Karl Marx

Honeyed Assurances

Written about May 6, 1859.

From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune," No. 5639 of May 18, 1859, Leading Article]

The circular of 27 April, transmitted by Louis Napoleon through his diplomatic representatives to all the governments of Europe, and his message to the Corps Législatif of 3 May prove that the Emperor is fully aware of the distrust generally shown towards his motives and the real aims of his interference in Italian affairs, and is strenuously endeavouring to dispel it. In the circular he attempts to demonstrate that he has always carried out this intervention only in concert with England, Prussia and Russia, and asserts that these powers are just as dissatisfied with the state of affairs in Italy, just as convinced of the dangers arising from the prevailing discontent and secret agitation there, and just as resolved to forestall an inevitable crisis by prudent foresight, as he himself is. But when he cites in proof the mission of Lord Cowley to Vienna, the Russian proposal for a congress, and the support given to these steps by Prussia, he seems to forget that these actions did not have Italy as their principal object, but were prompted and determined by the threatening quarrel between Austria and France, in the face of which Italian discontent and agitation sank into insignificance.

Only when Napoleon suddenly displayed an unusual interest in Italian affairs did the Italian question acquire urgent importance in the eyes of the other powers of Europe. Although Austria was the first to commence hostilities, the fact remains that there would have been no reason for opening hostilities if Sardinia had not been encouraged by Napoleon – in which neither Prussia nor England took part – and had consequently taken corresponding steps. It is therefore by no means the case that France merely offered the other powers her co-operation in the peaceful settlement of the disputed questions between Austria and Sardinia; on the contrary, it is an incontrovertible fact that the other powers only felt induced to show a greater interest when France became extensively involved in this quarrel, and when it thus ceased to be an Italian question and became a European one. The very fact that only France felt called upon to protect Sardinia against the Austrian attack contradicts the assertion that she is acting in concert with the other powers regarding Italian affairs.

In this circular as well as in his message to the Corps Législatif, the French Emperor zealously disclaims all personal ambition, all lust of conquest, any desire to consolidate French influence in Italy. He would have it believed that he is exclusively striving for the achievement of Italian independence and the restoration of that balance of power which was disturbed by Austria’s preponderance. Those who remember the assurances given by the Emperor and the oaths he swore as President of the French Republic will hardly be inclined to place unconditional trust in his bare declarations; and even these very efforts of his to allay apprehension and dispel Europe’s suspicion contain hints highly calculated to produce the opposite effect.

That Louis Napoleon at this moment sincerely wishes to prevent any interference by England or Germany in his war with Austria cannot be doubted by anyone; yet that by no means proves that he intends nothing more than a settlement of Italian affairs. Supposing he aspires to supremacy in Europe, he would naturally prefer to fight the various powers one by one. He expresses surprise at the excitement in some German states, although this excitement is produced by the self-same causes with which he seeks to explain his own haste to rush to Sardinia’s aid.

If France possesses a common frontier with Sardinia, is connected with her by old memories, by a common origin, and by the recently concluded alliance, the kinship of Germany and Austria is the same, indeed even closer; and if Napoleon is unwilling to wait until he himself is confronted with an accomplished fact, namely the triumph of Austria over Sardinia, the Germans likewise are not inclined to wait for the accomplished fact of a triumph of France over Austria. That Louis Napoleon seeks the humiliation of Austria, particularly by driving her out of Italy, he does not deny. He does, however, deny that he wants to conquer Italian territory or to acquire influence over it, declaring that the purpose of the war is to give Italy back to herself and not to impose upon her a mere change of masters. But suppose, as is very likely, the Italian governments, whose independence vis-à-vis Austria is to be defended, were to be hard pressed by those whom Louis Napoleon calls “the friends of disorder” and “the incorrigible adherents of old parties.” What then?

“France,” says Louis Napoleon, “has shown its hatred of anarchy.”

He assures us that he owes his present power to this very hatred of anarchy. In this hatred of anarchy he perceived his warrant for dissolving the Republican Chamber, for breaking his own oaths, for overthrowing the republican government by military force, for utterly destroying the freedom of the press, and for driving all opponents of his sole arbitrary rule into exile or shipping them off to Cayenne. Could not the suppression of anarchy serve his interests in Italy equally well? If “the suppression of the friends of disorder and the incorrigible adherents of old parties” justified the destruction of French liberty, could it not just as well serve as a pretext for overthrowing Italian independence?