Frederick Engels

Could the French Storm London?

Written at the end of July 1860.

From the English.

[“New-York Daily Tribune” No. 6021, 11 August 1860]

The report of the British National Defence Commission, recently published in London, states that, if the Emperor of the French were disposed to set a hostile army in motion against England, it would be impossible for “all the available ships of the Royal Navy” to prevent it from landing at any point on the 2,147-mile-long coast of England and Wales, to say nothing of the coast of Ireland. Since it has been admitted on various occasions both before and since the appearance of the famous pamphlet by de Joinville that a landing of 100,000 Frenchmen or more, under skilful leadership, could be effected on the British Isles, the only important point to be considered is what power of resistance Great Britain has at its command to oppose to such an invasion.

In pursuance of an order of the House of Commons, a return was made last May of the strength of the British land forces. It showed the following: total regimental strength, 144,148; effective strength on 1 May, aggregate, 133,952; embodied militia, 19,333. When these figures were published, an almost unanimous lamentation arose in all parts of the three kingdoms at the manner in which the 75,000,000 dollars voted for the army had been expended, since an analysis of the 144,148 men given as the available material of the line troops “disclosed the appalling fact that scarcely 30,000 infantry could be brought together for offensive or defensive purposes at any given point.”

Mr. Sidney Herbert and his friends of the Horse Guards at once held a consultation, and the London *Times* endeavoured to allay the public uneasiness. It wrote:

“We took the opportunity of checking the figures on which these statements are based, and explained the current situation in detail.”

The London *Times* attempts to

“show that, if it was intended by the term ‘troops’ to designate only the line infantry, the facts were stated fairly accurately; but that in reality the home forces included strong divisions of other arms, so that their total strength is by no means as small as might be supposed.”

The result of this nervousness on the part of the public as well as of the Horse Guards’ consultation was a completely new statistical table, which put the home military forces of Great Britain at 323,259, or 179,111 men more than the statistics issued two months earlier. The discrepancy requires no great explanation. The first figures were published with the intention of showing how many men would be ready for immediate action under favourable circumstances and on a reasonable estimate; the latter, in order to ascertain the total number of all men and youths entered in the regimental lists, who therefore have a share in the 75,000,000 dollars, besides 227,179 volunteers and militia, of whom fully 200,000 do not exist as soldiers. Then there are 33,302 men enumerated who belong to the “depots”. Lest we be accused of prejudice in describing what these “depots” are, we quote the London *Times* as an authority:

“The troops in the depots do not really belong to the home establishment, but to the foreign one. They are parts of the battalions serving abroad, and it is not surprising that they should be comparatively ineffective for home service.”

In short – they are an ineffective body of troops, composed of recruits with not more than three months’ service, who are embarked every quarter or more often, as soon as they are called for, for the foreign regiments, and of old invalids who are left at home as unfit for service, “so that the corps, partly through the worn-out and partly through the yet untrained soldiers, is never in the condition of a regular battalion.”

So much for the depots. Now for the volunteers and militia. One need only repeat that at present at least 200,000 men exist merely on paper. Mr. Maguire recently proved in Parliament that almost every militia regiment has 200 to 300 men more in the Horse Guards’ lists than can ever be brought together at any parade. Mr. Sidney Herbert made a similar admission. Of the Irish militia regiments, whose members are compelled by oppression and poverty to attend more punctually than their English neighbours, many that are now estimated at 800 men – the Waterford regiment, for instance – have only 400. If the strength of the militia and volunteers of England is estimated at 138,560, that would probably correspond to what an impartial statistician is able to ascertain.

The regular army at home, according to the recent report of the War Office, has a strength of 68,778 men. Included in this are the Royal Horse Guards (1,317), the Royal Engineers (2,089), the Army Medical Corps, consisting of discharged invalids, the train, and other troops partly unfit for action. To avoid this controversial point, let us assume that the entire 68,000 men are available. This would give, if the whole militia and all volunteers were raised and under arms, a total strength of 206,560 men. We will even add the Irish constabulary to this statement, thus raising it to about 237,000 men. The nominal strength of the regular army and the embodied militia is at present given as 100,000, some 16,000 men more than the real figures; but let us take the figures as they are given. Allow that within three days after the landing of the French, 15,000 volunteers could be assembled at a given point, then England would still have an army of 115,000 men at its disposal. It must be borne in mind that 25,000 of these are unskilled in the use of arms. Now, all the naval arsenals, armouries, and fortified places in the districts would require extra garrisons, for there are never more than 8,000 marines ashore in the harbours. Ireland will require an army, even if no great importance is attached to the influence of the “National Petition” in achieving a friendly attitude towards MacMahon’s soldiers. Neither the volunteers nor the whole militia would suffice to maintain order on the Green Isle, Ireland, in the prospect of a fight.

Her Majesty’s authorities would have to provide, besides the police, at least 10,000 regulars and 25,000 irregulars for that country. This would amount in all to about 55,000 men, and leave only 80,000 soldiers for England and Wales to protect the armouries, magazines, and naval arsenals. It is idle to suppose that less than 20,000 serviceable troops would suffice for this important task, even if it is conceded that the discharged or inexperienced men in the depots are capable of holding their own. Thus Napoleon’s 100,000 Frenchmen, Zouaves, etc., would face 60,000 redcoats, of whom scarcely more than 45,000 belonged to the line. The probable issue of an encounter between the two forces thus confronting each other leaves hardly any room for doubt.

It will be objected that France could not equip and send 100,000 men across the Channel without that becoming known. That may be; but England would not know whither the blow would be directed. It would naturally be concerned for the safety of its possessions on the Mediterranean coast and would try to reinforce its garrisons there, so that under the pretext of an attack on London no ulterior designs upon Malta and Gibraltar could be concealed. England would send 20,000 or 30,000 soldiers to those places with some ships of the Channel Fleet, and these would be no “volunteers”, so that the latter would in the main be left with the task of resisting the enemy at home. Some eminent writers declare that even the storming of London would in the end be less detrimental to England than its expulsion from Malta and Gibraltar.

But it will be urged that the mere announcement of a national danger would suffice to rouse every Briton in the country, from the Cheviot Hills to Cornwall, to drive the invader into the sea. That is plausible. Experience, however, teaches us that – however strong the patriotism of the masses may be – the fact that they, as a rule, have no arms, and if they had them would not know how to use them, greatly reduces the value of their availability. Cudgels and pitchforks may be extremely dangerous weapons for human beings in Seven Dials (the poor quarter of London) or in the provinces, but it would be foolish to suppose that they are invincible when it comes to driving back the Zouaves. It may also be seriously doubted whether the middle classes, who almost exclusively compose the volunteer corps, would be as ready to obey the call to muster if the French were stationed on their home island as they are when called upon to receive Her Majesty’s congratulations. In any case, it is no more extravagant to admit the possibility that an invading army might number 150,000 men than to assume that 120,000 volunteers could be raised, when a cordial invitation from Buckingham Palace after a twelve months’ recruiting drive fails to bring together more than 18,300.

Since some doubts have been expressed concerning the number of troops actually mustered in Hyde Park, we quote an article from the *Manchester Guardian* on the parade on the second day. The private correspondent here referred to is Mr. Tom Taylor, an intimate and trusted friend of Colonel McMurdo:

“Our private correspondent, as our readers will remember, put the number at 18,300 on the official testimony of Colonel McMurdo, which is somewhat less than the figure given in Sir John Burgoyne’s calculation. But the martial bearing of the volunteers evidently made a stronger impression on Sir John than their mere numbers.”

In estimating the forces that could probably be brought together to oppose invaders, we have deliberately made a very generous calculation in favour of Great Britain. Our statistics of the regular army assume every man whose name is on the military lists, whether sick or healthy, to be fit for service. The militia and the volunteers have been set down at a strength of 115,000 men, which those well informed on this subject may consider exaggerated. The acknowledged capability of the French troop officers, the excellent discipline of the French military, the general superiority of French tactics, and on the other side the proven stupidity of many of the highest officers in the English army, the negligent provisioning of the regulars and volunteers (a raised militia regiment had, in May of this year, five weeks after the report was made, still 135 barefoot members), even the admitted inferiority of the ensemble <the whole> of an English fighting army compared with that of a French one – all this has not been taken into account, although these are extremely important factors in the discussion of the subject.

In view of these facts, it seems certain that Napoleon, if he landed tomorrow in a cleverly chosen port of England with 150,000 or even only 100,000 men, could “storm London” and escape the “annihilation” which, according to the recent assertion of a London journal, would be his inevitable fate if he “set foot with hostile intent on Anglo-Saxon soil.”