ground of an infantry regiment:

Notwithstanding the pedantic severity with which the forms are practised, this is in general at the same time done superficially; little attention is paid to the bearing of the individual men, and thus the regulations (in company and battalion training) are carried out quite slovenly. No importance is attached to standing still in the ranks, to sharp dressing, to standing and marching closed arm-in-arm, to the condition of the clothing, or even to keeping step. It suffices if the men are only there and arrive together. In an army accustomed to such a negligent manner of drilling, these great defects have, to be sure, less disadvantage as long as it remains advancing. This system must, however, exercise a very bad influence on the discipline and the order of battle, and entails quite particularly the most disadvantageous consequences when falling back in combat. This is also the reason why the attempt to withdraw in good order during a retreat forcibly imposed has so often proved dangerous for the French, and why a retreat in the face of solid, well-trained troops will likewise always be most disastrous.

After General Waldersee has dealt with the drill, he gives an outline of Marshal Bugeaud’s combat principles (the same which we have largely translated in the preceding numbers of the “Volunteer Journal” under the heading: “On the moral elements in fighting”). Waldersee agrees entirely with these principles and attempts at the same time – and not without success – to prove that most of them are old practical guidelines that can already be found in the instructions of Frederick the Great. We pass over this as well as a lengthy strategic critique of the campaign in Italy of 1859 (in which no fewer than eighteen distinct errors of General Gyulay are pointed out), to come to the remarks on the mode of fighting of the French in that campaign.

The most essential principles of this method are:

1. wherever possible, to act only offensively,

2. to disdain fire combat and to pass over to the bayonet fight as soon and as quickly as possible – at the double –.

As soon as this became known, it was quite generally inferred that the French had always and everywhere, setting aside all forms, rushed upon the Austrians and had each time immediately, without further ado, run them down or chased them away. But the history of the campaign proves that this was by no means the case. On the contrary, it shows:

1. that the French did generally – though not always – dash forward at their opponents with vehemence, but almost never defeated them in the first onset. In general they were not only unsuccessful in this, but were in most cases repulsed several times in succession with losses, so that in every engagement they fell back almost as often as they advanced.

2. that they did frequently attack without firing, but – driven back from these – were forced to continue the fight as a fire combat, and indeed not infrequently of longer duration, even though interrupted by repeated bayonet attacks. At Magenta and Solferino such fire combats lasted for several hours.

The author then, following reports he has received from French and Austrian officers, gives an account of the tactical formations employed by the French during the Italian campaign. With excerpts from this account we shall conclude this article.

["The Volunteer Journal, for Lancashire and Cheshire" No. 62 of 8 November 1861]

Our author, having described the general character and combat principles of the French army, goes on to give a report on the tactical formations employed by it in the Italian campaign of 1859.

A French army division is composed of two brigades, of which the first consists of a chasseur battalion and two infantry regiments (each of three battalions), while the second has only two infantry regiments (i.e. six battalions). Each battalion has six companies.

In the line of battle, the first brigade forms the first line, the battalions being formed in columns at half distance and drawn up at full deploying distance, covered by a line of skirmishers. The second brigade stands in the second line, 250 yards behind, its battalions likewise in columns at half distance, but only at half deploying distance; they are generally posted behind one of the wings of the first line.

The column formation as generally used in the Italian war the French call divisional column. Two companies are designated as a division. The six companies are arranged two in front, two at half distance behind them, and again two companies at half distance behind the second pair of companies. This column can be formed either on the two centre companies or on the two outer companies of either wing. With the Guards, who consist only of picked men, it was always formed on the two centre companies, and in doing so (exactly as in the English double column on the two centre subdivisions) the time for both forming the column and deploying it was halved; but in the line it was generally formed on the two right companies. The reason was that in this way the ‘grenadier’ company (No. 1) came to the head of the column, the light or ‘voltigeur’ company (No. 6) to the rear. Thus these two companies, consisting of picked men, formed, so to speak, a frame in which the less reliable four ‘centre companies’ were enclosed. Moreover, if the two rear companies received orders to deploy as tirailleurs, the light company was one of them, while the grenadier company remained together in the front line, unless the whole battalion had to deploy as skirmishers.

For an army fighting mainly not in line, but in a combination of tirailleurs and columns, this formation offers great advantages. One-third of the soldiers (the two front companies) are always able to use their firearms, while at the same time deployment is simple and can be carried out very quickly. The great distance between the components of the column (half company distance, or about 40 yards) is very well suited to mitigate the devastation which artillery causes in denser columns; and if it is noted that usually two companies deploy as skirmishers, so that the whole column consists of two companies in front and two 40 yards behind, it can be seen that this formation approximates the line as far as possible. The two rear companies act more as a reserve or second line to the two front companies and less as immediate support, which, in attack columns on the Continent, is generally provided by the men behind the front line. Besides, although deployments into line occurred here and there in the Italian campaign, the ground in Lombardy is such that fighting in line is absolutely impossible. On these small areas, interrupted by hedges, ditches, and stone walls, and covered with corn interspersed with mulberry trees, the latter connected to one another by vines; in a country where the roads, enclosed by high walls, are so narrow that two vehicles can hardly pass each other, in such a country all regular formation often ceases as soon as the troops approach the enemy. The only necessity is to have a swarm of tirailleurs in front and to dash at the most important points with a compact mass. For this purpose, there could be no better formation than the one chosen by the French. One-third of the battalion as tirailleurs – no second line of skirmishers – the column 100 yards in rear as sufficient support – rapid advance of the whole – once close enough to the opponent, the tirailleurs clear the front of the battalion by moving to the flanks – a volley delivered by the first line and reloading – the second line follows 40 yards behind as a reserve and in as good order as the ground permits. We must admit that this method seems very well suited for all attack purposes on such ground, and keeps the soldiers together as well as possible, under the control of their officers.

Wherever the ground was open enough to allow regular movements, the attack was carried out as follows: The tirailleurs engaged the enemy until the column was ordered to advance; the reserves (if reserves were present) formed on the flanks of the line of tirailleurs and deployed against the enemy’s flanks, to outflank the advancing foe and bring him under crossfire. When the column reached the line of tirailleurs, the latter filled the intervals between the battalions and advanced in line with the head of the column; twenty yards from the enemy, the head of the column fired a volley and charged at the double. When the ground was very thickly covered, three or four companies of a battalion deployed as skirmishers, and cases are reported (the Turcos at Magenta) in which whole battalions deployed as tirailleurs.

Against an Austrian bayonet charge, a method was sometimes used similar to that prescribed in the British regulations for street firing (Battalion Drill, Section 62). The leading companies of the column fired a volley, faced outwards and marched to the rear, where they reformed; the succeeding companies did the same, until, after the rear companies had fired their volley and cleared the front, the whole battalion attacked the enemy.

In decisive moments, the soldiers were ordered to lay their knapsacks on the ground, but to equip themselves with all the ammunition in them and with some bread, which they stowed about their persons as best they could. That is the origin of the fables ‘that the Zouaves usually carried their cartridges in their trouser pockets’.

At Magenta, the Zouaves and the first Guard Grenadier regiment deployed into line and delivered file-firing for some time. At Solferino, the Guard Voltigeur division (12 battalions) deployed in a single line before going into action; but when they were actually drawn into the fighting, they seem to have been formed in the usual column. As these two deployments were carried out under the immediate command and in the presence of Louis Napoleon, there can hardly be any doubt that he ordered them in remembrance of English line manoeuvres; but in both cases the predilection of the French officers for their own national mode of fighting and the condition of the ground seem to have prevailed as soon as the affair became serious.

In the attack on a village, several columns, preceded by strong swarms of tirailleurs, were sent forward; the weaker column, intended to attack the place itself, was kept back till the last, while stronger columns outflanked the village. The troops that took the place immediately occupied and fortified it, while the reserves pursued the enemy. The French preferred to leave the defence of a village to the reserves behind or alongside the village, rather than to a strong garrison in the houses themselves.

With this extract on the tactical formations of the French army in 1859 in Italy we take leave of Count Waldersee’s work.

Although England is a far more even ground for fighting than Lombardy, its numerous enclosures, ditches, clumps of trees, and thickets, together with the hilly nature of the ground and the deep, wooded ravines that cut into it, make it a far more difficult battlefield than the great unbroken plains of northern France, Belgium, and Germany. If ever a French army should attempt a landing on English soil, there can be little doubt that its infantry formations would be very similar to those used in Italy. That is the reason why we consider these formations not uninteresting for English Volunteers.

F. E.