Friedrich Engels

Cavalry

Written between the beginning of March and about 21 June 1858.

From the English.

["The New American Cyclopædia", Volume IV]

Cavalry
(French *cavalerie*, from *cavalier* = rider, from *cheval* = horse) – a body of troops mounted on horses. The use of the horse for riding and the introduction of mounted troops into armies naturally originated in those countries where the horse was indigenous and where the climate and the growth of grass favoured the development of all its physical qualities. While the horse in Europe and in tropical Asia soon degenerated into a clumsy animal or a stunted pony, the breeding of Arabia, Persia, Asia Minor, Egypt, and the northern coast of Africa produced great beauty, speed, docility, and endurance. The horse appears, however, at first to have been used only as a draught animal; at least, in the history of war the war chariot makes its appearance much earlier than the armed rider. On the Egyptian monuments many chariots are to be seen, but, with a single exception, no riders; and this exception probably dates from the Roman period. Yet there can be no doubt that the Egyptians possessed a numerically strong cavalry at least some centuries before the conquest of the country by the Persians; the commander of this arm is mentioned more than once among the most important officials of the court. Very probably the Egyptians became acquainted with cavalry during their war with the Assyrians, for on the Assyrian monuments riders are often depicted, and their very early use in the Assyrian armies in war has been established with certainty. The saddle, too, seems to have originated with them. On the older sculptures the soldier rides on the bare back of the animal; in a later epoch we find a kind of pad or cushion, and finally a high saddle, similar to that now in general use throughout the East.

The Persians and Medes, at their entrance into history, were horse-

peoples. Although they retained the war chariot and even accorded it the precedence, dating from ancient times, over the younger arm, the cavalry, the latter nevertheless acquired, through the great numerical strength of the mounted men, an importance which it had never possessed in earlier armies. The cavalry of the Assyrians, Egyptians, and Persians was the same as that which still prevails in the East and as was invariably used down to the most recent times in North Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, namely, irregular cavalry.

When the Greeks, however, had so far improved their horses by crossing them with the eastern breeds that they were fit for cavalry purposes, they began to organise this arm according to a new principle. They are the creators of both regular infantry and regular cavalry. They formed the masses of warriors into fixed units, armed and equipped them appropriately, and taught them to act in concert, to move in rank and file, to keep together in a given tactical formation, and thus to throw the whole weight of their concentrated and advancing mass upon a given point of the enemy’s front. Organised in this form, they everywhere proved superior to the untrained, cumbersome, and unmanageable masses which the Asiatics led against them. Down to the time when the Persians themselves formed a cavalry of a more regular kind, we know of no instance of an engagement between Greek cavalry and Persian riders; but there can be no doubt that the result would have been the same as in an encounter between the infantry of the two nations. Cavalry was at first organised only by the horse-breeding tribes of Greece, e.g. the Thessalians and Boeotians; but very soon afterwards the Athenians raised, besides mounted archers for outpost duty and skirmishing, a unit of heavy cavalry. From the elite of their youth the Spartans had likewise formed a mounted bodyguard, but they placed no confidence in cavalry and therefore made them dismount in battle and fight as infantry.

The Persians learned from the Greeks of Asia Minor and also from the Greek mercenaries serving in their army the formation of regular cavalry, and undoubtedly a considerable portion of the Persian horse that fought against Alexander the Great was more or less trained to act regularly in close order units.

To the Macedonians, however, they were not equal. Among this people, riding was an indispensable part of the education of the noble youths, and the cavalry occupied a first-rate position in their army. The

cavalry of Philip and Alexander consisted of the Macedonian and Thessalian nobility, together with a few squadrons recruited in Greece proper. It was composed of heavy horsemen – *cataphractae* –, armed with helmet and breastplate, greaves, and a spear. It usually attacked in close formation, in rectangular or wedge-shaped column, sometimes also in line. The light cavalry, consisting of auxiliaries, was more or less irregular and served, like the Cossacks today, for outpost duty and skirmishing.

The Battle of the Granicus (334 B.C.) affords the first example of an encounter in which cavalry played a decisive role. The Persian cavalry was posted within attacking distance of the fords of the river. As soon as the heads of the columns of the Macedonian infantry had crossed the river and before they could deploy, the Persian horse fell upon them and drove them impetuously back into the river. This manoeuvre, repeated several times with complete success, proves that the Persians could oppose regular cavalry to the Macedonians. In order to surprise infantry just at the moment of its greatest weakness, that is, when it is passing from one tactical formation to another, the cavalry must be firmly in hand and completely under the control of its commanders. Irregular troops are incapable of this. Ptolemy, who commanded the vanguard of Alexander’s army, could make no headway until the Macedonian heavy cavalry had crossed the river and attacked the Persians in flank. A long struggle followed, but the Persian horse were at last put to flight, as they were drawn up in a single line without reserves and were finally deserted by the Asiatic Greeks in their army.

The Battle of Arbela (331 B.C.) was the most glorious battle for the Macedonian cavalry. Alexander himself led the Macedonian horse, which formed the extreme right wing of his order of battle, while the Thessalian horse stood on the left. The Persians attempted to outflank him; but at the decisive moment Alexander brought fresh troops to the front to outflank the Persians in turn, who in the meantime had left a gap between their left wing and their centre. Alexander instantly dashed into this gap, separated the left wing from the rest of the army, rolled it up completely, and pursued it over a considerable distance. When Alexander was then called upon to come to the aid of his own hard-pressed left wing, he rallied his cavalry in a very short time, led them behind the

enemy’s centre, and attacked its right wing in the rear. With that the battle was won, and from that day Alexander ranks among the greatest cavalry generals of all times. To crown this exploit, his cavalry pursued the flying enemy so impetuously that his vanguard stood the next day 75 miles from the field of battle.

It is very interesting to observe that the general principles of cavalry tactics were as well mastered then as they are today. To attack infantry in its march formation or during a change of formation; to attack cavalry always in the flanks; to profit by every gap in the enemy’s line by dashing into it and then wheeling right or left, in order to take the troops adjacent to such a gap in flank and rear; to exploit a victory by the rapid and unrelenting pursuit of the shattered enemy – these rules are among the first and most important that every cavalry officer has to learn today. After Alexander’s death we hear no more of that excellent cavalry of Greece and Macedonia. In Greece the infantry again predominated; in Asia and in Egypt, too, the mounted arm soon decayed.

The Romans were never horsemen. The numerically small cavalry belonging to the legions preferred to fight on foot. Their horses were inferior, and the men could not ride.

In the south of the Mediterranean region, however, a cavalry was created which not only equalled that of Alexander but even surpassed it. The Carthaginian generals Hamilcar and Hannibal had succeeded in raising, besides their Numidian irregular horse, a first-rate regular cavalry and thus in creating a weapon which secured them the victory almost everywhere. The Berbers of North Africa, at least those of the plains, are to the present day a race of horsemen, and the magnificent Berber horse which carried Hannibal’s warriors into the dense masses of the Roman infantry with a speed and vehemence unknown before still mounts the best regiments of the entire French cavalry, the *chasseurs d’Afrique*, and is recognised by them as the best war-horse of all. The Carthaginian infantry was far inferior to the Roman, even after it had been trained for a long time by its two great commanders; it would not have had the slightest chance in combat against the Roman legions had it not been supported by that cavalry, by virtue of which alone Hannibal could maintain himself for 16 years in Italy. When this cavalry was ground down, not by the sword of the enemy, but by the constant

Having exhausted his strength in so many campaigns, he could no longer maintain himself in Italy. What the battles of Hannibal and Frederick the Great have in common is that in most cases the cavalry defeated first-class infantry; the cavalry never performed such glorious deeds as under these two great commanders. We do not know precisely from which people and according to which tactical principles Hamilcar and Hannibal formed their regular cavalry. However, since their Numidian light cavalry is always clearly distinguished from the heavy or regular cavalry, we can conclude that the latter was not composed of Berber tribes. It is very probable that it included many foreign mercenaries and some Carthaginians, but the great mass certainly consisted of Spaniards; for the regular cavalry had been raised in Spain, and even in Caesar’s time Spanish horsemen belonged to most Roman armies. The fact that Hannibal was well acquainted with Greek civilisation and that Greek mercenaries and adventurers had served under the Carthaginian flag before his time leaves hardly any doubt that the organisation of the Greek and Macedonian heavy cavalry formed the basis for the Carthaginian one. The very first clash in Italy proved the superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry. At the Ticinus (218 B.C.E.), the Roman consul Publius Scipio, while on reconnaissance with his cavalry and light infantry, encountered the Carthaginian cavalry, which under Hannibal’s leadership was pursuing similar objectives. Hannibal immediately attacked. The Roman light infantry formed the first line, the cavalry the second. The Carthaginian heavy cavalry fell upon the infantry, scattered it, and then at once hurled itself from the front upon the Roman cavalry, while the Numidian irregular horsemen attacked it in flank and rear. It was a short battle. The Romans fought bravely, but they had no prospect of success. They could not ride; their own horses overpowered them; frightened by the flight of the Roman light-armed troops, who were thrown back upon the cavalry and sought shelter among them, many horses threw their riders and broke up the order of battle. Other riders, who did not trust their own equestrian skill, were prudent enough to dismount and tried to fight as infantry. But already the Carthaginian heavy horse were in their midst, while the baleful Numidians galloped around the confused mass, cutting down any fugitive who separated himself from it. The Romans suffered considerable losses, and Publius Scipio himself was wounded.

At the Trebia, Hannibal succeeded in enticing the Romans to cross the river, so that they had to fight with this obstacle in their rear. Scarcely had they crossed when Hannibal advanced against them with all his troops and forced them to battle. Like the Carthaginians, the Romans had their infantry in the centre, but opposite the two Roman wings formed by cavalry, Hannibal placed his elephants and used his cavalry to outflank and envelop both wings of the enemy. At the very beginning of the battle the Roman cavalry, thus outflanked and numerically inferior, was completely defeated; but the Roman infantry drove back the Carthaginian centre and gained ground. The victorious Carthaginian cavalry now attacked it from the front and in the flank; it forced the Roman infantry to renounce further advance, but could not break it. Hannibal, however, knowing the steadiness of the Roman legion, had dispatched 1,000 cavalry and 1,000 picked foot soldiers under his brother Mago by a circuitous route to their rear. These fresh troops now attacked, and succeeded in breaking the Romans’ second line; but the first line, 10,000 men, closed up, forced its way through the enemy in close order and marched down the river to Placentia, where it crossed unmolested.

At the battle of Cannae (216 B.C.E.), the Romans had 80,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, the Carthaginians on the other hand 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. The cavalry of Latium formed the Roman right wing, which stretched along the Aufidus, the cavalry of the Italian allies stood on the left wing, while the infantry formed the centre. Hannibal likewise drew up his infantry in the centre, whose two wings were formed by the Celtic and Spanish levies, while beside them, somewhat further back, stood his African infantry, now armed and organised on the Roman model. Of his cavalry he formed the Numidians on the right wing, where the open plain allowed them, owing to their superior mobility and speed, to evade the attacks of the Italian heavy cavalry facing them, while the whole of the heavy cavalry under Hasdrubal was posted on the left wing, close to the river. On the Roman left wing the Numidians gave the Italian cavalry a great deal of trouble, but precisely because they were irregular cavalry they could not break the firm order of the Italians by regular attacks. In the centre the Roman infantry soon drove back the Celts and Spaniards and then formed itself into a wedge-shaped column in order to attack the African infantry. These, however, wheeled inwards, attacked the unwieldy mass in line, and thus broke its charge; the battle now began to stagnate. But meanwhile Hasdrubal’s heavy cavalry had prepared the Romans’ defeat. After it had impetuously attacked the Roman cavalry of the right wing, it scattered them after fierce resistance, bypassed the Roman centre like Alexander at Arbela, fell upon the Italian cavalry in the rear, completely shattered it, left it to the Numidians as easy prey, and formed up for a general attack on the flanks and rear of the Roman infantry. This brought about the decision. The unwieldy mass, attacked from all sides, fell back, pulled apart, was broken, and succumbed. Never had an army been so completely annihilated. The Romans lost 70,000 men; of their cavalry only 70 escaped. The Carthaginians lost scarcely 6,000 men, two-thirds of whom fell to the Celtic contingents, which had to bear the shock of the legions’ first attack. Of Hasdrubal’s 6,000 regular cavalry, which had won the entire battle, no more than 200 had been killed or wounded.

The Roman cavalry of later times was not much better than that of the Punic Wars. It was attached to the legions in small detachments and never formed an independent arm. In addition to this cavalry with the legions, there were in Caesar’s time Spanish, Celtic, and German mounted mercenaries, all of a more or less irregular character. No cavalry serving with the Romans ever performed deeds worth mentioning; this arm was so neglected and ineffective that even the Parthian irregulars of Khorasan were always exceedingly dreaded by the Roman armies.

In the eastern half of the empire, however, the old passion for horses and horsemanship retained its influence, and Byzantium remained until its conquest by the Turks the great horse market and riding school of Europe. Hence we see that during the temporary revival of the Byzantine Empire under Justinian, the cavalry there stood at a comparatively high level, and the eunuch Narses is said to have defeated the Germanic invaders in Italy in the battle of Capua in 554 mainly with the help of this arm.

The rise of a conquest-loving aristocracy of Germanic origin in all the countries of Western Europe ushered in a new epoch in the history of cavalry. The nobility everywhere devoted itself to mounted service and formed, under the name of Geharnischte (gens d’armes), a mounted force of the heaviest kind, in which not only the riders but also the horses were cased in metal armour. The first battle in which such cavalry appeared was that of Poitiers, where Charles Martel in 732 drove back the tide of the Arab invasion. The Frankish chivalry under Eudes, Duke of Aquitaine, broke through the ranks of the Moors and took their camp. But such a force was not suited for pursuit, and the Arabs were therefore able to withdraw unmolested to Spain under the protection of their untiring irregular cavalry. This battle marks the beginning of a series of wars in which the massive but clumsy regular cavalry of the West fought the mobile irregulars of the East with varying success. Throughout almost the entire tenth century the German knights crossed swords with the wild Hungarian horsemen and defeated them decisively through their close order of battle at Merseburg in 933 and on the Lech in 955. The Spanish chivalry fought the Moors who had invaded their country for several centuries and finally overcame them. But when, during the Crusades, the Western “heavy knights” transferred the theatre of war to the eastern homeland of their opponents, they were in their turn defeated and in most cases completely annihilated; neither they nor their horses could endure the climate, the enormously long marches, and the lack of suitable food and fodder.

These Crusades were followed by a new invasion of Europe by eastern horsemen, that of the Mongols. After they had overrun Russia and the Polish provinces, they clashed in 1241 at Wahlstatt in Silesia with a combined Polish and German army. After a long struggle the Asiatics defeated the exhausted armoured knights, but the victory was bought so dearly that it broke the strength of the invaders. The Mongols advanced no further, soon ceased to be dangerous owing to their internal dissensions, and were driven back.

Throughout the whole of the Middle Ages cavalry remained the principal arm of all armies; among the eastern peoples the light irregular cavalry had always held this position; among the peoples of Western Europe, during this period, the heavy regular cavalry formed by the knighthood was the arm that decided every battle. This pre-eminence of mounted troops resulted less from their own excellence – for the irregulars of the East were incapable of disciplined fighting, and the regulars of the West were in their movements incredibly heavy-

due — but was primarily a consequence of the poor quality of the infantry. Asiatics as well as Europeans despised this branch of the service; it was composed of those who could not afford a horse, hence mainly of slaves and serfs. The foot troops had no separate organisation; without armour, with pike and sword as their sole weapons, they could indeed hold their own here and there by their deep formation against the wild but undisciplined attacks of Eastern horsemen, but they were inevitably ridden down by the invulnerable knights of the West. The only exception was the English infantry, whose strength rested on their terrible weapon, the longbow. The numerical proportion of the European cavalry of this period in relation to the rest of the army was certainly not as great as it was a few centuries later or even still is today. The knights were not very numerous, and we can ascertain that in many great battles no more than 800 or 1,000 took part. Yet they generally sufficed to dispose of any number of foot soldiers, once they had succeeded in driving the hostile knights from the field. Usually these knights fought in line, in a single rank; the rear rank was formed by squires, who generally wore less complete and less heavy armour. Once these lines had penetrated into the enemy’s ranks, they soon broke up into individual combatants, and the battle was concluded in direct man-to-man combat. Later, when firearms gradually came into use, deep formations were adopted, usually squares; but by that time the days of the knightly order were already numbered.

During the 15th century not only was artillery introduced on the battlefield and a part of the infantry, the marksmen of that time, armed with muskets, but the character of the infantry itself changed altogether. This branch of the service was now formed by the recruiting of mercenaries who made soldiering their profession. The German Landsknechte <Landsknechte: in the "New American Cyclopædia" deutsch> and the Swiss were such professional soldiers, and they very soon introduced more regular formations and tactical movements. In a certain sense the old Dorian and Macedonian phalanx was revived; a helmet and a breastplate afforded the soldier some protection against lance and sabre of the cavalry; when the Swiss infantry actually drove the French chivalry from the field at Novara (1513), there was no longer any place for such brave but clumsy horsemen. After the rising of the Netherlands against Spain, we therefore find a new kind of cavalry, the German Reiter <Reiter: in the "New American Cyclopædia" deutsch> (reitres among the French), who, like the infantry, were raised by voluntary enlistment and armed with helmet and breastplate, sword and pistols. They were as unwieldy as the cuirassiers of today, but far lighter than the knights. They soon proved their superiority over the heavy knights. The latter now disappeared and with them the lance; the sword and short firearms henceforth formed the general armament of the cavalry.

About the same time (end of the 16th century) the hybrid branch of dragoons was introduced, first in France and then in the other countries of Europe. Armed with muskets, they were intended to fight according to circumstances either as infantry or as cavalry. A similar corps, called dimachae, had been formed by Alexander the Great, but that had not been imitated before. The dragoons of the 16th century lasted longer, yet by the middle of the 18th century they had everywhere lost their hybrid character, save the name, and were generally employed as cavalry. The most important feature of their formation was that they were the first regular cavalry force to wear no protective equipment whatever. Tsar Nicholas of Russia again attempted, on a large scale, to create genuinely hybrid dragoons; but it soon proved that in the face of the enemy they always had to be used as cavalry, and therefore Alexander II very soon converted them into ordinary cavalry, which, like the hussars or cuirassiers, gave up fighting dismounted.

Maurice of Orange, the great Dutch commander, was the first to form his Reiter <Reiter: in the "New American Cyclopædia" deutsch> in something like our modern tactical formation. He taught them to execute attacks and tactical evolutions in separate bodies and in more than one rank, to wheel, to halt, to form column and line, and to change front in single squadrons and detachments without falling into disorder. Thus a cavalry engagement was no longer decided by a single charge of the entire mass, but by successive charges of single squadrons and lines supporting each other. Maurice of Orange’s cavalry was generally drawn up 5 ranks deep. In other armies it fought in deep formations, and where a linear formation was employed, it was still 5 to 8 ranks deep.

The 17th century, having finally done away with the costly knights, increased the numerical strength of the cavalry to a prodigious extent. In no army was the proportion of this branch of the service ever so great; during the Thirty Years’ War every army generally consisted of two-fifths to nearly one-half of cavalry, in individual cases there were two horsemen to one foot soldier. Gustavus Adolphus stands at the head of the cavalry commanders of this period. His mounted troops consisted of cuirassiers and dragoons, the latter almost always fighting as cavalry. His cuirassiers, too, were much lighter than those of the Emperor and soon proved their undeniable superiority. The Swedish cavalry was formed in 3 ranks; contrary to the cuirassiers of most armies, whose main weapon was the pistol, it had orders not to lose time by firing, but to attack the enemy with the sabre in hand. In this period the cavalry, which during the Middle Ages had generally been placed in the centre, was again, as in antiquity, stationed on the wings of the army and drawn up there in 2 lines.

In England the Civil War produced two excellent cavalry leaders. Prince Rupert, on the royalist side, certainly possessed the “dash” of a cavalry general, but almost always allowed himself to be carried away, lost command over his cavalry, and was so engrossed by the immediate events in front of him that the general in him invariably gave way to the “bold dragoon.” On the other side was Cromwell, a far better general, who possessed equal dash where it was required; he kept his soldiers well in hand, always held a reserve in readiness for unforeseen events and decisive movements, knew how to manoeuvre, and thus generally carried off the victory over his hotheaded opponent. He won the battles of Marston Moor and Naseby solely by his cavalry.

In most armies the firearm still remained the cavalry’s chief weapon in battle, except among the Swedes and the English. In France, Prussia, and Austria, the cavalry was trained to use the carbine exactly as the infantry used the musket. It fired from horseback by squads, platoons, ranks, etc., the line halting while this was done; when the attack was made, the cavalry advanced at a trot, halted a short distance from the enemy, fired a volley, drew the sabre and then charged. The effective fire of the long infantry lines had shattered all confidence in a charge of cavalry that was no longer protected by armour; as a result riding was neglected, movements could not be executed at a fast pace, but even at slow pace accidents to man and horse occurred frequently. In training, the cavalry mostly dismounted, and its officers had no idea whatever how cavalry should be led in battle. The French, it is true, sometimes attacked with the cold steel, and Charles XII of Sweden, true to the national tradition, always charged at full gallop without firing, broke cavalry and infantry, and in some cases even captured weak field fortifications.

Only Frederick the Great and his great cavalry general Seydlitz were destined to transform the mounted arm completely and lead it to the summit of glory. The Prussian cavalry, heavy soldiers on clumsy horses, trained only in firing, such as Frederick’s father <Frederick William I> had left to his son, was beaten in a trice at Mollwitz (1741). But the first Silesian War was scarcely over when Frederick completely reorganised his cavalry. Firing and foot duty were pushed into the background, and greater attention was paid to riding.

“All tactical evolutions are to be executed at the utmost speed, all wheelings at a short gallop. The cavalry officers must above all train the men into perfect horsemen; the cuirassiers must be as agile and skilful on horseback as a hussar and well acquainted with the use of the sabre.”

The men were to ride every day. The principal exercises were riding over broken ground, across obstacles, and fencing on horseback. In the charge, the use of firearms was entirely forbidden until the first and second line of the enemy was completely broken.

“Every squadron that advances to the attack must charge the enemy with the cold steel, and no commander shall, under penalty of dishonourable cashiering, allow his troops to fire; the brigade generals shall be answerable for this. On the advance they fall first into a fast trot and finally into a full gallop, and in close order; and if they charge in this way, His Majesty is certain that the enemy will always be overthrown.

Every cavalry officer should always bear in mind that only two things are required to defeat the enemy: first, to attack him with the utmost speed and full force, and second, to outflank him.”

These passages from Frederick’s instructions sufficiently show the complete revolution he carried out in cavalry tactics. He was ably seconded by Seydlitz, who constantly commanded the cuirassiers and dragoons and formed them into such soldiers that – in the impetuosity and order in the charge, in the rapidity of tactical evolutions, in readiness for flank attacks, and in the swiftness in rallying and reforming after a charge – no other cavalry ever equalled the Prussian cavalry of the Seven Years’ War. The fruits were soon evident. At Hohenfriedberg the Bayreuth Dragoon Regiment – 10 squadrons – rode down the entire left wing of the Austrian infantry, dispersed 21 battalions, captured 66 colours, 5 cannon and took 4,000 prisoners. When at Zorndorf the Prussian infantry had been forced to retreat, Seydlitz with 36 squadrons drove the victorious Russian cavalry from the field and then fell upon the Russian infantry, which he totally destroyed in a great carnage. At Rossbach, Striegau, Kesselsdorf, Leuthen and in ten other battles Frederick owed the victory to his superb cavalry.

When the French Revolutionary War broke out, the Austrians had adopted the Prussian system, but the French had not. The cavalry of the French had, in fact, been very disorganised by the Revolution, and at the beginning of the war the new formations proved almost useless. When in the years 1792 and 1793 the good cavalry of the English, Prussians, and Austrians confronted the new French infantry levies, these were beaten almost without exception. The French cavalry, which could not at all match such opponents, was always kept in reserve until it had improved after some years of fighting. From 1796 onwards, every infantry division had cavalry to support it; but the entire French cavalry was beaten at Würzburg (1796) by 59 Austrian squadrons.

When Napoleon took the destinies of France in hand, he did his utmost to improve the French cavalry. He found pretty much the worst material imaginable. The French are decidedly the worst riders in Europe, and their horses, which are good in harness, are not suited for the saddle. Napoleon himself was only a mediocre rider and also thought little of riding in others. Nevertheless he improved many things, and after the camp of Boulogne his cavalry, largely supplied with German and Italian horses, was no contemptible opponent. Through the campaigns of 1805 and 1806/1807, his cavalry was able to absorb almost all the horsemen of the Austrian and Prussian armies; in addition, Napoleon’s army in these campaigns was reinforced by the excellent cavalry of the Confederation of the Rhine and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Thus were formed those huge masses of cavalry with which Napoleon operated in 1809, 1812, and the second half of 1813, which were generally described as French but consisted to a large extent of Germans and Poles. The cuirass, which had been completely abolished in the French army shortly before the Revolution, was reintroduced by Napoleon for part of the heavy cavalry. In all other respects the organisation and equipment remained almost the same, except that with his Polish auxiliary troops he received several regiments of light cavalry armed with lances, whose uniform and equipment were soon imitated in other armies. The tactical employment of the cavalry, however, was completely changed by him. In accordance with the principle of forming divisions and army corps from all three arms together, a part of the light cavalry was attached to each division or corps, but the bulk of this arm and especially all the heavy cavalry were kept in reserve, in order to deliver a great decisive blow at a favourable moment or, in case of need, to cover the retreat of the army. These masses of cavalry, appearing suddenly at a given point on the battlefield, often had a decisive effect, but they never achieved such brilliant successes as the cavalry of Frederick the Great. The reason for this is partly to be sought in the changed tactics of the infantry, which mainly chose broken ground for its operations and always received cavalry in square; this made it difficult for the cavalry to gain such great victories as the Prussian cavalry had won over the long, thin infantry lines of their adversaries. It is, however, also certain that Napoleon’s cavalry was not equal to that of Frederick the Great, and that Napoleon’s cavalry tactics did not in every case represent an advance upon Frederick’s. Their mediocre riding forced the French to charge at a relatively slow gait, at a trot or a light, short gallop; there are only a few examples of their attacking at full gallop. Their great bravery and their closed ranks often made up for the restrained momentum of the charge, but nevertheless their charge was not such as would today be called good. The old system of receiving the enemy cavalry standing still, carbine in hand, was retained by the French cavalry in very many cases, and in every one of these cases they were beaten. The most recent example of this was provided by Dannigkow (5 April 1813), where about 1,200 French cavalry thus awaited an attack by 400 Prussians and, despite their numerical superiority, were completely beaten. Under Napoleon’s tactics, the employment of great masses of cavalry became such a rigid rule that not only was the divisional cavalry weakened to the point of complete worthlessness, but Napoleon with these masses also often neglected the successive employment of his troops, one of the most important principles of modern tactics, which applies even more to cavalry than to infantry. He introduced the cavalry charge in column and even formed entire cavalry corps into a single enormous column; in such formations the extrication of a single squadron or regiment and any attempt to deploy became utterly impossible. His cavalry generals likewise did not meet the requirements, and even the most brilliant of them, Murat, would have cut a miserable figure beside a Seydlitz.

During the wars of 1813, 1814 and 1815, cavalry tactics on the part of Napoleon’s opponents had undoubtedly made progress. Although they acted to a great extent according to Napoleon’s system, keeping cavalry in large masses in reserve and thereby very often excluding the greater part of the cavalry completely from a fight, they nevertheless tried in a number of cases to return to Frederick’s tactics. In the Prussian army the old spirit revived. Blücher was the first to employ his cavalry more boldly and, on the whole, successfully. The surprise attack at Haynau (1813), where 20 Prussian squadrons rode down 8 French battalions and captured 18 cannon, marks a turning-point in the modern history of cavalry and forms a happy contrast to the tactics at Lützen, where the Allies kept 18,000 horsemen exclusively in reserve until the battle was lost, although no more favourable cavalry terrain could have been found.

The English had never adopted the system of forming great masses of cavalry and therefore had many successes, although Napier himself admits that their cavalry was not then as good as that of the French. At Waterloo (where, incidentally, the French cuirassiers charged at full gallop for once) the English cavalry was excellently led and was generally successful, except when it fell into its national fault and got out of hand.

Since the peace of 1815, Napoleonic tactics have again given way to Frederick’s, although they were still retained in the regulations of most armies. More attention is paid to riding, though still by no means to the necessary extent. The idea of receiving the enemy with the carbine in the hand is proscribed; everywhere Frederick’s rule again applies that any cavalry commander deserves cashiering who allows himself to be attacked by the enemy instead of attacking himself. The gallop is again the gait for the charge, and the charge in column has been replaced by charges in successive lines; in this the cavalry was drawn up so that a flank attack was possible and the whole could manoeuvre in separate parts during the charge. Yet much still remains to be done. Greater attention to riding, especially across country, greater approximation to the saddle and seat of hunting-riding, and above all reduction of the weight to be carried by the horse are improvements that are demanded in every army without exception.

Let us now turn, after the history of the cavalry, to its present organisation and tactics. The recruitment of the cavalry, as far as the soldiers are concerned, does not on the whole differ from the manner in which the other arms are recruited in each country. In some states, however, the inhabitants of particular districts are designated for this service: thus in Russia the Malorussians (inhabitants of Little Russia) and in Prussia the Poles. Austria recruits its heavy cavalry in the German territories and in Bohemia, the hussars exclusively in Hungary, and the uhlans mostly in the Polish provinces. The procurement of horses, however, deserves special attention. In England, where the whole cavalry in wartime requires no more than 10,000 horses, the government has no difficulty in purchasing them. But in order to secure for the army such horses as have not yet been put in harness and are up to about 5 years old, three-year-old foals, mostly from Yorkshire breeding, are bought and kept in paddocks at the state’s expense until they are suitable for use. The price paid for the foals (20 to 25 pounds sterling) and the abundance of good horses in the country certainly make the British cavalry the best-mounted in the world. In Russia a similar abundance of horses prevails, but the breed is inferior to the English. The remount officers buy the horses wholesale in the southern and western provinces of the empire, mostly from Jewish dealers; the unfit ones they sell again and distribute the horses according to their colour to the different regiments (in

In a Russian regiment all horses have the same colour). The colonel is, as it were, regarded as the owner of the horses; for a fixed sum paid to him, he must keep the regiment in a well-mounted state. The horses are expected to last 8 years. Formerly they were obtained from the large studs of Volhynia and the Ukraine, where they grow up in complete freedom, but breaking them in for cavalry purposes was so difficult that it had to be abandoned. In Austria, the horses are partly purchased, but the greater part are now supplied by the state studs, which can deliver over 5,000 five-year-old cavalry horses each year. In the event of exceptional demand, a country as rich in horses as Austria can rely on its internal markets. Prussia, 60 years ago, had to buy almost all its horses abroad, but now it can supply its entire cavalry, line as well as Landwehr, with horses from home. For the line, the horses are bought at the age of 3 by remount commissioners and sent to paddocks until they are old enough for service; 3,500 are required annually. On the mobilisation of the Landwehr cavalry, just as with the men, all horses in the country can be called up for service; an indemnity of from 40 to 70 dollars is, however, paid for them. There are three times as many horses fit for service in the country as are needed. France is, of all European countries, the worst off for horses. Although often good and even excellent for harness, the breed is generally unsuitable for the saddle. State studs (haras) have long existed, but not with the success that other studs have had. In 1838, they and the remount paddocks connected with them could not supply 1,000 horses, whether purchased or of state breeding. General Le Roche-Aymon calculated that in France there were not 20,000 horses between 4 and 7 years old fit for cavalry service in all. Although the paddocks and studs have recently been greatly improved, they are still not sufficient to supply the army fully. Algeria furnishes an excellent breed of cavalry horse, and the best regiments of the army, the chasseurs d’Afrique, are exclusively mounted on them, while the other regiments hardly receive any. In the event of mobilisation, the French are therefore forced to buy abroad, sometimes in England, but mostly in North Germany, where they do not get the best horses, although each horse costs them almost 100 dollars. Many cast-off horses from German cavalry regiments find their way into the ranks of the French, and in general the French cavalry, with the exception of the chasseurs d’Afrique, is the worst mounted in Europe.

The cavalry consists essentially of two kinds: heavy and light cavalry. The real distinguishing feature of the two kinds is the horses. Large, strong horses cannot act well together with small, active, and quick horses. The former react less quickly in the attack, but with greater weight, the latter act more by the speed and impetuosity of their attack and are, moreover, far more suited for single combats and skirmishes, for which heavy, large horses are neither mobile nor intelligent enough. Thus far a distinction is necessary; but fashion, fancy, and the imitation of certain national costumes have created numerous subdivisions and modifications, which it is not of interest to mention in detail. The heavy cavalry is, in most countries, at least partly equipped with a cuirass, which is, however, far from being bullet-proof; in Sardinia, the first rank carries a lance. The light cavalry is armed partly with sabre and carbine, partly with lances. The carbine has a smooth or rifled barrel. In most cases, pistols are added to the rider’s armament; only the cavalry of the United States carries the revolver. The sabre is either straight or more or less curved, the former more for thrusting, the latter for cutting. The question whether the lance is to be preferred to the sabre is still disputed. For close combat, the sabre is undoubtedly more suitable, and in an attack the lance, unless it is not too long and too heavy to be handled at all, can hardly be used, but in the pursuit of defeated cavalry it has proved highly effective. Almost all horsemen’s peoples rely on the sabre; even the Cossack abandons his lance when he has to fight against Circassians, who are excellent at handling the sabre. The pistol is useless except for a single shot; the carbine is not very effective, even with a rifled barrel, and will never be of great real utility until a breech-loader is introduced; the revolver is a dangerous weapon in close combat in practised hands; but the queen of weapons for cavalry is still a good, sharp, handy sabre.

In addition to the saddle, the bridle, and the armed rider, the cavalry horse has to carry a saddlebag with reserve clothing, camp utensils, cleaning kit, and on campaign also provisions for the rider and fodder for itself. The total weight of this load varies in the different armies and types of cavalry between 250 and 300 pounds for the heavy marching equipment, a weight that appears enormous when compared with what civilian saddle-horses have to carry. This overloading of the horses is the weakest point of every cavalry. In this respect, great reforms are necessary everywhere. The weight of man and equipment can and must be reduced, but as long as the present system exists, this burden on the horses must always be taken into account when judging the capabilities of cavalry in their performance and endurance.

The heavy cavalry, consisting of powerful, yet as light as possible riders on strong horses, must act mainly by the strength of a closed, massive attack. This requires strength, endurance, and a certain bodily weight, though it must not be too great if the cavalry is to remain mobile. It must be rapid in its movements, but not more so than can be combined with the best order. As soon as the heavy cavalry is formed for the attack, it must, above all, ride straight ahead; and whatever comes in its way must be swept away by its charge. The individual rider does not need to be able to ride as well as in the light cavalry, but he must have his horse completely under control and be accustomed to riding strictly straight ahead and in tightly closed formation. Its horses must consequently be less sensitive to pressure of the leg, and also they should not bring their hindquarters too far forward; they should step out well at the trot and be accustomed to keeping well together at a steady, extended gallop.

The light cavalry, with more agile men and faster horses, has, on the contrary, to act by its speed and ubiquity. What it lacks in weight must be made up for by speed and activity. It will attack with the greatest impetuosity; but when it appears favourable, it will feign flight so as to fall on the enemy’s flank by a sudden change of front. Superior speed and aptitude for single combat make the light cavalry particularly suited for pursuit. Its leaders need a quicker eye and greater presence of mind than those of the heavy cavalry. The men must individually be better riders; they must have their horses completely in hand, fall from a stand into a full gallop and immediately halt again on the spot, turn quickly, and jump well. The horses must be tough and fast. They must be soft in the mouth and respond well to the pressure of the leg, be handy in wheeling, and particularly broken in for the short gallop, with their hindquarters well under them. Besides rapid flank and rear attacks, raids, and pursuits, the light cavalry must perform the bulk of the outpost and patrol duty for the whole army; aptitude for single combat, whose basis is good horsemanship, therefore belongs to its principal prerequisites. In line, the men ride less closely closed up, so as to be always prepared for a change of front and other tactical manoeuvres.

The English nominally have 13 regiments of light and 13 regiments of heavy cavalry (dragoons, hussars, uhlans: only the 2 regiments of the Life Guards are cuirassiers), but in reality their whole cavalry, in composition and training, is heavy cavalry, and differs little from one another in the size of the soldiers and horses. For the actual service of light cavalry, they have always used foreign soldiers—Germans in Europe and native irregulars in India. The French dispose of three kinds: 174 squadrons of light cavalry, hussars and chasseurs, 120 squadrons of line cavalry, uhlans and dragoons, 78 squadrons of reserve cavalry, cuirassiers and carabiniers. Austria has 96 squadrons of heavy cavalry, dragoons and cuirassiers, and 192 squadrons of light cavalry, hussars and uhlans. Prussia has in the line troops 80 squadrons of heavy cavalry, cuirassiers and uhlans, and 72 squadrons of light cavalry, dragoons and hussars, to which in the event of war 136 squadrons of uhlans of the first levy of the Landwehr may be added. The second levy of the Landwehr cavalry will hardly ever be formed separately. The Russian cavalry consists of 160 squadrons of heavy cavalry, cuirassiers and dragoons, and 304 squadrons of light cavalry, hussars and uhlans. The formation of a corps of dragoons for cavalry and infantry service was given up, and the dragoons were taken over into the heavy cavalry. The real light cavalry of the Russians, however, are the Cossacks, of whom they always have more than enough for the entire outpost, reconnaissance, and irregular service of their armies. In the army of the United States there are 2 regiments of dragoons, 1 regiment of mounted riflemen, and 2 regiments designated as cavalry. It has been recommended to call all these regiments cavalry regiments. The cavalry of the United States is in fact a mounted infantry.

The tactical unit in the cavalry is the squadron, which comprises as many men as a commander can keep under control with his voice and through his immediate influence during tactical manoeuvres. The strength of a squadron varies between 100 men (in England) and 200 men (in France); that of the other armies also moves within these limits. Four, six, eight or ten squadrons form a regiment. The weakest regiments are the English ones (400 to 480 men), the strongest those of the Austrian light cavalry (1,600 men). Strong regiments easily become unwieldy, too weak ones are very soon worn down in a campaign. Thus the British light brigade, formed in 5 regiments of 2 squadrons each, numbered at Balaclava, barely two months after the opening of the campaign, scarcely 700 men or just half as many as a single Russian hussar regiment at war strength. Special formations are: among the British the troop or half-squadron, and among the Austrians the division or double squadron, an intermediate link which alone makes it possible for a commander to command the strong Austrian cavalry regiments.

Up to the time of Frederick the Great, every cavalry was drawn up at least 3 ranks deep. In 1743 Frederick for the first time formed his hussars 2 ranks deep, and at the battle of Rossbach he had drawn up his heavy cavalry in the same manner. After the Seven Years' War this formation was adopted by all other armies and is now the only one in use. For tactical manoeuvres the squadron is subdivided into 4 divisions. The wheeling from line into open column of divisions and from column back into line constitutes the principal and fundamental evolution of all cavalry manoeuvres. Most other evolutions are only applied either on the march (the flank march by threes, etc.) or in exceptional cases (the close column in platoons or squadrons). The employment of cavalry in battle consists predominantly in hand-to-hand combat; the use of the firearm plays only a subordinate role with it; steel – either sabre or lance – is its chief weapon, and every action of the cavalry is directed towards the attack.

Thus the attack is the criterion for all movements, tactical manoeuvres and positions of the cavalry. Everything which checks the dash of the attack is faulty. The momentum of the attack is achieved by bringing all the force of man and horse to bear upon the culminating point, the moment of immediate impact with the enemy. In order to achieve this, one must approach the enemy with gradually increasing speed, so that the horses strike their fastest gait only just before the enemy. But the execution of such an attack is probably the most difficult thing that can be required of the cavalry. It is exceedingly difficult, when riding forward in an increasingly rapid gait, to preserve complete order and complete cohesion, particularly when the ground to be covered is not entirely level. Here it is shown how difficult, but also how important it is to ride strictly straight forward, for if every rider does not maintain his direction, a crush arises in the ranks which soon surges to and fro from the centre to the flanks and from the flanks to the centre; the horses become excited and restless, their different speed and different temperament make themselves felt, and soon the whole line rushes along in a mad confusion and shows anything but that firm cohesion which alone can ensure success. Just before the enemy the horses will naturally try to break out, instead of dashing into the mass standing opposite or moving towards them, and the riders must prevent this, since otherwise the attack is certainly doomed to failure. The rider must therefore not only possess the firm resolution to break into the enemy's line, but he must also be completely master of his horse. The regulations of the various armies contain different rules for the manner of advance of attacking cavalry, but all agree on one point, that the line should first move as far as possible at the walk, then at the trot, 300 to 150 yards from the enemy in a short gallop, gradually passing over into an extended gallop, and attain the fastest gait 20 to 30 yards from the enemy. All these regulations are, however, subject to many exceptions. The nature of the ground, the weather, the condition of the horses, etc., must be taken into consideration in every practical case.

When, in an attack of cavalry against cavalry, both sides really collide, which is by far the most unusual case in cavalry encounters, the sabres are of little use during the actual impact. Here it is the momentum of the one mass which brings the other to waver and shatters it. The moral element, bravery, is here at once transformed into material force; the bravest squadron will ride on with the greatest self-confidence, with the greatest determination, speed, ensemble and with the greatest cohesion. Hence it comes that no cavalry can achieve great things if it does not display a great deal of "dash". But as soon as the ranks of one side break up, the sabres, and with them the individual horsemanship of the single rider, come into action. At least a part of the victorious troop must also give up its tactical formation in order to reap the fruits of victory with the sabre. Thus the successful attack at once decides the encounter; but if the victory is not exploited by pursuit and by individual combat, it would be comparatively worthless.

It is precisely this immense superiority of the side which has preserved its tactical cohesion and formation over the side which has lost it that explains why it is impossible for irregular cavalry, however good and numerous it may be, to defeat regular cavalry. There can be no doubt that, as regards individual skill in riding and sabre-fencing, no regular cavalry has ever come up to the irregulars of the equestrian peoples of the East, and yet the very worst European regular cavalry has always beaten them in the field. From the defeat of the Huns at Châlons (451) to the Sepoy revolt of 1857 there is not a single instance in which the excellent but irregular horsemen of the East defeated a single regiment of regular cavalry in a proper attack. Their disordered swarms, attacking without combination and cohesion, cannot make any impression upon a firm, rapidly moving mass. Their superiority can only be shown when the tactical formation of the regulars is broken up and hand-to-hand combat sets in; but the wild onrush of the irregulars against their opponents cannot lead to this result. Only when regular cavalry had given up its line formation in pursuit and become involved in individual combats has it happened that the irregulars defeated them by suddenly wheeling about and exploiting the favourable moment; indeed, ever since the wars of the Parthians and Romans the entire tactic of irregulars against regulars has been practically confined to this stratagem. There is no better example of this than that of Napoleon's dragoons in Egypt, who, undoubtedly the worst regular cavalry of that time, invariably defeated the Mamelukes, the most brilliant of all irregular horsemen. Napoleon said of them that 2 Mamelukes were decidedly superior to 3 Frenchmen; 100 Frenchmen were equal to 100 Mamelukes; 300 Frenchmen would generally defeat 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen would in every case defeat 1,500 Mamelukes.

But however great the superiority of that cavalry troop in an attack may be which best preserves its tactical formation, it is nevertheless obvious that even such a troop must have fallen into considerable disorder after a successful attack. The success of the attack is not equally great at every point; many cavalrymen will inevitably be involved in single combats or pursue the opponent; only a relatively small part, mostly belonging to the second rank, remains approximately in line. This is the most dangerous moment for the cavalry; a small detachment of fresh soldiers thrown against it would snatch the victory from its hands. The criterion of a really good cavalry is therefore rapid rallying after an attack, and it is precisely in this respect that not only young but also already experienced and brave troops show deficiencies. The British cavalry, which rides the most mettlesome horses, gets out of hand particularly easily and has almost everywhere paid dearly for it (e.g., at Waterloo and Balaclava).

When the rally has been sounded, pursuit is generally left to some divisions or squadrons which are designated for this task either specially or by general regulations, while the main body of the troops re-forms in order to be prepared against all unexpected events. For the confusion after an attack, even in the ranks of the victors, is precisely what tempts the enemy to keep a reserve always ready which can be sent forward in case of a failure of the first attack; therefore it has always been the supreme law in cavalry tactics never to employ more than a part of the available troops at one time. This general use of reserves explains the fluctuating character of great cavalry battles, where the wave of victory surges to and fro and each side is beaten alternately, until the last available reserves bring the weight of their solid order to bear against the masses thrown into disorder and surging back and forth, and decide the encounter.

Another very important circumstance is the nature of the ground. No arm is so dependent upon the ground as the cavalry. Heavy, yielding ground slows the extended gallop down to the short gallop; an obstacle which a single rider would take without difficulty can dissolve the order and cohesion of the line, and an obstacle which would be easily taken by fresh horses causes animals to fall which have been trotting and galloping since early morning without fodder. An unforeseen obstacle, by interrupting the onrush and thus entailing a change of front and formation, can also expose the whole line to the flank attacks of the enemy. An example of how cavalry attacks should not be ridden was Murat's great attack at the battle of Leipzig. He formed 14,000 horsemen into a deeply massed column and stormed against the Russian

Infantry forward, whose attack on the village of Wachau had just been repulsed. The French cavalry approached at a trot; at a distance of about 600 to 800 yards from the infantry of the allies it broke into a short gallop; owing to the yielding ground, the horses were soon exhausted, and by the time they reached the squares of the Russian infantry, the impetus of the attack was spent. Only a few very weakened battalions were ridden down. The mass of the cavalry galloped past the other squares through the second infantry line, without causing any damage, and eventually came upon a series of ponds and marshes which brought their advance to a halt. The horses were utterly blown, the riders in disorder, the regiments intermingled and beyond control; in this condition they were surprised in flank by two Prussian regiments and the Guard Cossacks—in all less than 2,000 men—and were all driven back again in complete confusion. In this case there had been neither a reserve for unforeseen events, nor had the pace and the distance been properly taken into account; the result was a defeat.

The attack can be carried out in various formations. Tacticians distinguish the attack *en muraille* (in a straight line), when the squadrons of the attacking line have no intervals or only very small ones between them; the attack with intervals, in which the squadrons are 10 to 20 yards apart; the attack *en échelon* (in echelon), in which the squadrons advance to the attack one after the other, beginning from one wing, and therefore reach the enemy not simultaneously but successively—this form can be reinforced by a squadron in open column on the extreme flank, behind the squadron that forms the first echelon—; and, finally, the attack in column. This last mode of attack stands in essential opposition to all the preceding ones, which are all merely variations of the attack in line. The line was, until Napoleon, the general and fundamental form of all cavalry attacks. Throughout the entire 18th century we find that cavalry attacked in column only in a single case, namely when it had to cut its way through an enemy that was surrounding it. But Napoleon, whose cavalry consisted of brave soldiers but bad horsemen, had to compensate for the tactical shortcomings of his mounted troops by a new method. He began to send his cavalry into the attack in deep columns, thereby compelling the leading ranks to ride forward and

at the same time throwing a far larger number of riders upon the chosen point of attack than he could have done in a line attack. The striving to operate with masses became with Napoleon, during the campaigns that followed that of 1807, a sort of fixed idea. He devised column formations that were simply unnatural, but to which he clung in the later campaigns because they had accidentally led to success in 1809, and thereby lost many a battle. He formed columns out of whole infantry or cavalry divisions by placing deployed battalions and regiments one behind the other. This was first practised with the cavalry in 1809 at Eggmühl, where 10 cuirassier regiments attacked in column, with a front of 2 deployed regiments, followed by 4 similar lines at intervals of about 60 yards. Infantry columns of entire divisions were formed at Wagram, one deployed battalion standing behind the other. Against the slowly and methodically advancing Austrians of that time such manoeuvres might not have been dangerous, but in all later campaigns and against more active opponents they ended in defeat. We have seen what a pitiful end the great attack of Murat at Wachau met with in the same formation. The catastrophic outcome of d’Erlon’s great infantry attack at Waterloo was caused by the use of this formation. For cavalry the monster column appears particularly unsuitable, since it ties up the most valuable reserves in a single unwieldy mass that, once in motion, slips irretrievably from the commander’s control and, whatever success it may achieve in front, is always delivered over to smaller, well-led detachments thrown against its flanks. With the forces used for such a column, a second line and one or two reserves could be formed, whose attacks might at first not have such an effect, but through their repetition would finally achieve better results at smaller losses. In fact, in most armies this form of attack in column has either been given up, or has been preserved merely as a theoretical curiosity, while in practice strong cavalry units are drawn up in several lines that attack at intervals and support and relieve one another during a prolonged engagement. Napoleon was also the first to mass his cavalry into large bodies consisting of several divisions, so-called cavalry corps. To simplify the transmission of orders in a large army, such an organisation of the reserve cavalry is extremely necessary; but when it was retained on the battlefield, when these

corps had to operate as a whole, they never produced adequate results. Indeed, this organisation was one of the main causes of that faulty formation of monster columns which we have already mentioned. In the European armies of today the cavalry corps is generally retained, and in the Prussian, Russian, and Austrian armies model formations and general rules for the operation of such a corps on the battlefield have even been drawn up, all of them based on the formation of a first and second line and a reserve, to which are added instructions for the placement of the horse artillery attached to such a force.

Hitherto we have spoken of the employment of cavalry only in so far as it is directed against cavalry. Yet one of the chief tasks of this arm in battle, indeed its principal use in our own time, is its employment against infantry. We have seen that the infantry of the 18th century hardly ever formed squares against cavalry in battle. It awaited the attack in line, and when the attack was directed against a flank, some companies swung back *en potence* (in the shape of a hook) to confront it. Frederick the Great taught his infantry never to form squares, unless an isolated battalion were surprised by cavalry; if on such an occasion it had formed a square,

“it can march straight on the enemy cavalry, drive them off, and continue marching in the direction of its objective without bothering about their attacks.”

The thin infantry lines of that time met the cavalry attack with full confidence in the effect of their fire and often enough repulsed it; but once they began to waver, as at Hohenfriedberg and Zorndorf, the disaster could not be repaired. Today, when the column has in many cases replaced the line, the rule is that infantry, wherever possible, receives cavalry in squares. There are, it is true, a host of examples from the wars of our own day in which good cavalry surprised infantry formed in line and had to flee before its fire, but these examples form the exception. The question now is whether cavalry is really capable of breaking infantry squares. Opinions on this are divided; yet it seems generally acknowledged that, under ordinary conditions, good, fit-for-action infantry that has not been shaken by artillery fire has

a very great prospect of success against cavalry, while resolute cavalry, facing young foot-soldiers whose energy and steadfastness have flagged after a heavy day’s fighting, high losses, and prolonged shelling, has the greatest prospect of success. There are exceptions, such as the attack of the German dragoons at Garcia Hernandez (1812), where each of the 3 squadrons broke a strong French square, but as a rule a cavalry commander will not consider it advisable to send his men against such a body of infantry. At Waterloo, Ney’s magnificent attacks with the mass of the French reserve cavalry upon Wellington’s centre could not make the English and German squares waver, because these troops, well covered by the ridge, had suffered very little from the preceding cannonade and were almost entirely intact. Such attacks are therefore suitable only for the final stage of a battle, when the infantry is already fairly shaken and exhausted through active engagement and inactive waiting under concentrated artillery fire. In such cases, as at Borodino and Ligny, cavalry attacks act decisively, especially when they are supported, as in both these cases, by infantry reserves.

We cannot here go into the various tasks that cavalry may be set on outposts, on patrols, on escort duties, etc. A few words on the general tactics of cavalry may, however, be in place. Since infantry has become more and more the main strength of battles, the manoeuvres of the mounted troops are necessarily more or less subordinated to those of the infantry. And since modern tactics rest on the co-operation and mutual support of the three arms, it follows that, at least for one part of the cavalry, all independent action is entirely out of the question. For this reason the cavalry of an army is always divided into two distinct bodies: the divisional cavalry and the reserve cavalry. The former consists of horsemen attached to the various infantry divisions and corps and under the same commander. In combat its task is to exploit every favourable moment that offers itself to its advantage, or to cut its own infantry free when it is attacked by superior forces. Its employment is by its nature limited, and its strength is not sufficient to act independently in any way. The reserve cavalry, the main body of the army’s cavalry, operates in the same subordinate position towards the entire infantry of the army as the divisional

cavalry does in relation to the infantry division to which it belongs. Consequently, the reserve cavalry is held back until a favourable moment for an effective blow presents itself, either to repulse a great infantry or cavalry attack of the enemy or, for its part, to deliver a decisive attack. From what has been established above, it follows that the reserve cavalry is generally best employed during the final stages of a great battle; then, however, it can be decisive and has often been so. Such immense successes as Seydlitz achieved with his cavalry are today completely out of the question, but nevertheless most great battles of our own time have been very strongly influenced by the part the cavalry has played in them.

The great importance of the cavalry, however, lies in the pursuit. Infantry, supported by artillery, need not fear the cavalry as long as it maintains order and stands firm; but as soon as it wavers, for whatever reason, it becomes the prey of the horsemen brought against it. Before horses one cannot run away; even on difficult terrain, good riders can make headway, and the energetic pursuit of a beaten army by the cavalry is always the best and only way to completely secure the victory. Whatever superiority the infantry may have won in combat, the cavalry is nonetheless an indispensable arm and will always remain so; today as in the past, no army can take the field with real prospects of success if it does not have a cavalry that can both ride and fight.