Friedrich Engels

Garibaldi in Calabria

Written at the beginning of September 1860.

From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 6058, September 24, 1860, leading article]

We are now in possession of accurate information regarding Garibaldi’s conquest of Lower Calabria and the complete expulsion of the Neapolitan corps intended for its defence. In this section of his triumphant career, Garibaldi has proved himself not only a brave leader and clever strategist, but also a scientifically trained general. The attack with the main force on a chain of coastal forts is an undertaking that requires not only military talent but also military knowledge, and it is gratifying to note that our hero, who never in his life passed a military examination and of whom it can scarcely be said that he ever belonged to a regular army, was just as much at home on a battlefield of this kind as on any other.

The toe of the Italian boot is formed by the mountain chain of Aspromonte, which ends with the peak of Montalto, about 4,300 feet high. From this peak the waters flow down in a number of deep ravines, which radiate from Montalto as a centre like the radii of a semicircle, the periphery of which is formed by the coast. These ravines, whose respective riverbeds are dried up at this season, are called fiumare, and each forms a position for a retreating army. They can, it is true, be turned by way of Montalto, particularly as mule paths and footpaths run along the crest of every mountain spur and along the main chain of the Aspromonte itself; but the total absence of water in the high-lying region would make this a rather difficult manoeuvre with a large force in summer. The spurs of the mountain extend to the coast, where they fall away to the sea in steep and irregularly fissured rocks.

The forts which guard the strait between Reggio and Scilla are partly erected on the beach, but still more frequently on low, projecting rocks near the coast. The consequence is that they are all commanded and overlooked by higher rocks in their vicinity, and these commanding points lie outside the range of artillery and mostly beyond the range of the old Brown Bess, so that these rocks were disregarded when the forts were built; but they acquired decisive importance with the introduction of the modern rifled gun. Under these circumstances, a forcible attack on these forts, disregarding the rules of a regular siege, was fully justified. What Garibaldi had to do was, to send one column along the high road under the fire of the forts for the purpose of a feigned frontal attack on the Neapolitan troops, and to lead another column over the hills – as far up the fiumare as the nature of the ground, or rather the extent of the front determined by some Neapolitan defensive position, required – thereby turning both troops and forts, and in every engagement possessing the advantage of commanding ground.

Accordingly, on the 21st of August, Garibaldi sent Bixio with a part of his troops along the coast in the direction of Reggio, while he himself with a small detachment and the troops of Missori, who had again joined him, went through the higher country. The Neapolitans, eight companies or about 1,200 men, occupied a fiumare in the immediate vicinity of Reggio. Bixio, who attacked first, sent a column to the extreme left on the sandy beach, while he himself advanced on the road. The Neapolitans soon gave way, but their left wing in the mountains held out against the few soldiers of Garibaldi’s vanguard until Missori’s men came up and drove them into a corner. Thereupon they fell back into the fort, which lies in the centre of the town, and on a small battery on the coast. The latter was taken by a very brave assault of three companies of Bixio, who penetrated through an embrasure. The large fort was bombarded by Bixio, who had found two Neapolitan heavy guns with ammunition in the battery. But this would not have forced the Neapolitans to surrender, if Garibaldi’s sharpshooters had not occupied the commanding heights, from which they could see the gunners in the batteries and take aim at them. This produced its effect. The artillerymen left the gun platforms and ran into the casemates; the fort surrendered. Some of the men joined Garibaldi; but the greater part went home. While this was going on in Reggio, and the attention of the Neapolitan steamers was directed to this fight, to the destruction of the stranded steamer “Torino”, and to a feigned embarkation of Medici’s soldiers at Messina, Cosenz succeeded in getting 1,500 men out of the Faro Lagore in 60 boats and landing with them on the north-west coast between Scilla and Bagnara.

On the 23rd, a small skirmish took place near Salice, a little behind Reggio. Fifty Garibaldians – English and French – under the command of Colonel de Flotte, beat a fourfold number of Neapolitans. De Flotte fell. On the same day, General Briganti, who commanded a brigade under Viale in Lower Calabria, had a conference with Garibaldi concerning the terms of his going over to the Italian camp. This conference, however, had no other result than to show that the Neapolitans were completely demoralised. From that moment the question was no longer one of victory, but only of surrender. Briganti and Melendez, the chief of the second mobile brigade of Lower Calabria, had taken up a position close to the coast, between Villa San Giovanni and Scilla, which extended with its left as far as the hills near Fiumara di Muro. Their combined forces may be estimated at somewhat more than 3,600 men.

Garibaldi, who got into communication with Cosenz, who had landed in the rear of this body, drew a complete net around them and then calmly awaited their capitulation, which took place on the 24th towards evening. He disarmed them and allowed the men to go home if they wished – which most of them did. Fort Punta di Pezzo surrendered likewise, and the posts at Allafiumare, Torre del Cavallo, and at Scilla followed the example, discouraged both by the rifle fire from the commanding heights and by the general defection of the other forts and the troops in the field. Thus not only was the complete command of both sides of the strait secured, but the whole of Lower Calabria had been conquered, and the troops sent for its defence taken prisoner and sent home in less than five days.

This series of defeats made the Neapolitan army unfit for any further resistance. The officers of the remaining battalions of Viale at Monteleone resolved to defend their position for an hour in order to keep up appearances, and then to lay down their arms. The insurrection in the other provinces made rapid progress. Whole regiments refused to march against the insurgents, and desertions even occurred among the troops covering Naples. Thus, at last, the way to Naples was paved for the hero of Italy.