Friedrich Engels

The Battle of Magenta

["Das Volk" No. 7, 18 June 1859]

The official reports, French and Austrian, on the battle of Magenta confirm the conjectures we had ventured on the basis of the telegraphic dispatches.

On the morning of 4 June the Austrians had accomplished their retreat across the Ticino and were marching on Magenta and Abbiategrasso, in order to fall upon the flank of the French army, which was making for Milan. General Clam-Gallas, who had just arrived from Milan with one division of his corps (the first), was to attack the enemy frontally at the same time, with his division and the second corps (Liechtenstein), which joined him at Magenta. As his reserve he had the Reischach division of the seventh corps (Zobel) at Corbetta, a few miles behind Magenta. After the line of the Ticino had been abandoned as untenable, these seven or eight Austrian brigades were to hold the line of the
Naviglio Grande,
a broad canal that runs almost parallel with the Ticino and can be crossed only over bridges. To be defended were the two bridges of Boffalora and Magenta on two roads, both of which lead from Magenta to the bridge of San Martino over the Ticino. The division of the first corps (commanded by General Cordon) advanced on the road from Turbigo; two brigades of the second corps were at the bridges, one division before Magenta, Reischach’s division (seventh corps), as stated, at Corbetta.

The French advanced in two columns. The first, under the nominal command of the hero of Satory, consisted of the division of the Grenadiers of the Guard and the corps of Canrobert, Niel and Baraguay d'Hilliers, in all 9 divisions or 18 brigades (117 battalions). It advanced on the direct road from Novara to Milan over the bridge of San Martino and was to take the bridges of Boffalora and Magenta. The second column, under Mac-Mahon, consisted of the division of the Voltigeurs of the Guard, Mac-Mahon’s corps and the entire Piedmontese army, in all 8 divisions or 16 brigades (109 battalions, the Piedmontese divisions count one battalion more than the French). Its vanguard had crossed the Ticino and the Naviglio without serious resistance at Turbigo and was to support the frontal attack of the first column by a movement on the Austrian flank, namely by a direct march on Magenta from the north.

At noon Mac-Mahon opened the attack. With superior forces he drove the Cordon division before him towards Magenta, and at about 2 o’clock the Grenadiers of the Guard, who had chased the Austrian outposts back to the canal, attacked the bridges of Boffalora and Magenta. At this moment there were on the field of battle 8 French brigades facing 5 Austrian brigades (2 from the first and 3 from the second corps) or fewer than 30,000 men, for even Reischach’s two brigades still tarried at Corbetta. The French “secret general”, following Falstaff’s precept, transforms fewer than 30,000 Austrians into more than 125,000. The French succeeded in storming the bridges over the canal. Gyulay, who was at Magenta, ordered Reischach to advance and retake the bridge of Magenta. This was done. Boffalora, however, appears to have remained in the hands of the French. The battle came to a standstill. Mac-Mahon’s corps as well as the Grenadiers of the Guard were successfully beaten back, but the Austrians had also engaged every available man. Where were
the other corps
?

They were everywhere, only not where they ought to have been. The second division of the first corps was still on the march from Germany. Its arrival could therefore, understandably, not be expected. Of another brigade of the second corps all information was lacking. Gyulay’s own dispatches, however, prove that only 3 brigades of the second corps were engaged. The second division of the seventh corps, commanded by General Lilia, was at Castelletto, 6 or 7 miles from Magenta. The third corps was at Abbiategrasso, 5 miles from Magenta. The fifth corps was marching to Abbiategrasso, probably from Bereguardo. At the start of the battle it was at least 9 miles from Magenta, the eighth corps was on the march from Binasco to Bestazzo, 10 or 12 miles away, and the ninth corps, incredibile dictu <incredible to relate>, was loitering on the Po, behind Pavia, 20 or 25 miles from the theatre of war. Through this fabulous splitting up of his troops Gyulay put himself in the unpleasant position

of having to withstand, from noon until about 5 in the evening, the onslaught of both French columns with only seven brigades. This was only possible because the enormous French masses marched along only two roads and therefore wove their way forward only sluggishly.

While Reischach held the bridge of Magenta and captured one of the new French rifled cannon, Herr Gyulay rode to Robecco, a village on the canal, about 3 miles below Boffalora, to hasten the march of the third and fifth corps and to assign them their direction of attack. Four brigades of the third corps were now thrown forward, Hartung and Ramming in the first line, Dürfeld as reserve, all three along the canal, but Wetzlar along the Ticino. They were to fall upon the French right flank. In the meantime, however, the latter had also received reinforcements. Picard’s brigade (Renault’s division, Canrobert’s corps) came to the support of the Grenadiers and drove Reischach back across the bridge. Vinoy’s division (Niel’s corps), Jannin’s brigade (Renault’s division) and Trochu’s division (Canrobert’s corps) followed him. Thus the French concentrated on this point six brigades, along with two of their Grenadier brigades. On the other side, of the four brigades of the third Austrian corps only two or three were really engaged. Despite this disproportion, the Austrians gained possession of the bridge of Magenta again and again, which it remained to the enemy’s superior force only after the most desperate efforts.

While the struggle for the bridges went on, Mac-Mahon had prepared a second attack upon the Austrians in his front, roughly 4 or 5 brigades of the first and second corps. His 2 divisions pressed forward anew in two columns upon Magenta, behind them in second line Camou’s Gardes-Voltigeur division. As the divisions Espinasse and La Motterouge (Mac-Mahon’s corps) had been thrust back with success by the Austrians, the Voltigeurs advanced to support them. The fight now entered the turning point of the crisis. The first French column had passed the bridge of Magenta and surged towards the locality, already hard pressed by Mac-Mahon’s column. Finally, at sunset, the fifth Austrian corps appeared on the field of battle, the brigade Prince of Hesse <The brigade was at this time commanded by General Dormus>. It made a fresh attempt to drive the French back over the bridge. However, in vain. It was indeed an exaggerated expectation that a weak brigade, already decimated in the battle of Montebello, should stem and hurl back the

lava torrent of French troops that flooded the bridge of Magenta. Attacked in front, flank and rear, and without rest in the fire since the action began, the Austrians finally gave way, and after repeated violent struggling Magenta was occupied by the French towards evening.

Gyulay withdrew his troops across Corbetta, in the meantime occupied by Lilia’s division, and across Robecco, held by the third corps, while the fifth corps bivouacked between the two places. He intended to continue the fight on 5 June, but a quite singular confusion in the orders that were issued frustrates the plan: for in the middle of the night he suddenly learns that the first and second corps, as the result of
misunderstood
orders, had withdrawn several miles from the field of battle and were continuing their retreat even at 3 o’clock in the morning. This news determined Gyulay to abandon the battle intended for the following day. A brigade of the third corps stormed Magenta anew to cover the retreat of the Austrians, which took place in the greatest order.

According to the Austrian report, there were engaged on their side:

Brigades

from 1st Corps Cordon’s division

2

from 2nd Corps

3

from 7th Corps Reischach’s division

2

from 3rd Corps

3

from 5th Corps late in the evening

1

total

11

According to the French report, there were engaged on the side of the Allies:

Brigades

from the Guard Corps 2 divisions

4

from Mac-Mahon’s corps

4

from Canrobert’s corps 2 divisions (Renault and Trochu)

4

from Niel’s corps 1 division (Vinoy)

2

total

14

The 14 French brigades – 91 battalions – were at least 80,000 strong. But the French battle report says, with reference to the advance of Vinoy’s division:

“The 85th Regiment of the Line suffered the most ... General Martimprey received a wound at the head of his brigade.”

Now, neither the 85th Regiment nor Martimprey’s brigade belong to Vinoy’s division of Niel’s corps. The 85th Regiment belongs to the second brigade under General Ladreitt de la Charrière’s command, Ladmirault’s division, and General Martimprey commands the first brigade of the same division, belonging to the corps of Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers. Thus we find incontrovertible proof that
more French troops were engaged than are enumerated in the official report
. If Ladmirault’s division, which swells the number of brigades to 16, that of battalions to 104 and that of combatants to 90,000, is filched away in this manner, the suspicion arises that the French active on the field of battle were altogether far more numerous than those that figure in the battle bulletin. Moreover, one sees from the Austrians’ report that their prisoners belong to almost
all
the regiments of which the allied operational army in Italy is composed. The French thus found themselves in a numerical superiority that is the highest honour to the Austrian troops. Only field-depth was wrested from them; they captured one cannon and lost four; they quit the field of battle with the confidence that, with equal forces, victory would be assured to them. But what are we to say of their general, the Imperial-Royal Feldzeugmeister? On 4 June he
expects
the attack. He has 13 brigades (the 7 first engaged, 2 of Lilia, 4 of the third corps) 8 miles from the field of battle; 4 other brigades of the fifth corps 9 miles away; finally 4 brigades of the eighth corps at a distance of 10 or 12 miles. Thus his troops stood at 8 o’clock 30 minutes in the morning. Is it asking too much that, on a day of battle, all these corps should have approached close enough to Magenta by 4 or at latest 5 in the afternoon to take part in the battle? Ought not at least 13, instead of 7 brigades, to have been engaged at 2 in the afternoon, when the battle began in earnest? In that case the heavy losses of Cordon’s division and of the second corps would have been avoided. With the arrival of the fifth corps the Austrians could have taken the offensive and thrown the French back across the Ticino. But the old notorious incapacity for movement seems to gain the upper hand once again among the Austrians. They lose the most precious moments in useless pomp and empty formalities, said the real Napoleon. Gyulay has revived the tradition and thus, forfeiting his own victory, has procured for the “secret general” a victory that would have been an easy and decisive one had it not been paralysed by the stubborn bravery of the Austrian soldiers

and the talentless nullity of the chief of the Society of 10 December.

On the morning of 5 June, Gyulay had under his command the following troops that had not yet been engaged at Magenta:

Brigades

one division of the 3rd Corps

2

of the 5th Corps

3

one division (Lilia) of the 7th Corps

2

of the 8th Corps

4

total

11

This was a force equal to that which he had had at his disposal the day before. Of the troops engaged on the previous day, only 3 divisions (1st and 2nd Corps) were initially unfit for combat. Thus 8 brigades remained available, making a total of 19 brigades, over 100,000 men. Opposite him stood the 16 brigades already engaged on the 4th; 4 fresh French divisions, which must have been ready for action on the 5th, and one or two divisions of the Piedmontese, the latter still far in the rear. Thus on the 5th Gyulay could have had 19 brigades at his disposal, which, supported moreover by the 9th Corps, which he incomprehensibly kept far away, were bound to reverse the fortunes of the previous day. Gyulay’s blunders can be briefly summed up as follows:

First: When Louis-Napoleon was making the flank march in the Austrian operational zone from Vercelli to Turbigo, Gyulay failed to exploit his enemy’s unfavourable position and did not fall with all his forces upon their exposed line of march, which he could have cut in two and partly driven to the Alps – repeating Radetzky’s manoeuvre of 1849.

Second: Instead of this, he retreated behind the Ticino and thus moved in a roundabout way to cover Milan, while the direct road was left to the enemy.

Third: He disperses his troops during the retreat and carries out the latter with a comfortable indolence that would be barely excusable on the parade ground.

Fourth: He leaves his 9th Corps entirely outside the area of concentration.

Fifth: During the battle itself, concentration was carried out so slovenly that the troops suffered needlessly and victory was presented to the enemy.

If Gyulay, despite these accumulated and gross blunders, nevertheless suffered no complete defeat, although he faced the élite of the French army, this is owed exclusively to the bravery of his troops and the cunning of his opponent, the “Secret General”. Gyulay’s troops represented the invincible vital energy of the peoples, he himself the senile idiocy of the monarchy. The Secret General on the other side notices that with the Austrians’ retreat to the Mincio the melodramatic part of the struggle ends and the real war begins. He has convinced himself of the soundness of the aphorism which the real Napoleon impressed on his brother Joseph’s conscience, namely, that in war one does not avoid personal danger by playing hide-and-seek. Finally, Canrobert, offended by Mac-Mahon’s favouritism, has threatened certain revelations about the hero of Satory’s heroic deeds in this campaign. The hero therefore longs to return to his dear wife in the Faubourg Poissonnière and for peace at any price <Frieden um jeden Preis>. If that is unattainable, at least peace negotiations, to give a gloss to “his bodily retreat to Paris”.