Friedrich Engels

The War Events

["Das Volk" No. 6, June 11, 1859]

The fragmentary and contradictory character of the telegrams received from the theatre of war allows only a few marginal glosses on the retreat of the Austrians across the Ticino and their defeat at Magenta. Deterred, as it seems, by General Niel’s occupation of Novara, the Austrians withdrew across the Ticino during 3 and 4 June. On 4 June at 4 a.m., the French and Piedmontese, who had crossed the Ticino at Turbigo and Boffalora on the right wing of the Austrians, fell with superior masses upon the enemy immediately opposite them and, after extremely bloody and stubborn resistance, drove him from his position. The details of the action published by the telegraphist of the allied army, Louis Bonaparte, bear witness to the imagination of this “secret general”, who still cannot overcome his aversion to “armes de précision” [“precision weapons” (rifled guns)] and therefore follows the army with train and baggage at a fearful distance behind the battlefield, yet “in full bodily health”.

The importunity with which this health bulletin is flung at the world has its good reasons. For, at the time of the deliberations of the French Chamber of Peers on Louis Bonaparte’s Boulogne expedition, evidence given under oath established that the hero, at the moment of danger, had given vent to his oppressed heart in a manner that was anything but a symptom of “full bodily health”.

The Austrians had concentrated on the Agogna in the position of a tiger about to spring. Their defeat was Gyulay’s fault, through his abandoning this position. After they had occupied the Lomellina and taken up a position some thirty miles from Milan, it was self-evident that all possible approaches to this capital could not be covered. Three roads were open to the Allies: one through the Austrian centre via Valenza, Garlasco and Bereguardo; one on the Austrian left via Voghera, Stradella and the Po between Pavia and Piacenza; and finally the road to the Austrian right via Vercelli, Novara and Boffalora. If the Austrians wished to defend Milan directly, they could block only one of these roads with their army. The posting of a corps on each of them would have split their forces and ensured their defeat. But it is a rule of modern warfare that a road is defended just as well, if not better, by a flank position than by a frontal position. An army of 130,000 to 200,000 men, concentrated on a small area of terrain, ready to act in every direction, can only be neglected by the enemy with impunity if the latter has a numerically immensely superior force. When Napoleon marched on the Elbe in 1813, the Allies, though numerically much weaker, had reasons to provoke a battle. They accordingly took up position at Lützen, a few miles south of the road leading from Erfurt to Leipzig. Part of Napoleon’s army had already marched past when the Allies revealed their proximity to the French. As a result, the entire French army was halted, its advanced columns were recalled, and a battle was fought which, despite a numerical superiority of about 60,000 men, scarcely left the French in possession of the field. The next day, both armies marched on parallel lines towards the Elbe, without the retreat of the Allies being interfered with. With less disproportionate forces, the Allies’ flank position would have halted Napoleon’s march at least as successfully as a direct frontal position on the Leipzig road.

Gyulay’s position was similar. With a force of about 150,000 men, he stood between Mortara and Pavia, thus blocking the direct road from Valenza to Milan. He could be outflanked on both wings, but his position provided him with counter-measures against such a turning movement. The mass of the allied army was concentrated near Vercelli on 30, 31 May and 1 June. It consisted of 4 Piedmontese divisions (36 battalions), Niel’s corps (26 battalions), Canrobert’s corps (39 battalions), the Guard (26 battalions) and Mac-Mahon’s corps (26 battalions), together 173 battalions of infantry, besides cavalry and artillery. Gyulay, for his part, had 6 army corps, weakened by

detachments against Garibaldi, towards Voghera, for the occupation of various places, etc., but still mustering 150 battalions. His army was so placed that it could be outflanked on the right only by a flank march within its operational zone. Now, it is known that an army always needs time to pass from column of march into line of battle, even in a frontal attack, although in that case the marching order is as far as possible adapted for the coming battle. The disruption is far more dangerous when columns in column of march are attacked in the flank. It is therefore a standing rule to avoid a flank march within the effective range of the enemy. The allied army violated this rule. It marched on Novara and the Ticino, apparently without regard to the Austrians on its flank. This was the moment for Gyulay to act. He had to concentrate his troops on Vigevano and Mortara during the night of 3 June, after leaving a corps on the lower Agogna to observe Valenza, and to fall on the advancing Allies in flank with every available man on 4 June. The result of such an attack, undertaken with about 120 battalions against the long-drawn-out and frequently interrupted marching column of the Allies, could hardly be doubted. If part of the Allies had already crossed the Ticino, so much the better for Gyulay; his attack would have called them back but would scarcely have given them time to intervene decisively. Even in the worst case of an unsuccessful attack, the Austrians’ retreat to Pavia and Piacenza was as secure as, for example, after the battle of Magenta. Gyulay’s whole disposition shows that this was, in fact, the original plan of the Austrians. His council of war, after mature reflection, had decided that the direct road to Milan should remain open to the French and that Milan should be covered only by a march on the enemy’s flank. But when the decisive moment came and Gyulay saw the French masses rolling towards Milan on his right, the full-blooded Magyar lost his head, wavered, and finally retreated behind the Ticino. And thus he prepared his own defeat. While the French marched in a straight line on Magenta (between Novara and Milan), he made a great detour, first marching down along the Ticino and crossing it at Bereguardo and Pavia, and then marching back up along the river towards Boffalora and Magenta, in order to block the direct road to Milan. The result was that his troops arrived in weak detachments and could not be massed sufficiently to break the core of the allied army.

Assuming that the allied army remained in possession of the battlefield, i.e., of the direct road to Milan, the Austrians must withdraw behind the Po, behind the Adda, or into their great fortresses in order to reorganise. Though the battle of Magenta then decided the fate of Milan, it would by no means decide the campaign. The Austrians have three whole army corps which at this moment are being concentrated on the Adige and which should ultimately secure them the balance of power, unless the gross blunders of the “secret general” are again, as on this occasion, corrected by Gyulay’s irresolution.