Friedrich Engels

The War Prospects

Written about April 28, 1859.
From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 5634 of May 12, 1859, Leading Article]

We have not thought it necessary to go into various superficial criticisms that have always cropped up over the last two months whenever we undertook to discuss the resources and the strategic conditions for the outbreak of the great and bloody war in which Europe is now involved. We find, however, in the many details that fill the pages of our newspaper today and that convey a vivid picture of the opening scenes of this terrible and gripping drama, so complete and so detailed a confirmation of our views, which will certainly interest the public, that we may rightly draw attention to it.

Two full months ago we described the offensive as the correct method for Austria to defend herself. We asserted that the Austrians, having concentrated their Italian army fully ready for action near the defensive position of the Piedmontese, would make a great mistake if they did not exploit this momentary superiority over their still geographically separated opponents by immediately invading Sardinian territory, first to defeat the Sardinian army and then to march against the French, who have to cross the Alps in several columns and thus run the risk of being defeated in detail. This conclusion of ours elicited a good many contrary expressions of opinion from some more or less prominent and more or less strategically versed critics; on the other hand, we found our assessment confirmed by every military specialist who has written on this question; and finally it turns out that the Austrian generals judge exactly the same. So much for that point.

Now that war has already begun, how are the respective forces of the parties and their prospects of success to be assessed? The Austrians have five army corps in Italy – the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 8th – consisting of at least 26 infantry regiments, each of five battalions (one of which is a grenadier battalion), and 26 light battalions – in all, therefore, 156 battalions or 192,000 men. Their total strength, including cavalry, artillery, engineers, and garrison troops, is at the very lowest estimate 216,000 men. We do not know to what extent this figure has been exceeded by the dispatch of new frontier regiments and reservists to Italy. That it has been exceeded can hardly be doubted – but we will take the lowest estimate of 216,000 men as the basis. Of these, 56,000 men are amply sufficient to hold all the fortresses, forts, and entrenched camps that the Austrians wish to hold in Lombardy; but we take the largest possible number and say 66,000 men. Thus there remain 150,000 men for the invasion of Piedmont. The telegrams give the strength of the Austrian army of invasion as 120,000, but these reports naturally cannot be relied upon with certainty. To be on the safe side, however, we will assume that the Austrians have no more than 120,000 men available for the field army. How will the deployment of the French and Piedmontese forces be effected in order to confront this compact army?

The Piedmontese army is concentrated between Alessandria and Casale in a position which we described a few weeks ago. It consists of five infantry divisions and one cavalry division, or 45,000 line infantry including reserves, 6,000 riflemen, and about 9,000 cavalry and artillery – in all 60,000 men, the utmost Piedmont can throw onto the battlefield. The remaining 15,000 men are required for the garrisons. The Italian volunteers are not yet capable of facing an enemy in the open field. As we have already pointed out, for strategic reasons the Piedmontese position cannot well be turned in the south, but in the north a turning movement is possible; here, however, it is covered by the Sesia, which flows into the Po about four miles east of Casale, and which the Sardinians, if the telegraphic dispatches are to be believed, intend to hold.

It would be utterly ridiculous to accept a decisive battle in this position with 60,000 men when the enemy is attacking in double strength. In all probability, only such resistance will be offered on this river as will compel the Austrians to display their full strength, and then the Sardinians will withdraw behind Casale and the Po, leaving the direct road to Turin open. This may have happened on 29 or 30 April, unless English diplomacy has caused a further delay in military operations. On the following day the Austrians would attempt to cross the Po, and if they succeeded, to drive the Sardinians across the plain to Alessandria. There the Austrians could leave them for the time being; if necessary, the Austrian column would be able to debouch south of the Po from Piacenza, destroy the railway line between Genoa and Alessandria, and attack any French corps marching from the former to the latter place.

But what, in our opinion, will the French do in the meantime? Well, they are moving with all haste towards the future theatre of war, the valley of the upper Po. When the news of the Austrian ultimatum reached Paris, the forces destined for the Army of the Alps comprised scarcely more than four infantry divisions at Lyons and three others that were either in the south of France and Corsica or in the process of concentration. Another division was on its way from Africa. These eight divisions were to form four corps. As a first reserve, the division of the line troops of Paris was available, and as a second reserve, the Guard. That would make a total of twelve line and two Guard divisions, equivalent to seven army corps. The twelve line divisions, before the arrival of their men on leave, would each number about 10,000 men, making 120,000 in all, or with cavalry and artillery 135,000, and the Guard 30,000, giving a total of 165,000 men. With the men recalled from leave, this army would be 200,000 strong altogether. So far so good. It is an excellent army, strong enough to conquer a country twice the size of Italy. But where could it be on or about 1 May, at the time when it was needed on the plains of Piedmont? Well, MacMahon’s corps was sent to Genoa about 23 or 24 April; as it had not been concentrated beforehand, it will not be able to leave Genoa before 30 April. Baraguay d’Hilliers’ corps is in Provence and – according to some accounts – was to advance via Nice and the Col di Tenda; according to other accounts, it was to embark and land on the Mediterranean coast. Canrobert’s corps was to go into Piedmont via Mont Cenis and Mont Genèvre, and all other troops were to follow on the same routes as they arrived.

Now, it is certain that no French troops entered Sardinian territory before 26 April, that three divisions of the Army of Paris were still in Paris on the 24th, only one of which set out by rail for Lyons that day, and that the Guard was not ready to march before the 27th. Thus, provided that all the other troops listed above are concentrated on the frontier and ready to march, eight infantry divisions, or 80,000 men, are available. Of these, 20,000 are going to Genoa; 20,000 under Baraguay, if to Piedmont at all, are going via the Col di Tenda; the remaining 40,000 under Canrobert and Niel are going via Mont Cenis and Mont Genèvre. This will be all that Louis Napoleon can bring into action by the time his assistance is most urgently needed – i.e., the time when the Austrians may be before Turin. All this, incidentally, is in complete accordance with the indications we gave on this question weeks ago. Even with the help of all the railways in the world, Louis Napoleon is not in a position to bring up his remaining four divisions of the Army of Paris in time to take part in the first engagements, unless he allows the Austrians to deal with the Piedmontese at their pleasure for a full two weeks. Even if he were to bring eight divisions across the two mountain passes, and the enemy were only equally strong at their point of junction, he has very little prospect of success. But a man in his position cannot, for political reasons, permit Piedmont to be overrun by the enemy for a fortnight, and therefore he will have to accept battle as soon as the Austrians offer it; and in this battle he will have to fight under unfavourable circumstances. The quicker the French cross the Alps, the better for the Austrians.