Friedrich Engels

Brighton and Wimbledon

Written about 4 April 1861.
From the English.

[“The Volunteer Journal, for Lancashire and Cheshire”, No. 31, 6 April 1861]

The exercises of the Volunteer Corps in and around London on Easter Monday seem fully to have confirmed the expectations we expressed in our
article on “Volunteer Generals”.
Lord Ranelagh’s attempt to assemble all the volunteers of his district for a day under his command at once produced a split among the various corps. A rival candidate for the supreme command arose in the person of Lord Bury; to the Brighton manoeuvre he opposed a field exercise at Wimbledon. Disagreement among the different corps was great, and the consequence was that some marched to Brighton under Lord Ranelagh’s command, some to Wimbledon under Lord Bury’s, some, independent of these, to the same place, some to Richmond, and some to Wanstead. In itself this fragmentation would have involved no disadvantage. Each corps is completely independent of the others and has the right to enjoy its days of exemption in its own way. But great disadvantages have necessarily resulted, and did result, from the sharp debates, the personal quarrels, and the hostilities that preceded this fragmentation and will certainly continue for some time. Commanding officers took sides on one side or the other; their soldiers also took sides, though not always for their own commanding officers, so that the majority of the London volunteers have been split into two great parties – the Ranelagh and the Bury party. At Brighton a large number of soldiers belonging to corps that had been ordered to Wimbledon appeared without arms but in uniform, to protest against the decision and the

orders of their own immediate superiors. Lord Ranelagh, greatly flattered by this token of sympathy, even formed them into a provisional battalion; with an extraordinarily good military taste, such as has never yet been encountered in any army, he allowed them to march up with his own soldiers. At least so reported the _Daily Telegraph_.

We now ask what right Lord Ranelagh as well as Lord Bury have to set themselves up as candidates for volunteer generals and thereby sow discord among units that have hitherto worked together harmoniously. Both officers have served with the regular troops; if they were ambitious of becoming generals, the ordinary path of rising to that rank was open to them as it is to others, and their social position gave them ten times the chance of doing so that most of their comrades enjoy. When they entered the Volunteer Corps they were well aware that the highest active rank compatible with this service is that of lieutenant-colonel, that in the event of the volunteers ever being called out, they would be combined with the line troops and militia into brigades and placed under the command of brigadier-generals of the line, and that it is precisely the nature of British military organisation which makes it impossible to appoint officers of any part of the armed forces other than the line troops to be generals. If they aspire to the rank of temporary volunteer general, they are striving for positions to which neither they nor any other volunteer officers would ever be called, and for which they are also unfit, for want of experience in handling masses of troops. If, however, merely to play the general for a day, they disturb the harmony among the various corps of their district, running the risk of doing serious harm to the movement, they deserve even sterner and more pointed condemnation.

Hitherto it has been customary, at every larger assembly of volunteers, to offer the supreme command and the appointment of brigade and divisional generals to the military commander of the district. In our
previous article
we stated that we fully approve of this procedure, because it accords with military custom and subordination and because it guarantees able commanders. We now see that it achieves still more. Had the command of the Easter affair been entrusted to the competent authorities, there would have been no split,

and all this bickering would have been avoided. But the London commanding officers seem to have filled their men with a most ridiculous fear of the Horse Guards. “For God’s sake keep the Horse Guards out of it!” is their rallying cry. We in the North are not so narrow-minded. We have always stood on excellent terms with our natural military superiors and have derived benefit from it; we hope, too, that the old system will be maintained and will preserve us from the ridiculous disputes that now divide the London corps.

How suspicious the Londoners were of the Horse Guards was shown by the outcry caused by the presence at Brighton of General Scarlett, who had been deputed by the Horse Guards to report on the proceedings. The wise men of the various corps shook their heads most gravely. The sending of this general was an attempt, on the part of the Horse Guards, to gain their end by very cunning means. The most dreadful consequences were prophesied if the thing were to be accepted as a matter of course. The volunteers should really have protested; and indeed it was alleged that General Scarlett had no claim to the salute, which was due only to the Lord Lieutenant of the county. The matter was finally settled by both of them appearing and receiving the salute jointly. But that such questions could be discussed shows how wrongly some volunteers conceive their position.

We thus see that this Easter affair has been of no benefit whatsoever to the discipline within the corps, nor with regard to subordination, nor even to deference towards the higher officers for the London volunteers.

Turning to the various field exercises, we must premise that we can only rely on the reports of the London press, which are exceedingly incomplete and confused as regards the military part. Hence any errors of fact that may occur cannot be laid to our charge.

Lord Ranelagh’s five brigades took up position east of Brighton, the town in their front, after they had marched past. They were very small; each comprised only three battalions averaging 400 men. With this force a chain of hills was to be occupied, a line far too extended for so small a number. In such a case, if 7,000 men accept an engagement, it is assumed that the enemy are not greatly superior in numbers, since otherwise they would fall back upon supports.

Consequently the commander would draw up his troops in the usual first and second line and a reserve. He would secure his flank as best he could and would entrust the repelling of any outflanking movements of the enemy to his reserves and the main body (assuming these were behind him). However, as almost all accounts seemed to show, Lord Ranelagh deployed his 7,000 men in a single line! He had drawn up a programme for three times that number, and when only 7,000 men turned up instead of 20,000, he made the small force occupy the whole extent of ground that had been designed for the larger number. If this really took place, it would once and for all demolish Lord Ranelagh’s pretensions to the rank of general, whether in the volunteers or elsewhere. We are utterly loath to believe that he could have committed such an absurdity, but we have nowhere seen the almost unanimous statement of the press contradicted and must therefore assume that it happened as described. We are even informed that there was a small reserve of a few companies, but that two-thirds of it were immediately ordered into the first line, so that there was hardly a trace of a second line or reserve in the field.

This first line with its
supposed
second line and
supposed
reserve was attacked by a
supposed
enemy, who was received by skirmishers and – after these had been thrown back – by file-firing from the companies of the right wing. Why the volunteers should learn file-firing at manoeuvres is more than we can say. We believe that all soldiers who have stood in the field will agree with us that file-firing, which at the time when the line advanced at parade step was of some use, is now completely obsolete and utterly worthless against the enemy, and that there is no useful intermediate link between skirmisher fire and the volley.

The imaginary enemy threw back the line of defence. How the action of the second line and the reserves (which after all were
supposed
to support the first line) was represented, we are unable to conceive. The battalions had not only to assume that they had been thrown back, but also that they had been relieved. Then a second chain of hills lying in the rear was occupied and again lost, but at a third change of ground a turn took place, imaginary reinforcements came up, the enemy was hurled back but not seriously pursued.

The _Times_ informs us that the movements carried out were of the simplest nature. The following is a summary which the correspondent of the _Telegraph_ received from an officer as an account of his battalion’s movements.

“Arrived in fours, the ranks formed quarter-distance columns in front of No. 1, the column wheeled left and again deployed as skirmishers in the direction of No. 1, advanced in line covered by No. 1, halted, the call to rally sounded, and the skirmishers took their turn. Fire from the companies of the right wing; the line retired and passed from the extreme right of companies in fours to the rear; change of front in column, quarter-distance column formed behind No. 1; marched in sub-divisions round the centre, deployed from the rear at wheeling distance, left wheel into line and fired a volley; advanced in company columns along and behind the right flank; formed up on No. 1, quarter-distance columns in front of No. 1; deployed on No. 2; then No. 1 moved into the front line and the remainder wheeled to the right front, formed quarter-distance columns behind No. 1 in fours to the left and thus left the hill.”

Concerning the manner in which these movements were carried out, we only know that, as usual with volunteers, distances were very often lost and the companies fell apart when forming up.

At Wimbledon Lord Grosvenor manoeuvred his battalion early in the morning and marched off when Lord Bury’s two brigades (less than 4,000) arrived. These went through a very simple exercise, which was, however, very well suited to give the men an idea of the occurrences and movements such as arise in a real war. The whole affair is so well described in Colonel McMurdo’s address that we need only add that here, too, in order to fill the time between the falling back of the skirmishers and the opening of volley fire, we find file-firing, which we judge most decidedly to be wrong in every respect. At such moments the Duke of Wellington ordered his men to lie flat on the ground rather than stand upright and be shelled by the artillery, and to reply with a weak, ineffective file-fire that was demoralising to themselves. For the rest, we entirely agree with the excellent address by McMurdo with which we close these remarks. We hope all Volunteers will note and bear in mind what he says about company drill. The basic training of Volunteers

is necessarily less complete than that of the regular soldier, but it is nevertheless of the highest importance for the reliability of battalions. Only the greatest attention to company drill can to some extent remedy this unavoidable deficiency.

Colonel McMurdo says:

“Volunteers! To men who understand something of the matter, the movements you have carried out today need not be explained in the smallest detail. I consider it necessary, however, to direct your attention to the character of the two positions you have occupied in the course of the field exercises performed. The first position you took up today was naturally very strong, so strong that two-thirds of the enemy could not have been brought into action. Neither could his cavalry have acted with success, nor his artillery have done you harm—except by vertical fire. It was assumed that the enemy, considering this position too strong, strove to reach the plateau on which we now stand, by falling upon our flank along one of these long valleys in the direction of Wimbledon. It was therefore necessary for you to abandon the strong position you previously held and to change your front to the left. The enemy had a double object in view. He wanted to get on to level, flat ground, where he could employ artillery as well as cavalry and infantry in the fight, and, by falling upon your left flank, he wanted to reach the Wimbledon road, along which he could march through your position upon London. It is my wish to make clear to you the difference between the two positions you held. It was something quite different when you lay on the rugged hill, where neither cavalry nor artillery could reach you. You held the enemy back there, and any number of brave soldiers at all could have held the enemy back there; but here you have been led, as it were, on to a kind of billiard table, where you might be exposed to the operations of perhaps the best troops in Europe. I observed, as the line formed here, that some battalions were a little unsteady. I do not blame them for it, for they still have very little practice. Yet they were unsteady, and if they are so today when forming the line, what would happen if this plain here were swept by enemy artillery, if you were near to perishing of thirst, if many of your comrades were falling close to you, and if, suddenly, amid dust and smoke, you felt the ground rock under your feet from a heavy attack of the enemy’s cavalry? Consider how readily young troops can become unsteady under such circumstances! What, then, overcomes all this? Discipline, and again discipline. By discipline I do not mean the correction of bad bearing—I mean rather the habitual connection, the unity of body and mind directed to a definite purpose; that connection of body and mind which sets the whole in action and makes a company, a battalion, a brigade act like a machine. This can, however, be attained only by company drill; it can be attained only if great attention is paid to individual

drill, because I regard a company as the unit of the army, and if the individuals are well-drilled and steady, then the company is steady, and the whole army will be steady. Everything you have learned about shooting, all your zeal, all your patriotism, will be useless on the day of battle without a thorough knowledge of company drill. Company drill, and nothing but company drill, does it, and therefore I ask you to consider that excellent shooting is not everything, because it avails nothing if you have not formed the line with complete steadiness under fire. Gentlemen, you have had a hard day’s work on the damp ground; I will therefore detain you no longer, but leave you to return to those homes which you are so well able to protect.”

F. E.