Friedrich Engels

Garibaldi’s Movements

From the English.

[“New-York Daily Tribune” No. 6031, August 23, 1860]

London, August 8, 1860

The crisis in Southern Italy is near. If we are to believe the French and Sardinian newspapers, 1,500 Garibaldians have landed on the coast of Calabria, and Garibaldi is expected hourly. But even if this news is premature, there is no doubt that Garibaldi will have transferred the theatre of war to the Italian mainland before the middle of August.

In order to understand the movements of the Neapolitans, it must be borne in mind that in their army two opposing currents are at work: the moderate liberal party, officially in power and represented by the ministry, and the absolutist camarilla, to which the majority of the army chiefs belong. The orders of the ministry are counteracted by the secret orders of the court and by the intrigues of the generals. Hence also the contradictory movements and contradictory reports. Today we hear that all royal troops are to leave Sicily – tomorrow we find them preparing a new base of operations at Milazzo. This state of affairs is peculiar to all half-revolutions. The year 1848 furnished proofs of it throughout Europe.

While the ministry proposed to evacuate the island, Bosco – who, in the heap of old women wearing Neapolitan general’s epaulettes, seems to be the only resolute man – tried to quietly transform the north-eastern corner of the island into a stronghold from which the reconquest of the island might be attempted, and for this purpose marched to Milazzo with a picked force of the best soldiers to be found in Messina. Here Bosco unexpectedly encountered the Garibaldians of Medici’s brigade.

He did not, however, venture a serious attack. In the meantime Garibaldi was informed of this and brought up reinforcements. Now the commander of the insurgents in his turn attacked the Royalists and, after a stubborn struggle of about 12 hours, completely defeated them. The forces were fairly equal on both sides, but the position occupied by the Neapolitans was very strong. Yet neither position nor soldiers could withstand the onslaught of the insurgents, who drove the Neapolitans straight through the town into the citadel. Here nothing remained for them but to capitulate, and Garibaldi allowed them to embark, though without arms. After this victory he immediately marched on Messina, where the Neapolitan general consented to surrender the outer forts of the town on condition that he would not be molested in the citadel. This citadel, which cannot hold more than a couple of thousand men, will never present a serious obstacle to Garibaldi in his offensive operations. He was therefore quite right to spare the town a bombardment, which would have been unavoidable in an attack. As things stand, this series of capitulations at Palermo, Milazzo, and Messina must do more to destroy the confidence of the royal troops in themselves and their leaders than twice as many victories. It has become a matter of course that the Neapolitans always capitulate before Garibaldi.

From that moment on, it became possible for the Sicilian dictator to contemplate a landing on the mainland. His steam fleet is probably not yet large enough to permit him to attempt a landing further north, somewhere six to eight days’ march from Naples, for instance in the Gulf of Policastro. He therefore appears to have resolved to cross the strait at its narrowest point, that is, at the extreme north-eastern point of the island, north of Messina. At this point he is said to have concentrated some 1,000 vessels, most of them most likely fishing boats or coastal feluccas of the kind customary along those coasts. Should the landing of the 1,500 men under Sacchi prove successful, they will form Garibaldi’s vanguard. The point is not very favourable for a march on Naples, being situated on the part of the mainland farthest from the capital. However, if his steam fleet cannot carry 10,000 men at one time, he has no other choice, and he then has at least the advantage that the Calabrians will immediately join him. If, however, he can cram a few tens of thousands of men onto his steamers and can rely on the neutrality of the royal navy (which seems determined not to fight against Italians), he can still land a few men as a feint in Calabria and himself proceed with the main body to the Gulf of Policastro or even to that of Salerno.

The force Garibaldi has at his disposal at present consists of 5 brigades of regular infantry, each of 4 battalions; 10 battalions of Cacciatori dell’Etna (Etna Sharpshooters); 2 battalions of Cacciatori delle Alpi (Alpine Sharpshooters), the élite of his army; a foreign (now Italian) battalion under Colonel Dunne, an Englishman; a battalion of engineers; a regiment and a squadron of cavalry, and four battalions of field artillery—in all 34 battalions, 4 squadrons and 32 guns, altogether about 25,000 men, of whom probably more than half are North Italians, the remainder from other parts of Italy. Almost the whole force can be employed for the invasion of Naples, because the new formations now being organised will soon be sufficient to watch the citadel of Messina and to protect Palermo and the other towns from sudden attacks. Nevertheless this force seems very small compared to the one the Neapolitan government has on paper.

The Neapolitan army consists of three guard regiments, fifteen line regiments, four foreign regiments, each of 2 battalions—or together 44 battalions—13 battalions of chasseurs, nine cavalry and two artillery regiments, in all 57 battalions and 45 squadrons on the peace establishment. Including the 9,000 gendarmes, who are also fully organised on a military footing, this army numbers 90,000 men in peacetime; but during the last two years it has been brought up to full war strength. Third battalions of the regiments have been organised, the depot squadrons have been ordered to active duty, the garrison troops have been completed, and this army now consists on paper of over 150,000 men.

But what an army it is! To a martinet’s eye it presents a good outward appearance, yet it is without life, without spirit, without patriotism, and without fidelity. It has no national military traditions. When Neapolitans fought as such, they were always beaten. If ever—then it was only under Napoleon that they shared in victories. It is no national army; it is a decidedly Royalist army. It was raised and organised for the express and exclusive purpose of keeping down the people. But even for that it seems unfit.

There are in it a host of anti-Royalist elements which are now bursting forth everywhere. In particular, the sergeants and corporals are almost without exception liberals. Whole regiments shout: “Viva Garibaldi!” No army ever experienced such disgrace as the Neapolitan from Calatafimi to Palermo, and if the foreign troops and some Neapolitans fought well at Milazzo, one must not forget that these picked soldiers form only a small minority of the army.

Thus it is almost certain that if Garibaldi lands with a force sufficient to achieve some successes on the mainland, no concentration of Neapolitan masses will be capable of opposing him with any prospect of success; and we may shortly expect to hear the news that he is continuing his triumphant march with 15,000 men against a tenfold superiority from Scilla to Naples.