Friedrich Engels

Infantry

Written September to about 10 October 1859.

From the English.

["The New American Cyclopædia", Volume IX]

Infantry – the foot soldiers of an army. With the exception of nomadic tribes, the main body, if not the total strength, of all armies has always consisted of foot soldiers. Hence, even in the earliest Asiatic armies, among the Assyrians, Babylonians and Persians, the infantry formed, at least numerically, the principal part of the army. Among the Greeks, the army at first consisted exclusively of infantry. The little we know about the composition, organization and tactics of the ancient Asiatic infantry has already been set forth in the article Army, to which we refer for many details whose repetition here would be superfluous. In the present article we shall confine ourselves to presenting the most important tactical features in the history of this branch of the service, and shall therefore begin at once with the Greeks.

I. Greek Infantry

The creators of Greek tactics were the Dorians, and of these it was the Spartans who developed the old Doric battle order to perfection. Originally all classes of which the Doric community was composed were liable for military service, not only the fully enfranchised citizens who formed the aristocracy, but also the non-enfranchised perioeci and even the slaves. They all belonged to the same phalanx, but occupied different positions in it. The full citizens had to appear heavily armed, with a protective equipment consisting of helmet, cuirass, greaves of bronze, a large wooden shield covered with leather, high enough to protect the whole body, as well as a spear and a sword. They formed, according to their numbers, the first or the first and second ranks of the phalanx. Behind them stood the non-enfranchised citizens and the slaves, so that each Spartan aristocrat had his personal retinue behind him; these were without the costly protective equipment and relied on the protection afforded to them by the front ranks and their shields. The offensive weapons of the perioeci and slaves were slings, javelins, knives, daggers and clubs.

Thus the Doric phalanx formed a deep line, with the hoplites, that is the heavy infantry, in the front ranks, and the gymnetae, that is the light infantry, in the rear ranks. The hoplites were to make the enemy waver by attacking with their spears; once they had penetrated the enemy’s ranks, they drew their short swords and advanced further in hand-to-hand combat, while the gymnetae, who had prepared the attack by hurling stones and javelins over the heads of the front ranks, supported the advance of the hoplites by giving the death-blow to the wounded, still fighting enemies.

The tactics of such a body of troops were accordingly very simple; there was hardly any tactical manoeuvring. Courage, tenacity, physical strength, as well as individual agility and skill of the combatants, especially of the hoplites, decided everything.

This patriarchal union of all classes of the people in the same phalanx disappeared soon after the Persian Wars, mainly for political reasons. The consequence was that the phalanx was now composed only of hoplites and that the light infantry, where it still continued to exist or was newly formed, fought separately in open order.

In Sparta, the full citizens together with the perioeci formed the heavy-armed phalanx; the helots followed with the baggage train or as shield-bearers (hypaspistae). For a considerable time this phalanx met all the demands made upon it in battle, but in the Peloponnesian War the light-armed troops of the Athenians soon forced the Spartans to raise similar troops. They did not, however, form separate gymnetae, but let their younger men fight in open order. When the number of full citizens and even that of the perioeci had greatly decreased towards the end of this war, the Spartans were compelled to form phalanxes of heavily armed slaves, commanded by full citizens.

After the Athenians had excluded the gymnetae, consisting of the poorer citizens, the personal retinue and the slaves, from the phalanx, they created special corps of light infantry, consisting of gymnetae or psiloi, destined for skirmishing and armed exclusively for long-range combat, such as slingers (sphendonetae), archers (toxotae) and javelin throwers (acontistae); the latter were also called peltastae after the small shield (pelta) which only they carried.

This new kind of light infantry, which was originally recruited from the poorer citizens of Athens, very soon came to be formed almost exclusively from mercenaries and the contingents of Athens’ allies. From the moment these light-armed troops were employed, the unwieldy Doric phalanx was no longer capable of fighting a battle alone. Its human material, too, had steadily deteriorated: in Sparta through the gradual dying out of the military aristocracy, in the other cities through the influence of trade and prosperity, which in the course of time undermined the contempt for death characteristic of antiquity. Thus the phalanx, now formed from a levy of not very heroic men, lost much of its former significance. It formed the background, the reserve of the line of battle, in front of which the light-armed fought or behind which they withdrew when hard pressed; but the phalanx was hardly expected to engage in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. Even where the phalanx was composed of mercenaries, things were not much better. Due to its unwieldiness, it was unsuited for manoeuvring, especially on slightly hilly terrain, and its whole value lay in passive resistance. This led to two attempts at reform by Iphicrates, a mercenary general. This Greek condottiere exchanged the old short spears of the hoplites (8 to 10 feet long) for considerably longer ones, so that in close order the spears of three or four ranks projected forward and could be brought to bear against the enemy; thereby the defensive strength of the phalanx was considerably increased. On the other hand, Iphicrates equipped his peltasts with light protective armour and a good sword and drilled them in the evolutions of the phalanx, in order to create a force capable of deciding battles by closed and yet rapid attacks. When the order to attack was given, the peltasts advanced with a swiftness unattainable by the phalanx of hoplites, showered the enemy with a hail of javelins from a distance of 10 or 20 yards, and then broke into his ranks with the sword.

The simplicity of the old Doric phalanx had thus given way to a far more complicated battle order; the actions of the commander had become an important prerequisite of victory; tactical manoeuvres were now possible.

Epaminondas was the first to recognise the great tactical principle which, up to the present day, decides almost all regular battles: the unequal distribution of troops along the front line in order to concentrate the main attack on a decisive point. Hitherto, the battles of the Greeks had been fought in parallel order, the strength of the front line was equal at all points. If one army was numerically superior to the other, it either formed a deeper battle order or outflanked the other army on both wings. Epaminondas, on the contrary, designated one of his wings for attack and the other for defence. The attacking wing was composed of his best troops and the bulk of his hoplites, formed in a deep column, followed by light infantry and cavalry. The other wing was naturally much weaker and was held back, while the attacking column broke through the enemy’s line, then either deployed or wheeled and thus rolled up the enemy with the support of the light and mounted troops.

The progress achieved by Iphicrates and Epaminondas was further developed when Macedonia assumed the leadership of the Hellenes and led them against Persia. We find the long spears of the hoplites still further lengthened in the Macedonian sarissa. Iphicrates’ peltasts reappear in an improved form in Alexander’s hypaspists. The rational employment of forces which Epaminondas introduced into the battle order was finally extended by Alexander to such a combination of different arms as Greece, with its insignificant cavalry, could never have produced. Alexander’s infantry consisted of the phalanx of hoplites, which represented the defensive strength of the battle order, and of the light infantry fighting in open order, which engaged the enemy along the whole front and also participated in the final winning of victory. Furthermore, Alexander’s infantry consisted of the hypaspists, which included his own bodyguard, and which, despite their light equipment, were still capable of the regular manoeuvres of a phalanx, and formed that kind of medium infantry which was more or less adapted to both, the closed and the open order. Nevertheless, neither Greece nor Macedonia ever produced a mobile infantry that could be relied upon when confronting a solid phalanx. In such a case, Alexander used his cavalry. The attacking wing was formed from the bulk of his heavy cavalry, selected from the Macedonian nobles; with them fought the hypaspists. Their deployment followed the attack of the horsemen. They threw themselves into the breach made by the cavalry, thus secured the success achieved by it and maintained themselves in the midst of the enemy’s position.

After the conquest of the centre of the Persian Empire, Alexander used his hoplites mainly as garrisons for the conquered cities. They soon disappeared from the army which, by its bold and rapid advance, subjugated the Asiatic tribes as far as the Indus and Jaxartes. This army consisted mainly of cavalry, hypaspists and light infantry, while the phalanx, not equal to such marches, became superfluous because of the nature of the enemy to be overcome.

Under Alexander’s successors, the infantry, as well as the cavalry and their tactics, deteriorated absolutely and very rapidly. The two wings of the battle order were formed exclusively of cavalry, and the centre of infantry; the latter, however, was so little trusted that it was covered by elephants. In Asia, the predominant Asiatic element soon gained the upper hand and made the armies of the Seleucids practically worthless. In Europe, the Macedonian and Greek infantry regained its steadiness, but with this the former exclusively applied phalanx tactic returned. Light troops and cavalry did not regain importance, although much effort and ingenuity were wasted on useless attempts to give the phalanx the mobility which, owing to its particular character, it could never attain, until finally the Roman legion put an end to the whole system.

The tactical organisation and the manoeuvres of the phalanx were anything but simple. Generally 16 men deep (under Alexander), a line of 16 files formed exactly a square, and this, the syntagma, constituted the evolutionary unit; 16 syntagmas or 256 files formed a phalangarchy of 4,096 men and 4 of these again the full phalanx. The phalangarchy formed in battle order a line 16 men deep; it changed to marching order by making a turn right-about or left-about or by wheeling in syntagmas. In each case it formed itself into a close column in ranks of 16 men. If they were formed in line, the depth could be increased and the front shortened by doubling the ranks, the files with even numbers placing themselves behind those with odd numbers. The opposite movement was achieved by doubling the files and thereby reducing the depth from 16 to 8 men per file. When the enemy suddenly appeared in the rear of the phalanx, the countermarch by files was carried out; the inversion thereby caused (each file was in its own section or syntagma in the wrong place) was sometimes rectified by the countermarch by ranks of each section. If the handling of the pikes is added, we have enumerated the various points of the military training of the hoplites of antiquity. It goes without saying that the lighter troops, though not actually intended for fighting in close order, were still trained in the movements of the phalanx.

II. Roman Infantry

The Latin word legio originally served to designate the totality of the men selected for field service, and was thus synonymous with army. Later, when the extension of the Roman territory and the strength of the enemies of the Republic required larger armies, these were subdivided into several legions, each legion having a strength similar to that of the original Roman army. Up to the time of Marius, each legion was composed of both infantry and cavalry; the latter had approximately one-tenth of the strength of the former.

Originally the infantry of the Roman legion seems to have been organised similarly to the old Doric phalanx, namely fighting in a deep line, the patricians and richer citizens in heavy armour forming the front ranks and the poorer and more lightly armed plebeians standing behind them. But about the time of the Samnite wars, a change began to take place in the organisation of the legion, which soon brought it into complete contrast to the Greek phalanx and of which Polybius gives us a full account after it had reached its full development in the Punic wars. The legion—generally four were levied for each campaign—was now composed of four classes of infantry: velites, hastati, principes, and triarii. The first was a light infantry formed of recruits; the triarii, consisting of veterans, were the reserve of the army; the other two classes, the remainder of the army, formed the main fighting force or line infantry and differed in that the principes were selected from the circle of those men who had served the longest after the triarii.

The velites wore leather caps and light round shields as protective equipment, besides swords and a number of light javelins. The remaining three classes had metal helmets, a leather cuirass studded with metal plates, and greaves of metal. The hastati and principes carried, besides a short sword, two pila, that is, javelins, one light and one very heavy; the latter was the special assault weapon of the Roman infantry. It consisted of thick, heavy wood with a long iron point, weighed at least 10 lbs. in all and was nearly 7 feet long with the point. It could only be thrown from a very short distance, about 8-12 yards, but owing to its weight its effect on the light protective equipment of that time was terrible. The triarii carried, besides the sword, spears instead of pila.

Each legion consisted of 1,200 hastati, subdivided into 10 maniples, equivalent to companies, of 120 men each, further the same number of principes with similar subdivision, of 600 triarii in 10 maniples of 60 men each, and of 1,200 velites, 40 of whom were attached to each of the 30 maniples and who, when not otherwise employed, formed the rear ranks.

The hastati formed the first line, each maniple, probably 6 men deep, being drawn up in line, with an interval to the next maniple equal to the length of its front. This was, since the space allotted to each man in the rank was 6 feet, about 120 feet long and extended over the whole line to 2,400 feet. Behind them, in the second line, the 10 maniples of the principes took up position, covering the intervals of the maniples of the first line, and behind the principes the triarii, each line at an appropriate distance from the one standing before it. The velites fought in open order in front of the front and on the flanks. By doubling the ranks, the battle formation could be reduced to half the original front length, that is, to 1,200 feet. This whole battle order was calculated for the attack.

Through the small size of the tactical units and the great freedom of movement thereby gained, the legion could fight on almost any kind of terrain and was thereby significantly superior to the Greek phalanx, which required flat ground and had, through its ponderousness, very soon sunk to a purely defensive formation. The legion advanced; from a distance of 8-12 yards the hastati, who probably doubled their files for this purpose, hurled the heavy pila into the phalanx, whose spears did not yet reach the Romans. After they had thus thrown the close order of the phalanx into disorder, they threw themselves with the sword in hand upon the enemy. If a single maniple fell into disorder, this did not affect the neighbouring ones; for if the fight continued without an immediate decision, the principes marched up in the intervals of the hastati, hurled their pila and likewise broke with the sword into the enemy phalanx, thereby giving the hastati the opportunity to disengage from the enemy and re-form behind the triarii. In exceptional cases the latter went forward, either to bring about the victory definitively or to secure an orderly retreat. The velites, together with the cavalry, performed outpost duties, engaged the enemy at the beginning of the battle through small skirmishes and pursued him persistently. The light pilum of the hastati and principes seems to have been used mainly in defence, to create disorder in the ranks of an advancing enemy before he had come near enough for the heavy pilum.

Marches forward were begun on one of the two wings, the first maniple of the hastati at the head, followed by the respective first maniple of the principes and the triarii, then the 3 second maniples in the same order, and so on. Flank marches were carried out in 3 columns, each of the 3 classes of infantry forming one column; the baggage train was on the side furthest from the enemy. If the enemy appeared on the side on which the triarii were marching, the army halted and turned to face the enemy. The principes and hastati then passed through the intervals of the maniples of the triarii and took up their correct positions.

When after the Second Punic War the continuous wars and extensive conquests of the Romans, together with important social changes in Rome and Italy in general, made universal compulsory military service almost impossible, the Roman armies gradually came to be composed of voluntary recruits drawn from the poorer classes. Thus professional soldiers arose in place of the old militia, in which all citizens had been included. Through this the character of the army completely changed, and since the elements of which it was composed deteriorated, a reorganisation became ever more necessary. Marius carried out this reorganisation.

The Roman cavalry ceased to exist. What cavalry still remained consisted of barbarian mercenaries or contingents of the allies. The division of the 4 classes in the infantry was abolished. The velites were replaced by contingents of the allies or by barbarians, and the remaining part of the legion was formed of one and the same class—the line infantry, which was armed like the hastati or principes, only without the light pilum.

The maniple as a tactical unit was replaced by the cohort, a body of troops averaging 360 men, originally formed by the union of 3 maniples into one, so that now the legion was divided into 10 cohorts, which were generally drawn up in 3 lines (4, 3, and 3 cohorts respectively). The cohort was formed 10 men deep, with 3 to 4 feet front for each file, so that the total front of the legion was very greatly shortened (to about 1,000 feet). In this way not only were the tactical movements very much simplified, but beyond that the influence of the commander of the legion also became much more direct and effective.

The armament and equipment of each soldier became lighter; but on the other hand he had to carry the greater part of his baggage on wooden forks invented for this purpose by Marius (muli Mariani <Marius's mules>); the impedimenta of the army were thereby considerably reduced. On the other hand, the concentration of 3 maniples into one cohort had to diminish the manoeuvrability on uneven ground. The absence of the light pilum reduced the defensive power, and the abolition of the velites, who were not always fully replaced by foreign auxiliary troops, mercenaries or by antesignani (men selected by Caesar from the ranks of the legion for service in the light infantry, but who had no weapons for long-range combat), left fewer possibilities open to maintain an engagement and yet avoid a decision. The rapid, resolute attack became for these legions the only suitable form of combat. The Roman infantry still consisted of Romans or at least of Italici, and although the Empire declined under the Caesars, it maintained its old glory as long as the national character was preserved. But when Roman citizenship was no longer a necessary condition for entry into the legion, the army soon lost its prestige. Already by the time of Trajan, barbarians, partly from the Roman provinces, partly from unconquered countries, formed the bulk of the legions, and from that point onward the Roman infantry had lost its typical characteristics. The heavy armour was abolished and the pilum replaced by the spear. The legion organised in cohorts had again become a ponderous phalanx. Since in this period a general aversion to coming to close quarters was typical of the infantry, the bow and the javelin were now used not only for skirmishing, but also in the close order of the line infantry.

III. The Infantry of the Middle Ages

The decline of the Roman infantry found its continuation in the decline of the Byzantine foot soldiers. A kind of compulsory recruitment was still maintained, but only with the result of forming the worst scum of the army. Barbarian auxiliaries and mercenaries constituted its best elements, but even these were of little value. The hierarchical and administrative organisation of the troops had been developed to an almost complete state of bureaucratism, yet with the same result that we now see in Russia: a perfect organisation of embezzlement and fraud at the expense of the state, with armies that devour enormous sums while partly existing only on paper. The contact with the irregular cavalry of the East steadily diminished both the importance and the quality of the infantry. Mounted archers became the favourite arm; the greater part, if not the whole of the infantry, received the bow as part of their equipment in addition to spear and sword. Thus long-range combat became the rule, and hand-to-hand fighting was considered outmoded. The infantry was so little esteemed that it was deliberately kept away from the battlefield and employed mainly for garrison duty. Most of Belisarius’s battles were fought exclusively by the cavalry, and whenever the infantry took part in them, it was sure to run away. Belisarius’s tactics were based exclusively on the principle of avoiding hand-to-hand combat and wearing out the enemy. If he was successful with this against the Goths, who had no long-range weapons at all, by selecting uneven ground on which their phalanx could not come into action, he was defeated by the Franks, whose infantry possessed something of the old Roman mode of fighting, and likewise by the Persians, whose cavalry was unquestionably superior to his own.

The Germans who invaded the Roman Empire originally fought for the most part as infantry and in a kind of Doric phalanx, the tribal elders and wealthier men in the front ranks, the others behind them. Their weapons were the sword and the spear. The Franks, however, carried short double-edged battle-axes, which they hurled into the enemy ranks, as the Romans did the pilum, before attacking them with the sword in hand. The Franks and the Saxons maintained a good and respectable infantry for a long time; but gradually the Teutonic conquerors everywhere went over to cavalry service and left the service as foot soldiers to the conquered inhabitants of the Roman provinces; thus it came about that infantry service was despised as a service of slaves and serfs, and that the standing of the foot soldier inevitably lost in esteem.

Towards the end of the 10th century, cavalry was the only arm that really decided battles throughout Europe. Although the infantry was far more numerous in every army than the cavalry, it was no more than a badly armed mob, almost without the rudiments of organisation. A foot soldier was not even regarded as a soldier; the word miles [soldier] became synonymous with horseman. The only possibility of maintaining a respectable infantry lay with the towns, especially in Italy and Flanders. They had their own militia, which was necessarily composed of infantry and which, because of the never-ending feuds among the nobles of the surrounding districts, was constantly called out for the defence of the towns. Hence it was soon found expedient to have a troop of mercenaries instead of a militia composed of citizens; the latter was intended for extraordinary occasions. Nevertheless, we do not find that the contingents of the towns showed any significant superiority over the motley crowd of foot soldiers whom the nobles gathered around them and whom they always left behind in battle to guard the baggage. At least this holds true for the classic period of chivalry.

In the cavalry of that period, every knight appeared cap-à-pied [from head to foot] armed and in full armour; he rode a similarly armoured horse. He was accompanied by a somewhat more lightly armed squire and various other mounted men who wore no armour and were armed with bows.

In battle order, these forces were drawn up on a principle similar to that of the old Doric phalanx: the heavily armed knights in the first rank, the squires in the second, and the mounted archers behind them. The latter were soon employed dismounted, in accordance with their armament, a mode of fighting that increasingly became the rule with them, so that their horses served not for attack but mainly for locomotion. The English archers armed with the longbow—those of southern Europe carried crossbows—particularly distinguished themselves in this manner of fighting on foot, and very probably this circumstance soon led to the increasing spread of fighting on foot in this branch of the service. Without doubt, the horses of the heavily armed knights were soon exhausted during their long campaigns in France and were only fit to serve as means of transport. It was quite natural that in such a situation the worst-mounted gens d’armes dismounted and formed a phalanx of lances, which was supplemented by the better part of the foot soldiers (especially the Welsh), while those whose horses were still capable of a charge now constituted the actual fighting cavalry. Such an arrangement appeared very well suited for defensive battles; on it were based all the battles of the Black Prince [Edward, Prince of Wales], which, as is well known, were completely successful. The new mode of fighting was soon adopted by the French and other nations, and may be regarded as the almost universally prevailing system of the 14th and 15th centuries. Thus after 1,700 years we have returned almost to the tactics of Alexander, with the sole difference that under Alexander the cavalry was a newly introduced arm which had to reinforce a heavy infantry exposed to decay, whereas here the heavy infantry formed from dismounted horsemen was living proof of the decay of the cavalry and the incipient resurgence of the infantry.

IV. The Revival of the Infantry

From the towns of Flanders, then the first industrial region of the world, and from the Swiss mountains came the first troops who, after centuries of decline, again deserved the name of infantry. The French chivalry succumbed to the weavers and fullers, the goldsmiths and tanners of the Belgian towns, just as the Burgundian and Austrian nobility succumbed to the peasants and cowherds of Switzerland. Good defensive positions and light armament did their part, supported in the case of the Flemings moreover by numerous firearms, and in that of the Swiss by a country which was almost impassable for the heavily armoured knights of that period.

The Swiss carried mainly short halberds, which could be used both for thrusting and striking and were not too long for hand-to-hand fighting; later they also had pikes, crossbows and firearms; but in one of their most famous battles, that of Laupen (1339), they had no weapons for long-range fighting other than stones. From defensive engagements in their inaccessible mountains they soon passed to offensive battles on the plain and therewith to a more regular tactic. They fought in a deep phalanx; their protective equipment was light and generally limited to the front ranks and the flank files, while the centre consisted of men without armour. The Swiss phalanx, however, was always divided into three distinct bodies: vanguard, main body, and rearguard, so that greater mobility and the possibility of manifold tactical groupings were ensured. They soon learned to exploit the unevennesses of the ground skilfully, which, combined with the improvement of firearms, protected them from the attack of cavalry, while against infantry armed with long pikes they devised various methods of making a breach somewhere in the forest of pikes; by means of their short, heavy halberds they were then even greatly superior to men in armour. They very soon learned, especially when supported by artillery and small firearms, to withstand cavalry attacks by forming square or by adopting a cross formation. But as soon as infantry was again capable of this, the days of chivalry were numbered.

Around the middle of the 15th century, the rulers of the larger consolidating monarchies, as well as the towns, everywhere fought against the feudal nobility, and to this end they proceeded to form mercenary armies both to keep down the nobility and to pursue independent foreign-policy objectives. Alongside the Swiss, the Germans and soon afterwards most of the other European nations began to maintain large mercenary contingents which were raised by volunteering and served for the highest bidder without regard to nationality. These bodies formed themselves tactically on the same principle as the Swiss; they were mainly armed with pikes and fought in large square battalions with as many men in depth as in length. They had, however, to fight under different circumstances from the Swiss, who defended their mountains; they had to attack as well as to hold out in defensive positions; they had to confront the enemy on the Italian and French plains and in the mountains alike, and they very soon faced the now rapidly improved hand firearms. These circumstances caused some deviations from the old Swiss tactics, which differed according to the various nationalities; but the main feature, the division into three deep columns, which appeared in name, though not always in reality, as vanguard, main body, and rearguard or reserve, remained common to all.

The Swiss retained their superiority until the Battle of Pavia, after which the German Landsknechte [Landsknechte: in the “New American Cyclopædia” German], who for some time had been almost, if not entirely, the equals of the Swiss, were regarded as the first infantry of Europe. The French, whose infantry had hitherto been good for nothing, made great efforts in this period to form an efficient national force of foot soldiers; but they succeeded only with the inhabitants of two provinces, the Picards and the Gascons. The Italian infantry of this period counted for nothing at all. The Spaniards, however, among whom Gonzalo de Córdoba first introduced Swiss tactics and armament during the wars against the Moors of Granada, soon acquired a great name, and from the second half of the 16th century they were considered the best infantry in Europe. While the Italians, and after them the French and Germans, lengthened their pikes from 10 to 18 feet, the Spaniards kept shorter and handier pikes, and their dexterity made them very formidable in hand-to-hand fighting with sword and dagger. They maintained this reputation in Western Europe—at least in France, Italy, and the Netherlands—until the end of the 17th century.

The disregard for protective equipment by the Swiss, which rested on the traditions of another age, was not shared by the pikemen of the 16th century. As soon as a European infantry was formed, in which the various armies increasingly approximated each other in their military qualities, the system proved inadequate of surrounding the phalanx with a thin line of men equipped with breastplates and helmets. If the Swiss had until then held such a phalanx to be invincible, that was no longer the case when it was confronted by another, fully equivalent phalanx. Now an appropriate protective equipment gained some importance; as long as it did not too much impede the mobility of the troops, it was decidedly advantageous. Moreover, the Spaniards had never shared the underestimation of breastplates, and the protective equipment began to be generally recognised. Accordingly, breastplate, helmets, greaves, arm armour and gauntlets once again became part of the regular equipment of the pikemen. In addition, there was a sword – shorter among the Germans, longer among the Swiss – and sometimes a dagger.

V. The Infantry of the 16th and 17th Centuries

The longbow had for a considerable time disappeared from the European continent, except in Turkey. The crossbow was last used by the Gascons in the first quarter of the 16th century. It was everywhere replaced by the matchlock musket, which, in various degrees of perfection, or rather imperfection, now became the second weapon of the infantry. The matchlock muskets of the 16th century, unwieldy and faultily constructed machines, were of a very heavy calibre so as to guarantee, alongside range, at least a certain precision and the force to penetrate the breastplate of a pikeman. Around 1530 the heavy musket, fired from a fork, was generally used, as without such a rest it would have been impossible to take aim. The musketeers carried a sabre but no protective equipment; they were employed either for skirmishing or in a kind of open order, to hold defensive positions or to prepare the assault of the pikemen when attacking such positions. The number of musketeers increased rapidly in proportion to the pikemen; whereas in the battles of Francis I in Italy they were numerically far weaker than the pikemen, 30 years later they were at least equal in strength.

The growing number of musketeers, for their constant integration into the order of battle, required the invention of an appropriate tactical method. This found expression in a tactical system which the imperial troops developed during their wars against the Turks in Hungary, called the Hungarian Ordonnanz. The musketeers, incapable of defending themselves in close combat, were always placed in such a way that they could withdraw behind the pikemen. Thus they were sometimes posted on one of the two wings, sometimes at the 4 corners of the wings; very often the whole square or column of pikemen was surrounded by a line of musketeers who found cover under the pikes of the men standing behind them.

Finally, in the new tactical system introduced by the Dutch in their war of independence, the plan prevailed of posting the musketeers on the flanks of the pikemen. This system is particularly characterized by the subdivision of each army into 3 large phalanxes, in accordance with Swiss and Hungarian tactics. Each of them consisted of 3 lines, of which the middle one was again divided into a right and a left wing. The distance between the two wings was at least equal to the frontage of the first line. The whole army was organized in half-regiments, which we shall call battalions; each battalion had its pikemen in the centre and its musketeers on the flanks. The vanguard of an army, consisting of 3 regiments, would accordingly be formed as follows: 2 half-regiments in connected front in the first line; behind each of their wings another half-regiment; further back, covering the first line, the remaining 2 half-regiments likewise in connected front. The main body and the rearguard would be posted either on the flank or behind the vanguard, but formed according to the same plan. Here we have, to a certain extent, a return to the old Roman formation in 3 lines and certain small bodies.

The Imperialists, and with them the Spaniards, deemed it necessary to divide their large armies into more than the 3 bodies of troops already mentioned; but their battalions or tactical units were much larger than the Dutch ones; they fought in column or in square instead of in line and had no regular formation for the order of battle, until the Spaniards, during the Dutch war of independence, began to draw them up in the order known as the Spanish Brigade. Four of these large battalions – each usually consisting of several regiments, formed in square, surrounded by one or two lines of musketeers, with wings of shot at the corners – were posted at certain intervals at the 4 corners of a square, so that one corner faced the enemy. If the army was too large for one brigade, 2 could be formed; this resulted in 3 lines, with 2 battalions in the first, 4 (sometimes only 3) in the second, and 2 in the third line. Here, as in the Dutch system, the attempt is evident to return to the old Roman system of the 3 lines.

During the 16th century, another great change took place. The heavy cavalry of the knights dissolved and was replaced by mercenary cavalry, armed similarly to our modern cuirassiers with cuirass, helmet, sabre and pistols. This cavalry was far superior in mobility to its predecessors and thus also posed a greater threat to the infantry; however, the pikemen of that time never feared it. Through this change, the cavalry became a uniform arm and entered into the composition of armies with a far greater proportion, especially in the period now to be considered, namely the Thirty Years’ War.

In this period, the system of mercenary service was generally prevalent in Europe; a category of men had been created who lived from war and by war. Although tactics may have improved thereby, the character of the men, the composition of the human material of the army, as also their morale, decidedly suffered. Central Europe was overrun by condottieri of every shade, who used religious and political disputes as a pretext to plunder and devastate the whole country. The character of the individual soldier degenerated more and more, until the French Revolution finally swept away this system of mercenary service.

The Imperialists fought their battles according to the Spanish brigade system, 4 or more brigades in line, thus forming 3 lines. The Swedes under Gustavus Adolphus formed themselves into Swedish Brigades, each consisting of 3 battalions, of which one stood in front and the two others somewhat further back, each deployed in line, the pikemen in the centre and the musketeers on the wings. They were so posted (both arms numerically equally strong) that, by forming a connected line, each arm could cover the other. Assuming an order was given to form a connected line of musketeers, the two wings of this arm in the middle or front battalion would cover their pikemen by placing themselves in front of them, while the wings of the other two battalions, each on the corresponding flank, would advance until they stood level with the first. If a cavalry attack was expected, all musketeers would withdraw behind the pikemen, while the two wings of the pikemen would advance to align themselves with the centre and thus form a connected line of pikemen. The order of battle was formed by 2 lines of such brigades, the centre of the army, while the numerous cavalry was posted on both wings and reinforced by small bodies of musketeers. It is characteristic of this Swedish system that the pikemen, who in the 16th century represented the great offensive arm, had now lost all capacity for attack. They had become a purely defensive force, and their task was to cover the musketeers against an attack by the cavalry; again it was the last-mentioned arm that had to carry out the attack to the full extent.

Thus the infantry had lost importance, while the cavalry had regained importance; but then Gustavus Adolphus put an end to the firing which had become a popular form of combat among the cavalry, and ordered his horsemen always to attack at full gallop and with the sabre in hand. From that time until the resumption of fighting in hilly terrain, any cavalry that applied this tactic could boast of great successes over the infantry. There can be no greater condemnation of the mercenary infantry of the 17th and 18th centuries than this, and yet for all purposes of combat it constituted the most disciplined infantry of all times.

The general result of the Thirty Years’ War with regard to European tactics was that both the Swedish and the Spanish Brigade disappeared and the armies were now drawn up in 2 lines, with the cavalry forming the wings and the infantry the centre. The artillery was placed in front of the front or in the intervals of the other arms. Sometimes a cavalry reserve or a reserve consisting of cavalry and infantry was kept back. The infantry was drawn up in line, 6 men deep. Muskets became so much lighter that the forks could be dispensed with, and cartridges and cartridge boxes were introduced everywhere.

The combining of musketeers and pikemen in the same infantry battalions now led to the most complicated tactical movements, all based on the necessity of forming so-called defensive battalions, or, as we would say today, squares, against the cavalry. Even in a simple square it was no small matter to draw apart the 6 ranks of pikemen from the centre so that they completely surrounded the musketeers – who were, of course, defenceless against cavalry – on all sides; but what must it have meant to form the battalion in a similar manner as a cross, an octagon, or in other fanciful shapes! So it came about that the drill regulations of this period were the most complicated that ever existed, and no one but a soldier for life ever had a chance of acquiring even the simplest proficiency in them. It is equally clear that all these attempts to form a body of troops capable of resisting cavalry in the face of the enemy were utterly useless; any decent cavalry would have been in the midst of such a battalion before a quarter of the intended movements could have been carried out.

During the second half of the 17th century, the number of pikemen was very sharply reduced in relation to the musketeers; for from the moment when the pikemen had lost all offensive power, the musketeers were the truly active part of the infantry. Moreover, it was observed that the Turkish cavalry, the most feared of this period, very often broke into the squares of pikemen, while just as often it was repulsed by the well-aimed fire of a line of musketeers. As a consequence, the Imperialists abolished the pike altogether in their Hungarian army and sometimes replaced it with *chevaux de frise* (Spanish riders), which were put together in the field; the musketeers carried the stakes as part of their regular equipment. In other countries, too, cases occurred in which armies were sent into the field without a single pikeman; the musketeers trusted to their fire and to the support of their own cavalry whenever they were threatened by a cavalry attack. Nevertheless, two inventions were needed to abolish the pike entirely: the bayonet, invented in France around 1640 and so far improved by 1699 that the handy weapon now in use came into being, and the flintlock musket, invented around 1650. The bayonet, although certainly an imperfect substitute for the pike, enabled the musketeer to afford himself to a certain extent the protection he had hitherto been supposed to receive from the pikemen; the flintlock musket, on the other hand, by simplifying the loading process and thereby achieving rapid fire, enabled him to more than compensate for the shortcomings of the bayonet.

VI. The Infantry of the 18th Century

With the abolition of the pike the defensive armour of the infantry was likewise completely done away with, and this arm now consisted only of soldiers armed with the flintlock musket and bayonet. This change was accomplished during the first years of the War of the Spanish Succession and coincides with the first years of the 18th century. At the same time we now find everywhere standing armies of considerable strength, recruited as far as possible by voluntary enlistment combined with man-stealing, but when necessary also by compulsory levy. These armies were now regularly organised as tactical units into battalions of 500 to 700 men, subdivided into companies on special occasions; several battalions formed a regiment.

In this way the organisation of the infantry began to assume a more stable and balanced form. The handling of the flintlock musket required much less space than that of the old matchlock musket. The old open order was abolished, and the ranks were closed up tightly, so as to have as many musketeers as possible on the same ground. For the same reason, the intervals between the different battalions of the line of battle were reduced to a minimum, so that the whole front formed a rigid, uninterrupted line, the infantry in two lines in the centre, the cavalry on the wings. The earlier system of fire by ranks, in which each rank retired to the rear after firing in order to reload, was now replaced by platoon or company fire, the three front ranks of each platoon firing simultaneously on the word of command. In this way an uninterrupted fire could be maintained by each battalion against the enemy standing before it. Each battalion had its particular place in this long line, and this order, which assigned each its station, was called the order of battle.

The great difficulty now was so to organise the order of march that the army could always pass from the order of march to the fighting order with ease and that every part of the line reached its correct place immediately and quickly. Within range of the enemy the layout of the camp served the same goal. Thereby great advances were made during this period in the art of marching and camping; nevertheless the rigidity and unwieldiness of the order of battle meant an impediment to all movements of an army. This rigidity in

the order and the impossibility of manoeuvring with such a line anywhere but on perfectly level ground at the same time restricted the choice of terrain suitable for a battlefield; but as long as both sides were fettered by the same chains, this was a disadvantage to neither. From Malplaquet onwards until the outbreak of the French Revolution, a road, a village, or a farmstead was shunned by the infantry; even a ditch or a hedge was virtually regarded as an obstacle by those who had to defend it.

The Prussian infantry is the classic infantry of the 18th century. It was essentially formed by Prince Leopold of Dessau. During the War of the Spanish Succession, the infantry line had been reduced from 6 to 4 ranks deep. Leopold abolished the fourth rank and drew up the Prussians 3 deep. He also introduced the iron ramrod, which enabled the Prussian troops to load and fire five times a minute, whereas other troops hardly fired three. At the same time, they were drilled to fire while advancing, but as they had to halt for this purpose and the whole long line had to keep dressed, the pace was slow—the so-called stiff step. The firing began at 200 yards from the enemy; the line advanced at the stiff step; the closer it came to the enemy, the shorter its steps became and the heavier its fire grew, until the enemy either gave way or was so shaken that a cavalry attack from the wings and an advance of the infantry with the bayonet drove him from his position. The army was always drawn up in two lines; but as there were scarcely any intervals in the first line, it became very difficult for the second to come to the aid of the first in case of need.

Such were the army and tactics that Frederick II of Prussia had at his disposal upon ascending the throne. There seemed to be very slight possibilities for a genius to improve such a system without breaking through it, and that Frederick, in his position and with the human material at his disposal, could not do. Nevertheless, he contrived so to organise his mode of attack and his army that with the resources of a kingdom smaller than Sardinia is today and with the meagre financial support of England he could wage a war against nearly the whole of Europe. The secret can easily be explained.

Hitherto, the battles of the 18th century had been parallel battles, in which both armies were drawn up frontally opposite each other and contended with each other in a simple, open, direct struggle, without any

cunning or artifice; the only advantage that fell to the stronger party was that its wings overlapped those of the adversary. Frederick applied to the linear order of battle the system of oblique attack invented by Epaminondas. He selected one wing of the enemy for the first attack and opposed one of his own wings, which overlapped the enemy’s, and a part of his centre to it, while at the same time he kept back the rest of his army. Thus he had not only the advantage of outflanking the enemy, but also that of smashing the troops exposed to his attack with superior forces. The other enemy troops could not come to the aid of those attacked, not only because they were tied to their place in the line, but also because in the event of a successful attack on the one wing, the other part of the attacking army advanced into the front line and threatened the enemy centre before it, while the originally attacking wing, after overcoming the enemy flank, threw itself upon the adversary’s flank and rear. This was truly the only conceivable method by which, while retaining the linear system, it was possible to concentrate a superior force against one part of the enemy’s line of battle. Everything depended on the deployment of the attacking wing, and as far as the rigidity of the order of battle permitted, Frederick always reinforced it. Very often he placed an advanced line, formed of his grenadiers, the elite troops, in front of the first infantry line of the attacking wing, so as to assure success as far as possible from the very outset.

The second means Frederick used to improve his army was the reorganisation of the cavalry. The lessons of Gustavus Adolphus had been forgotten; instead of relying on the sabre and the impetuous charge, the cavalry, with few exceptions, again used the pistol and carbine in combat. The wars at the beginning of the 18th century consequently show few successful cavalry attacks; the Prussian cavalry was especially neglected. Frederick, however, reverted to the old system, charging at full gallop with the sabre in hand, and thus created a cavalry unsurpassed in history; to it he owed a great part of his successes.

When his army became the model for Europe, Frederick began, in order to deceive the military experts of other nations, to complicate the system of tactical evolutions, all of which were unsuited to a real war, to a bewildering degree, intending thereby merely to camouflage the simplicity of the means that had helped him to victory. In this he was so successful that no one was more deceived than

his own subordinates, who actually believed that these intricate methods of deploying in line were the true essence of his tactics. In this way Frederick in fact prepared the army for the incomparable disgrace of Jena and Auerstädt and created, besides, the basis for that pedantry and rigorous discipline which have since marked the Prussians.

Alongside the line infantry we have so far described, which always fought in close order, there was also a certain type of light infantry, which did not, however, appear in great battles. Their task was the petty war; admirably suited for this were the Austrian Croats, who, by contrast, were useless for other duties. Following the model of these semi-savages from the military frontier on the Turkish border, the other European states formed their light infantry. But skirmishing in great battles, as it had been practised by the light infantry of antiquity and the Middle Ages, and even down to the 17th century, had entirely disappeared. Only the Prussians, and after them the Austrians, raised one or two battalions of riflemen, consisting of huntsmen and gamekeepers—all sharpshooters—who, during the battle, were distributed along the whole front and fired at officers; but there were so few of them that they hardly counted.

The revival of skirmishing is the result of the American War of Independence. While the soldiers of the European armies, held together by compulsion and strict discipline, could not be trusted to fight in open order, they found themselves compelled in America to hold their own against a population that was untrained in the regular drill of line soldiers, but were good shots and knew how to handle the rifle superbly. The nature of the terrain favoured them; instead of attempting manoeuvres for which they were at first incapable, they were driven by necessity to fight in dispersed order. Thus the action of Lexington and Concord marks a new epoch in the history of the infantry.

VII. The Infantry of the French Revolution and the 19th Century

When the European coalition invaded revolutionary France, the French were in a similar situation to the Americans shortly before, except that they did not have the same advantages of terrain. In order to fight the numerous armies that invaded or threatened to invade the country, according to the old linear principle, they would have needed well-trained men, and these were scarcely available, while untrained volunteers were present in large numbers. As far as time permitted, they were trained in the elementary evolutions of linear tactics; however, the battalions drawn up in line, as soon as they came under fire, unconsciously dissolved into dense swarms of skirmishers, who sought cover from the fire in every unevenness of the ground, while the second line formed a kind of reserve, which was, however, quite often drawn into the fight at the very start of the engagement. Moreover, the French armies were organised quite differently from their opponents. They were not formed in an immobile, uniform line composed of battalions, but in army divisions, each consisting of artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

Suddenly, the great fact was rediscovered that it is of no importance whether a battalion stands on its “correct” place in the order of battle in order to advance in line on command and to fight well. As the French government was without means, the tents and the enormous baggage of the eighteenth-century armies were abolished; bivouacking was adopted, and the comfort of the officers, which in other armies caused a great part of the impediment, was reduced to what they could carry on their backs. Instead of being provisioned from magazines, the army had to rely on requisitions in the respective country through which it marched. In this way the French attained a mobility and lightness in forming the order of battle that were entirely unknown to their enemies. If they suffered a defeat, they were beyond the reach of their pursuers within a few hours. When advancing, they could appear at unexpected points on the enemy’s flanks before he was warned. This mobility, and the mistrust and discord among the leaders of the coalition, gave the French the breathing space to train their volunteers and to elaborate the new tactical system that was developing among them.

From the year 1795 onwards, we see this new system taking on firm form as a combination of dispersed order and close column. The line formation was subsequently added, although not as before for a whole army, but only for individual battalions, which deployed into line when a situation seemed to require it. It is obvious that this manoeuvre, which requires greater steadiness in training, was the last that could be adopted by the irregular troops of the French Revolution.

Three battalions formed a demi-brigade, six a brigade, two or three infantry brigades a division, to which two batteries of artillery and also a small amount of cavalry were added. Several such divisions formed an army. When a division encountered the enemy, the skirmishers of the vanguard established themselves in a defensive position, the vanguard forming the reserve until the division arrived. The brigades then formed in two lines and a reserve, but each battalion in column and without fixed intervals; the cavalry and the reserve were intended to guard against breaks in the order of battle. The line of battle was no longer necessarily straight and unbroken; it could be curved in all directions, according to the requirements of the ground, since it was no longer necessary to select barren, flat plains as the battlefield; on the contrary, the French preferred hilly terrain, and their skirmishers, forming a chain in front of the whole line of battle, threw themselves into every village, every farm, or every thicket of which they could take possession. When the battalions of the first line deployed, they generally soon dissolved into swarms of skirmishers; those of the second line always remained in column and usually attacked the weak enemy lines in this formation with great success. Thus the tactical formation of a French field army gradually came to consist of two lines, and each line in turn of battalions in close column, drawn up en échiquier (checkerboard-like) with swarms of skirmishers in front and a firm reserve in the rear.

It was at this stage of development that Napoleon found the tactics of the French Revolution. As soon as his accession to political power allowed him, he began to elaborate this system still further. He concentrated his army in the camp of Boulogne and carried out a regular training course with it there. In particular, he drilled it in forming firm mass reserves on a small space and in the rapid deployment of these masses into line. He united two or three divisions into an army corps, in order thus to simplify the command. He invented the new marching order and brought it to the highest perfection. This consists in distributing the troops over such a large area that they can subsist on the provisions to be found there, and yet remain sufficiently together to be able to be united at any given point before the enemy can destroy the part attacked. From the campaign of 1809 onwards, Napoleon began to develop new tactical formations, such as the deep columns of whole brigades and divisions, which, however, failed completely and were never applied again.

After 1813, the new French system became the common property of all nations of the European continent. The old linear system and the system of recruiting mercenaries had been abandoned. Universal military service was recognised everywhere and the new tactics introduced. In Prussia and in Switzerland, absolutely everyone had to serve. In other states, conscription was introduced; the young men drew lots to decide who was to serve. Everywhere, reserve systems were introduced, whereby a part of the men were sent home after their period of service, so as to have a large number of trained men available for the event of war at small expense in times of peace.

Since that time, the armament and organisation of the infantry have been altered several times, partly brought about by the progress in the manufacture of hand firearms, partly by the collision of French infantry with the Arabs in Algeria. The Germans, who had always valued the rifle, had strengthened their light skirmisher battalions. Driven by the necessity of having a weapon with a longer range in Algeria, the French finally formed a rifle battalion in 1840, equipped with an improved rifle of great precision and long range. These men, drilled to execute all their evolutions and even long marches in a kind of trot (pas gymnastique), soon showed such efficiency that new battalions were raised. In this way a new light infantry was created, consisting not of huntsmen and forest wardens, but of the strongest and most agile men; precision of fire and great range were combined with mobility and endurance, and thus a fighting force arose which, within its limits, was certainly superior to any other existing infantry. At the same time, the pas gymnastique was introduced in the line infantry, and running, which even Napoleon would have regarded as the greatest stupidity, is now practised in every army as an important component of infantry training.

The success of the new rifle of the French riflemen (Delvigne-Poncharra) soon led to further improvements. For weapons with rifled barrels, the conical bullet was introduced. New devices were invented by Minié, Lorenz, and Wilkinson, so that the bullet slid easily down the barrel and could then expand in such a way as to fill the grooves with its lead, in order thereby to obtain the twist and the velocity that are decisive for the effect of the rifle. On the other hand, Dreyse invented the needle-gun, which was loaded from the breech and required no separate priming compound. With all these rifles one could hit at a distance of 1,000 yards, and they could be loaded just as easily as an ordinary smoothbore musket. Then the idea arose of arming the entire infantry with such rifles. England was the first country to realise this idea; it was followed by Prussia, which had long prepared this step, then Austria and the smaller German states, and lastly France. Russia, as well as the Italian and Scandinavian states, still lag behind.

This new armament has completely changed the aspect of warfare, but for a very simple mathematical reason and not in the way expected by theorists of tactics. It can easily be demonstrated, by describing the trajectory of these projectiles, that an error of 20 or 30 yards in estimating the distance to the object annihilates every chance of hitting beyond 300 or 350 yards. Now, whereas on the practice ground the distances are known, they are not so on the battlefield, and they change every moment. An infantry deployed in a defensive position, which has had sufficient time to pace out the distance to the most conspicuous objects lying in front of it, will thereby have a considerable advantage over an attacking enemy at a distance of 1,000 to 300 yards. This can be counteracted only by advancing at a full run up to 300 yards without firing, from which point onward the fire of the two sides will be equally effective. At this distance, the fire between two well-placed lines of skirmishers will become so deadly, and so many bullets will strike the outposts and the reserves, that a resolute infantry can do nothing better than to seize the first opportunity to charge against the enemy, firing a volley at 40 or 50 yards. These rules, first proved theoretically by the Prussian Major Trotha, have recently been tested in practice and with success by the French in their war against the Austrians. They will therefore constitute the alpha and omega of modern infantry tactics, especially if they prove equally effective against so quick-loading a weapon as the Prussian needle-gun. The arming of the entire infantry with the same rifle will lead to the abolition of the still existing distinctions between the light and the line infantry, by forming an infantry suited for every service. In this, no doubt, the next improvement of this arm of service will consist.