Friedrich Engels

The Sick Man of Austria

Written on 16 August 1860.

From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 6039 of 1 September 1860, leader]

Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria seems destined to live only to prove the truth of the old Latin maxim, that the gods first make mad those they wish to destroy. From the beginning of 1859 he has done nothing but deliberately trample underfoot every opportunity that offered itself to save himself and the Austrian Empire. The sudden attack on Piedmont with only part of his forces, Marshal Hess’s removal from the supreme command by the emperor and his clique, the indecision which led to the battle of Solferino, the sudden conclusion of peace just at the moment when the French had arrived in front of his strongest positions, the obstinate refusal of all concessions in the internal organisation of the empire until it was too late — these are a series of foolish blunders which, committed by a single individual in so short a time, have no equal.

But, luckily for him, Francis Joseph has another chance. The shameless double-dealing of Louis Napoleon rendered necessary that alliance between Prussia and Austria which alone made possible the preceding humiliations of Austria, its daily increasing difficulties at home and abroad. The interviews of Baden and Teplitz sealed this alliance. Prussia, acting for the first time as the representative of the rest of Germany, promised her aid in case Austria were attacked by Italy, or even by France, while Austria undertook to make concessions to public opinion and to alter her home policy. Here was, in fact, a hope for Francis Joseph. A struggle with Italy alone he need not have feared, even if there were to be difficulties in Hungary, for his new policy would be the best guarantee of safety in that respect. With a separate constitution on the basis of the one abrogated in 1849, Hungary would have been satisfied; a liberal constitution for the whole empire would have met the immediate wishes of the German core of the monarchy, and to a great extent counteracted the separatist tendencies of the Slav provinces. Once the finances were under the control of the people, the state credit would have recovered by itself, and the same Austria which is now weak, poor, shattered, exhausted, and a prey to internal dissension, would soon have revived under the protection of the 700,000 bayonets which Germany was keeping in readiness for Austria’s defence. To secure all this, only two things were required of Austria: to pursue a really liberal policy at home, sincerely and without reserve, and to remain on the defensive in Venetia, leaving the rest of Italy to its fate.

But neither the one nor the other, it seems, can or will Francis Joseph do. He can neither throw overboard his power as absolute monarch, which is dissolving more and more each day into thin air, nor can he forget that position as protector of the petty Italian tyrants which he has already lost. Insincere, weak, and obstinate at the same time, he appears to be seeking refuge from his difficulties at home in a war of aggression abroad, and instead of consolidating his empire by sacrificing a power which is slipping out of his hands anyhow — to have thrown himself once more into the arms of his personal bosom friends and to be preparing an invasion of Italy which may end with the collapse of the Austrian monarchy.

Quite irrespective of whether a note or other communication was sent from Vienna to Turin on the question of Garibaldi’s landing in Calabria or not, it is very probable that Francis Joseph has resolved to regard this landing as a reason for intervening on behalf of the King of Naples. Whether this is so we shall soon see. But what can be the cause of this sudden reverse in Austrian policy? Has the recent fraternisation with Prussia and Bavaria turned Francis Joseph’s head? It does not seem so; for, after all, the Teplitz fraternisation was a humiliation for him and a triumph solely for Prussia. Does Francis Joseph want to gather the armies of the Pope and of the King of Naples under his banner before Garibaldi smashes them to atoms and has united their Italian components with his own followers? That would be a very insufficient motive. In whatever campaign it may be, these troops will lack nothing, whereas Austria, in the situation into which she will bring herself by such a foolish aggression, would suffer from a want of everything. There can be no other cause than the situation in Austrian home politics.

And here we need not look far. The Imperial Council, reinforced by some of the most conservative and aristocratic elements of the various provinces, and in times of peace vested with the control of the finances of the country, is just now discussing the question of popular representation and of constitutions for the empire and for the individual provinces of which it is composed. The motions brought in for this purpose by the Hungarian members obtained an overwhelming majority in the committee, and, in defiance of the government, will be carried in the Council in the same triumphant manner. In a word, *the second Austrian revolution seems to have begun*. The Imperial Council, a feeble copy of the French Notables, declares itself — exactly as they did — incompetent and calls for the States-General. The government — in the same financial difficulties as Louis XVI’s, and still weaker in consequence of the divergent tendencies of the different nationalities composing the empire — is in no position to offer resistance. Concessions that are wrested from the government will certainly entail new concessions and demands. The States-General would soon form itself into a National Assembly. Francis Joseph feels the ground shake under his feet and may perhaps flee into war in order to escape the threatening earthquake.

What will be the end if Francis Joseph makes good his threat and embarks on a crusade for legitimacy in Naples and for the Papal State? There is not a power and not a state in Europe that has the slightest interest in maintaining the Bourbon rule, and if Francis Joseph intervenes in their name, he will have to bear the consequences. Louis Napoleon will certainly cross the Alps to protect the principle of non-intervention, and Austria — the public opinion of all Europe entirely against her, with ruined finances, an insurrection in Hungary, and with a brave but numerically far weaker army — will be fearfully defeated. Perhaps in the process Austria will receive the death blow. That Germany will come to her aid is altogether out of the question. The Germans will very decidedly refuse to fight for the King of Naples or for the Pope. They will take care that the territory of the Confederation is respected (which France and Italy will be only too glad to accept), and if Hungary rises, they will look on just as coolly. The German provinces of the empire, indeed, will very probably, as in 1848, support the demands of the Hungarians and demand a constitution for themselves. The Austrian press, despite government restrictions, shows even in Austria unmistakeable signs of widely disseminated sympathies for Garibaldi. Public opinion is pursuing a direction different from that of last year. Venetia is now regarded as a very unadvantageous possession, and the struggle of the Italians for independence is viewed by the Viennese public in a favourable light, since it is being carried on without French aid. Francis Joseph will find that it will even be extremely difficult to induce his own German subjects to take up the cause of the Bourbons of Naples, the Pope, and the minor Dukes of Emilia. A people that is on the point of carrying out a revolution against absolutism will hardly exert itself for the dynastic interests of its ruler. The Viennese have proved that before, and it is altogether probable that the crossing of the Austrian troops over the Po may become the signal, both in Vienna and in Hungary, for the use of sharper measures by the progressive forces.