Karl Marx

The Russo-French Alliance

Translated from the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 6025 of 16 August 1860]

London, 3 August 1860

The reflections ventured in my last article on the secret connection between the Syrian butchery and the Russo-French alliance have found unexpected confirmation from the other side of the Channel, in the form of a pamphlet published last Tuesday by M. Dentu, entitled *La Syrie et l’Alliance Russe* and attributed to the pen of M. Edmond About. As you know, M. Dentu is the publisher of the French government, the one who has issued all the semi-official pamphlets that from time to time have initiated Europe into the “studies” just then being prosecuted at the Tuileries. The pamphlet mentioned above acquires a special interest because its publication immediately followed the love-letter addressed by the man of December to Persigny, intended to mesmerise John Bull, and of which Lord John Russell, at the very moment he declined to lay it before Parliament, sent a copy to the London *Times*. The following extracts contain the essential content of *La Syrie et l’Alliance Russe*:

“As at the time of the Crusades, Christian Europe is stirred by appalling crimes, the scene of which is Syria just now. 700,000 Christians are delivered over to the pitiless fanaticism of two million Moslems, and the Turkish government appears, by its incomprehensible inactivity, to confess itself an accomplice. France would undoubtedly deny all her traditions if she had not immediately claimed the honour of protecting the lives and property of those who in past times were the soldiers of Peter the Hermit and Philip Augustus. … It is therefore high time to think of an escape from a situation that cannot last longer without leading to a great calamity – the total extermination of the Christian subjects of the Porte. The expedition of which the Turkish government speaks so much is utterly insufficient to restore order. The powers which have co-religionists in Syria and are justly alarmed for their safety must be ready to intervene by force. If they hesitated, no time would be left to protect the victims; their only duty would then be to avenge martyrs.

Two nations are especially interested in defending the Cross on those distant shores: France and Russia. What would be the probable consequence of the union of their forces, and the result with regard to the later organisation of Europe? That is the subject we now intend to examine.

In certain periods of history we find that, under the pressure of certain laws of attraction and agglomeration, peoples form political unions previously unknown. We are just now ‘assisting’ at one of these critical moments in the life of mankind. The Syrian question is only one of the nodal points of a very complicated situation. The whole of Europe is in a state of expectation and anxiety; it hopes for a comprehensive solution that can provide the basis for a durable peace in Europe as well as in the East. Now, this end can be attained only insofar as the organisation of our continent is brought into conformity with the wishes and needs of the nationalities that are at present writhing under the yoke. Hostile religious tendencies, incompatibility of temperaments, altogether opposed languages sustain, in certain European states, hidden movements that prevent the restoration of confidence and hinder the progress of civilisation. Peace, that supreme concept of the ambition of all governments, can be secured permanently only when the enduring causes of unrest that we have just enumerated shall have disappeared. We should therefore like to arrive at a twofold result:

1. Wherever possible, to favour the formation of a homogeneous and national state, whose task it would be to absorb and concentrate, in a powerful unity, sections of the population with common ideas or inclinations.

2. To endeavour to carry out this principle without recourse to arms.

At first sight, France and Russia appear to have realised the ideal of monarchies. Although separated by 400 leagues, these two powers have, by very different roads, attained that unity which alone is capable of creating lasting empires, and not merely short-lived frontiers that can at any time be altered by the fortune of war. … The Tsars, who during the past 135 years have meditated on the testament of Peter the Great, have not ceased to cast covetous glances towards European Turkey. … Should France continue to protest against the Tsars’ claims to the crumbling empire of the Sultan? We think not.
If Russia would offer us her co-operation in the

recovery

of the Rhine frontier, it seems to us that a kingdom would not be too high a price for her alliance. Thanks to such a union, France could regain her true frontiers, as traced eighteen centuries ago by the geographer Strabo.”
(There follows a quotation from Strabo, enumerating the advantages of Gaul as the seat of a mighty empire.)

“It can readily be understood that France should have aspired to re-erect this divine work” (I take it, the frontiers of Gaul), “which for so many centuries has been traversed by human fraud, and this is so much in the nature of things that Germany, at a time when we were thinking of no territorial enlargement, was nevertheless subject to periodical fits of uneasiness and, as a proof of her hostility, hurled at us Becker’s patriotic song. … We know that we are not alone in having plans of aggrandisement. Now, if Russia looks upon Constantinople in the same way as we look upon the Rhine, cannot these analogous claims be turned to account, and Europe be forced to accept a combination that would assign Turkey to Russia and give France that Rhine frontier which Napoleon I regarded in 1814 as a *sine qua non* <indispensable> condition of his existence as a sovereign?

There are only two million Turks in Europe, while there are thirteen million Greeks, whose spiritual head is the Tsar. … The Greek insurrection, which lasted nine years, was only the prelude to the movement whose outbreak the massacre in Syria may give the signal for. The Greek Christians wait only for an order from their chief in St. Petersburg or their patriarch in Constantinople to rise against the infidels; and there are few far-sighted politicians who do not foresee a solution of the Eastern question in a sense advantageous to Russia, and that in no very distant time. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Russians, ready to respond to the call of their co-religionists and encouraged by the prophecies of Stalezanew, should at the next moment cross the Pruth.

If we cast a glance at our own frontiers, the considerations that justify our intentions appear exactly as weighty as those that impel Russia. Let us set aside all historical recollections and all geographical motives, and discuss one by one the provinces enclosed by the Rhine, in order to examine the reasons that demand their annexation.

Let us first come to Belgium. It is truly difficult to doubt the striking resemblance that has induced some historians to call the Belgians the French of the North. In fact, the educated classes throughout the country use no language other than French, and the Flemish dialect is understood only by the lower classes of the population in a few districts. Moreover, Belgium is thoroughly devoted to Catholicism, and to France, her sister, she is indebted, by origin, idiom, and religion, for her independence. We will not recall the fact that Belgium, when conquered by our armies in 1795, formed nine French departments up to 1814. Yet it seems that our yoke was not too heavy, for in 1831, when Belgium failed to obtain from the great powers permission to be joined to France, she offered, by a resolution of the two Chambers, the Belgian crown to the Duc de Nemours, son of the King of the French. The latter’s refusal caused them subsequently to offer the crown to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, the present Leopold I; but the precedent to which we refer appears to us highly significant, and it leads to the supposition that Belgium, if asked, would be no less broad-minded than Savoy and would again demonstrate the attraction of the prestige inspired in her by the greatness of France. The opposition of a few members of the upper classes would very soon be stifled by the acclamation of the people.

Before the Rhine empties itself into the sea, it divides into three arms, two of which flow in a fairly northerly direction – the IJssel, which empties into the Zuider Zee, and the Waal, a tributary of the Maas. If France were once more to draw her frontiers, could she not take the line of the Rhine that is truly so called, instead of that of the Waal or the IJssel, so as to cut off as little as possible from South Holland? Unquestionably she would do so. Besides, it is precisely Holland that is not affected by the necessary rectification of our frontiers which takes the Rhine line as a basis. Belgium, within her present boundaries, would suffice to satisfy the need for expansion that has recently been so loudly proclaimed by public opinion. Moreover, the Scheldt line was the frontier conceded to France in 1801 by the Peace of Lunéville.”

Here follows a short paragraph in which, by similar arguments, the necessity of annexing the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, “which under the Empire formed the Département des Forêts”, is demonstrated. The author of the pamphlet then goes on to show the necessity of annexing Rhenish Prussia:

“Once Belgium and Luxembourg are in our power, our task is not yet finished. … To complete our frontiers we must take no less than two-thirds of Rhenish Prussia, the whole of the Rhenish province of Bavaria, and about a third of the Grand Duchy of Hesse. All these territories under the Empire formed the departments of Ruhr-Rhine, Moselle-Saar, Mont-Tonnerre, and the Grand Duchy of Berg. In 1815 they were divided among several possessors in order to make their recovery more difficult for us. It is noteworthy that these provinces, which were incorporated into the French monarchy, stood in direct connection with us for only a few years, and that our transient presence among them has nonetheless left the most enduring marks. What sympathy flows towards the French traveller in these parts of the country we gladly leave to the judgement of those who there

were travelling. In the last 45 years not a single French soldier has been garrisoned in these towns on the banks of the Rhine, and yet it is wonderful to see what a touching reception our uniform meets with there. Catholics like us, they are French like us.
Did not our Emperor Karl der Große hold his court in Aachen?
... Bordering on France, the Rhine provinces must become the political appurtenances of France, just as they are her natural appurtenances.”

The author then turns again to Russia, and having shown that the Crimean War presents no obstacle to the alliance between Russia and France, since at that time they had not yet reached an agreement, he makes the following communication regarding France’s claim on Russia’s gratitude:

“It must not be forgotten that France did not lend herself to England’s plans in the Baltic. We do not know whether an attack on Kronstadt would in any case have been successful; but we have reason to believe that, thanks to France’s opposition, it was not undertaken.”

After a digression on the Italian campaign, the author has no doubt that Prussia will finally join the Franco-Russian alliance:

“But in order to win the Berlin cabinet for our policy, it must be withdrawn from England’s influence. How can this be achieved? By striving to ensure that Prussia is no longer our neighbour on the Rhine, and by promising to support its legitimate aspirations to supremacy in Germany. The exchange of these Rhine provinces will prompt Bavaria and Prussia to seek compensation at Austria’s expense. The alliance with England can secure Prussia only the status quo, the alliance with France opens up an unlimited horizon to it.

Once the alliance between France, Russia and Prussia has been concluded in an upright manner – and we have reason to hope that this will come about – it will have most natural consequences ... We have shown above what Strabon recorded 1,800 years ago as undisputed – that the Rhine was the natural frontier of France. Prussia has to suffer the most from this great territorial extension. For the past 45 years it has had the Rhine as the dragon that guards the garden of the Hesperides. Let us make this cause of enmity between France and Prussia disappear, let the left bank of the Rhine become French again; in return for its good services, Prussia would seek compensation at Austria’s expense, and that power would be punished for its malice and ponderousness. Let us do everything for a lasting peace.

Let us consult the inhabitants, so that no violent annexations take place. If Russia is established at Constantinople and France on the Rhine, Austria diminished and Prussia holds the supremacy in Germany, where then can one find cause for unrest and revolution in Europe? Would England dare,

alone, to fight against Russia, Prussia and France? We cannot suppose anything of the kind. However, if this should actually happen, if Great Britain dared to commit such folly, it could receive a harsh lesson. Gibraltar, Malta and the Ionian Islands guarantee that it will behave quietly; these are the vulnerable points of its armour. But even if it were confined to a fruitless movement on its island and forced to be a passive observer of what takes place on the Continent, it will hardly be permitted to express its opinion on account of the five or six thousand men it will send to Syria.

The moment has come when our policy must be clearly defined. In Syria, France must peacefully conquer the Rhine frontier by forging the alliance with Russia. But we must take care not to allow Russia unlimited expansion. The provinces north of the Bosporus must suffice for its ambition. Asia Minor must remain neutral ground. Were it indeed possible to see a practical matter in a poetic and practical light, we should say that our choice is made; a man has just appeared who seems to be the incarnation of the idea we would like to see represented in Syria: Abd el Kader. As a Muslim, he is orthodox enough to placate the Mohammedan population; he is civilised enough to grant equal justice to all; he is bound to France by ties of gratitude; he would protect the Christians and bring to obedience the rebellious tribes that are constantly ready to disturb the tranquillity of Asia Minor. To make Abd el Kader Emir of Syria would be a generous reward for the services of our prisoner.”