Friedrich Engels

Lessons of the American War

Written at the end of November 1861.

From the English.

["The Volunteer Journal, for Lancashire and Cheshire", No. 66, December 6, 1861]

When we drew attention a few weeks ago to the process of purging which had become necessary in the American volunteer army, we by no means exhausted the valuable lessons which this war affords to volunteers on this side of the Atlantic. We therefore take the liberty of returning to this subject.

The warfare as it is now practised in America is, in truth, without precedent. From the Missouri to the Chesapeake Bay, a million soldiers, divided almost equally into two hostile camps, have now confronted one another for more than six months without coming to a single major action. In Missouri the two armies advance and retreat alternately, deliver a battle, advance and retreat again, without arriving at any visible result. Even now, after seven months of marching and counter-marching, during which the country has certainly been fearfully laid waste, matters seem further than ever from a decision. After a prolonged period of apparent neutrality, but in reality a period of preparations, a similar situation appears to be imminent in Kentucky; in Western Virginia constant minor actions take place without any visible result; and on the Potomac, where the largest masses are concentrated almost within sight of each other on either bank, neither side shows any inclination to attack, thereby proving that, as things stand, not even a victory would be of any use. And unless circumstances unconnected with this situation bring about a greater change, this fruitless mode of conducting war may continue for months to come.

How can this be explained?

On both sides the Americans have almost nothing but volunteers. The small nucleus of the former regular army of the United States has either dissolved or is too weak to exert any influence on the enormous mass of untrained recruits that have accumulated on the theatre of war. There are not even enough drill-sergeants to turn all these men into soldiers. Hence the training must proceed very slowly, and one really cannot say how long it will be before the excellent soldier material assembled on both banks of the Potomac will be capable of marching off in large bodies and of delivering or accepting a battle with united forces.

But even if the men could be trained in a reasonable time, there are not enough officers to command them, let alone company officers – who cannot, of course, come from the ranks of civilians – or even officers for battalion commanders, even if every lieutenant and ensign of the regulars could be appointed to such a post. A considerable number of civilian colonels is therefore unavoidable, and no one who knows our own volunteers will think that McClellan or Beauregard are over-anxious when they decline to carry out offensive actions or complicated strategic manoeuvres with civilian colonels who have been such for only six months and are supposed to execute their orders.

Let us suppose, however, that this difficulty has in general been overcome; that the civilian colonels have, together with their uniforms, acquired the knowledge, experience, and assurance which they need for the performance of their duties – at least as far as the infantry is concerned. But what is to become of the cavalry? To train a cavalry regiment requires more time and experience on the part of the training officers than to bring an infantry regiment into shape. Suppose that all the men join their corps with an adequate knowledge of riding – that is to say, they sit their horses firmly, have them under control and know how to groom and feed them – yet this will hardly shorten the time required for their training. Military riding, that control over the horse by which it is put through all the movements necessary in cavalry evolutions, is something quite different from the ordinary riding of civilians. Napoleon’s cavalry, which Sir William Napier (“History of the Peninsular War”) rates almost more highly than the English cavalry of the present day,

consisted, as is generally known, of the very worst horsemen that ever graced a saddle; and many of our best occasional riders found, on joining a mounted volunteer corps, that they still had something to learn. We need not be surprised, therefore, to discover that the Americans have a very insufficient cavalry and that the little they possess consists of a kind of Cossacks or Indian irregular troops (rangers), incapable of a close attack.

With the artillery and with the engineers they must fare even worse. Both are highly scientific arms and require a long and careful training both for officers and for non-commissioned officers, and certainly more training for their men than the infantry. Moreover, the artillery is a more complicated arm than even the cavalry; guns are required, horses broken in for the purpose, and two groups of trained men – gunners and drivers. In addition, numerous ammunition waggons and large laboratories for the ammunition, forges, workshops, etc., are needed; all equipped with complicated machinery. The Federals are said to have 600 guns in the field; but how they are served we can easily imagine when we know that it is completely impossible to conjure up out of nothing 100 complete, well-equipped, and well-served batteries in six months.

But let us assume once more that all these difficulties have been overcome and that the fighting part of the two hostile American camps were in a proper state for their purpose, could they then already move? Certainly not! An army must be supplied; and a large army in a relatively thinly populated country like Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri must be supplied chiefly from depots. Its stock of ammunition must be replenished; it must be accompanied by gunsmiths, saddlers, carpenters, and other artisans in order to keep its war materiél in good order. All these necessary things did not exist in America; they had to be organised from almost nothing; and we have no proof whatsoever that in at least one of the two armies the commissariat and transport have yet emerged from their infancy.

America, both North and South, Federation and Confederacy, had, so to speak, no military organisation. The line army was, on account of its numbers, totally insufficient for employment against a serious enemy; the militia barely existed. The Union’s earlier wars never compelled the military forces of the country to the utmost exertion; England had not many troops available in the years between 1812 and 1814, and Mexico defended itself mainly with undisciplined hordes. The fact is that, owing to its geographical position, America had no enemies which could anywhere have attacked it with more than, at the very most, 30,000 or 40,000 regular soldiers, and for this number the immeasurable expanse of the country would be a far more terrible obstacle than any troops America might bring against them, while its army sufficed to form the nucleus for some 100,000 volunteers and to train them in a reasonable time. But when a civil war calls up more than a million fighting soldiers, the whole system breaks down, and everything has to be begun anew from the start. The results lie before us. Two enormous, clumsy bodies of troops, each afraid of the other and almost as fearful of a victory as of a defeat, confront one another and try, at immense cost, to convert themselves into a somewhat regular organisation. Terrifying as the financial outlay is, it is inevitable in consequence of the complete absence of the organised foundation upon which the edifice could have been erected. How, given the ignorance and inexperience prevailing in every part, could it be otherwise? On the other hand, the gain in efficiency and organisation which these expenditures bring is extremely small; and could it be otherwise?

The British volunteers may thank their lucky stars that from the very first they found a large, well-disciplined, and experienced professional army ready to take them under its wing. Allowing for the prejudices peculiar to every profession, this army has received and treated them well. We hope that neither the volunteers nor the public will ever believe that the volunteer movement can in any way make a regular army superfluous. If some should do so, one glance at the condition of the two American volunteer armies would show them their ignorance and folly. No army newly formed from civilians can ever remain in a competent state unless it is trained and supported by the immense intellectual and material resources which lie in the hands of a relatively strong regular army, and above all by that organisation which constitutes the regulars’ main strength. Suppose England were threatened with invasion, and let us compare what would then be done with what has been done in America. In England the War Office, with the assistance of a few officials who could easily be found among trained military professionals, would cope with all the additional work involved in an army of 300,000 volunteers; there are plenty of officers on half-pay who might each take special charge of, say, three or four volunteer battalions, and with some effort every battalion could be supplied with a line officer as adjutant and one as colonel. Cavalry could not, of course, be got ready in a great hurry; but a decisive reorganisation of the artillery volunteers, with officers and drivers from the Royal Artillery, would help to man many a field battery. The civil engineers in the country are only waiting for an opportunity to receive that training on the military side of their profession which would make them first-class engineer officers. The commissariat and transport services are organised and can soon be made to cover the requirements of 400,000 just as easily as those of 100,000. Nothing would be disorganised, nothing disturbed; everywhere there would be help and support for the volunteers, who would never have to grope in the dark. Once England plunges into a war, we see – apart from mistakes that cannot be avoided – no reason why everything should not run fairly smoothly within six weeks.

If one now looks across to America, one can see what value a regular army possesses for a volunteer army in the process of formation.