Army, the organized body of armed men which a state maintains
for purposes of offensive or defensive war. Of the armies of
ancient history the first of which we know any thing positive is
that of Egypt. Its grand epoch of glory coincides with the reign of
Rhamses II (Sesostris), and the paintings and inscriptions relating
to his exploits on the numerous monuments of his reign, form the
principal source of our knowledge on Egyptian military matters.
The warrior caste of Egypt was divided into two classes, hermotybii
and calasiri, the first 160,000, the other 250,000 strong, in their
best times. It appears that these two classes were distinguished
from each other merely by age or length of service, so that the
calasirii, after a certain number of years, passed into the
hermotybii or reserve. The whole army was settled in a sort of
military colonies, an ample extent of land being set apart for each
man as an equivalent for his services. These colonies were mostly
situated in the. lower part of the country, where attacks from the
neighboring Asiatic states were to be anticipated; a few colonies
only were established on the upper Nile, the Ethiopians not being
very formidable opponents. The strength of the army lay in its
infantry, and particularly in its archers. Beside these latter there
were bodies of foot soldiers, variously armed and distributed into
battalions,* according to their arms; spearmen, swordsmen, club-
men, slingers, &c. The infantry was supported by numerous
war-chariots, each manned by 2 men, one to drive and the other
to use the bow. Cavalry does not figure on the monuments. One

infantry.— Ed.

solitary drawing of a man on horseback is considered to belong to
the Roman epoch, and it appears certain that the use of the horse
for riding and of cavalry became known to the Egyptians through
their Asiatic neighbors only. That at a later period they had a
numerous cavalry, acting, like all cavalry in ancient times, on the
wings of the infantry, is certain from the unanimity of the ancient
historians on this point. The defensive armor of the Egyptians
consisted of shields, helmets, and breastplates, or coats-of-mail, of
various materials. Their mode of attacking a fortified position
shows many of the means and artifices known to the Greeks and
Romans. They had the testudo, or battering-ram, the vinea, and
scaling-ladder; that they, however, also knew the use of movable
towers, and that they undermined walls, as Sir G. Wilkinson
maintains,* is a mere supposition. From the time of Psammetichus
a corps of Grecian mercenaries was maintained; they were also
colonized in lower Egypt.

Assyria furnishes us with the earliest specimen of those Asiatic
armies which, for above 1,000 years, struggled for the possession
of the countries between the Mediterranean and the Indus. There,
as in Egypt, the monuments are our principal source of
information. The infantry appear armed similar to the Egyptian,
though the bow seems less prominent, and the arms offensive and
defensive are generally of better make and more tasteful
appearance. There is, beside, more variety of armament, on
account of the greater extent of the empire. Spear, bow, sword,
and dagger, are the principal weapons. Assyrians in the army of
Xerxes are also represented with iron-mounted clubs. The
defensive armament consisted of a helmet (often very tastefully
worked), a coat-of-mail of felt or leather, and a shield. The
war-chariots still formed an important portion of the army; it had
2 occupants, and the driver had to shelter the bowman with his
shield. Many of those who fight in chariots are represented in long
coats-of-mail. Then there was the cavalry, which here we meet
with for the first time. In the earliest sculptures the rider mounts
the bare back of his horse; later on, a sort of pad is introduced,
and in one sculpture a high saddle is depicted, similar to that now
in use in the East. The cavalry can scarcely have been very
different from that of the Persians and later eastern nations—
light, irregular horse, attacking in disorderly swarms, easily
repelled by a well-armed, solid infantry, but formidable to a

pp. 67-68.— Ed.

disordered or beaten army. Accordingly, it figured in rank behind
the charioteers, who appear to have formed the aristocratic arm of
the service. In infantry tactics some progress toward regular
movements and formations in ranks and files appears to have
been made. The bowmen either fought in advance, where they
were always covered, each of them, by a shield-bearer, or they
formed the rear rank, the first and second ranks, armed with
spears, stooping or kneeling to enable them to shoot. In sieges
they certainly knew the use of movable towers and mining; and,
from a passage in Ezekiel,* it would almost appear that they made
some sort of mound or artificial hill to command the walls of the
town—a rude beginning of the Roman agger.” Their movable and
fixed towers, too, were elevated to the height of the besieged wall,
and higher, so as to command it. The ram and vinea they used
also; and, numerous as their armies were, they turned off whole
arms of rivers into new beds in order to gain access to a weak
front of the attacked place, or to use the dry bed of the river as a
road into the fortress. The Babylonians seem to have had armies
similar to those of the Assyrians, but special details are wanting.

The Persian empire owed its greatness to its founders, the
warlike nomads of the present Farsistan, a nation of horsemen,
with whom cavalry took at once that predominant rank which it
has since held in all eastern armies, up to the recent introduction
of modern European drill. Darius Hystaspes established a standing
army, in order to keep the conquered provinces in subjection, as
well as to prevent the frequent revolts of the satraps, or civil
governors. Every province thus had its garrison, under a separate
commander; fortified towns, beside, were occupied by detach-
ments. The provinces had to bear the expense of maintaining
these troops. To this standing army also belonged the guards of
the king, 10,000 chosen infantry (the Immortals, Athanatoz),
resplendent with gold, followed on the march by long trains of
carriages, with their harems and servants, and of camels with
provisions, beside 1,000 halberdiers, 1,000 horse guards, and
numerous war-chariots, some of them armed with scythes. For
expeditions of magnitude this armament was considered insuffi-
cient, and a general levy from all the provinces of the empire took
place. The mass of these various contingents formed a truly
oriental army, composed of the most heterogeneous parts, varying
among themselves in armament and mode of fighting, and

accompanied by immense trains of baggage and innumerable
camp-followers. It is to the presence of these latter that we must
ascribe the enormous numbers of the Persian armies as estimated
by the Greeks. The soldiers, according to their respective
nationality, were armed with bows, javelins, spears, swords, clubs,
daggers, slings, &c. The contingent of every province had its
separate commander; they appear, from Herodotus, to have been
divided by tens, hundreds, thousands, &c., with officers to
command each decimal subdivision.* The commands of large corps
or of the wings of the army were generally given to members of
the royal family. Among the infantry the Persian and the other
Aryan nations (Medes.and Bactrians) formed the élite. They were
armed with bows, spears of moderate size, and a short sword; the
head was protected by a sort of turban, the body by a coat covered
with iron scales; the shield was mostly of wicker-work. Yet this
élite, as well as the rest of the Persian infantry, was miserably
beaten whenever it was opposed to even the smallest bodies of
Greeks, and its unwieldy and disorderly crowds appear quite
incapable of any but passive resistance against the incipient
phalanx of Sparta and Athens; witness Marathon, Plataea, Mycale,
and Thermopylae.''! The war-chariots, which in the Persian army
appear for the last time in history, might be useful on quite level
ground against such a motley crowd as the Persian infantry
themselves were, but against a solid mass of pikemen, such as the
Greeks formed, or against light troops taking advantage of
inequalities of ground, they were worse than useless. The least
obstacle stopped them. In battle the horses got frightened, and, no
longer under command, ran down their own infantry. As to the
cavalry, the earlier periods of the empire give us little proof of its
excellence. There were 10,000 horse on the plain of Marathon—a
good cavalry country—yet they could not break the Athenian
ranks. In later times it distinguished itself at the Granicus,'”
where, formed in one line, it fell on the heads of the Macedonian
columns as they emerged from the fords of the river, and upset
them before they could deploy. It thus successfully opposed
Alexander’s advanced guard, under Ptolemy, for a long while,
until the main body arrived and the light troops manoeuvred on
its flanks, when, having no second line or reserve, it had to retire.
But at this period the Persian army had been strengthened by the
infusion of a Greek element, imported by the Greek mercenaries,
who, soon after Xerxes, were taken into pay by the king; and the

@ Herodotus, History, Book VII, Ch. 81.— Ed.

Army . 89

cavalry tactics displayed by Memnon on the Granicus are so
thoroughly un-Asiatic that we may, in the absence of positive
information, at once ascribe them to Greek influence.

The armies of Greece are the first of the detailed organization
of which we have ample and certain information. With them the
history of tactics, especially infantry tactics, may be said to begin.
Without stopping to give an account of the warlike system of the
heroic age of Greece, as described in Homer,* when cavalry was
unknown, when the nobility and chiefs fought in war-chariots, or
descended from them for a duel with an equally prominent
enemy, and when the infantry appears to have been little better
than that of the Asiatics, we at once pass to the military force of
Athens in the time of her greatness. In Athens every free born
man was liable to military service. The holders of certain public
offices alone, and, in the earlier times, the fourth’ or poorest class
of freemen, were exempt.'! It was a militia system based upon
slavery. Every youth on attaining his 18th year was obliged to do
duty for 2 years, especially in watching the frontiers. During this
time his military education was completed; afterward he remained
liable to service up to his 60th year. In case of war the assembled
citizens fixed the number of men to be called out; in extreme
cases only the levées en masse (panstratia) were resorted to. The
strategi, 10 of whom were annually elected by the people, had to
levy these troops and to organize them, so that the men of each
tribe, or phyle, formed a body under a separate phylarch. These
officers, as well as the taxiarchs, or captains of companies, were
equally elected by the people. The whole of this levy formed the
heavy infantry (hoplitae) destined for the phalanx or deep line
formation of spearmen, which originally formed the whole of the
armed force, and subsequently, after the addition of light troops
and cavalry, remained its mainstay—the corps which decided the
battle. The phalanx was formed in various degrees of depth; we
find mentioned phalanxes of 8, 12, 25 deep. The armature of the
hoplitae consisted of a breastplate or corslet, helmet, oval target,
spear, and short sword. The forte of the Athenian phalanx was
attack; its charge was renowned for its furious impetus, especially
after Miltiades, at Marathon, had introduced the quickening of the
pace during the charge, so that they came down on the enemy
with a run. On the defensive, the more solid and closer phalanx of
Sparta was its superior. While at Marathon the whole force of the
Athenians consisted of a heavy armed phalanx of 10,000 hoplitae,

a.n the Ilhad— Ed.

at Plataea they had, beside 8,000 hoplitae, an equal number of
light infantry. The tremendous pressure of the Persian invasions
necessitated an extension of the liability to service; the poorest
class, that of the thetes, was enrolled. They were formed into light
troops (gymnetae, psili); they had no defensive armor at all, or a
target only, and were supplied with a spear and javelins. With the
extension of the Athenian power, their light troops were
reinforced by the contingents of their allies,''* and even by
mercenary troops. Acarnanians, /tolians, and Cretans, celebrated
as archers and slingers, were added. An intermediate class of
troops, between them and the hoplitae, was formed, the peltastae,
armed similar to the light infantry, but capable of occupying and
maintaining a position. They were, however, of but little impor-
tance until after the Peloponnesian war,''’ when Iphicrates
reorganized them. The light troops of the Athenians enjoyed a
high reputation for intelligence and quickness both in resolution
and in execution. On several occasions, probably in difficult
ground, they even successfully opposed the Spartan phalanx. The
Athenian cavalry was introduced at a time when the republic was
already rich and powerful. The mountainous ground of Attica was
unfavorable to this arm, but the neighborhood of Thessaly and
Boeotia, countries rich in horses, and consequently the first to
form cavalry, soon caused its introduction in the other states of
Greece. The Athenian cavalry, first 300, then 600, and even 1,000
strong, was composed of the richest citizens, and formed a
standing corps even in time of peace. They were a very effective
body, extremely watchful, intelligent, and enterprising. Their
position in battle, as well as that of the light troops, was generally
on the wings of the phalanx. In later times, the Athenians also
maintained a corps of 200 mercenary mounted archers (hippotox-
otae). The Athenian soldier, up to the time of Pericles, received no
pay. Afterward 2 oboli (beside 2 more for provisions, which the
soldier had to find) were given, and sometimes even the hoplitae
received as much as 2 drachms. Officers received double pay,
cavalry soldiers three-fold, generals four-fold. The corps of heavy
cavalry alone cost 40 talents ($40,000) per annum in time of peace,
during war considerably more. The order of battle and mode of
fighting were extremely simple; the phalanx formed the centre,
the men locking their spears, and covering the whole front with
their row of shields. They attacked the hostile phalanx in a
parallel front. When the first onset was not sufficient to break the
enemy’s order, the struggle hand to hand with the sword decided
the battle. In the mean time the light troops and cavalry either

attacked the corresponding troops of the enemy, or attempted to
operate on the flank and rear of the phalanx, and to take
advantage of any disorder manifesting itself in it. In case of a
victory they undertook the pursuit, in case of defeat they covered
the retreat as much as possible. They were also used for
reconnoitring expeditions and forays, they harassed the enemy on
the march, especially when he had to pass a defile, and they tried
to capture his convoys and stragglers. Thus the order of battle was
extremely simple; the phalanx always operated as a whole; its
subdivisions into smaller bodies had no tactical* significance; their
commanders had no other task than to see that the order of the
phalanx was not broken, or at least quickly restored. What the
strength of Athenian armies was during the Persian wars, we have
shown above by a few examples. At the beginning of the
Peloponnesian war, the force mustered 13,000 hoplitae for field
service, 16,000” (the youngest and the oldest soldiers) for garrison
duty, 1,200 horsemen, and 1,600 archers. According to Boeckh’s
calculations the force sent against Syracuse numbered 38,560 men;
reinforcements despatched afterward, 26,000 men; in all nearly
65,000 men.* After the complete ruin of this expedition, indeed,
Athens was as much exhausted as France after the Russian
campaign of 1812.

Sparta was the military state, par excellence, of Greece. If the
general gymnastic education of the Athenians developed the
agility as much as the strength of the body, the Spartans directed
their attention mostly to strength, endurance, and hardiness. They
valued steadiness in the ranks, and military point of honor, more
than intelligence. The Athenian was educated as if he was to fight
among light troops, yet in war he was fitted into his fixed place in
the heavy phalanx; the Spartan, on the contrary, was brought up
for service in the phalanx, and nothing else. It is evident that as
long as the phalanx decided the battle, the Spartan, in the long
run, had the best of it. In Sparta, every freeman was enrolled in
the army lists from his 20th to his 60th year. The ephori'"’
determined the number to be called out, which was generally
chosen among the middle-aged men, from 30 to 40. As in Athens,
the men belonging to the same tribe or locality were enrolled in
the same body of troops. The organization of the army was based
upon the confraternities (enomotiae) introduced by Lycurgus, 2 of
which formed a pentecostys; 2 of these were united into a lochos,

¢ A. Béckh, Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener, Bd. 1, S. 287.— Ed.

and 8, or 4 lochi, into a mora. This was the organization in
Xenophon’s time; in former periods it appears to have varied. The
strength of a mora is variously stated at from 400 to 900 men, and
their number at one time was said to be 600. These various bodies
of free Spartans formed the phalanx; the hoplitae forming it were
armed with a spear, a short sword, and a shield fastened round
the neck. Later on, Cleomenes introduced the large Carian shield,
fastened by a string on the left arm, and leaving both hands of the
soldier free. The Spartans considered it disgraceful for their men
to return, after a defeat, without their shields; the preservation of
the shield proved the retreat to have been made in good order
and a compact phalanx, while single fugitives, running for their
lives, of course had to throw away the clumsy shield. The Spartan
phalanx was generally 8 deep, but sometimes the depth was
doubled by placing one wing behind the other. The men appear
to have marched in step; some elementary evolutions were also in
use, such as changing front to the rear by the half-turn of each
man, advancing or retiring a wing by wheeling, &c., but they
would seem to have been introduced at a later period only. In
their best times, the Spartan phalanx, like that of Athens, knew
the parallel front attack only. The ranks, on the march, were
distant from each other 6 feet, in the charge 3 feet, and in a
position receiving the charge, only 1'/s foot, from rank to rank.
The army was commanded by one of.the kings, who, with his suite
(damosia), occupied a position in the centre of the phalanx.
Afterward, the number of the free Spartans having considerably
decreased, the strength of the phalanx was kept up by a selection
from the subjected Periaeci. The cavalry was never stronger
than about 600 men, divided into troops (ulami) of 50 men. It
merely covered the wings. There was, beside, a body of 300
mounted men, the élite of the Spartan youth, but they dismounted
in battle, and formed a sort of body-guard of hoplitae around the
king. Of light troops, there were the skiritae, inhabitants of the
mountains near Arcadia, who generally covered the left wing; the
hoplitae of the phalanx, beside, had Helot servants,''? who were
expected in battle to do duty as skirmishers; thus, the 5,000
hoplitae at Plataea brought 35,000 Helot light troops with them,
but of the exploits of these latter we find nothing stated in history.

The simple tactics of the Greeks underwent considerable
changes after the Peloponnesian war. At the battle of Leuctra,'”°
Epaminondas had to oppose, with a small force of Thebans, the
far more numerous, and hitherto invincible Spartan phalanx. The
plain, parallel front attack, here, would have been equivalent to

certain defeat, both wings being outflanked by the longer front of
the enemy. Epaminondas, instead of advancing in line, formed his
army into a deep column, and advanced against one wing of the
Spartan phalanx, where the king* had taken his station. He
succeeded in breaking through the Spartan line at this, the
decisive point; he then wheeled his troops round, and moving on
either hand, he himself outflanked the broken line, which could
not form a new front without losing its tactical order. At the battle
of Mantinea,’?’ the Spartans formed their phalanx with a greater
depth, but, nevertheless, the Theban column again broke through
it. Agesilaus in Sparta, Timotheus, Iphicrates, Chabrias in Athens,
also introduced changes in infantry tactics. Iphicrates improved
the peltastae, a sort of light infantry, capable, however, in case of
need, to fight in line. They were armed with a small round target,
strong linen corslet, and long spear of wood. Chabrias made the
first ranks of the phalanx, when on the defensive, kneel down to
receive the enemy’s charge. Full squares, and other columns, &c.,
were introduced, and accordingly deployments formed part of the
elementary tactics. At the same time, greater attention was paid to
light infantry of all kinds; several species of arms were borrowed
from the barbarous and semi-barbarous neighbors of the Greeks,
such as archers, mounted and on foot, slingers, &c. The majority
of the soldiers of this period consisted of mercenaries. The
wealthy citizens, instead of doing duty themselves, found it more
convenient to pay for a substitute. The character of the phalanx,
as the preeminently national portion of the army, in which the
free citizens of the state only were admitted, thus suffered from
this admixture of mercenaries, who had no right of citizenship.
Toward the approach of the Macedonian epoch, Greece and her
colonies were as much a mart for soldiers of fortune, and
mercenaries, as Switzerland in the 18th and 19th centuries. The
Egyptian kings had at an early time formed a corps of Greek
troops. Afterward, the Persian king gave his army some steadiness
by the admission of a body of Greek mercenaries. The chiefs of
these bodies were regular condottieri, as much as those of Italy in
the 16th century. During this period, warlike engines for throwing
stones, darts, and incendiary projectiles, were introduced, especial-
ly by the Athenians. Pericles already used some similar machines
at the siege of Samos.'”? Sieges were carried on by forming a line
of contravallation, with ditch, or parapet, round the place,
investing it, and by the attempt to place the war-engines in a

commanding position near the walls. Mining was regularly made
use of, to bring the walls down. At the assault, the column formed
the synaspismus, the outer ranks holding their shields before them,
and the inner ranks holding them over their heads, so as to form
a roof (called by the Romans, testudo), against the projectiles of the
enemy.

While Greek skill was thus mainly directed toward shaping the
flexible material of the mercenary bands into all sorts of novel and
artificial formations, and in adopting or inventing new species of
light troops, to the detriment of the ancient Doric heavy phalanx,
which at that time alone could decide battles, a monarchy grew up,
which, adopting all real improvements, formed a body of heavy
infantry of such colossal dinrensions, that no army with which it
came in contact could resist its shock. Philip of Macedon formed a
standing army of about 30,000 infantry, and 3,000 cavalry. The
main body of the army was an immense phalanx of some 16,000
or 18,000 men, formed upon the principle of the Spartan
phalanx, but improved in armament. The small Grecian shield was
replaced by the large oblong Carian buckler, and the moderately
sized spear by the Macedonian pike (sarissa) of 24 feet in length.
The depth of this phalanx varied, under Philip, from 8, to 10, 12,
24 men. With the tremendous length of the pikes, each of the 6
front ranks could, on levelling them, make the points project in
front of the first rank. The regular advance of such a long front
of from 1,000 to 2,000 men, presupposes a great perfection of
elementary drill, which in consequence was continually practised.
Alexander completed this organization. His phalanx was, normal-
ly, 16,384 men strong, or 1,024 in front by 16 deep. The file of 16
(lochos) was conducted by a lochagos, who stood in the front rank.
Two files formed a dilochy, 2 of which made a tetrarchy, 2 of
which a taxiarchy, 2 of which a xenagy or syntagma, 16 men in
front by 16 deep. This was the evolutionary unit, the march
being made in columns of xenagies, 16 in front. Sixteen xenagies
(equal to 8 pentecosiarchies, or 4 chiliarchies, or 2 telarchies)
formed a small phalanx, 2 of which a diphalangarchy, and 4 a
tetraphalangarchy or phalanx properly so called. Every one of
these subdivisions had its corresponding officer. The diphalangar-
chy of the right wing was called head, that of the left wing, tail, or
rear. Whenever extraordinary solidity was required, the left wing
took station behind the right, forming 512 men in front by 32 in
depth. On the other hand, by deploying the 8 rear ranks on the
left of the front ranks, the extent of front could be doubled, and
the depth reduced to 8. The distances of ranks and files were

similar to those of the Spartans, but the close order was so
compact that the single soldier in the middle of the phalanx could
not turn. Intervals between the subdivisions of the phalanx were
not allowed in battle; the whole formed one continuous line,
charging en muraille. The phalanx was formed by Macedonian
volunteers exclusively; though, after the conquest of Greece,
Greeks also could enter it.'?? The soldiers were all heavy armed
hoplitae. Beside shield and pike, they carried a helmet and sword,
although the hand-to-hand fight with the latter weapon cannot
very often have been required after the charge of that forest of
pikes. When the phalanx had to meet the Roman legion, the case
indeed was different. The whole phalangite system, from the
earliest Doric times down to the breaking up of the Macedonian
empire, suffered from one great inconvenience; it wanted
flexibility. Unless on a level and open plain, these long, deep lines,
could not move with order and regularity. Every obstacle in front
forced it to form column, in which shape it was not prepared to
act. Moreover, it had no second line or reserve. As _ soon,
therefore, as it was met by an army, formed in smaller bodies and
adapted to turn obstacles of ground without breaking line, and
disposed in several lines seconding each other, the phalanx could
not help going into broken ground, where its new opponent
completely cut it up. But to such opponents as Alexander had at
Arbela,* his 2 large phalanxes must have appeared invincible.
Beside this heavy infantry of the line, Alexander had a guard of
6,000 hyraspistae, still more heavily armed, with even larger
bucklers and longer pikes. His light infantry consisted of
argyraspides, with small silver-plated shields, and of numerous
peltastae, both of which troops were organized in demi-phalanxes
of normally 8,192 men, being able to fight either in extended
order or in line, like the hoplitae; and their phalanx often had the
same success. The Macedonian cavalry was composed of young
Macedonian and Thessalian noblemen, with the addition, sub-
sequently, of a body of horsemen from Greece proper. They were
divided into squadrons (ilae), of which the Macedonian nobility
alone formed 8. They belonged to what we should call heavy
cavalry; they wore a helmet, cuirass with cuissarts of iron scales to
protect the leg, and were armed with a long sword and pike. The
horse, too, wore a frontlet of iron. This class of cavalry, the
cataphracti, received great attention both from Philip and Alexan-
der; the latter used it for his decisive manoeuvre at Arbela, when

he first beat and pursued one wing of the Persians, and then,
passing behind their centre, fell upon the rear of the other wing.
They charged in various formations: in line, in common rectangu-
lar column, in rhomboid or wedge-shaped column. The light
cavalry had no defensive armor; it carried javelins and light short
lances; there was also a corps of acrobalistae, or mounted archers.
These troops served for outpost duty, patrols, reconnoitring, and
irregular warfare generally. They were the contingents of Thra-
cian and [Illyrian tribes, which, beside, furnished some few
thousands of irregular infantry. A new arm, invented by
Alexander, claims our attention from the circumstance that it has
been imitated in modern times, the dimachae, mounted troops,
expected to fight either as cavalry or as infantry. The dragoons of
the 16th and following centuries are a complete counterpart to
these, as we shall see hereafter. We have, however, no information
as to whether these hybrid troops of antiquity were more
successful in their double task than the modern dragoons.

Thus was composed the army with which Alexander conquered
the country between the Mediterranean, the Oxus, and the
Sutledj. As to its strength, at Arbela, it consisted of 2 large
phalanxes of hoplitae (say 30,000 men), 2 semi-phalanxes of
peltastae (16,000), 4,000 cavalry, and 6,000 irregular troops, in all
about 56,000 men. At the Granicus, his force of all arms was
35,000 men, of whom 5,000 were cavalry.

Of the Carthaginian army we know no details; even the strength
of the force with which Hannibal passed the Alps, is disputed. The
armies of the successors of Alexander show no improvements on
his formations; the introduction of elephants was but of short
duration; when terrified by fire, these animals were more
formidable to their own troops than to the enemy. The later
Greek armies (under the Achaean league '**) were formed partly
on the Macedonian, partly on the Roman system.

The Roman army presents us with the most perfect system of
infantry tactics invented during the time when the use of
gunpowder was unknown. It maintains the predominance of heavy
infantry and compact bodies, but adds to it mobility of the
separate smaller bodies, the possibility of fighting in broken
ground, the disposition of several lines one behind the other,
partly as supports and reliefs, partly as a powerful reserve, and
finally a system of training the single soldier which was even more
to the purpose than that of Sparta. The Romans, accordingly,
overthrew every armament opposed to them, the Macedonian
phalanx as well as the Numidian horse.

In Rome every citizen, from his 17th to his 45th or 50th year,
was liable to serve, unless he belonged to the lowest class, or had
served in 20 campaigns on foot, or 10 campaigns as a horseman.
Generally the younger men only were selected. The drill of the
soldier was very severe, and calculated to develop his bodily
powers in every imaginable way. Running, jumping, vaulting,
climbing, wrestling, swimming, first naked, then in full armament,
were largely practised, beside the regular drill in the use of the
arms and the various movements. Long marches in_ heavy
marching order, every soldier carrying from 40 to 60 Ibs., were
kept up at the rate of 4 miles an hour. The use of the intrenching
tools, and the throwing up of intrenched camps in a short time,
also formed part of the military education; and not only the
recruits, but even the legions of veterans, had to undergo all these
exercises in order to keep their bodies fresh and supple, and to
remain inured to fatigue and want. Such soldiers were, indeed, fit
to conquer the world.

In the best times of the republic there were generally 2 consular
armies, each consisting of 2 legions and the contingents of the
allies (in infantry of equal strength, cavalry double the strength of
the Romans). The levy of the troops was made in a general
assembly of the citizens on the capitol or Campus Martius; an
equal number of men was taken from every tribe,'”? which was
again equally subdivided among the 4 legions, until the number
was completed. Very often citizens, freed from service by age or
their numerous campaigns, entered again as volunteers. The
recruits were then sworn in and dismissed until required. When
called in, the youngest and poorest were taken for the velites, the
next in age and means for the hastati and principes, the oldest
and wealthiest for the triarii. Every legion counted 1,200 velites,
1,200 hastati, 1,200 principes, 600 triarii, and 300 horsemen
(knights),'*° in all 4,500. The hastati, principes, and triari, were
each divided into 10 manipuli or companies, and an equal number
of velites attached to each. The velites (rorarii, accensi, ferentarit*)
formed the light infantry of the legion, and stood on its wings
along with the cavalry. The hastati formed the Ist, the principes
the 2d line; they were originally armed with spears. The triarii
formed the reserve, and were armed with the pilum, a short but
extremely heavy and dangerous spear, which they threw into the
front ranks of the enemy immediately before engaging him sword
in hand. Every manipulus was commanded by a centurion, having

a 2d centurion for his lieutenant. The centurions ranked through
the whole of the legion, from the 2d centurion of the last or 10th
manipulus of the hastati to the 1st centurion of the 1st manipulus
of the triarii (primus pilus), who, in the absence of a superior
officer, even took the command of the whole legion. Commonly,
the primus pilus commanded all the triarii, the same as the primus
princeps (1st centurion of Ist manipulus of principes), all the
principes, and the primus hastatus, and all the hastati of the legion.
The legion was commanded in the earlier times in turns by its 6
military tribunes; each of them held the command for 2 months.
After the 1st civil war,'?’ legates were placed as standing chiefs at
the head of every legion; the tribunes now were mostly officers
intrusted with the staff or administrative business. The difference
of armament of the 3 lines had disappeared before the time of
Marius. The pilum had been given to all 3 lines of the legion; it
now was the national arm of the Romans. The qualitative
distinction between the 3 lines, as far as it was based upon age and
length of service, soon disappeared too. In the battle of Metellus
against Jugurtha,’ there appeared, according to Sallust,? for the
last time hastati, principes, triarii. Marius now formed out of the
30 manipuli of the legion 10 cohorts, and disposed them in 2 lines
of 5 cohorts each. At the same time, the normal strength of the
cohort was raised to 600 men; the Ist cohort, under the primus
pilus, carried the legionary eagle.'*? The cavalry remained formed
in turmae of 30 rank and file and 3 decurions, the Ist of whom
commanded the turma. The armature of the Roman infantry
consisted of a shield of demi-cylindric shape, 4 feet by 2'/,, made
of wood, covered with leather and strengthened with iron
fastenings; in the middle it had a boss (umbo) to parry off
spear-thrusts. The helmet was of brass, generally with a prolonga-
tion behind to protect the neck, and fastened on with leather
bands covered with brass scales. The breastplate, about a foot
square, was fastened on a leather corslet with scaled straps passing
over the shoulder; for the centurions, in consisted of a coat-of-
mail covered with brass scales. The right leg, exposed when
advanced for the sword-thrust, was protected by a brass plate.
Beside the short sword, which was used for thrusting more
than for cutting, the soldiers carried the pilum, a heavy spear 4 Mg
feet wood, with a projecting iron point of 1'/, foot, or nearly 6
feet in all long, but 2'/y inches square in the wood, and weighing
about 10 or Il Ibs. When thrown at 10 or 15 paces distance, it

Army | 99

often penetrated shields and breastplates, and almost every time
threw down its man. The velites, lightly equipped, carried light
short javelins. In the later periods of the republic, when barbaric
auxiliaries undertook the light service, this class of troops
disappears entirely. The cavalry were provided with defensive
armor similar to that of the infantry, a lance and a longer sword.
But the Roman national cavalry was not very good, and preferred
to fight dismounted. In later periods it was entirely done away
with, and Numidian, Spanish, Gallic, and German horsemen,
supplanted it.

The tactical disposition of the troops admitted of great mobility.
The manipuli were formed with intervals equal to their extent of
front; the depth varied from 5 or 6 to 10 men. The manipuli of
the 2d line were placed behind the intervals of the Ist; the triarii
still further to the rear, but in one unbroken line. According to
circumstances, the manipuli of each line could close up or form
line without intervals, or those of the 2d line could march up to
fill the intervals of the Ist; or else, where greater depth was
' required, the manipuli of the principes closed up each in rear of
the corresponding manipulus of the hastati, doubling its depth.
When opposed to the elephants of Pyrrhus, the 3 lines all
formed with intervals, each manipulus covering the one in its
_ front, so as to leave room for the animals to pass straight through
the order of battle. In this formation the clumsiness of the
phalanx was in every way successfully overcome. The legion could
move and manoeuvre, without breaking its order of battle, in
ground where the phalanx durst not venture without the utmost
risk. One or two manipuli at most would have to shorten their
front to defile past an obstacle; in a few moments, the front was
restored. The legion could cover the whole of its front by light
troops, as they could retire, on the advance of the line, through
the intervals. But the principal advantage was the disposition in a
plurality of lines, brought into action successively, according to the
requirements of the moment. With the phalanx, one shock had to
decide. No fresh troops were in reserve to take up the fight in
case of a reverse—in fact that case was never provided for. The
legion could engage the enemy with its light troops and cavalry on
the whole of his front—could oppose to the advance of his
phalanx its first line of hastati, which was not so easily beaten, as
at least 6 of the 10 manipuli had first to be broken singly —could
wear out the strength of the enemy by the advance of the
principes, and finally decide the victory by the triarii. Thus the
troops and the progress of the battle remained in the hand of the

§-2315

general, while the phalanx, once engaged, was irretrievably
engaged with all its strength, and had to see the battle out. If the
Roman general desired to break off the combat, the legionary
organization permitted him to take up a position with his reserves,
while the troops engaged before retired through the intervals, and
took up a position in their turn. Under all circumstances, there
was always a portion of the troops in good order, for even if the
triarii were repulsed, the 2 first lines had re-formed behind them.
When the legions of Flamininus met Philip’s phalanx in the plains
of Thessaly,’*’ their first attack was at once repulsed; but charge
following charge, the Macedonians got tired and lost part of their
compactness of formation; and wherever a sign of disorder
manifested itself, there was a Roman manipulus to attempt an
inroad into the clumsy mass. At last, 20 manipuli attacking the
flanks and rear of the phalanx, tactical continuity could no longer
be maintained; the deep line dissolved into a swarm of fugitives,
and the battle was lost. Against cavalry, the legion formed the
orbis, a sort of square with baggage in the centre. On the march,
when an attack was to be apprehended, it formed the legio
quadrata, a sort of lengthened column with a wide front, baggage
in the centre. This was of course possible in the open plain, only
where the line of march could go across the country.

In Caesar’s time the legions were mostly recruited by voluntary
enlistment in Italy. Since the Social war,’”* the right of citizenship,
and with it liability for service, was extended to all Italy, and
consequently there were far more men available than required.
The pay was about equal to the earnings of a laborer; recruits,
therefore, were plentiful, even without having recourse to the
conscription. In exceptional cases only were legions recruited in
the provinces; thus Caesar had his fifth legion recruited in Roman
Gallia,’ but afterward it received the Roman naturalization en
masse. The legions were far from having the nominal strength of
4,500 men; those of Caesar were seldom much above 3,000. Levies
of recruits were formed into new legions (legiones tironum), rather
than mixed with the veterans in the old legions; these new legions
were at first excluded from battles in the open field, and
principally used for guarding the camp. The legion was divided
into 10 cohorts of 3 manipuli each. The names of _hastati,
principes, triarii, were maintained as far as necessary to denote the
rank of officers according to the system indicated above; as to the
soldiers, these names had lost all significance. The 6 centurions of
the first cohort of each legion were, by right, present at councils of
war. The centurions rose from the ranks, and seldom attained

higher command; the school for superior officers was in the
personal staff of the general, consisting of young men of
education, who soon advanced to the rank of tribuni militum, and
later on to that of legati. The armament of the soldier remained
the same: pilum and sword. Beside his accoutrements, the soldier
carried his personal baggage, weighing from 35 to 60 pounds. The
contrivance for carrying it was so clumsy that the baggage had
first to be deposited before the soldier was ready for battle. The
camp-utensils of the army were carried on the back of horses and
mules, of which a legion required about 500. Every legion had its
eagle, and every cohort its colors. For light infantry, Caesar drew
from his legions a certain number of men (antesignani), men
equally fit for light service and for close fight in line. Beside these,
he had his provincial auxiliaries, Cretan archers, Balearic slingers,
Gallic and Numidian contingents, and German mercenaries. His
cavalry consisted partly of Gallic, partly of German troops. The
Roman velites and cavalry had disappeared some time ago.
The staff of the army consisted of the legati, appointed by the
senate, the lieutenants of the general, whom he employed to
command detached corps, or portions of the order of battle.
Caesar, for the first time, gave to every legion a legate as standing
commander. If there were not legati enough, the quaestor, too, had
to take the command of a legion. He was properly the paymaster
of the army, and chief of the commissariat, and was assisted in this
office by numerous clerks and orderlies. Attached to the staff were
the tribuni militum, and the young volunteers above mentioned
(contubernales, comites praetori1), doing duty as adjutants, orderly
officers; but in battle they fought in line, the same as private
soldiers, in the ranks of the cohors praetoria, consisting of the
lictors, clerks, servants, guides (speculatores), and orderlies (appari-
tores) of the head-quarters. The general, beside, had a sort of
personal guard, consisting of veterans who voluntarily had
reénlisted on the call of their former chief. This troop, mounted
on the march, but fighting on foot, was considered the élite of the
army; it carried and ‘guarded the vexillum, the signal-banner for
the whole army. In battle, Caesar generally fought in 3 lines, 4
cohorts per legion in the first, and 3 in the second and third lines
each; the cohorts of the second line dressed on the intervals of the
first. The second line had to relieve the first; the third line formed
a general reserve for decisive manoeuvres against the front or
flank of the enemy, or for parrying his decisive thrusts. Wherever
the enemy so far outflanked the line that its prolongation became
necessary, the army was disposed in two lines only. One single line

g*

(acies simplex) was made use of in an extreme case of need only,
and then without intervals between the cohorts; in the defence of
a camp, however, it was the rule, as the line was still 8 to 10 deep,
and could form a reserve from the men who had no room on the
parapet. :

Augustus completed the work of making the Roman troops a
regular standing army. He had 25 legions distributed all over the
empire, of which 8 were on the Rhine (considered the main
strength, praecipium robur, of the army), 3 in Spain, 2 in Africa, 2
in Egypt, 4 in Syria and Asia Minor, 6 in the Danubian countries.
Italy was garrisoned by chosen troops recruited exclusively in that
country, and forming the imperial guard; this consisted of 12,
later on, of 14 cohorts; beside these the city of Rome had 7
cohorts of municipal guards (vigiles), formed, originally, from
emancipated slaves. Beside this regular army, the provinces had to
furnish, as formerly, their light auxiliary troops, now mostly
reduced to a sort of militia for garrison and police duty. On
menaced frontiers, however, not only these auxiliary troops, but
foreign mercenaries, too,: were employed in active service. The
number of legions increased under Trajan to 30, under Septimius
Severus to 33. The legions, beside their numbers, had names,
taken from their stations (L. Germanica, L. Italica), from emperors
(L. Augusta), from gods (L. Primigenia, L. Apollinaris*), or
conferred as honorary distinctions (L. fidelis, L. pia, L. invicta’).
The organization of the legion underwent some changes. The
commander was now called praefectus. The first cohort was
doubled in strength (cohors milliaria), and the normal strength of
the legion raised to 6,100 infantry and 726 cavalry; this was to be
the minimum, and in case of need one or more cohortes milliariae
were to be added. The cohors milliarta was commanded by a
military tribune, the others by tribunes or praepositi; the rank of
centurio was thus confined to subalterns. The admission of
liberated, or non-liberated slaves, natives of the provinces, and all
sorts of people into the legions, became the rule; Roman
citizeriship being required for the praetorians in Italy only, and
even there this was abandoned in later times. The Roman
nationality of the army was thus very soon drowned in the influx
of barbaric and semi-barbaric, Romanized and non-Romanized
elements; the officers alone maintained the Roman character. This
deterioration of the elements composing the army very soon

reacted upon its armament and tactics. The heavy breastplate and
pilum were thrown overboard; the toilsome system of drill, which
had formed the conquerors of the world, was neglected; camp-
followers and luxuries became necessary to the army, and the
impedimenta (train of baggage) increased as strength and endur-
ance decreased. As had been the case in Greece, the decline was
marked by neglect of the heavy line infantry, by a foolish fancy
for all sorts of light armament, and by the adoption of barbaric
equipments and tactics. Thus we find innumerable classifications
of light troops (auxiliatores, exculcatores, jaculatores, excursatores,
praecursatores, scutati, funditores, balistari, tragularii*), armed with all
sorts of projectiles, and we are told by Vegetius that the cavalry
had been improved in imitation of the Goths, Alani, and Huns.°
Finally, all distinction of equipment and armament between
Romans and barbarians ceased, and the Germans, physically and
morally superior, marched over the bodies of the un-Romanized
legions.

The conquest of the Occident by the Germans thus was opposed
by but a small remnant, a dim tradition of the ancient Roman
tactics; but even this small remnant was now destroyed. The whole
of the middle ages is as barren a period for the development of
tactics as for that of any other science. The feudal system, though
in its very origin a military organization, was essentially opposed to
discipline. Rebellions and secessions of large vassals, with their
contingents, were of regular occurrence. The distribution of
orders to the chiefs turned generally into a tumultuous council of
war, which rendered all extensive operations impossible. Wars,
therefore, were seldom directed on decisive points; struggles for
the possession of a single locality filled up entire campaigns. The
only operations of magnitude occurring in all this period (passing
over the confused times from the 6th to the 12th century), are the
expeditions of the German emperors against Italy, and the
crusades,'** the one as resultless as the other.

The infantry of the middle ages, composed of the feudal
retainers and part of the peasantry, was chiefly composed of
pikemen, and mostly contemptible. It was great sport for the
knights, covered as they were with iron all over, to ride singly into
this unprotected rabble, and lay about them with a will. A portion
of the infantry was armed, on the continent of Europe, with the

ers, skirmishers, shield bearers, slingers, ballista men, pikemen.— Ed.

crossbow, while in England the longbow became the national
weapon of the peasantry. This longbow was a very formidable
weapon, and secured the superiority of the English over the
French at Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt.’ Easily protected
against rain, which rendered the crossbow unserviceable at times,
it projected its arrow to distances above 200 yards, or not much
less than the effective range of the old smooth-bored musket.
The arrow penetrated a one-inch board, and would even pass
through breastplates. Thus it long maintained its place even
against the first small fire-arms, especially as six arrows could be
shot off while the musket of that epoch could be loaded and fired
once; and even as late as the end of the 16th century Queen
Elizabeth attempted to reintroduce the national longbow as a
weapon of war. It was especially effective against cavalry; the
arrows, even if the armor of the men-at-arms was proof against
them, wounded or killed the horses, and the unhorsed knights
were thereby disabled, and generally made prisoners. The archers
acted either in skirmishing order or in line.

Cavalry was the decisive arm of the middle ages. The knights in
full armor formed the first effective body of heavy cavalry,
charging in regular formation, which we meet with in history; for
Alexander’s cataphracti, though they decided the day at Arbela,’
were so much an exception that we hear nothing more of them
after that day, and during the whole sequel of ancient history,
infantry maintains its preeminent rank in battle. The only
progress, then, which the middle ages have bequeathed to us, is
the creation of a cavalry, from which our modern mounted service
descends in a direct line. And yet, what a clumsy thing this cavalry
was, is proved by the one fact, that during the whole middle ages
the cavalry was the heavy, slow-moving arm, while all light service
and quick movements were executed by infantry. The knights,
however, did not always fight in close order. They preferred
fighting duels with single opponents, or spurring their horses into
the midst of the hostile infantry; thus the mode of fighting out a
battle was carried back to the Homeric times. When they did act in
close order, they charged either in line (one deep, the more
lightly-armed esquires forming the second rank) or in deep
column. Such a charge was undertaken, as a rule, against the
knights (men-at-arms) only of the opposing army; upon its
infantry it would have been wasted. The horses, heavily laden with
their own as well as their rider’s armor, could run but slowly aud

for short distances. During the crusades, therefore, and in the
wars with the Mongolians in Poland and Silesia,’° this immovable
cavalry was constantly tired out, and, finally, worsted by the active
light horsemen of the East. In the Austrian and Burgundian wars
against Switzerland,'?’ the men-at-arms, entangled in difficult
ground, had to dismount and form a phalanx even more
immovable than that of Macedon; in mountain defiles, rocks and
stumps of trees were hurled down upon them, in consequence of
which the phalanx lost its tactical order, and was scattered by a
resolute attack.

Toward the 14th century a kind of lighter cavalry was
introduced, and a portion of the archers were mounted to
facilitate their manoeuvring; but these and other changes were
soon rendered useless, abandoned, or turned to different account
by the introduction of that new element, which was destined to
change the whole system of warfare— gunpowder.

From the Arabs in Spain the knowledge of the composition and
the use of gunpowder spread to France and the rest of Europe;
the Arabs themselves had received it: from nations further east,
who again had it from the original inventors, the Chinese. In the
first half of the 14th century cannon first was introduced into
European armies; heavy, unwieldy pieces of ordnance, throwing
stone balls, and unfit for any thing but the war of sieges. Small
arms were, however, soon invented. The city of Perugia in Italy
supplied itself in 1364, with 500 hand-guns, the barrels not more
than eight inches long; they subsequently gave rise to the
manufacture of pistols (so called from Pistoja in Tuscany). Not
long afterward longer and heavier hand-guns (arquebuses) were
manufactured, corresponding to our present musket; but short.
and heavy in the barrel, they had but a restricted range, and\the
matchlock was an almost absolute hindrance to correct aim, beside
having nearly every other possible disadvantage. Toward the close
of the 14th century there was no military force in western Europe
without its artillery and arquebusiers. But the influence of the new
arm on general tactics was very little perceptible. Both large and
small fire-arms took a very long time in loading, and what with
their clumsiness and costliness, they had not even superseded the
crossbow by 1450.

In the mean time the general breaking up of the feudal system,
and the rise of cities, contributed to change the composition of
armies. The larger vassals were either subdued by central
authority, as in France, or had become quasi-independent
sovereigns, as in Germany and Italy. The power of the lesser

nobility was broken by the central authority in conjunction with
the cities. The feudal armies no longer existed; new armies were
formed from the numerous mercenaries whom the ruin of
feudalism had set free to serve those who would pay them. Thus,
something approaching standing armies arose; but these mer-
cenaries, men of all nations, difficult to keep in order, and not
very regularly paid, committed very great excesses. In France,
King Charles VII therefore formed a permanent force from
native elements. In 1445 he levied 15 compagnies d’ordonnance of
600 men each; in all, 9,000 cavalry garrisoned in the towns of the
kingdom, and paid with regularity. Every company was divided
into 100 lances; a lance consisted of one man-at-arms, 3 archers,
an esquire, and a page. Thus they formed a mixture of heavy
cavalry with mounted archers, the 2 arms, in battle, acting of
course separately. In 1448 he added 16,000 francs-archers, under
4 captains-general, each commanding 8 companies of 500 men.
The whole of the archers had the crossbow. They were recruited
and armed by the parishes, and free from all taxes. This may be
considered the first standing army of modern times.

At the close of this first period of modern tactics, as they
emerged from mediaeval confusion, the state of things may be
summed up as follows: The main body of the infantry, consisting
of mercenaries, was armed with pike and sword, breastplate and
helmet. It fought in deep, close masses, but, better armed and
drilled than the feudal infantry, it showed greater tenacity and
order in combat. The standing levies and the mercenaries, soldiers
by profession, were of course superior to the casual levies and
disconnected bands of feudal retainers. The heavy cavalry now
found it sometimes necessary to charge in close array against
infantry. The light infantry was still principally composed of
archers, but the use of the hand-gun for skirmishers gained
ground. The cavalry remained, as yet, the principal arm; heavy
cavalry, men-at-arms encased in iron, but no longer composed, in
every case, of the nobility, and reduced from its former chivalrous
and Homeric mode of fighting to the more prosaic necessity of
charging in close order. But the unwieldiness of such cavalry was
now generally felt, and many devices were planned to find a
lighter kind of horse. Mounted archers, as has been stated, had in
part to supply this want; in Italy and the neighboring countries
the stradioti, light cavalry on the Turkish plan, composed of
Bosnians and Albanian mercenaries, a sort of Bashi-Bozuks,
found ready employment, and were much feared, especially in
pursuits. Poland and Hungary had, beside the heavy cavalry

adopted from the West, retained their own national light cavalry.
The artillery was in its infancy. The heavy guns of the time were,
indeed, taken into the field, but could not leave their position
after it was once taken up; the powder was bad, the loading
difficult and slow, and the range of the stone-balls short.

The close of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th century are
marked by a double progress; the French improved the artillery,
and the Spaniards gave a new character to the infantry. Charles
VIII of France so far made his guns movable that, not only could
he take them into the field, but make them change their position
during battle and follow the other troops in their movements,
which, however, were not very quick. He thereby became the
founder of field artillery. His guns, mounted on wheeled carriages
and plentifully horsed, proved immensely superior to the old-
fashioned clumsy artillery of the Italians (drawn by bullocks), and
did such execution in the deep columns of the Italian infantry,
that Machiavelli wrote his “Art of War’ * principally in order to
propose formations, by which the effect of such artillery on
infantry could be counteracted. In the battle of Marignano,
Francis I of. France defeated the Swiss pikemen by the effective
fire and the mobility of this artillery, which, from flanking
positions, enfiladed the Swiss order of battle. But the reign of the
pike, for infantry, was on the decline. The Spaniards improved
the common hand-gun (arquebuse) and introduced it into the
regular heavy infantry. Their musket (hacquebutte) was a heavy,
long-barrelled arm, bored for 2-ounce bullets, and fired from a
rest formed by a forked pole. It sent its bullet through the
strongest breastplate, and was therefore decisive against the heavy
cavalry, which got into disorder as soon as the men began falling.
Ten or 15 musketeers were placed with every company of
pikemen, and the effect of their fire, at Pavia,'*° astonished both
allies and enemies. Frundsberg relates that, in that battle a single
shot from such a musket used to bring down several men and
horses. From that time dates the superiority of the Spanish
infantry, which lasted for above 100 years.

The war consequent upon the rebellion of the Netherlands
was of great influence on the formation of armies. Both Spaniards
and Dutch improved all arms considerably. Hitherto, in the armies
of mercenaries, every man offering for enlistment had to come
fully equipped, armed, and acquainted with the use of his arms.
But in this long war, carried on during 40 years on a small extent

of country, the available recruits of this class soon became scarce.
The Dutch had to put up with such able-bodied volunteers as they
could get, and the government now was under the necessity of
seeing them drilled. Maurice of Nassau composed the first
drill-regulations of modern times, and thereby laid the foundation
for the uniform instruction of a whole army. The infantry began
again to march in step; it gained much in homogeneity and
solidity. It was now formed into smaller bodies; the companies,
hitherto 400 to 500, were reduced to 150 and 200 men, 10
companies forming a regiment. The improved musket gained
ground upon the pike; one-third of the whole infantry consisted
of musketeers, mixed in each company with the pikemen. These
latter, being required for hand-to-hand fight only, retained their
helmet, breastplate, and steel gauntlets; the musketeers threw
away all defensive armor. The formation was generally 2 deep for
the pikemen, and from 5 to 8 deep for the musketeers; as soon as
the first rank had fired, it retired to load again. Still greater
changes took place in cavalry, and here, too, Maurice of Nassau
took the lead. In the impossibility of forming a heavy cavalry of
men-at-arms, he organized a body of light-horse recruited in
Germany, armed them with a helmet, cuirass, brassarts for the
arms, steel gauntlets, and long boots, and as with the lance they
would not have been a match for the heavy-armed Spanish
cavalry, he gave them a sword and long pistols. This new class of
horsemen, approaching our modern cuirassiers, soon proved
superior to the far less numerous and less movable Spanish
men-at-arms, whose horses they shot down before the slow mass
broke in upon them. Maurice of Nassau had his cuirassiers drilled
as well as his infantry; he so far succeeded, that he could venture
to execute in battle, changes of front and other evolutions, with
large and small bodies of them. Alva, too, soon found the necessity
of improving his light horse; hitherto they had been fit for
skirmishing and single combat only, but under his direction they
soon learned to charge in a body, the same as the heavy cavalry.
The formation of cavalry remained still 5 to 8 deep. About this
time Henry IV of France introduced a new kind of mounted
service, the dragoons, originally infantry, mounted on horses for
quicker locomotion only; but very few years after their introduc-
tion, they were used as cavalry as well, and equipped for>this
double service. They had neither defensive armor nor high boots,
but a cavalry sword, and sometimes a lance; beside, they carried
the infantry musket, or a shorter carbine. These troops did not,
however, come up to the expectations which had led to their

formation; they soon became a portion of the regular cavalry, and
ceased to fight as infantry. (The emperor Nicholas of Russia
attempted to revive the original dragoons by forming a body of
16,000 men strong, fit for dismounted as well as mounted service;
they never found occasion to dismount in battle, always fought as
cavalry, and are now broken up and incorporated, as. cavalry
dragoons, with the remaining Russian cavalry.) In artillery the
French maintained the superiority they had gained. The prolonge
was invented by them about this time, and case-shot introduced by
Henry IV. The Spaniards and Dutch, too, lightened and
simplified their artillery, but still it remained a clumsy concern,
and light, movable pieces of effective calibre and range were still
unknown.

With the 30 years’ war'* opens the period of Gustavus
Adolphus, the great military reformer of the 17th century. His
infantry regiments were composed of two-thirds musketeers, and
one-third pikemen. Some regiments consisted of musketeers alone.
The muskets were so much lightened, that the rest for firing them
became unnecessary. He also introduced paper cartridges, by
which loading was much facilitated. The deep formation was done
away with; his pikemen stood 6, his musketeers only 3 deep.
These latter were drilled in firing by platoons and ranks. The
unwieldy regiments of 2,000 or 3,000 men were reduced to 1,300
or 1,400, in 8 companies, and 2 regiments formed into a brigade.
With this formation he defeated the deep masses of his opponents,
often disposed, like a column or full square, 30 deep, upon which
his artillery played with terrible effect. The cavalry was reorgan-
ized upon similar principles. The men-at-arms were completely
done away with. The cuirassiers lost the brassarts, and some other
useless pieces of defensive armor; they were thus made considera-
bly lighter and more movable. His dragoons fought nearly always
as cavalry. Both cuirassiers and dragoons were formed only 3
deep, and had strict orders not to lose time with firing, but to
charge at once sword in hand. They were divided into squadrons
of 125 men. The artillery was improved by the addition of light
guns. The leather guns of Gustavus Adolphus are celebrated, but
were not long retained. They were replaced by cast-iron 4-pound-
ers, so light that they could be drawn by 2 horses; they could be
fired 6 times while a musketeer fired twice; 2 of these were
attached to every regiment of infantry. Thus, the division of light
and heavy field artillery was established; the light guns accom-
panied the infantry while the heavy ones remained in reserve, or
took up a position for the whole of the battle. The armies of this

time begin to show the increasing preponderance of infantry over
cavalry. At Leipsic, in 1631, Gustavus Adolphus had 19,000
infantry and 11,000 cavalry; Tilly had 31,000 infantry and 13,000
cavalry. At Lützen, 1632, Wallenstein had 24,000 infantry and
16,000 cavalry (in 170 squadrons). The number of guns, too,
increased with the introduction of light pieces; the Swedes often
had from 5 to 12 guns for every 1,000 men; and at the battle of
the Lech, Gustavus Adolphus forced the passage of that river
under cover of the fire of 72 heavy guns.’*

During the latter half of the 17th and the first half of the 18th
century, the pike, and all defensive armor for infantry, was finally
done away with by the general introduction of the bayonet. This
weapon, invented in France about 1640, had to struggle 80 years
against the pike. The Austrians first adopted it for all their
infantry, the Prussians next; the French retained the pike till 1703,
the Russians till 1721. The flint-lock, invented in France about the
same time as the bayonet, was also gradually introduced, before
the year 1700, into most armies. It materially abridged the
operation of loading, protected, to some degree, the powder in the
pan from rain, and thus contributed very much to the abolition of:
the pike. Yet firing was still so slow that a man was not expected
to use more than from 24 to 36 cartridges in a battle; until in the
latter half of this period improved regulations, better drill, and
further improvement in the construction of small arms (especially
the iron ramrod, first introduced in Prussia), enabled the soldier
to fire with considerable rapidity. This necessitated a still further
reduction of the depth of formation, and infantry was now
formed only 4 deep. A species of élite infantry was created in the
companies of grenadiers, originally intended to throw hand-
grenades before coming to close quarters, but soon reduced to
fight with the musket only. In some German armies riflemen had
been formed as early as the 30 years’ war; the rifle itself had been
invented at Leipsic in 1498. This arm was now mixed with the
musket, the best shots in each company being armed with it; but,
out of Germany, the rifle found but little favor. The Austrians
had also a sort of light infantry, called pandours: Croatian and
Servian irregulars from the military frontier '** against Turkey,
useful in roving expeditions and pursuit, but, from the tactics of
the day and their absolute want of drill, useless in battle. The
French and Dutch created, for similar purposes, irregular infantry
called compagnies franches. Cavalry, too, was lightened in all armies.
There were no longer any men-at-arms; the cuirassiers maintained
the breastplate and helmet only; in France and Sweden, the

breastplate was done away with too. The increasing efficiency and
rapidity of infantry fire told very much against cavalry. It was
soon considered perfectly useless for this latter arm to charge
infantry sword in hand; and the opinion of the irresistibility of a
firing line became so prevalent that cavalry, too, was taught to rely
more on its carbines than on the sword. Thus, during this period,
it often occurs that 2 lines of cavalry maintain a firing fight against
each other the same as if they were infantry; and it was considered
very daring, to ride up to 20 yards from the enemy, fire a volley,
and charge at a trot. Charles XII, however, stuck to the rule of his
great predecessor.* His cavalry never stopped to fire; it always
charged, sword in hand, against any thing opposing it, cavalry,
infantry, batteries, and intrenchments; and always with success.
The French, too, broke through the new system and recom-
menced relying on the sword only. The depth of cavalry was still
further reduced from 4 to 3. In artillery, the lightening of the
guns, the use of cartridges and case-shot, became, now, general.
Another great change was that of the incorporation of this arm
with the army. Hitherto, though the guns belonged to the state,
the men serving them were no proper soldiers, but formed a sort
of guild, and artillery was considered not an arm but a handicraft.
The officers had no rank in the army, and were considered more
related to master-tailors and carpenters than to gentlemen with a
commission in their pockets. About this time, however, artillery
was made a component part of the army, and divided into
companies and battalions; the men were converted into permanent
soldiers, and the officers ranked with the infantry and cavalry.
The centralization and permanence of the armed contingent upon
this change, paved the way for the science of artillery, which,
under the old system, could not develop itself.

The passage from deep formation to line, from the pike to the
musket, from the supremacy of cavalry to that of infantry, had
thus been gradually accomplished when Frederick the Great
opened his campaigns, and, with them, the classical era of line
tactics. He formed his infantry 3 deep, and got it to fire 5 times in
1 minute. In his very first battles at Mollwitz,'*? this infantry
deployed in line, and repelled, by its rapid fire, all charges of the
Austrian cavalry, which had just totally routed the Prussian horse;
after finishing with the cavalry, the Prussian infantry attacked the
Austrian infantry, defeated it, and thus won the battle. Formation
of squares against cavalry was never attempted in great battles, but

only when infantry, on the march, was surprised by hostile cavalry.
In a battle, the extreme wings of the infantry stretched round en
potence,* when menaced by cavalry, and this was generally found
sufficient. To oppose the Austrian pandours, Frederick formed
similar irregular troops, infantry and cavalry, but never relied on
them in battle, where they seldom were engaged. The slow
advance of the firing-line decided his battles. Cavalry, neglected
under his predecessor,” was now made to undergo a complete
revolution. It was formed only 2 deep, and firing, except on
pursuit, was strictly prohibited. Horsemanship, considered, hither-
to, of minor importance, was now cultivated with the greatest
attention. All evolutions had to be practised at full speed, and the
men were required to remain well closed up. By the exertions of
Seydlitz, the cavalry of Frederick was made superior to any other
then existing or ever existing before it; and its bold riding, close
order, dashing charge, and quick rallying, have never yet been
equalled by any that succeeded it. The artillery was considerably
lightened, and, indeed, so much that some of the heavy-calibred
guns were not able to stand full charges, and had, therefore, to be
abolished afterward. Yet the heavy artillery was still very slow and
clumsy in its movements, owing to inferior and heavy carriages
and imperfect organization. In battle, it took up its position from
the first, and sometimes changed it for a second position, more in
advance, but manoeuvring, there was none. The light artillery, the
regimental guns attached to the infantry, were placed in front of
the infantry-line, 50 paces in advance of the intervals of the
battalions; they advanced with the infantry, the guns dragged by
the men, and opened fire with canister at 300 yards. The number
of guns was very large, from 3 to 6 guns per 1,000 men. The
infantry, as well as the cavalry, were divided into brigades and
divisions, but as there was scarcely any manoeuvring after the
battle had once begun, and every battalion had to remain in its
proper place in the line, these subdivisions had no tactical
influence; with the cavalry, a general of brigade might, during a
charge, now and then, have to act upon his own responsibility; but
with the infantry, such a case could never occur. This line-
formation, infantry in 2 lines in the centre, cavalry in 2 or 3 lines
on the wings, was a considerable progress upon the deep
formation of former days; it developed the full effect of infantry
fire, as well as of the charge of cavalry, by allowing as many men
as possible to act simultaneously; but its very perfection in this

point confined the whole army, as it were, in a strait-waistcoat.
Every squadron, battalion, or gun, had its regulated place in the
order of battle, which could not be inverted or in any way
disturbed without affecting the efficiency of the whole. On the
march, therefore, every thing had to be so arranged that when the
army formed front again for encampment or battle, every
subdivision got exactly into its correct place. Thus, any ma-
noeuvres to be executed, had to be executed with the whole army;
to detach a single portion of it for a flank attack, to form a
particular reserve for the attack, with superior forces, of a weak
point, would have been impracticable and faulty with such slow
troops, fit, only, to fight in line, and with an order of battle of
such stiffness. Then, the advance in battle of such long lines was
executed with considerable slowness, in order to keep up with the
alignment. Tents followed the army constantly, and were pitched
every night; the camp was slightly intrenched. The troops were
fed from magazines, the baking establishments accompanying the
army as much as possible. In short, the baggage and other train of
the army were enormous, and hampered its movements to a
degree unknown nowadays. Yet, with all these drawbacks, the
military organization of Frederick the Great was by far the best of
its day, and was eagerly adopted by all other European govern-
ments. The recruiting of the forces was almost everywhere carried
on by voluntary enlistments, assisted by kidnapping; and it was
only after very severe losses that Frederick had recourse to forced
levies from his provinces.

When the war of the coalition against the French republic
began, the French army was disorganized by the loss of its officers,
and numbered less than 150,000 men. The numbers of the enemy
were far superior; new levies became necessary and were made, to
an immense extent, in the shape of national volunteers, of which,
in 1793, there must have been at least 500 battalions in existence.
These troops were not drilled, nor was there time to drill them
according to the complicated system of line-tactics, and to the
degree of perfection required by movements in line. Every
attempt to meet the enemy in line was followed by a signal defeat,
though the French had far superior numbers. A new system of
tactics became necessary. The American revolution '*’ had shown
the advantage to be gained, with undisciplined troops, from
extended order and skirmishing fire. The French adopted it, and
supported the skirmishers by deep columns, in which a little
disorder was less objectionable, so long as the mass remained well
together. In this formation, they launched their superior numbers

against the enemy, and were generally successful. This new
formation and the want of experience of their troops led them to
fight in broken ground, in villages and woods, where they found
shelter from the enemy’s fire, and where his line was invariably
disordered; their want of tents, field-bakeries, &c., compelled
them to bivouac without shelter, and to live upon what the country
afforded them. Thus they gained a mobility unknown to their
enemies, who were encumbered with tents and all sorts of
baggage. When the revolutionary war had produced, in Napoleon,
the man who reduced this new mode of warfare to a regular
system, combined it with what was still useful in the old system,
and brought the new method at once to that degree of perfection
which Frederick had given to line-tactics—then the French were
almost invincible, until their opponents had learnt from them, and
organized their armies upon the new model. The principal
features of this new system are: the restoration of the old principle
that every citizen is liable, in case of need, to be called out for the
defence of the country, and the consequent formation of the
army, by compulsory levies, of greater or less extent, from the
whole of the inhabitants; a change by which the numeric force of
armies was at once raised to three-fold the average of Frederick’s
time, and might, in case of need, be increased to larger
proportions still. Then, the discarding of camp utensils, and of
depending for provisions upon magazines, the introduction of the
bivouac and of the rule that war feeds war; the celerity and
independence of an army was hereby increased as much as its
numeric force by the rule of general liability to serve. In tactical
organization, the principle of mixing infantry, cavalry, and
artillery in the smaller portions of an army, in corps and divisions,
became the rule. Every division thus became a complete army on a
reduced scale, fit to act independently, and capable of considera-
ble power of resistance even against superior numbers. The order
of battle, now, was based upon the column; it served as the
reservoir, from which sallied and to which returned the swarms of
skirmishers; as the wedgelike compact mass to be launched against
a particular point of the enemy’s line; as the form to approach the
enemy and then to deploy, if the ground and the state of the
engagement made it desirable to oppose firing-lines to the enemy.
The mutual supporting of the 3 arms developed to its full extent
by their combination in small bodies, and the combination of the 3
forms of fighting; skirmishers, line, and column, composed the
great tactical superiority of modern armies. Any kind of ground,
thereby, became fit for fighting in it; and the ability of rapidly

judging the advantages and disadvantages of ground, and of at
once disposing troops accordingly, became one of the chief
requirements of a captain. And not only in the commander-in-.
chief, but in the subordinate officers, these qualities, and general
aptness’ for independent command, were now a necessity. Corps,
divisions, brigades, and detachments, were constantly placed in
situations where their commanders had to act on their own
responsibility; the battle-field no longer presented its long
unbroken lines of infantry disposed in a vast plain with cavalry on .
the wings; but the single corps and divisions, massed in columns,
stood hidden behind villages, roads, or hills, separated from each
other by seemingly large intervals, while but a small portion of the
troops appeared actually engaged in skirmishing and _ firing
artillery, until the decisive moment approached. Lines of battle
extended with the numbers and with this formation; it was not
necessary actually to fill up every interval with a line visible to the
enemy, so long as troops were at hand to come up when required.
Turning of flanks now became generally a strategical operation,
the stronger army placing itself completely between the weaker
one and its communications, so that a single defeat could
annihilate an army and decide a campaign. The favorite tactical
manoeuvre was the breaking through the enemy’s centre, with
fresh troops, as soon as the state of affairs showed that his last
reserves were engaged. Reserves, which in line-tactics would have
been out of place and would have deducted from the efficiency of
the army in the decisive moment, now became the chief means to
decide an action. The order of battle, extending as it did in front,
extended also in depth; from the skirmishing line to the position
of the reserves the depth was very often 2 miles and more. In
short, if the new system required less drill and parade-precision, it
required far greater rapidity, exertions, and intelligence from every
one, from the highest commander as well as the lowest skirmisher;
and every fresh improvement made since Napoleon, tends in that
direction.

The changes in the matériel of armies were but trifling during
this period; constant wars left little time for such improvements
the introduction of which requires time. Two very important
innovations took place in the French army shortly before the
revolution; the adoption of a new model of musket of reduced
calibre and windage, and with a curved stock instead of the
straight one hitherto in use. This weapon, more accurately
worked, contributed a great deal toward the superiority of the
French skirmishers, and remained the model upon which with

trifling alterations the muskets in use in all armies up to the
introduction of percussion locks, were constructed. The second
was the simplification and improvement of the artillery by
Gribeauval. The French artillery under Louis XV was completely
neglected; the guns were of all sorts of calibres, the carriages were
old-fashioned, and the models upon which they were constructed
not even uniform. Gribeauval, who had served during the 7 years’
war |*8 with the Austrians, and there seen better models, succeeded
in reducing the number of calibres, equalizing and improving the
models, and greatly simplifying the whole system. It was with his
guns and carriages that Napoleon fought his wars. The English
artillery, which was in the worst possible state when the war with
France broke out, was gradually, but slowly, considerably im-
proved; with it originated the block-trail carriage, which has since
been adopted by many continental armies, and the arrangement
for mounting the foot artillerymen on the limbers and ammuni-
tion wagons. Horse-artillery, invented by Frederick the Great, was
much cultivated during Napoleon’s period, especially by himself,
and its proper tactics were first developed. When the war was
over, it was found that the British were the most efficient in this
arm. Of all large European armies, the Austrian is the only one
which supplies the place of horse-artillery by batteries in which the
men are mounted on wagons provided for the purpose.

The German armies still kept up the especial class of infantry
armed with rifles, and the new system of fighting in extended
order gave a fresh importance to this arm. It was especially
cultivated, and in 1838 taken up by the French, who felt the want
of a long range musket for Algiers. The tirailleurs de Vincennes,
afterward chasseurs a pied, were formed, and brought to a state of
efficiency without parallel. This formation gave rise to great
improvements in rifles, and by which both range and precision
were increased to a wonderful degree. The names of Delvigne,
Thouvenin, Minié, became celebrated thereby. For the totality of
the infantry, the percussion lock was introduced between 1830 and
1840 in most armies; as usual, the English and the Russians were
the last. In the mean time, great efforts were made in various
quarters still further to improve small arms, and to produce a
musket of superior range which could be given to the whole of the
infantry. The Prussians introduced the needle gun, a rifle arm
loaded at the breech, and capable of very rapid firing, and having
a long range; the invention, originated in Belgium, was considera-
bly improved by them. This gun has been given to all their light
battalions; the remainder of the infantry have recently got their

old muskets, by a very simple process, turned into Minié rifles.
The English were the first this time to arm the whole of their
infantry with a superior musket, viz., the Enfield rifle, a slight
alteration of the Minié; its superiority was fully proved in the
Crimea, and saved them at Inkermann.'*9

In tactical arrangements, no changes of importance have taken
place for infantry and cavalry, if we except the great improvement
of light infantry tactics by the French chasseurs, and the new
Prussian system of columns of companies, which latter formation,
with perhaps some variations, will no doubt soon become general
from its great tactical advantages. The formation is still 3 deep
with the Russians and Austrians, the English have formed 2 deep
ever since Napoleon’s time; the Prussians march 3 deep, but
mostly fight 2 deep, the 3d rank forming the skirmishers and their
supports; and the French, hitherto formed 3 deep, have fought
2 deep in the Crimea, and are introducing this formation in
the whole army. As to cavalry, the Russian experiment of restor-
ing the dragoons of the 17th century and its failure have been
mentioned.

In artillery, considerable improvements of detail and simplifica-
tion of calibres, and models for wheels, carriages, &c., have taken
place in every army. The science of artillery has been greatly
improved. Yet no considerable changes have taken place. Most
continental armies carry 6 and 12-pounders; the Piedmontese 8
and 16-pounders; the Spanish 8 and 12-pounders; the French,
who hitherto had 8 and 12-pounders, are now introducing Louis
Napoleon’s so-called howitzer gun, a simple light 12-pounder,
from which small shells are also fired, and which is to replace
every other kind of field gun. The British have 3 and 6-pounders
in the colonies, but in their armies sent out from England, now
only use 9-pounders, 12-pounders, and 18-pounders. In the
Crimea they even had a field battery of 32-pounders, but it always
stuck fast.

The general organization of modern armies is very much alike.
With the exception of the British and American, they are
recruited by compulsory levy, based either upon conscription, in
which case the men, after serving their time, are dismissed for life,
or upon the reserve system, in which the time of actual service is
short, but the men remain liable to be called out again for a
certain time afterward. France is the most striking example of the
first, Prussia of the second system. Even in England, where both
line and militia are generally recruited by voluntary enlistment,
the conscription (or ballot) is by law established for the militia

should volunteers be wanting. In Switzerland, no standing army
exists; the whole force consists of militia drilled for a short time
only. The enlistment of foreign mercenaries is still the rule in
some countries; Naples and the Pope still have their Swiss
regiments; the French their foreign legion; and England, in case
of serious war, is regularly compelled to resort to this expedient.
The time of actual service varies very much; from a couple of
weeks with the Swiss, 18 months to 2 years with the smaller
German states, and 3 years with the Prussians, to 5 or 6 years in
France, 12 years in England, and 15 to 25 in Russia. The officers
are recruited in various ways. In most armies there are now no
legal impediments to advancement from the ranks, but the
practical impediments vary very much. In France and Austria a
portion of the officers must be taken from the sergeants; in Russia
the insufficient number of educated candidates makes this a
necessity. In Prussia the examination for officers’ commissions, in
peace, is a bar to uneducated men; in England advancement from
the ranks is a rare exception. For the remainder of the officers,
there are in most countries military schools, though with the
exception of France, it is not necessary to pass through them. In
military education the French, in general education the Prussian
officers are ahead; the English and the Russians stand lowest in
both. As to the horses required, we believe Prussia is the only
country in which the equine population too is subject to
compulsory levies, the owners being bought off at fixed rates.
With the exceptions named above, the equipment and armament
of modern armies is now everywhere nearly the same. There is, of
course, a great difference in the quality and workmanship of the
material. In this respect, the Russians stand lowest, the English,
where the industrial advantages at their command are really made
use of, stand highest.

The infantry of all armies is divided into line and light infantry.
The Ist is the rule, and composes the mass of all infantry; real
light infantry is everywhere the exception. Of this latter, the
French have at present decidedly the best in quality and a
considerable number: 21 battalions of chasseurs, 9 of Zouaves, and
6 of native Algerian tirailleurs. The Austrian light infantry,
especially the rifles, are very good, too; there are 32 battalions of
them. The Prussians have 9 battalions of rifles and 40 of light
infantry; the latter, however, not sufficiently up in their special
duty. The English have no real light infantry, except their 6
battalions of rifles, and are, next to the Russians, decidedly the
least fit for that kind of duty. The Russians may be said to be

without any real light infantry, for their 6 rifle battalions vanish in
their enormous army.

Cavalry, too, is everywhere divided into heavy and _ light.
Cuirassiers are always heavy, hussars, chasseurs, chevaux-legers,
always light horse. Dragoons and lancers are in some armies light,
in others heavy cavalry; and the Russians would also be without
light cavalry were it not for the Cossacks. The best light cavalry is
undoubtedly that of the Austrians, the national Hungarian hussars
and Polish hussars. The same division holds good with artillery,
with the exception of the French, who as stated now have only one
calibre. In other armies there are still light and heavy batteries,
according to the calibres attached to them. Light artillery is still
subdivided in horse and foot, the Ist especially intended to act
in company with cavalry. The Austrians, as stated, have no
horse-artillery; the English and French have no proper foot-
artillery, the men being carried on the limbers and ammunition
wagons.

The infantry is formed into companies, battalions, and regi-
ments. The battalion is the tactical unity; it is the form in which
the troops fight, a few exceptional cases left aside. A battalion,
therefore, must not be too strong to be commanded by the voice
and eye of its chief, nor too weak to act as an independent body in
battle, even after the losses of a campaign. The _ strength,
therefore, varies from 600 to 1,400 men; 800 to 1,000 forms the
average. The division of a battalion into companies has for its
object the fixing of its evolutionary subdivisions, the efficiency of
the men in the details of the drill, and the more commodious,
economical administration. Practically, companies appear as sepa-
rate bodies in skirmishing only, and with the Prussians, in the
formation in columns of companies, where each of the 4
companies forms columns in 3 platoons; this formation presup-
poses strong companies, and they are in Prussia 250 strong. The
number of companies in a battalion varies as much as their
strength. The English have 10, of from 90 to 120 men, the
Russians and Prussians 4 of 250 men, the French and Austrians 6
of varying strength. Battalions are formed into regiments, more
for administrative and disciplinarian purposes and to insure
uniformity of drill, than for any tactical object; in formations for
war, therefore, the battalions of one regiment are often separated.
In Russia and Austria there are 4, in Prussia 3, in France 2 service
battalions, beside depots to every regiment; in England, most
regiments are formed, in peace, of but 1 battalion. Cavalry is
divided into squadrons and regiments. The squadron, from 100 to

200 men, forms the tactical and administrative unity; the English
alone subdivide the squadron, for administrative purposes, into 2
troops. There are from 3 to 10 service squadrons to a regiment;
the British have, in peace, but 3 squadrons, of about 120 horse;
the Prussians 4 of 150 horse; the French 5 of 180 to 200 horse;
the Austrians 6 or 8 of 200 horse; the Russians 6 to 10 of 150 to
170 horse. With cavalry the regiment is a body of tactical
significance, as a regiment offers the means to make an
independent charge, the squadrons mutually supporting each
other, and is for this purpose formed of sufficient strength, viz.,
between 500 and 1,600 horse. The British alone have such weak
regiments that they are obliged to put 4 or 5 of them to 1| brigade;
on the other hand, the Austrian and Russian regiments in many
cases are as strong as an average brigade. The French have
nominally very strong regiments, but have hitherto appeared in
the field in considerably reduced numbers, owing to their poverty
in horses. Artillery is formed in batteries; the formation in
regiments or brigades in this arm is only for peace purposes, as
almost in every case of actual service the batteries are sure to
become separated, and are always used so. Four guns is the least
number, and the Austrians have 8; the French and English 6 guns
per battery. Riflemen or other real light infantry are generally
organized in battalions and companies only, not in regiments; the
nature of the arm is repugnant to its reunion in large masses. The
same is the case with sappers and miners, they being, beside, but a
very small portion of the army. The French alone make an
exception in this latter case; but their 3 regiments, sappers and
miners, count only 6 battalions in all. With the regiment the
formation of most armies in time of peace is generally considered
complete. The larger bodies, brigades, divisions, army-corps, are
mostly formed when war breaks out. The Russians and Prussians
alone have their army fully organized and the higher commands
filled up, as if for actual war. But in Prussia this is completely
illusory, unless at least a whole army-corps be mobilized, which
supposes the calling in of the Landwehr‘ of a whole province;
and if in Russia the troops are actually with the regiments, yet the
late war* has shown that the original divisions and corps very soon
got mixed, so that the advantage gained from such a formation is
more for peace than for war.

In war, several battalions or squadrons are formed into a
brigade; from 4 to 8 battalions for infantry, or from 6 to 20

squadrons for cavalry. With large cavalry regiments these latter
may very well stand in lieu of brigade; but they are very generally
reduced to smaller strength by the detachments they have to send
to the divisions. Light and line infantry may with advantage be
mixed in a brigade, but not light and heavy cavalry. The Austrians
very generally add a battery to each brigade. A combination of
brigades forms the division. In most armies, it is composed of all
the 3 arms, say 2 brigades of infantry, 4 to 6 squadrons, and 1 to
3 batteries. The French and Russians have no cavalry to their
divisions, the English form them of infantry exclusively. Unless,
therefore, these nations wish to fight at a disadvantage, they are
obliged to attach cavalry (and artillery respectively) to the divisions
whenever the case occurs; which is easily overlooked or often
inconvenient or impossible. The proportion of divisionary cavalry,
however, is everywhere but small, and therefore the remainder of
this arm is formed into cavalry divisions of 2 brigades each, for
the purpose of reserve cavalry. Two or 3 divisions, sometimes 4,
are, for larger armies, formed into an army-corps. Such a corps
has everywhere its own cavalry and artillery, even where the
divisions have none; and, where these latter are mixed bodies,
there is still a reserve of cavalry and artillery placed at the disposal
of the commander of the corps. Napoleon was the first to form
these, and, not satisfied therewith, he organized the whole of the
remaining cavalry into reserve cavalry-corps of 2 or 5 divisions of
cavalry with horse-artillery attached. The Russians have retained
this formation of their reserve cavalry, and the other armies are
likely to take it up again in a war of importance, though the effect
obtained has never yet been in proportion to the immense mass of
horsemen thus concentrated on one point. Such is the modern
organization of the fighting part of an army. But, in spite of the
abolition of tents, magazines, field-bakeries, and bread-wagons,
there is still a large train of non-combatants and of vehicles
necessary to insure the efficiency of the army in a campaign. To
give an idea of this, we will only state the train required, according
to the existing regulations, for 1 army-corps of the Prussian
service: —

Artillery train: 6 park columns of 30 wagons, 1 laboratory do., 6 wagons.
Pontoon train: 34 pontoon wagons, 5 tool wagons, 1 forge.

Infantry train: 116 wagons, 108 team horses.

Medical train: 50 wagons (for 1,600 or 2,000 sick).

Reserve commissariat train: 159 wagons.

Reserve train: 1 wagon, 75 reserve horses.

In all, 402 wagons, 1,791 horses, 3,000 men.

To enable the commanders of armies, army-corps and divisions
to conduct, each in his sphere, the troops intrusted to him, a
separate corps is formed in every army except the British,
composed of officers exclusively, and called the staff. The
functions of these officers are to reconnoitre and sketch the
ground on which the army moves or may move; to assist in
making out plans for operations, and to arrange them in detail so
that no time is lost, no confusion arises, no useless fatigue is
incurred by the troops. They are, therefore, in highly important
positions, and ought to have a thoroughly finished military
education, with a full knowledge of the capabilities of each arm on
the march and in battle. They are accordingly taken in all
countries from the most able subjects, and carefully trained in the
highest military schools. The English alone imagine any subaltern
or field-officer selected from the army at large is fit for such a
position, and the consequence is that their staffs are inferior, and
the army incapable of any but the slowest and simplest ma-
noeuvres, while the commander, if at all conscientious, has to do all
the staff work himself. A division can seldom have more than one
staff-officer attached, an army-corps has a staff of its own under
the direction of a superior or a staff-officer, and an army has a
full staff, with several generals, under a chief who, in urgent cases,
gives his orders in the name of the commander. The chief of the
staff, in the British army, has an adjutant-general and a
quartermaster-general under his orders; in other armies the
adjutant-general is at the same time chief of the staff; in France
the chief of the staff unites both capacities in himself, and has a
different department for each under his orders. The adjutant-
general is the chief of the personnel of the army, receives the
reports of all subordinate departments and bodies of the army,
and arranges all matters relative to discipline, instruction, forma-
tion, equipment, armament, &c. All subordinates correspond
through him with the commander-in-chief. If chief of the staff at
the same time, he cooperates with the commander in the
formation and working out of plans of operation and movements
for the army. The proper arrangement of these in detail is the
department of the quartermaster-general; the details of marches,
cantonments, encampments, are prepared by him. A sufficient
number of staff-officers are attached to head-quarters for recon-
noitring the ground, preparing projects as to the defence or attack
of. positions, &c. There is, beside, a commander-in-chief of the
artillery, and a superior engineer-officer for their respective
departments; a few.deputies to represent the chief of the staff on

Pages of Marx’s notebook with entries on the dispatch of articles to The New American
Cyclopaedia

particular points of the battle-field, and a number of orderly
officers and orderlies to carry orders and despatches. To the
head-quarters are further attached the chief of the commissariat,
with his clerks, the paymaster of the army, the chief of the medical
department, and the judge-advocate, or director of the depart-
ment of military justice. The staffs of the army-corps and divisions
are regulated on the same model, but with greater simplicity
and a reduced personnel; the staffs of brigades and regiments are
still less numerous, and the staff of a battalion may consist merely
of the commander, his adjutant, an officer as paymaster, a
sergeant as clerk, and a drummer or bugleman.

To regulate and keep up the military force of a great nation,
numerous establishments, beside those hitherto named, are
required. There are recruiting and remounting commissioners, the
latter often connected with the administration of national estab-
lishments for the breeding of horses, military schools for officers
and non-commissioned officers, model battalions, squadrons, and
batteries, normal riding schools, and schools for veterinary
surgeons. There are in most countries national founderies and
manufactories for small arms and gunpowder; there are the
various barracks, arsenals, stores, the fortresses with their equip-
ments and the staff of officers commanding them; finally, there
are the commissariat and general staff of the army, which, for the
whole of the armed force, are even more numerous and have
more extensive duties to perform than the staff and commissariat
of a single active army. The staff especially has very important
duties. It is generally divided into a historical section (collecting
materials relative to the history of war, the formation of armies,
&c., past and present), a topographical section (intrusted with the
collection of maps and the trigonometrical survey of the whole
country), a statistical section, &c. At the head of all these
establishments, as well as of the army, stands the ministry of war,
organized differently in different countries, but comprising, as
must be evident from the preceding observations, a vast variety of
subjects. As an example we give the organization of the French
ministry of war. It comprises 7 directions or divisions: 1, of the
personnel; 2, of the artillery; 3, of the engineers and fortresses; 4,
of administrative affairs; 5, of Algeria; 6, war depot (historical,
topographical, &c., and sections of the staff); 7, finances of the
war department. Immediately attached to the ministry are the
following consultative commissions, composed of generals and
field-officers and professional men, viz.: the committees of the
staff of infantry, of cavalry, of artillery, of fortification, of medical

affairs, and the commissions for veterinary science and for public
works. Such is the vast machinery devoted to recruiting, remount-
ing, feeding, directing, and always reproducing a modern first
class army. The masses brought together correspond to such an
organization. Though Napoleon’s grand army of 1812, when he
had 200,000 men in Spain, 200,000 in France, Italy, Germany,
and Poland, and invaded Russia with 450,000 men and 1,300
guns, has never yet been equalled; though we shall most likely
never see such an army again united for one operation as these
450,000 men, yet the large continental states of Europe, Prussia
included, can each of them raise an armed and disciplined force
of 500,000 men, and more; and their armies, though not more
than from 1'/s to 3 per ct. of their population, have never yet
been reached at any former period of history.

The system of the United States bases the defence of the
country substantially on the militia of the different states, and on
volunteer armies raised as occasion demands; the standing military
force, employed mainly in preserving order among the Indian
tribes of the West, consisting, according to the report of the
secretary of war* for 1857, of only about 18,000 men.’