Friedrich Engels

Historical Justice

Written around July 6, 1859.

From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 5692 of July 21, 1859, leading article]

After we have published every official report of the battle of Solferino received by us, including many letters from both headquarters, as well as the excellent special correspondence of the London *Times*, and our readers have become acquainted with these documents, it is perhaps time to set out the real causes why the battle was lost by Franz Joseph and won by Napoleon III.

When the Austrian Emperor again crossed the Mincio to attack, he had nine army corps at his disposal, which, after deducting the fortress garrisons, appeared on the battlefield with an average strength of four infantry brigades each, or thirty-six brigades in all—each brigade averaging 5,000 to 6,000 men. His forces for the attack therefore numbered about 200,000 infantry. This strength, although fully sufficient to justify the troop movement, was nevertheless inferior to, or only approximately equal to, that of the enemy, for the latter counted ten Piedmontese and twenty-six French infantry brigades. Since Magenta the French had received large reinforcements of furloughed men and trained recruits, who had been incorporated into their regiments. Their brigades were certainly stronger than those of the Austrians, whose reinforcements consisted of two fresh army corps (the tenth and eleventh), by which the number, but not the strength, of the brigades had been increased. Estimating from the full complement (170,000 French, 75,000 Sardinians), deducting the losses of around 30,000 men since the beginning of the campaign, the infantry of the allied army can be put at about 215,000 men at this time.

In their attack the Austrians relied on the speed of the manoeuvre and the element of surprise, on the burning desire of their troops to avenge the defeat of Magenta and prove that they were not inferior to their opponents, and on the strength of the positions which, by a rapid advance, they could regain on the heights behind Castiglione. This was certainly justified, but only if they kept their troops as closely massed as possible and advanced swiftly and energetically. Neither of these conditions was fulfilled.

Instead of advancing with their whole force between Peschiera and Volta to secure the entire ridge as far as Lonato and Castiglione and leaving the protection of the plain of Guidizzolo to the cavalry and perhaps one infantry corps, they left one corps, the second, at Mantua to protect it against an eventual raid by Prince Napoleon’s corps, which was suspected to be in the vicinity. If, however, the garrison of Mantua was insufficient to hold the strongest fortress in Europe against an irregular attack without the help of an additional corps, it must have been a very odd sort of garrison. Yet that was apparently not the reason which fettered the second corps to Mantua. In fact, two other corps, the eleventh and tenth, were detached to turn the right flank of the allies at Asola, a town on the Chiese, about 6 miles south-west of Castelgoffredo, and so far from the battlefield that under any circumstances they were bound to arrive too late. The second corps, it seems, was destined to cover the flanks and rear of this turning column against the possible arrival of Prince Napoleon and thus prevent it from being itself turned. The whole plan is so thoroughly old Austrian school, so complicated, so ridiculous to anyone accustomed to drawing up battle plans, that the Austrian staff must certainly be absolved of all responsibility for this invention. No one but Franz Joseph and his adjutant Count Grünne could have dreamed up such an anachronism. Thus three corps were successfully kept away from the fight. The remaining six were employed as follows: the eighth (Benedek) between Pozzolengo and Lake Garda, to hold a hill position whose centre and key was San Martino; the fifth (Stadion) occupied Solferino; the seventh (Zobel) San Cassiano; the first (Clam-Gallas) Cavriana. To the south, in the plain, the third (Schwarzenberg) advanced along the main road from Goito to Castiglione by way of Guidizzolo, and the ninth (Schaffgotsch) further south towards Medole. This wing was thrown forward to drive back the allied right and to offer support to the tenth and eleventh corps whenever, and if ever, they should arrive.

In this way the six corps that were actually engaged and that essentially formed the Austrian combat army were strung out along a line 12 miles long, giving each corps an average front extension of 2 miles or 3,540 yards. With so long a line there could be no depth. Yet that was not the only serious error. The third and ninth corps advanced from Goito, where their line of retreat also lay; the adjacent corps, the first and the seventh, had their line of retreat at Valeggio. A glance at the map shows that this produces an eccentric retreat; to this circumstance is undoubtedly to be ascribed essentially the meagre effect achieved by the two corps on the plain.

This faulty disposition, made for the twenty-four, or, if we assume that Benedek had been reinforced by some troops from the garrison of Peschiera, twenty-five or twenty-six Austrian brigades, was made still faultier by the sluggishness of the advance. A forced march on the 23rd, when the Mincio was crossed again, would have brought the concentrated Austrian army by midday up to the forward positions of the allies at Desenzano, Lonato and Castiglione and enabled it to drive the allies back to the Chiese by nightfall and thus begin the battle immediately with an Austrian success; yet the most advanced point reached on the hills was Solferino, only 6 miles from the Mincio. In the plain the advancing troops got as far as Castelgoffredo, 10 miles from the Mincio; with appropriate orders, however, they could have reached the Chiese. Then, on the 24th, the advance was to begin not at daybreak but at 9 o’clock! Thus it happened that the allies, who set off at 2 o’clock in the morning, fell upon the Austrians between 5 and 6 o’clock. The consequences were inevitable. Thirty-three strong brigades against twenty-five or twenty-six weak ones (all of them had previously been in action and had suffered heavy losses) could only result in a defeat for the Austrians. Benedek alone, with his five or six brigades, held out all day against the Piedmontese army, whose ten brigades, with the exception of the guard, were all engaged; and he would have held his position had not the general retreat of the centre and the left wing forced him to fall back as well. In the centre, the fifth and first corps (8 brigades) held Solferino against Baraguay d’Hilliers’ corps (6 brigades) and the guard (4 brigades) until after 2 o’clock, while the seventh corps (4 brigades) kept Mac-Mahon’s four brigades in check. After Solferino was finally taken, the guard advanced against San Cassiano, thereby forcing the Austrian seventh corps to abandon its position. The fall of Cavriana, at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon, then decided the fate of the battle in the centre and compelled the Austrians to retreat. On the Austrian left, the third and ninth corps waged a planless fight against Niel’s corps and one division (Renault) of Canrobert’s, until in the afternoon another division (Trochu) of the latter corps entered the line of battle and drove the Austrians back towards Goito. Although these eight Austrian brigades faced from the outset a force almost equal in strength, they could have done far more than they really did. By a resolute advance from Guidizzolo towards Castiglione they could have relieved the seventh corps at San Cassiano and thus indirectly supported the defenders of Solferino; but as their line of retreat ran to Goito, every step forward exposed them, and so they acted with a caution that was completely out of place in such a battle; the blame, however, lies with those who ordered the retreat to Goito.

The allies had every man in action, except three brigades—two of Canrobert’s corps and one of the Piedmontese guard. If, however, the employment of all their reserves except these three brigades was necessary to win a hard-fought victory, after which there was no pursuit, how would the battle have developed if Franz Joseph had been in a position to employ his three army corps that were wandering about far away in the south? Suppose he had given one corps to Benedek, placed another behind Solferino and San Cassiano as a reserve, and kept one behind Cavriana as a general reserve, what would have been the result of the battle? That cannot be doubted for a moment. After repeated and vain efforts to take San Martino and Solferino, the Piedmontese and French centre would have been broken by a final, crushing advance of the whole Austrian line, and the Austrians, instead of retiring to the Mincio, would have ended the day on the banks of the Chiese. They were not beaten by the French, but by the presumptuous imbecility of their own Emperor. Overwhelmed by the enemy’s numerical superiority and the wretchedness of their own leadership, they nevertheless withdrew unbroken, abandoned nothing but the battlefield, and showed themselves less capable of panic than any other army had done before.